SECRET

following moscow 20178 dated 07/03/93 sent action secstate. being repeated for your info.
quote.

SECRET MOSCOW 020178

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUG, MTCRE, US, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN: TOKYO, UKRAINE NUCLEAR DEAL, MTYCR

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR TALBOTT DELIVERED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CTB FOR WHICH YELTSIN EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE. YELTSIN DESCRIBED PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISMANTLEMENT AND THEN OUTLINED AN "AGREEMENT" WITH UKRAINE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO START I AND NPT RATIFICATION INVOLVING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY "GUARANTEES:" USE OF TWO RUSSIA-CONTROLLED STORAGE SITES IN UKRAINE TO FACILITATE EARLY DISMANTLEMENT; RETURN OF ALL WARHEADS TO RUSSIA IN EXCHANGE FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FUEL FOR UKRAINE POWERReactORS; AND RUSSIAN HELP IN PERMANENTLY DISABLING MISSILE SILOS IN UKRAINE. ON MTYCR, YELTSIN ACCEPTED U.S. ASSURANCES ON NOT INTERRUPTING RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAM NOW PARTIALLY

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Perez, Senior Reviewer

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-00561 Doc No. C05719676 Date: 08/21/2015
DISPERSED TO SEVERAL NEW CIS STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, BUT WAS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO U.S. LANGUAGE. ON INDIA, HE MADE THE CASE THAT CONTRACTS PRE-EXISTED U.S. LAW AND HE PROPOSED A TRANSITION PERIOD UNTIL JANUARY 1994 BEFORE MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT TO CUT OFF TRANSFER OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY COME INTO EFFECT. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT YELTSIN ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHOKHIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV MET AMBASSADOR TALBOTT ACCOMPANIED BY PICKERING, UNDERSECRETARY DAVIS AND VICE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FUERTH AT THE KREMLIN AT NOON JULY 3 FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES.

4. TALBOTT BEGAN BY CARRYING GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON AND OUTLINED U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR TOKYO STRESSING THE PRESIDENT WAS DOING ALL HE COULD TO PREPARE FOR A SUCCESSFUL MEETING.

5. TURNING TO THE CTB, TALBOTT EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON TEST BAN MORATORIUM AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER NOTING THE DECISIVE NATURE OF THE STEP IN FOLLOWING UP VANCOUVER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE.

6. YELTSIN TERMED THE MESSAGE VERY ENCOURAGING AND REPEATED THAT RUSSIA WOULD CONTINUE ITS MORATORIUM: "UNTIL SOMEONE ELSE WHO ALSO HAD ACCEPTED A MORATORIUM HAD TESTED, AFTER WHICH RUSSIA WOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT TO DO." TURNING TO DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE SAID IN MAY 4,900 WEAPONS HAD BEEN DISMANTLED, INCLUDING 1,000 STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THAT THEY LOOKED TOWARD USING THE PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM FOR FUEL. A SIMILAR NUMBER APPLIED TO DISMANTLEMENT FOR JUNE. RUSSIA WAS AHEAD OF START I REQUIREMENTS AND MOVING ON TO START II EVEN BEFORE RATIFICATION.

7. TURNING TO UKRAINE, WHICH HE CALLED THE MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE HE FACED, YELTSIN SAID HE HAD BEEN DEVOTING ALL HIS ENERGY, WORKING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND HIS COLLEAGUES, TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WHEN HE MET KRAVCHUK LAST TIME. UKRAINE HAD MADE A FOUR POINT PROPOSAL TO ASSURE RATIFICATION OF START I AND THE NPT. FIRST, RUSSIA WILL GIVE "GUARANTEES" ON NUCLEAR SECURITY. SECOND, TWO RUSSIAN CONTROLLED NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES IN UKRAINE WILL BE USED TO HOUSE DISMANTLED MISSILE WARHEADS. THIRD, UKRAINE WILL RECEIVE LOW ENRICHED URANIUM NUCLEAR FUEL IN RETURN FOR WARHEADS TURNED OVER TO RUSSIA. FOURTH,
RUSSIA WOULD HELP DISABLE MISSILE SILOS IN UKRAINE WHICH UKRAINIANS WERE HESITANT TO DESTROY WITH EXPLOSIVES BY FILLING THEM WITH CONCRETE. HE STRESSED THAT UKRAINE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH START II; THESE ARRANGEMENTS COVERED ONLY START I. HE ADDED THAT 68 TONS OF NUCLEAR FUEL WOULD BE SUPPLIED IN RETURN FOR THE MIRY WARHEADS. THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL AND RUSSIA PREFERRED THAT THE U.S. SHARE HALF OF THE COST OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL. KUCHMA AND KRAVCHUK BOTH SAID THAT WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS START I AND THE NPT CAN BE RATIFIED.


