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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM FOR:


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SUBJECT:

Defining Amer interests in Kazakhstan



(CLAS) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(DTG) 150533Z FEB 92
(ORIG) FM AMEMBASSY ALMA ATA
(SUBJ) DEFINING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN

(TEXT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMA ATA 00013
EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO TO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON, EAID, TSCI, SENV, CASC, KZ, RU

SUBJECT: DEFINING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS TELEGRAM SEEKS TO DEFINE, ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS, THE MAIN AMERICAN INTERESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN. A SECOND TELEGRAM WILL SET OUT IDEAS FOR STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES TO PURSUE THESE INTERESTS.

INTEREST 1: THAT KAZAKHSTAN BE A FORCE IN THE REGION FOR MODERATION AND FOR POLITICAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE.

3. LIKE THE FORMER USSR AND RUSSIA, KAZAKHSTAN IS A MULTIETHNIC STATE WITH OVER 100 NATIONALITIES. SLAVS (MAINLY RUSSIANS AND SOME UKRAINIANS) MAKE UP JUST OVER TWO-FIFTHS OF THE POPULATION; KAZAKHS MAKE UP SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THIS AMOUNT. A LARGE PART OF INDUSTRIAL AND GRAIN-PRODUCING NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN, WHERE SLAVS PREDOMINATE, WAS UNDER RUSSIAN RULE FROM THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES UNTIL THE SOVIET REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN WAS CREATED IN 1936. MOST SLAVS NOW IN THIS REGION, HOWEVER, HAVE LINEAGE FROM THE SOVIET PERIOD -- KULAKS DEPORTED FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S, AND "VIRGIN LANDS" SETTLERS UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. MOST KAZAKHS LIVE IN THE SOUTH OF KAZAKHSTAN, WHERE COTTON IS THE MAIN CROP. JUST BELOW THIS AREA IS UZBEKISTAN, WHICH HAS SEVERAL MILLION MORE PEOPLE THAN KAZAKHSTAN (POPULATION JUST UNDER 17 MILLION). UZBEKISTAN VIEWS ITSELF AS THE NATURAL POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CORE OF A POTENTIAL FUTURE UNIFIED TURKIC STATE IN CENTRAL ASIA. THE KAZAKHS ARE LESS RELIGIOUSLY CONSCIOUS THAN CENTRAL ASIANS TO THE SOUTH. UNDERSCORING DISTINCTIONS, PEOPLE IN KAZAKHSTAN CALL THE REGION "KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA."

4. A SKILLFUL POLITICAL LEADER, PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV OFTEN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

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PUBLICLY LAUDS KAZAKHSTAN'S MULTIETHNIC CHARACTER. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SLAVS AND KAZAKHS IS CRITICAL; ILLUSTRATING ONE ASPECT OF THIS GAP, THE KAZAKHS ARE CONSOLIDATING THEIR POLITICAL HOLD IN KAZAKHSTAN, BUT RUSSIANS CONTROL MOST OF THE INDUSTRY. OVERALL, MODERATION AND POLITICAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE ARE THE MOST PROMINENT AND POSITIVE ASPECTS OF KAZAKHSTAN'S CURRENT POLICIES. THEIR CONTINUATION IS CRITICAL TO MAINTAINING THE UNEASY POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND LESSENING THE LIKLIHOOD AND RISKS OF FUTURE INTERNAL OR REGIONAL CONFLICTS, WHICH COULD DERIVE FROM AND EXACERBATE ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND TENSIONS. WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STILL TO BE PRESENT IN KAZAKHSTAN DURING SUCH CONFLICTS, THE DANGER TO U.S. FRIENDS AND INTERESTS IN THE REGION COULD BE FAR GREATER.

INTEREST 2: THAT KAZAKHSTAN ALLOW REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIA FOR DISMANTLEMENT.

5. ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT NOW -- OR SOON -- BE REMOVED FROM KAZAKHSTAN. THE COUNTRY STILL RETAINS AT LEAST 1,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ON SS-18 ICBM'S). THIS MAY BE MORE THAN CHINA, FRANCE, OR THE U.K. POSSESS, ALTHOUGH, UNLIKE THESE THREE, KAZAKHSTAN DOES NOT CONTROL THE WEAPONS ON ITS TERRITORY. SOME IN KAZAKHSTAN EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD ENHANCE THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY OR STATUS, E.G., BY DETERRING RUSSIA FROM USING INTIMIDATION OR COERCION TO REAQUIRE PREDOMINANTLY RUSSIAN AREAS, BY GIVING KAZAKHSTAN A REGIONAL OR MUSLIM LEADERSHIP ROLE IT WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE, AND BY ENSURING THAT GREAT POWERS WILL DEAL WITH KAZAKHSTAN AS SOMETHING MORE THAN AN ISOLATED, LESS-DEVELOPED, THIRD-WORLD STATE. BUT OTHERS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL HAVE NO USABLE MILITARY VALUE FOR KAZAKHSTAN.

