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(WITH BRIEF DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONS)

TAB 1: Brief Chronology of Events

TAB 2: Africa: Shaba and the Horn

♦ "The Horn of Africa," Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-21 [Excerpt], April 1, 1977

This response to Presidential Review Memorandum originated with the State Department and provides detailed background and policy options for the United States in the Horn of Africa.

♦ "Record of Conversation with the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia, Jose Peres Novoa," from the journal of A.P. Ratanov, February 10, 1977

The Cuban Ambassador informs the Soviets that Mengistu is asking Cuba for light arms.

♦ "Minutes of the Conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro" [Excerpt], April 3, 1977, 11:00-13:30 and 15:45-18:00

In this document from the Party Archives of the former GDR, Castro gives Honecker a tour d'horizon on the situation in Africa following his trip across the continent. Castro provides an early assessment of the growing Somali-Ethiopian conflict, and the personalities involved, noting that "the socialist countries are faced with a problem."

♦ "Summary of Conclusions of Policy Review Committee Meeting: Ethiopia and Horn of Africa," April 11, 1977, 4:00-5:25 p.m. (attached to Memorandum from Brzezinski to the President, April 11, 1977, with handwritten notation by Carter)

This meeting on possible U.S. policy options with regard to the military regime in Ethiopia was indecisive, but President Carter comments: "Sounds too easy on Ethiopia. Why just "wait and see?"

Cuban official Carlos Rodriguez recalls in his meeting with Secretary Haig that he accompanied Castro to his session in Moscow with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Gromyko and Rusakov in April. He says that it was the Cuban side “who insistently urged the need to render military assistance to Ethiopia.”

“Notes from the Discussion with the Head of the Cuban Military Specialists, Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, July 17, 1977,” from the journal of A. N. Ratanov [Excerpt],

In this document, the Soviet Ambassador and head of the Cuban military mission in Ethiopia coordinate political and military measures to save the “revolutionary” regime in Ethiopia. At this point, the Soviets rejected Mengistu’s impromptu request for a supply of tanks and armored cars as a premature and “light-headed approach.”

“Record of Conversation with the Chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam,” from the journal of A. P. Ratanov, July 29, 1977

The Soviet Ambassador relates to Mengistu a message from Brezhnev which in fact puts pressure on the Ethiopian regime to refrain from provocative actions regarding Somalia and to maintain, “no matter what,” a dialog with the Somali leadership.

“About the Address to the Leadership of the Progressive African States in Relation to the Crisis in Somali-Ethiopian Relations,” Minutes of the CC CPSU Politburo Session [Excerpt], August 4, 1977

This Politburo meeting takes place after the first round of parallel Soviet-Somali and Soviet-Ethiopian talks in Moscow (July 25-29, 1977), when Soviet attempts to find a compromise between the two African countries failed. On the eve of those talks, the Somali army began intervention into Ogaden.

“Transcript of the Conversation with the President of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, August 5, 1977,” from the journal of A.P. Ratanov [Excerpt], August 11, 1977

The Soviet ambassador informs Mengistu about the decision of the Soviet government to start delivery of heavy armaments, including tanks and helicopters, to Ethiopia to fend off the Somali invasion.
“On Additional Measures for Normalization of the Situation in the Horn of Africa and on Assistance and Support for the Leadership of Ethiopia,” Minutes the CC CPSU Politburo Session [Excerpt], August 11, 1977

This excerpt simply records Brezhnev’s reaction to Menqistu’s plea for assistance.

“PRC Review of Situation in Horn of Africa,” Memorandum for the President, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter, August 26, 1977

The Policy Review Committee (PRC) decides to reassure other countries in the region while keeping up the “dialogue” with Somalia. No arms are to be provided to the Somalis, however.

“Record of Conversation with the Chairman of the PMAC, Mengistu Haile Mariam, September 10, 1977,” from the journal of A.P. Ratanov [Excerpt], September “29”, 1977

Mengistu convenes a meeting of ambassadors from the socialist countries to inform them of a purported CIA plot to overthrow the PMAC (Provisional Military Assistance Council) and to create “a pro-Western, reactionary government.”

“Record of the Main Content of A. A. Gromyko’s Conversation with US President J. Carter” [Excerpt], September 23, 1977

Carter and Gromyko discuss problems in South Africa and Angola, but make no mention of the Horn.