9. ON THE CIS STATES, THE U.S. SIMPLY WANTS A COMMITMENT THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT DO WHAT IT HAS ALREADY TOLD US IT IS IN ITS INTEREST NOT TO DO -- NOT ASSIST ITS NEIGHBORS TO ATTAIN A BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY. THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE USE OF A CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO DEAL WITH DISCREPANCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE, NOT INTRUSIVE INSPECTION.

10. ON INDIA, WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP WITH INDIA. HE THEN URGED MOVING ON TO INITIALLING THE AGREEMENTS TODAY AND TO GET THE SPACE LAUNCH AND SPACE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE IN TOKYO.

11. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANY SURPRISES. THE INDIA DEAL INVOLVED OLD CONTRACTS, MADE AT A TIME WHEN THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF U.S. LAW. THERE WERE RULES ON RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. RUSSIA WOULD NOT SUCCEED TO U.S. PRESSURES, AND AS A GREAT POWER, IS NOT IN A POSITION VIZ INDIA TO CHANGE THE DEAL. SOME 80-90 PERCENT OF THE TECHNOLOGY HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED TO INDIA. YELTSIN PROPOSED THAT THE CONTROLS BEGIN 1 JANUARY 1994; A "SMALL" TRANSITION PERIOD.

12. ON THE CIS, THE U.S. APPROACH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO RUSSIA. RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO SEE INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES DEVELOP IN THE CIS AND RUSSIA COULD SUPPORT
U.S. LAW HERE (KOZYREV REMINDED HIM IT WAS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND YELTSIN AGREED). SO LONG AS IT WAS NOT IMPOSING A VERIFICATION REGIME, RUSSIA COULD AGREE. SHOKHIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE PROPOSED MEMORANDUM DID NOT CONFORM TO TALBOTT'S ASSURANCES.


+++++NODIS++
SPECIAL HANDLING $$$ REQUIRED $$$
$$$ COPY NUMBER

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#8814

SOM 22:23:45
EOM 22:23:53

Fri Jul 16 11:19:58 1993 [JUL 160137Z] SNIS COPY 10 OF 10 Page 02 OF 03

SECRET

PAGE 01

160210Z

OINFO: NODIS(00) S(01) D(01) P(01) E(01) T(01) SS(01)
PA(01) REAP(01) SENS(01) SNIS(01)

------------------------

ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOS-00

/00OW

-------------
D7886F 160215Z /64

O 160137Z JUL 93 ZPF-1/4
PM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
TO AMBASSADOR MOSCON
INFO SECSTATE WASH DC

SECRET

NODIS

SECTION 2 OF 4

WHOM ONLY 6 REMAIN NOW. YOUR LIST IS NEW. I WILL STUDY IT AND GIVE YOU MY OPINION. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: AS WE MOVE TO GRADUATE YOU OUT OF JACKSON-VANIK, FROM TIME TO TIME THERE WILL BE OTHER CASES. YOU AND I DON'T NEED TO DISCUSS THIS EVERY TIME. I SUGGEST THERE BE A PROCESS SO WE DON'T HAVE TO DISCUSS IT EVERY TIME. WE CAN REFER THE CASES TO THIS PROCESS. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I SET UP A COMMISSION ON THIS -- THE LAVROV COMMISSION. HE IS A DEPUTY TO KOZYREV. THUS, IF ANY QUESTIONS ARISE, LAVROV WILL DISCUSS THEM. (S)

