

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR *AD*

Date: 2/24/94

DATE: June 17, 1979

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TIME: 11:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,
Vienna

SUBJECT: Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and
President Brezhnev

Topics: SALT III and other arms control issues

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
General David Jones
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
General G. Seignious
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Joseph Powell
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President L. I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Marshal D. F. Ustinov
Mr. K. U. Chernenko
Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko
Marshal N. V. Ogarkov
Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin
Mr. A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. L. M. Zamyatin
Mr. V. G. Komplektov
Mr. A. M. Vavilov
Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

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Date: <u>10/23/92</u> 19__	

Drafted by: Wm. D. Krimer | OPR/LS
JUL 20, 1979 *AD*

Approved by: Mr. David Aaron

example for the other countries involved in the negotiations in terms of lessening the high concentration of forces and weapons in Central Europe. He was certain that a step of this kind would have great political significance and would be widely applauded throughout the world.

The President said he agreed and suggested we try to resolve this today.

Brezhnev said he would welcome that.

Turning to other disarmament issues, Brezhnev first wanted to remind the President that the Soviet Union was firmly in favor of disarmament and in favor of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union considered this to be a correct way of proceeding and was prepared at any time to begin practical discussions of this matter. Unfortunately, the United States and its NATO allies had not manifested such willingness to date. Well, the Soviet side would have to wait until the appropriate situation matured. But in the meanwhile, as he saw it, it might well be possible to reach agreement on such partial measures as prohibition of radiological weapons and prohibition of chemical weapons, mutual renunciation of the manufacture of neutron weapons and some other actions to reduce the scope of military competition between our countries and in the world at large. Here again, he would ask Gromyko to review the general state of affairs.

Gromyko noted that the Soviet Union was engaged in negotiations with the United States on some other partial disarmament questions, apart from mutual force reductions. The radiological weapons negotiations were scheduled to begin literally three days after conclusion of the current meeting. In general, at these negotiations the situation was encouraging. There were a few minor remaining differences which could probably be eliminated quickly. He hoped that this would be so and that both sides would make a major effort to achieve the goal of bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion. What was contemplated in this area was the signing of an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Turning to neutron weapons, Gromyko noted that the Soviet Union had tabled a proposal at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, proposing that these weapons be prohibited and that both our nations be a party to such an agreement. The Soviet Union had stated its views on this matter more than once and in particular this had been emphasized repeatedly by President Brezhnev. The Soviet Union believed that the manufacture and deployment of weapons of this kind would be a major negative step that would adversely affect relations between our two countries and the international atmosphere as a whole. He would therefore express the hope that President Carter personally and the United States approach this matter seriously and that an agreement be reached which would serve the interests of improving relations between us and the interests of detente and peace.

Turning to chemical weapons and the possibility of reaching agreement to prohibit such weapons, Gromyko noted that the negotiations on this question are proceeding badly and in an unsatisfactory way. It would evidently be difficult to go into detail at this meeting, but he wanted to make two points in this connection. First, we had major differences between our views on questions relating to verification in this connection and, secondly, for an agreement on chemical weapons to be effective it was important that all major powers, and certainly the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, join in such an agreement. What kind of an agreement would that be without the participation of China? Could one really agree to a situation in which the Chinese alone would have a free hand to manufacture chemical weapons? These were the major points to which he wanted to draw the President's attention.

Turning to anti-satellite systems, Gromyko said that Secretary Vance and he had discussed this matter just two days ago. He did not believe it necessary to repeat what he had said to Secretary Vance. The President was well aware of the Soviet position. The difference between our respective positions was very great indeed, and he would ask the President to take a more objective look at this matter. An agreement could not possibly be one-sided, benefiting the United States alone.

Turning to conventional arms transfers, Gromyko noted that the negotiations had begun some time ago and seemed to move right

along, but then the representatives of the United States had proposed to discuss conventional arms transfers on a regional basis. In brief, the regions mentioned were those in which the United States was interested. When Soviet representatives mentioned other areas and countries of concern to both sides, U.S. representatives had simply refused to discuss them. Since such an approach could not possibly be acceptable to the Soviet side, U.S. representatives had simply walked out of the talks and had returned home. Thus, the conventional arms transfers talks were now in a state of suspense.

The President wanted to say a few words on the anti-satellite talks. We had not complained about the Soviet manned Soyuz flights, and had not asserted that they were anti-satellite systems. Our space shuttle will not be used as an anti-satellite system. It was the very center of our space effort in the future. The President hoped that this would not be allowed to block progress in the talks because we are going to continue developing this vehicle. This was not a departure from our overall space effort, and if the Soviets took the position that the shuttle was being developed as an anti-satellite system, we could only assure them that this was not the case.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was in favor of continuing these negotiations, but it would be impossible to reach agreement on the basis of the U.S. position.

Gromyko said the Soviet Union would be prepared to resume the conventional arms transfer negotiations.

Gromyko turned to the talks on the Indian Ocean and limitation of military activities in that area. He noted that the talks on this subject had begun at a lively pace, but then the U.S. had unilaterally suspended them and no discussions were in progress at this time. He thought that perhaps the United States might be prepared to resume the talks, but pointed out that in the absence of these negotiations the United States had continued its activities aimed at strengthening the Diego Garcia base, and in general had intensified naval activities in that area. The Soviet side was prepared to continue negotiations on this subject, but he wanted to draw the President's attention to the fact that it would be impossible to do so without a change in the position of the United States.

The President said with respect to conventional arms transfers that our position has been that we should not begin with areas where each country was deeply involved. We provide military assistance to South Korea and Japan, for example. The Soviet Union provided military assistance to Vietnam and Ethiopia. We would want to concentrate in the beginning on areas where there was not that much controversy, where our two countries were not involved by commitments of long standing.

As for the Indian Ocean, the President said that we had never insinuated that we would stop developing the Diego Garcia base.

What had occurred was massive Soviet arms supply to Ethiopia and before that to Somalia, along with the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in that area. Now the Soviet Union was building up arms in Afghanistan. Thus, the situation had changed. We were prepared to negotiate with the aim of bringing about a stable situation with respect for international borders, where neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba would inject themselves into regional situations of turbulence. Such involvement caused us deep concern.

Brezhnev wanted to present another idea, suggesting that the two sides take a broad look at naval affairs. At one time he had already said that he did not think it was an ideal situation where the navies of the great powers cruise thousands of miles from their home territory for long periods of time, and the Soviet Union was prepared to resolve this problem on the basis of equality. The Soviet Union had proposed that Soviet and U.S. naval ships carrying nuclear weapons be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The United States had not responded to this idea, however, but he still believed that this should be a subject for negotiation. Initially, an exchange of views might begin on a bilateral basis, subsequently involving other countries as well. He would ask the President to consider this carefully. If that could be agreed in principle, he and President Carter might instruct their representatives to hold an appropriate exchange of views in greater specifics.

In conclusion, Brezhnev said he recalled an idea put forward by President Carter in their correspondence, the possibility of