“INFCE; South Africa, Horn of Africa, Rhodesia No. III of IV,” Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], October 17, 1977

Dobrynin maintains that Soviet military supplies to Ethiopia have “not yet reached the level previously supplied to the Somalis.” His personal opinion is that it would be “shortsighted for the Soviet Union” to send military advisers to Ethiopia.


Excerpts from an annotated chronology mention Mengistu’s secret meeting in Moscow on October 30-31, 1977, and the arrival of a Soviet state delegation
headed by Army General Vasily I. Petrov to Ethiopia in November 1977. Petrov's tasks include "planning of military operations in Ogaden and Eritrea."

- "Memorandum of Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Anatoly Ratanov, in Addis Ababa on December 6, 1977" [Excerpt], December 7, 1977

In this document from the Party Archive of the former GDR, Ratanov says that "300 Cuban military experts are expected to arrive soon" in Ethiopia. He also hints that the Soviets have not done enough to mediate between Mengistu and the Eritrean separatists.

- Letter from Carter to Brezhnev, December 21, 1977

Carter expresses "hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts." Brzezinski, according to his memoir, inserted into the letter "some reasonably straightforward language" regarding Soviet conduct in regional conflicts, notably in the Horn.

- "Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa, 26 January 1978, 7:00-8:45 p.m., White House Situation Room," NSC Memorandum for the Record [Excerpt], January 27, 1978

The Special Coordination Committee (SCC) concurs on the need to enlist advice and aid from American allies and other friendly governments "in impressing upon the Soviets our serious concern" about the military build-up in Ethiopia. After the word "Soviets," Carter adds in the margin: "and Cubans."

- "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Paul Markowski and Comrade Boris N. Ponomarev, Candidate of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC CPSU, on February 10, 1978, in the House of the CC CPSU" [Excerpt], February 13, 1978

Ponomarev touches on his conversation with Carter on January 25, 1978. Brzezinski later recalled that he "was very gratified that the President" at this meeting "spoke up forcefully on this subject, warning the Soviets that we did not wish a confrontation but that the Soviets were running the risk of creating one in a region which was very sensitive to us." Ponomarev, it seems, did not get the message.

- "Report on the Conversation with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, on February 13, 1978 in Havana," [SED CC] Department of International Relations -80- [Excerpt], February 16, 1978
Rafael Rodriguez informs his East German colleagues that the Cubans “continue to oppose a military intervention in Eritrea.” “As agreed upon with our Soviet comrades,” he states, “in no case will we transgress Somali borders.”

♦ “Middle East, Horn, Belgrade CSCE, SALT,” Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], February 14, 1978 (enclosed in Department of State Memorandum, Leo Reddy to Mr. Anderson, February 21, 1978)

Secretary Vance calls for the prompt withdrawal of “all foreign troops, including Soviet and Cuban, from Ethiopia and Somalia.” He emphasizes the importance of “a firm commitment that the Ethiopians and the Cubans would not cross into Somali territory” and warns of “the serious consequences.”

♦ “Memorandum of Conversation with the Deputy Head of the 3. Africa-Department in the MID, Comrade S. J. Sinitsin, on February 16, 1978,” Political Department of the Embassy of the GDR in Moscow [Excerpt], February 17, 1978

The Soviet Foreign Ministry official, formerly stationed in Ethiopia, characterizes Western policy with regard to the Horn as “the efforts of the imperialist countries to keep a crisis atmosphere on the African continent in order to achieve their long-term objectives.”

♦ “The Horn of Africa,” Minutes of the Special Coordination Committee, February 22, 1978

In this wide-ranging discussion, members of the SCC debate, among other things, policy options in the event Ethiopian or Cuban troops cross the frontier with Somalia. Brzezinski argues for deployment of a U.S. carrier task force off the Horn, Vance and Brown argue against. Brzezinski raises the China card as a way to “raise the cost of involvement for the Soviets and Cubans.” Brown responds: “that would certainly get their attention.”

♦ Memorandum for the President from Vance [Excerpt], February 22, 1978

Vance refers to “several recent clandestine reports which refer to joint Ethiopian-Soviet planning of military operations that would involve incursions into Somali territory, including the occupation of areas of northern Somalia.”

The day before this meeting, Brzezinski told the press: "We are not imposing any linkages [between Soviet assistance to Ethiopia and SALT], but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes." On the same day, Carter paraphrased Brzezinski. Yet, the heated discussion within the SCC meeting reveals that a gap persists on the relative importance of SALT and other policy priorities of the Administration.