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1261 S E C R E T

THE PRESIDENT: WE WANT TO CLOSE THE DEAL ON HEU. WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON THE VALUE -- $12 BILLION. BUT WE NEED YOU TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH UKRAINE AND AZECHAN ON THE FUNDS. WE WANT TO CLOSE THIS DEAL. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: AS FOR BELARUS, THIS IS RUSSIAN PROPERTY. AS FOR UKRAINE, THE PROCESS IS COMPLICATED. WE HAVE AGREED THAT WARRIORS WITH WEAPONS GRADE URANIUM WILL BE DISMANTLED AND RETURNED TO RUSSIA. WE WILL THEN SEND BACK ENRICHED URANIUM TO UKRAINE FOR THEIR NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS. BUT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH UKRAINE. TODAY THEY AGREE, TOMORROW THEY BACKTRACK. SO I ASK YOU TO PRESS UKRAINE ON THIS. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: IT'S THE SAME CASE WITH US. (S)

I HAVE A COUPLE OF OTHER ISSUES TO MENTION. FIRST, I AM PLEASED THAT WE APPARENTLY HAVE YOUR SUPPORT ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND A MOVE TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP ON THIS. (S)

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA1261 S E C R E T

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OKAY. YOU MEAN AN AGREEMENT WITH ALL FIVE? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: NOT WITH CHINA BUT WITH THE UK AND FRANCE. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: NOT CHINA? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: MAYBE YOU CAN GET THEM TO MOVE. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: CHINA IS OBSERVING. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: THEY ARE NOW. MAYBE YOU CAN GET THEM TO AGREE. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I THINK THAT WHEN THE BIG FOUR SIGN THE TREATY, CHINA WILL HAVE TO COMPLY. ANYWAY, TECHNOLOGICALLY, THEY ARE NOT ADVANCED SO THEY DON'T REPRESENT A THREAT. WE ARE TESTING THE MOST MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND THEY DON'T HAVE THIS TECHNOLOGY. (S)
THE PRESIDENT: I AGREE. (U)

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1263 S E C R E T

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND KOZYREV DISCUSSED THIS. THEY SHOULD COOPERATE MORE. WE CAN'T IGNORE THE BLOODSHED THERE. (S)

ON UKRAINE, YESTERDAY OUR SUPREME SOVIET SAID THAT SEVASTOPOL IS A RUSSIAN CITY. IT IS A PECULIAR SITUATION. SEVASTOPOL IS ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY. IT IS A VERY ODD DECREE. WHEN I GET BACK, I WILL HAVE TO WORK ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE. THANK GOD NO ONE TAKES THE SUPREME SOVIET SERIOUSLY! (S)

PERHAPS WE COULD TELL UKRAINE THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE THREE OF US TO HAVE A SIGNED AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: GOOD. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: SO LET'S PREPARE OUR INSTRUCTIONS. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: THEY (REFERRING TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND AMBASSADOR TALBOTT) SAY WE HAVE TO TALK ABOUT THIS. (C)

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA1263 S E C R E T

HOW DO YOU SAY IF LOOKS COULD KILL IN RUSSIAN? (AFTER YELTSIN GLARED THEATRICALLY AT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I WANT TO EXTEND THE IAEA FUNCTIONS. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: TO DO WHAT? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: FOR VERIFICATION AND MONITORING. I SUGGEST THAT WE EXTEND THEIR PREROGATIVES FOR NUCLEAR POWER. (S)

MINISTER KOZYREV: THE ANSWER IS POSITIVE, RIGHT? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: VERY. I BELIEVE IN THIS. WE HAVE TO KEEP TRYING. WE NEED TO WORK TO EXPAND IT. IN THIS CASE, AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTS OUT, THE IAEA IS UNDERFUNDED AND UNDERSTAFFED. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OKAY. (U)

THE NPT TREATY ENDS IN 1995. WE FAVOR AN INDEFINITE DURATION. (C)

PAGE 6 RHEHAAA1263 S E C R E T

THE PRESIDENT: WE DO TOO. THIS IS A BIG ISSUE IN KORBA. THAT'S ALSO WHY THE NORTH KOREA ISSUE IS IMPORTANT IN JAPAN. THE JAPANESE ARE LOOKING AT 1995. ALL THE OLDER JAPANESE POLITICIANS WHO REMEMBER WORLD WAR TWO AND WHO WANT JAPAN TO BE A GREAT ECONOMIC POWER WANT THE NPT TO BE MAINTAINED. THEY TRUST THE U.S. BUT IF NORTH KOREA HANGS OUT, SOME OF THE YOUNGER JAPANESE MAY ARGUE FOR A DIFFERENT TACTIC. (S)

--- END OF CONVERSATION ---

END TEXT

DECL: QADR

SECRET