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NUCLEAR SECURITY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: FRANK WISNER 14 MAY 1993

FROM: ASHTON B. CARTER

SUBJECT: SECDEF Weekly Report - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR/THREAT REDUCTION

SecDef Aspin Meetings with Grachev and Morozov: Nuclear Issues

We are working on a set of initiatives/actions for you to advance our nuclear security agenda with Grachev at your two June meetings.

- First, we are preparing an initiative on submarine operations about which you could inform Grachev at your early June meeting in Garmisch.

- Second, we hope to have available various strategic stability initiatives, including on detargeting, that you could announce to Grachev at your late June meeting in Washington, pursuant to the President’s 23 April security initiatives package.

- Next, we are considering whether to propose to Russia that you and Grachev sign the three Nunn-Lugar agreements that were announced at Vancouver; that might not fly, since other Russian ministries are the implementers of the agreements. But Aspin-Grachev signatures would give the agreements the visibility warranted by their importance.

- Finally, our current thinking is to recommend that you use the meeting to advance specific proposals designed to spur elimination of nuclear weapons from Ukraine; however, you should probe for details on the status of nuclear forces in Ukraine, the Russia-Ukraine discussions on the subject, and Grachev’s ideas for resolving the issue.

We will provide you with talking points and deliverables (if possible) in the following additional areas:

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- START II Ratification;
- GPS;
- Nuclear Testing;
- Conventional Arms Sales;
- Cold War Legislation;
- Export Controls;
- Nuclear Reactor Sales;
- MTCA & Space Cooperation;
- HEU Agreement;
- Chemical Warfare Destruction;
- Biological Warfare Destruction;
- CFE Flank Problem;
- Underground Facilities;
- SIGINT at Lourdes.

Talbott Trip to FSU

Strobe Talbott is finishing up his week-long trip to Kiev, Ekaterinburg, Moscow, Baku, Yerevan and Tallinn. We have received cables reporting on his security-related meetings in Moscow which were designed primarily to kick off the Talbott-Mamedov strategic stability group whose creation was agreed at Vancouver.

The meetings in Kiev appear to have gone quite well. At the last minute, President Kravchuk did agree to meet Strobe, and the Ukrainians appear to have gotten the message that the Clinton Administration has a definite new policy toward Ukraine though they are understandably fuzzy about its contents. It is probably a good sign that a day or two after Strobe's visit, the Ukrainian MFA approached us about scheduling a visit by our Nunn-Lugar delegation — a visit that Ukraine has heretofore repeatedly put off.

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START II Ratification

Your testimony will cover broader aspects of our nuclear and Russian policy, but we will be sure (as you asked in your conversation with me Wednesday in your office) that it explains clearly why START II is in the US security interest. And we will "run the numbers by you" shortly before delivery of the testimony to refresh your memory of details.

I believe Walt has shared the following information on the relationship between our timing and the Russians' timing on ratification with you orally, but I repeat it here just in case:

In PDD-3 (on START II and denuclearization) the President decided that the US would not seek a Senate vote on START II ratification until after the Russian Supreme Soviet did so. We were concerned that overwhelming Senate approval of START II -- which is virtually assured -- would fuel Russian right wing charges that the Treaty inequitably favors the U.S.

Since PDD-3 was issued, Russian opposition to START II has increased, primarily because of opposition to Ukraine and -- above all -- to Boris Yeltsin. The Russian Government has told us that the current legislature should not vote on the Treaty, and would turn it down if it did so. Instead, Russia plans to delay a ratification vote until the election of a new legislature, which could come as early as this fall.

On May 7, the Arms Control Interagency Working Group (IWG) considered our START II ratification strategy in light of these developments. The IWG agreed that currently scheduled hearings should be held as planned, because canceling them would invite unwelcome headlines, but also that the Administration would not press the Senate to complete quickly the committee hearing and report process. Bob Bell, NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, has discussed the IWG-recommended approach with SFRC, SASC and SSCI senior staff; none have any difficulty with it.

Secretary Christopher testified on START II before the SFRC on 11 May, and the SSCI held a Deputy Assistant Secretary-level hearing on 12 May. Neither hearing evidenced any substantive opposition to the Treaty, although the Republican Senators at the closed SSCI hearing questioned why they should bother holding hearings now when the future of even the START I Treaty is in doubt. Another SFRC hearing is scheduled for 18 May, at the Assistant Secretary-Deputy Assistant Secretary level. The SASC has not yet scheduled any hearings.

Nunn/Lugar Breakfast Next Week

You will have a breakfast meeting with Senators Nunn and Lugar on Wednesday, 19 May to elicit their support for your FY94 Cooperative Threat Reduction budget request. I will brief the organizational, procedural and substantive changes that we have made to the program to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness in meeting its core objectives. I will also have various "show and tell" items to impress upon the Senators that Nunn-Lugar assistance is now a reality. With this briefing as prelude, you and the Senators can discuss future, new directions for the program. I will provide your office a read-ahead on Tuesday.

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Representatives McCurdy and Kasich have already agreed to be in the forefront of House support for our Cooperative Threat Reduction request, so there will be no need for you to meet with them. My staff will brief McCurdy's staff next week on the details of the request.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION

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