A discussion of the recent visit of David Aaron, Brzezinski’s deputy, to the region. (For Aaron’s own version, see the SCC meeting of February 22, above.) According to the Cuban ambassador, Aaron “withdrew the demand for the immediate removal of Soviet and Cuban advisers” after Mengistu promised Ethiopian neutrality.

♦ “About Measures to Settle the Ethiopia-Somalia Military Conflict,” Minutes of Politburo Session [Excerpt], March 9, 1978

Brezhnev talks about the need to make another attempt to mediate a Somali-Ethiopian meeting, "if Ethiopia will agree to it."

♦ “Horn of Africa, Rhodesia (Part 1 of 2),” Department of State, memorandum of conversation (Vance, Shulman, Dobrynin), March 11, 1978

Vance suggests “further measures of cooperation” between the United States and the USSR in the Horn of Africa, particularly to overcome the new intransigence of the Ethiopian leadership.

♦ “Middle East, Horn of Africa, SALT, Other Multilateral Matters,” Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, G. Smith, Dobrynin) [Excerpt], March 16, 1978

Vance expresses satisfaction that the Ethiopians did not cross the border with Somalia. Dobrynin informs him that the Somalis had tried to revive the idea of a federation in the Horn, but they received no encouragement from Moscow.

♦ “SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights,” Memorandum of Conversation (President Jimmy Carter et al. - Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko et al.) [Excerpt], May 27, 1978, 8:00 a.m.- 12:20 p.m.
In the course of the first top-level, in-depth U.S.-Soviet discussion of conflicts in Africa, Gromyko terms the presence of a Soviet general in Ethiopia "a myth."

- "Record of the Main Content of the Conversation between A.A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance," [Excerpt] May 31, 1978

Vance says that "according to our intelligence data, Cubans took part in planning and preparation of the intrusion" in Zaire. Gromyko denies any Soviet role in recent events in Zaire, Rhodesia, or Namibia. He calls information that Ethiopian troops have acted under Soviet command "fiction."


Faced with Mengistu's increasingly chauvinistic and demanding line, Soviet leaders propose "to educate him" and to show "that we are on his side."


The text of the attachment (the Foreign Ministry/KGB/CC International Department draft decision approved by the Politburo), seeks to improve relations with Mengistu through increased economic assistance. It also mentions "a comradesly exchange of opinions with the leadership of Cuba and the GDR about the current situation in Ethiopia."

**TAB 3: The Middle East Peace Process**

- "MBFR, Middle East," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance-Gromyko, et al.) [Extract], March 29, 1977, 11:00 a.m. - 1:45 p.m.

This stenographic report opens the dialog on Middle East issues between the Soviet leadership and the Carter Administration. Earlier, Jimmy Carter had spoken publicly for the first time about a Palestinian "national homeland," but also told visiting Prime Minister Rabin that he favored "defensible borders" for Israel.

- "Transcript of A.A. Gromyko's Negotiations With C. Vance" [Extract], March 29, 1977, 16:30-19:45
In this record of a later discussion on March 29, the first signs emerge of the understanding that later materialized in the joint United States-Soviet communique of October 1, 1977

♦ “Record of the Main Contents of A.A. Gromyko’s Negotiations with the Secretary of State of the USA C. Vance, Geneva, May 18-20, 1977” [Extract], May 19, 1977

This record of the talks in Geneva between Gromyko and Vance reflects further development of a new American line of seeking a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East with active Soviet participation. Vance says that “it will not be difficult to agree on the concrete arrangements” to convene the Geneva conference on the Middle East in the fall of 1977.

♦ “Meeting with Dobrynin,” Telegram from Vance to AmEmbassy Moscow [Extract], August 30, 1977

A cable to the Moscow embassy relating Gromyko’s suggestion to prepare “a joint U.S.-Soviet co-chairmen’s statement about some basic principles of a settlement, including the rights of Palestinian self-determination and statehood” in view of the planned Middle East conference.

♦ “Record of the Main Content of A. A. Gromyko’s Conversation with US President J. Carter” [Extract], September 23, 1977

In this stenographic report, translated from Russian, Carter acknowledges that the Soviet position on a settlement in the Middle East “is very close to ours.”