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EFFORTS BY KAZAKHSTAN TO DISMANTLE ITSELF THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS ON ITS SOIL COULD POSE MAJOR PROLIFERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SAFETY PROBLEMS.

INTEREST 3: THAT KAZAKHSTAN MOVE MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WEST, FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS, EVEN AS IT INEVITABLY STRENGTHENS TIES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD.

7. THE RISK OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM OR IRANIAN INFLUENCE-PEDDLING IS LESS IN KAZAKHSTAN THAN IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES TO THE SOUTH. MANY LEADERS AND ELITES SEEM RECEPTIVE TO MOVING TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY SEE THIS AS THE KEY TO ACHIEVING GREATER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. KAZAKH NATIONALISTS VIEW ISLAM AS A USEFUL INSTRUMENT TO ADVANCE THEIR POLITICAL GOALS. TIES WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD WILL NATURALLY STRENGTHEN AS KAZAKHSTAN EMERGES FROM SOVIET RULE. ONE REASON IS THAT KAZAKH LEADERS -- MOSTLY ALL FORMER SOVIET STALWARTS -- WILL SEE GREATER IDENTIFICATION WITH ISLAM AS A MEANS TO ENHANCE THEIR POPULAR LEGITIMACY.

8. MOVING CLOSER TO THE WEST COULD REINFORCE TENDENCIES TOWARD MODERATION AND POLITICAL AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE, AND BENEFIT

b1

.S. AND WESTERN ECONOMIC INTERESTS. A MORE PROSPEROUS KAZAKHSTAN
OULD ALSO LESSEN DESIRES OF RUSSIANS IN KAZAKHSTAN TO DETACH
ORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN AND FUSE IT WITH RUSSIA, AND WOULD ENHANCE
ELF-CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE APPEAL OF RADICAL ISLAMIC IDEAS
N THE SOUTH OF KAZAKHSTAN.

INTEREST 4 : THAT AMERICAN COMPANIES PARTICIPATE TO THE GREATEST
XTENT POSSIBLE IN KAZAKHSTAN'S DEVELOPMENT, [REDACTED] b1

9. KAZAKHSTAN IS RICH IN OIL AND MINERALS (E.G., IT IS THE LARGEST
CHROMIUM PRODUCER OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA, AND HAS HALF OF THE
COPPER RESERVES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION), AND HAS SUBSTANTIAL
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY. A WELL-EDUCATED POPULATION (BY COMPARISON
WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES TO THE SOUTH OR WITH THE THIRD WORLD), IS
ALSO AN IMPORTANT RESOURCE. KAZAKHSTAN OFFERS A LARGE AND
RELATIVELY UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESSES. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, KAZAKHSTAN'S LEADERS SEEM
HESITANT ABOUT TAKING SOME RISKS WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS, AND
SOME SOVIET-ERA COMMERCIAL PRACTICES REMAIN IN PLACE. FOR
EXAMPLE, DESPITE REPEATED PROMISING INDICATIONS, KAZAKH LEADERS
HAVE PULLED BACK SEVERAL TIMES FROM CONCLUDING A MAJOR OIL
PRODUCTION AGREEMENT WITH CHEVRON AT THE TENGHIZ OIL FIELD IN THE
CASPIAN, AN EXCEPTIONALLY PROMISING RESERVE. THE U.S. HAS URGED
THE KAZAKHS TO COMPLETE THIS ARRANGEMENT, BOTH FOR ITS OWN VALUE
AND TO SEND A POSITIVE SIGNAL TO OTHER INVESTORS.

10. U.S. OIL AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN WOULD FURTHER
DIVERSIFY SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR THE U.S. AND WORLD ECONOMIES
(ALTHOUGH SOME U.S. DOMESTIC PRODUCERS MIGHT FACE GREATER
COMPETITION), RESULTING IN LOWER PRICES TO U.S. CONSUMERS AND LESS
OVERALL RISK OF SUPPLY DISRUPTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ALMA ATA 00013

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY (MRN SHOULD READ 00013 VICE 00014)

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SUBJECT: DEFINING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN

INTEREST 5: THAT KAZAKHSTAN INCREASE EFFORTS TO CURB ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION.

