

# The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente

## A Chronology<sup>\*</sup>

**August 31, 1926** - The USSR and Afghanistan sign a Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Intervention.

**Spring 1929** - Soviet military expedition, directed by Vitaly Primakov, the Soviet Military Attache in Kabul, penetrates into Afghanistan and becomes involved in power struggle there.

**October 1941** - The USSR issues a memorandum calling for Afghanistan's neutrality in the war.

**November 1941** - Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sends a letter to the Soviet embassy in Kabul noting that "to fight in Afghanistan with the basmachi [armed Muslim guerrillas who fled from Soviet Central Asia] and the White Guard would mean provoking a war in Central Asia, which would be to the advantage of Germany and Japan. It would undercut our prestige in the East and destabilize the territories behind the Red Army's frontlines. Therefore, neutralization of Afghanistan and cooperation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, along with strengthening relations with Yemen are the main tasks of our policy in this region." (Lyakhovsky, p. 15)

**1955-56** - Soviet military equipment, armaments and specialists begin to appear in Afghanistan.

**1963** - Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, and others organize the United National Front of Afghanistan.

**1965** - The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is formed. Taraki becomes its general secretary, and Babrak Karmal secretary of the Central Committee. (Lyakhovsky, p. 17)

**Fall of 1966** - The PDPA is split into two factions, "Khalq" of Taraki and "Parcham" of Karmal.

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\* This chronology was compiled by Malcolm Byrne and Vladislav Zubok with assistance from the staff of The National Security Archive.

**July 17, 1973** - King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan is overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud.

**1974** - Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran launches a determined effort to draw Afghanistan into a Western-tilted, Teheran-centered regional economic and security sphere embracing India, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf states. (Harrison, p. 15)

## 1977

**1977** - Some 1,300 Soviet technicians are currently in Afghanistan. (*Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response*, 1/10/80)

**February 1977** - A *Loya Jirgah* elects Mohammad Daoud president of the Republic of Afghanistan. (Ghaus, p. 174)

**February 1977** - Daoud announces a new Afghan constitution which provides for only one political party, purges members of the PDPA from positions in the bureaucracy and the army and appoints vocal anti-Communists to the ministries of interior (Ghulam Haidar Rasuli) and defense (Abdul Qadir Nuristani). (Barnet)

**March 1977** - Daoud receives and accepts an invitation from the Soviet government to visit Moscow in April. (Ghaus, p. 174)

**April 12-15, 1977** - Daoud visits Moscow and, according to Afghan diplomatic sources, stalks out of a meeting with Politburo officials after reminding Brezhnev that he is the president of an independent country. Nevertheless, a 12-year agreement to develop Afghan-Soviet economic and trade relations is signed. Anthony Arnold claims that Brezhnev challenged Daoud to "get rid of all those imperialist advisors" in Afghanistan, to which Daoud replied that he would dismiss all foreign advisors when they were no longer needed. (*Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment*, 1/30/78; Garthoff, p. 894; Arnold, p. 65) After the visit Daoud starts looking for ways to offset Afghan military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union, begins a crack-down on the PDPA. (Harrison, p. 20)

**April 15, 1977** - The Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council decides to maintain AID and USIS programs in Ethiopia at present levels; to continue non-lethal military equipment and military training of Ethiopians in the United States; to delay all other military actions; and to tell Somalia that "our military relationship with Ethiopia is on a downward trend." (*Policy Review Committee Meeting on Horn of Africa*, 4/15/77)

**June 1977** - the leaders of "Khalq" and "Parcham" sign a "Declaration of Unity of the PDPA."

**July 29, 1977** - Afghan Ambassador Abdul Wahid Karim visits Carter at the White House. Carter acknowledges Afghanistan's new constitution, particularly its human rights provisions and compliments Afghanistan on the implementation of the new joint commission on Afghan narcotics matters. Carter also acknowledges Daoud's efforts toward economic development, saying: "We are ready to help" in this effort. (*Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment*, 1/30/78)

**August 1977** - A presidential policy review (PRM) recommends the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could react quickly to contingencies in the Persian Gulf (Harrison, p. 55)

**October 1, 1977** - Vance meets with Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah and extends an invitation to Daoud to visit Carter in the United States in the summer of 1978. Abdullah says that his government "wants a closer relationship with the new American administration and a 'very visible' U.S. presence in Afghanistan." Vance responds that the United States supports the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and will continue U.S. assistance programs. (Garthoff, p. 938; *Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment*, 1/30/78)