♦ “Middle East Discussions with the Soviets,” Telegram from Vance to the President and Brzezinski, October 1, 1977

Secretary Vance informs Carter and Brzezinski that he and Gromyko agreed “this morning” in New York on the text of a joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the Middle East. The text is included.

♦ “The Middle East, No. I of IV” Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, Dobrynin) [Extract], October 17, 1977

Vance and Dobrynin discuss the U.S.-Israeli six-point working paper of October 11, in which the United States gave Israel a veto over the PLO’s participation in a Middle East conference.
Letter from Carter to Sadat, October 21, 1977

Carter makes "a personal appeal" to President Sadat to help break the stalemate in the Middle East. Some observers later question whether this may have given Sadat additional impetus to go to Jerusalem.

Letter from Carter to Brezhnev [Extract], December 21, 1977

Carter writes that the issue of procedures for a Geneva Conference "can best be settled in consultations with the parties to the conference," and not in a joint Soviet-U.S. effort.

"Horn of Africa; Middle East," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, Ponomarev, Dobrynin) [Extract], January 26, 1978

Ponomarev calls the meetings between Sadat and Begin "lightning out of a clear blue sky." Vance explains that Sadat did not consult with the United States.

"Middle East, Horn of Africa; SALT, Other Multilateral Matters," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (Vance, Shulman, G. Smith, Dobrynin) [Extract], March 16, 1978

In this memorandum of conversation Dobrynin tells Vance that the Soviets reacted so strongly to the Sadat initiative because they "had just succeeded in obtaining Syrian agreement to go to a Geneva conference when Sadat announced his trip" to Jerusalem.

"Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena," Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-78 [Extract], May 1978

This segment of an interagency estimate of Moscow's intentions notes that the Soviets believe "their fortunes would be improved by the failure of direct Israeli-Egyptian negotiations" and "the demise of Sadat."

"Letter from Vance to Gromyko, circa August 1978

Vance expresses hope that the Soviets will "lend support" to efforts to reach agreement on a number of issues relating to the peace process "at the highest political level."
"Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting on SALT," Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [Extract], September 28, 1978, 10:10-12:20 PM

During the course of this record of U.S.-Soviet ministerial talks, Vance belatedly briefs Gromyko on the Carter-Begin-Sadat meeting at Camp David.

"Changes in the Middle East: Moscow’s Perceptions and Options," Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Assessment [Extract], June 1979

According to this interagency estimate, "the probability of dramatic Soviet gains in relations with the Arab states is not high." Despite the opposition of the majority of Arab states to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, "the opportunities the Soviets have to seize the diplomatic initiative are severely limited."

TAB 4: Mid-1978: A Critical Moment?

"About the Results of the Negotiations with the Secretary of State of the USA, C. Vance," Transcript of Politburo session [Excerpt], April 27, 1978

Brezhnev reports to his Politburo colleagues that in a recent conversation with Vance he criticized the "foreign policy zigzags" of the Carter administration, and gave "a strong rebuff" to Vance's "attempt to deliver a reproach" on Soviet activities in Africa.

"Confrontation Or Cooperation with the Soviet Union," Address by President Carter at the U.S. Naval Academy, June 7, 1978

Carter addresses the increasingly ambiguous character of U.S.-Soviet relations: a mix of cooperation and confrontation. The speech, which comes at a time when Soviet leaders are complaining internally about "the growing aggression of U.S. foreign policy," later becomes the object of scrutiny itself. Vance, for one, writes in his memoir that "instead of combating the growing perception of an administration rent by internal divisions, the image of an inconsistent and uncertain government was underlined" by the speech.

"Several Issues of the International Situation," Protocol No. 107 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 8 June 1978 [Extract], (with attached text of Brezhnev's speech to the Politburo), June 8, 1978

Brezhnev, primed by Gromyko, tells the Politburo that Carter seems to be "intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the USA under the
banner of anti-Soviet policy and a return to the 'Cold War.'” He proposes to “fight” for detente and, in particular, “to categorically refute and expose the imperialist intentions with regard to the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Africa, among them the region of the Horn of Africa, in Zaire, etc.”

♦ “Soviet-American Relations in the Contemporary Era,” Political Letter from Dobrynin to Gromyko (with cover sheet attached), July 11, 1978

The Soviet ambassador informs Gromyko that Brzezinski and some other domestic advisers persuaded President Carter that he could halt his political decline by adopting a “more hard line course with regard to the Soviet Union. As a pretext one selected Africa (the events on the Horn of Africa, and then in the Zairian province of Shaba).” This analysis seems to dovetail with Brezhnev’s (and Gromyko’s own) earlier assessments.