11. KAZAKHSTAN'S ENVIRONMENT BEARS THE SCARS OF MISGUIDED SOVIET
NUCLEAR, INDUSTRIAL, AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES. THE DRYING UP OF
THE ARAL SEA AND THE ENORMOUS INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER POLLUTION IN
KAZAKHSTAN FURTHER DEGRADE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, WITH
POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. AS
ELSEWHERE IN THE FORMER USSR (AND AS DOCUMENTED BY NOTED
DEMOGRAPHER MURRAY FESHBACK), THIS DEGRADATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
APPEARS SHARPLY TO HAVE EXACERBATED HEALTH PROBLEMS. THIS, IN
TURN, WILL LIKELY LEAD TO GREATER HUMANITARIAN BURDENS ON THE U.S.

INTEREST 6: THAT KAZAKHSTAN BE MORE DEMOCRATIC IN POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION.

2. LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN KAZAKH INTERNAL POLITICS SINCE THE
EVENTS OF AUGUST. " [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT LEAST AS
IMPORTANT, A CONSENSUS FOR POLITICAL MODERATION EXISTS AMONG
ANY ELITES IN KAZAKHSTAN. YET, NATIONALIST ANXIETY IS ON THE
RISE AND WILL ACCELERATE IF ECONOMIC POLICIES DO NOT LEAD TO
GAINS IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING.

3. MOVING QUICKLY TOWARD MORE DEMOCRATIC RULE AT PRESENT WOULD
LIKELY LEAD TO POLITICAL PARTIES THAT CLEAVE ALONG ETHNIC LINES. A
DETERIORATING ECONOMY COULD MAKE THIS WORSE. THUS, AMERICA SHOULD
FOCUS FOR NOW ON STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS NECESSARY FOR A
SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRACY. THIS MEANS ENCOURAGING SOUND ECONOMIC
POLICY, TOLERANCE, AND FACILITATING THE CREATION OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER MEDIATING INFLUENCES
BETWEEN THE HOLDERS OF POWER AND THE PEOPLE. IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD
ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE COMPLEX AND FLEXIBLE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND POLICIES, WHILE DISCOURAGING
THOSE ALIGNED ONLY WITH ETHNIC GROUPINGS OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SOVIET PAST. FIRST AMONG OUR PRIORITIES SHOULD BE TO SPUR SOUND
INDUSTRIALIZATION. LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN INDUSTRY AND
AGRICULTURE, ALTHOUGH NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF HOUSING IS PRIVATE.

4. IF KAZAKHSTAN CREATES ITS OWN MILITARY, WE SHOULD GIVE
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO HELPING KAZAKHSTAN DEVELOP CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS APPROPRIATE TO A DEMOCRACY, AND DEFINE
THREATS, STRATEGIES, AND FORCE STRUCTURES IN WAYS THAT ARE
REALISTIC AND NOT PERCEIVED IN THE REGION AS AGGRESSIVE.

INTEREST 7: THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS' INTERESTS BE PROTECTED.

5. AT PRESENT THERE ARE AT LEAST 75 PRIVATE AMERICANS IN
KAZAKHSTAN IN SEVERAL MISSIONARY, EDUCATIONAL, AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS. THEY REPRESENT A VARIETY OF AMERICAN CHURCHES
AND FOUNDATIONS. THESE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PLAYING A VALUABLE ROLE
THIS WEEK AS MONITORS FOR OUR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FLIGHTS, ENSURING
THAT FOOD AND MEDICINE ARE DELIVERED TO INTENDED FACILITIES.
KAZAKHSTAN IS LIKELY TO BECOME AN OBJECT OF INTEREST AMONG MANY
MORE AMERICANS, WHO WILL FIND PEOPLE HERE TO BE QUITE OPEN
FRIENDLY, AND HELPFUL. PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THESE AMERICANS
IN THE FAR-FLUNG REACHES OF KAZAKHSTAN WILL BE AN OBVIOUS PRIORITY.
WE MUST ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PURSUE ANY FURTHER REPORTS
CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF U.S. POW'S/MIA'S IN KAZAKHSTAN.
JOURNEY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02