**Late 1977** - A State Department assessment of Afghanistan's external relations during 1977 finds that U.S. interests in the region were well served by Afghanistan's improved relations with both Pakistan and Iran, as well as by Daoud's "deft and able" handling of his country's complex relationship with the USSR. The Soviet Union "avoided any appearance of meddling in Afghan internal affairs," while maintaining its position as the major aid donor to Afghanistan. The Soviet government did, however, supply Afghanistan with "a few significant new weapons," such as SA-3 and SA-7 missiles. Daoud's desire to visit the United States following a trip to Moscow in April is viewed as part of an ongoing balancing act between the two superpowers. No significant breakthroughs were made with China during 1977. Relations with the United States were reported as "excellent;" funding for the U.S. military training program for Afghan officers was doubled in the hope of offsetting, even if only slightly, substantial Soviet assistance to the Afghan military. (*Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment*, 1/30/78)

**December 31, 1977** - Carter meets with the Shah in Tehran. During a toast at a State Dinner, Carter refers to Iran as "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." (*Toast by the President at a State Dinner, Tehran*, 12/31/77)

## 1978

**February 27, 1978** - As part of its annual policy assessment, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issues a report on U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan for 1978. The United States is to encourage Afghanistan's political independence and its political and economic development. The United States is not and should not become responsible for, or committed to, the "protection" of Afghanistan in any respect. Improved international and regional ties should be promoted, the Embassy argues, and Afghan reliance on the Soviet Union should be reduced by a diversification of Afghanistan's economic, political and military relationships with Iran, India, Turkey and the politically moderate countries of the Persian Gulf. (*1978 Annual Policy Assessment--Part II: Approaches to Achieving Our Goals and Objectives, 2/27/78*)

**March 9, 1978** - Adolph Dubs, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, refers to Afghanistan as "still very stable." He adds that Daoud does not appear to face any opposition at present and that efforts to increase economic growth are continuing. (House, p. 134)

**April 17, 1978** - Parcham intellectual and organizer Mir Akbar Khyber is murdered, possibly by the Daoud government or a member of it, or possibly by rival Khalqis -- perhaps Hafizullah Amin. The event, and reaction to it -- a large demonstration at the funeral two days later -- prompt a crackdown by Daoud, which itself leads to a coup against Daoud 11 days later. (Garthoff2, pp. 985-986)

**April 25, 1978** - In a speech, Brezhnev defends Soviet intervention in the third world, arguing that there is no contradiction between detente and Soviet relations with "countries liberated from colonialism." Charges that the Soviet Union has a "policy of expansion" are a "fabrication." He strongly supports detente and arms control and declares that in spite of "current oscillation," detente is the basis of relations with the U.S. (Garthoff, p. 596)

**April 26, 1978** - Daoud announces an "anti-Islamic" plot, allowing him the pretext to arrest seven main Parcham and Khalq leaders including Taraki, Amin and Karmal. Amin, for some reason, is only detained under house arrest for several hours, which gives him time to warn other Khalqis and leftists. (Garthoff2, p. 985)

**April 27, 1978** - Led by Maj. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, a 600-man force with 60 tanks storms the Arg, the walled area around Daoud's palace compound. About 20 MiG-21 and Soviet Union-7 fighter-bombers later join in the battle on the side of the coup plotters. Most of Daoud's forces stand on the sidelines rather than defending Daoud. Early the next morning, Daoud and his family, plus most of his ministers, are killed. The coup plotters then purge Daoud's Mohammadzai clan. (Garthoff2, p. 986)

**April 27, 1978** - Leaders of the coup against Daoud announce the formation of a Revolutionary Military Council including Watanjar. For the next three days, there is no

public mention of the status of Taraki, Amin or Karmal, or of the PDPA. It is later established that the Soviets had neither the time nor opportunity to establish a role for itself in instigating the coup, whether or not Moscow intended to see the PDPA take power at a later date. [See, for example, Puzanov report of May 5, 1978, and other accounts of Soviet officials, including Lt. Gen. Gorelov and KGB deputy chief of station in Kabul Col. Aleksandr Morozov which variously describe surprise by Soviet officials and recount earlier advice against a coup.] Some Soviet military advisers likely discovered what was about to happen and may even have participated in the event. (Garthoff2, pp. 986-988)

**April 29, 1978** - Taraki tells the Soviet ambassador in Kabul that "Afghanistan, observing Marxism-Leninism, will take the path of building Socialism and will belong to the socialist camp," but the PDPA will do it with "caution" and will inform the people of its true goals "later." (SCCD-W)