♦ “Record of the Main Contents of A. A. Gromyko’s Negotiations with the Secretary of State of the USA C. Vance,” [Excerpt], July 12-13, 1978

Gromyko inquires of Vance whether the United States “is reviewing the course of its policy towards the Soviet Union.” He assures him that the Soviet line, “as far as relations with the USA are concerned, remains the same.”


Brezhnev complains that the state of U.S.-Soviet relations “leaves a lot to be desired.” Improvement, he says, is not expected “any time soon,” because Carter “is listening to the forces to whom detente goes against the grain.”

TAB 5: China


This chronology, part of a study of Chinese negotiating strategy, is based largely on still-classified memoranda of conversations between American and Chinese officials. It offers a few glimpses into the U.S.-China relationship during the period.
“Record of the Main Content of A. A. Gromyko’s Conversation with US President J. Carter,” [Excerpt], September 23, 1977

Gromyko warns Carter against playing “the Chinese card against the Soviet Union.” He stresses that “it would have been a great mistake if a dirty game had been played” between Washington and Beijing, as part of an “open or secret collusion against the Soviet Union, against its interests.”

“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena,” Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-78 [Excerpt], May 1978

Soviet military policy against China is characterized “as one of containment with a variety of limited objective offensive options.”


U.S. intelligence believes that “a future military clash [with the PRC] remains quite conceivable in Soviet eyes, and particularly so in view of the February-March 1979 Chinese attack on the Soviet Union’s Vietnamese ally.”


This note to all Soviet ambassadors and representatives warns that “as American-Chinese military cooperation develops further, destructive elements will grow in international relations.” “In an effort to create favorable conditions for the realization of its hegemonic aims, the Peking leadership counts on aggravating relations between countries, setting some states against others, and provoking military conflicts. Peking does not hide the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, and, from its ashes, assume world domination.”

TAB 6: The Central Front

“Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena,” Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-78, [Excerpt], May 1978
This estimate gives a mixed picture of Soviet gains and losses in Europe. In the military field, however, the USSR has “now achieved qualitative competitiveness in most major weapon systems.”


On May 30, 1978, the NATO Council met in Washington and adopted a long-term plan to build up and modernize its forces. Secretary of Defense Brown, according to Brzezinski, “took the lead in these negotiations and succeeded in securing European compliance.” This development became one of the issues which drew an angry response from Soviet leaders, who later claimed that it was one of the fundamental causes of the decline of detente.

♦ “Secretary’s Talks with Gromyko on CTB, CAT, Indian Ocean and Middle East,” Cable, from Secstate to Amembassy Moscow [Excerpt], September 30, 1978

Vance’s cable comes at a time when both sides are still reasonably hopeful of concluding negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and other arms control measures.

♦ “Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev; Topics: SALT III and Other Arms Control Issues,” Memorandum of Conversation [Excerpt], June 17, 1979, 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

At the summit in Vienna, Gromyko reviews a range of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on non-strategic and “exotic” weapons.

7. The Polish Crisis

♦ “Prospects for Eastern Europe,” Central Intelligence Agency, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, June 10, 1977

This lengthy analysis concludes that “internal unrest is more serious in Poland than anywhere else in Eastern Europe,” but asserts that “the policies of the US and the West are not likely to be critical to what happens in Poland in the next few years.”

♦ “Agenda for Discussion of East European Policy,” Department of State, Memorandum and Agenda from Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, August 17, 1977
Prepared in advance of a Policy Review Committee session, this agenda offers a glimpse into U.S. thinking on the question of whether and to what degree to differentiate policy toward Eastern Europe.

♦ “PRC Meeting on Eastern Europe,” Department of State, Briefing Memorandum [Excerpt], August 18, 1977

Expanding somewhat on the previous document, this memo analyzes two of the principal options under discussion in the U.S. government at this time concerning Eastern Europe. “No one is under any illusions that our influence [in the region] will be decisive under either option,” the paper notes.

♦ “On the Role of Poland in the Strategy and Policy of the Vatican,” Document May 9, 1979, [Excerpt], (with attached cover memo, No. 1764-Cv), June 9, 1979

This document reflects Soviet concerns after Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow had become Pope John-Paul II on October 16, 1978.

