April 25, 1959

Dear Mike:

I thought you might like to see a copy of the confidential memorandum of my conversation with Castro.

With kindest personal regards,

[Signature]
Rough draft of summary of conversation between the Vice President and Fidel Castro:

When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak through a translator.

The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of interest, particularly in view of the comments I made with regard to the positions he took.

I suggested at the outset that while I understood that some reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it would be as long as four years before elections would be held. I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflecting the will of the people in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned that his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."

"It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels, not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make
them want what they ought to have. I pointed out that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date and thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up during the course of the conversation.

In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I in turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how his place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the right thing in the long run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact in his attitude toward Communism, both internally and from an international standpoint he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953. In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless
he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he
could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people
needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on
the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got
across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions
as freedom of speech, press and religion that his primary concern was
with developing programs for economic progress. He said over and over
that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year
and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house
and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom
along with it. I, of course, tried to emphasize that here again as a
leader of his people he should try to develop support for policies which
could assure economic progress with freedom rather than without it.

He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to
furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody
knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the
defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out. The
arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress
people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far
better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms
be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far
as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could
disagree with.

We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the
investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that
what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital
but government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments
as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the
government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately
owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hopes as far as
the U.S. was concerned was not in getting more government capital but
in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was
limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems
we presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other
hand was expandable and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba
far better by adopting policies which would attract it. I pointed out
that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the
world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable
fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against
private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to
explain why he had said and done some of the things which had appeared
to be anti-private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point
I doubt if I made too much of an impression.
I tried tactfully to suggest to Castro that Munoz Marin had done a remarkable job in Puerto Rico in attracting private capital and in generally raising the standard of living of his people and that Castro might well send one of his top economic advisers to Puerto Rico to have a conference with Munoz Marin. He took a very dim view of this suggestion, pointing out that the Cuban people were "very nationalistic" and would look with suspicion on any programs initiated in what they would consider to be a "colony" of the United States.

I reminded him that Mr. Marin had been one of his strong defenders. He said that he knew this was the case but he made it clear that he did not want to have anything to do with him at least publicly. I am inclined to think that the real reason for his attitude is simply that he disagreed with Munoz' firm position as an advocate of private enterprise and does not want to get any advice which might divert him from his course of leading Cuba toward more socialism of its economy.

He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail, justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.

He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. In one letter, he raised that speaking from some personal experience that it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with regard to criticism might eventually lead him to take some rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument went along this line: "Yours is a great country -- the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and happy. But every place I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."
In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people everywhere that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom.

Several other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth noting at this point. Significantly enough he did not raise any questions about the sugar quote nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.

My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere; he is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline -- my guess is the former and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in forty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.