TAB 8: June-December 1979

♦ “Your Meetings With President Brezhnev in Vienna,” Memorandum from Vance to the President, June 8, 1979

In one of several briefing memos supplied to the President in preparation for the summit, Vance lays out objectives for the session, anticipates Soviet goals, and suggests specific approaches. Vance emphasizes that the Soviets “attach great weight to the personal element,” and encourages making an effort to “establish personal rapport” with Brezhnev despite his “uncertain health and tenure.”

♦ “First Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev,” Memorandum of Conversation at the Vienna Summit, June 16, 1979, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

Brezhnev, in an obvious reference to the March 1977 meeting in Moscow and Carter’s “zigzagging,” asks the U.S. President what would happen to SALT “if subsequently one of the sides, for reasons of its own, were to start revising [its] decisions or begin acting as if they did not exist at all?” He also contrasts the successful completion of the talks on strategic armaments with the “ever increasing outlays and the persistent buildup of military forces” in the West. He then says, “off the record,” that he and Carter have “the duty of getting their nations used to
the idea of limiting strategic arms, and this warranted their moving forward to further steps in SALT III.”

“International Issues,” Memorandum of Conversation between President Carter and President Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit, June 17, 1979, 5:30 - 7:20 p.m.

During an informal talk at the Soviet embassy, Carter refers to “troubled areas” such as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, southern Africa and Southeast Asia, and advocates peaceful resolution of regional differences. He emphasizes that the Americans “regard[] Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union” and that “the extensive military activities of Cuba” are of “deep concern to the American people.” Brezhnev retaliates by mocking “the theory called the arc of crisis” as “an absolutely fairy tale” and blasting the Chinese aggression against Vietnam.

“Memorandum of the Meeting between SED CC General Secretary and Chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker, and the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev 27 July 1979 in the Crimea,” July 28, 1979

In an informal “comradely” talk with Honecker, Brezhnev says that if SALT II failed in the Senate it would be “a political catastrophe for Carter,” but it would not have a negative impact on the USSR.

“About a Response to the President of the USA Regarding the Issue of the Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba,” Working Transcript of Politburo session [Excerpt], September 27, 1979

This document reflects a discussion of the final draft of Brezhnev’s response to Carter’s letter on the Soviet brigade on Cuba, sent over the hot line. Brezhnev’s assistant, Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, and Boris Ponomarev come up with corrections which refer to the damage that the “artificially created campaign” is causing to the spirit of Vienna.

“Stenographic Minutes of Meeting between SED CC General Secretary and Chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker, and Other Members and Candidates of the Politburo and the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, and Other Members of the Soviet Government and Party Delegation on Thursday, October 4, 1979, in the Residence of the State Council” [Excerpt]

Brezhnev notes as “disconcerting” “the open tendency in Washington, regardless of SALT II, to build up vigorously their own armaments as well as the NATO arsenals
as a whole.” He also asserts that “Washington is increasingly actively playing its Chinese card.” Of additional interest are Brezhnev’s comments on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan.

♦ “Possible Conclusions of a Soviet Policy Review,” Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, December 14, 1979

Shulman concludes that “the Soviets are concerned that U.S.-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question.” The report says that “the Soviets appear to have concluded that the advantages of more direct intervention in Afghanistan now outweigh the inevitable price the Soviets will pay in terms of regional and US reactions. The confusion in Tehran and the prospect of US military action there have been factors in arriving at this conclusion.”

♦ “Record of Conversation with the Head of the USA Sector of the Americas Department of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba, Jose Antonio Arbesu,” December 27, 1979

Arbesu expresses his opinion that “in the last several months the Brzezinski line took over in the American leadership.”

♦ “Rebuttal of Gromyko’s Remarks on US-Soviet Relations,” Cable from Vance to Amembassy Moscow, February 17, 1980

The State Department seeks to refute Gromyko’s list of complaints about U.S. and Western behavior, including the handling of the “artificial issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba.”.

♦ Minutes of the Official Conversations between SED CC General Secretary and Chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker, and the First Secretary of the CC CP Cuba and Chairman of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers, Fidel Castro Rus in the Palace of the Revolution in Havana, 28 May 1980”

Castro recalls his arguments with the Soviets during the “mini-crisis” on the Cuban brigade.