**April 30, 1978** - Officials of the newly named Democratic Republic of Afghanistan announce in Decree No. 1 that a new Revolutionary Council has been established, headed by Taraki, who also takes over as prime minister. Two days later, Decree No. 2 announces that Karmal is the new vice president of the Council, and that he and Amin have been named deputy prime ministers. Amin is also appointed foreign minister. At first, the new regime declares itself "nonaligned" rather than "communist," possibly in part to keep the door open for continued U.S. economic aid. There are statements of intent "to further strengthen and consolidate friendly relations and all-around cooperation with the USSR." Within two months of the revolt, several Parcham officials (and military figures) are removed from their posts, reflecting a break-up of the Khalq-Parcham alliance. The Soviets reportedly oppose the purge. (Garthoff, pp. 986-987, 996)

**April 30, 1978** - In an interview with *The New York Times*, Carter states his support for Israel's peace objectives, explicitly opposing a Palestinian state and complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. (Sobel, p. 204)

**April 30, 1978** - The Shah of Iran tells U.S. presidential candidate George Bush that he views the communist seizure of power in Afghanistan as one more example of the Soviet grand design to encircle Iran. The Shah also speaks of his concern for the other Persian Gulf states, which he says are "run by a bunch of bedouins" who have no plans and are no match for forces determined to overthrow them. (*Military Conflict in Kabul*, 4/30/78)

**April 30, 1978** - Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, argues in a secret memorandum that "we need to take into account the mix of nationalism and Communism in the new leadership [of Afghanistan] and seek to avoid driving the new regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union than it might wish." Vance accepts this conclusion. Brzezinski, however, sees the April coup as the opening gambit in a Soviet master plan to incorporate Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit

and ultimately by political and military moves to subjugate the Gulf oil-producing states. (Harrison, p. 32)

**May 1, 1978** - The Afghan PDPA Revolutionary Council announces the formation of the first PDPA cabinet following the coup against Mohammad Daoud. Nur Mohammad Taraki is named president of the Council and prime minister; Babrak Karmal becomes vice chairman and deputy prime minister; Hafizullah Amin takes over as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. (Anwar, pp. 110-112; Adamec, p. 188)

**May 17, 1978** - A group of CPSU "party advisers" arrives in Kabul to assist the PDPA in strengthening its unity. It consists of Nikolai Simonenko, head of the Afghanistan sector of the International Department of the CC CPSU, Yuri Gankovsky and V.M. Smirnov. Another group of Soviet experts "in state security" arrives simultaneously. (SCCD-W)

**May 19, 1978** - *Pravda* reports on the visit of Hafizullah Amin to Moscow, where he declares that Afghanistan is "linked by unbreakable ties of brotherly friendship and neighborliness with its great neighbor, the Soviet Union." Amin also states that Afghanistan will seek to improve Afghan-Soviet relations in the future. (Sen Gupta, p. 46)

**May 19, 1978** - The White House discloses that 18 C-141 transport planes have been assigned to the French-Belgian airlift in Zaire. (NYT 5/20/78)

**May 21-23, 1978** - Brzezinski visits Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders about U.S. strategic plans, technological assistance, plans for countering Soviet policy and political collaboration in Africa and other areas. Carter has instructed Brzezinski to tell the Chinese that the U.S. has "made up its mind" to begin a "new phase in the American-Chinese relationship." During his mission, Brzezinski talks about the "polar bear" to the north and states that the Soviets support "international marauders" in Africa. In his banquet toast, Brzezinski states that "[o]nly those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear the further development of American-Chinese relations." (Garthoff, pp. 599, 702; Brzezinski, pp. 209-219)

**May 23, 1978** - Hafizullah Amin presents to Soviet advisers his plan for reorganizing the PDPA, which excludes the Parchamis from every influential position (Westad)

According to Colonel Alexander Morozov, deputy chief of the KGB intelligence station, "Amin isolated the advisers from the PDPA's chief ideologist, Babrak Karmal, and quickly indoctrinated Simonenko, turning him into a supporter of the Khalq faction." (Morozov, NT, 38, 1991, p. 39)

**May 24, 1978** - Reacting to insistent pleas from the Soviet ambassador and "party advisers" to cease factional struggles, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the

PDPA passes a decision to ban the use of the factional names "Khalq" and "Parcham."  
(SCCD-W)

**May 31, 1978** - Puzanov sends a political letter to Moscow on the domestic situation in the DRA, informing that "according to the available information" the U.S. embassy and the embassies of other Western countries in Kabul have received instructions to seek all means to retain Western positions in Afghanistan, "including a promise to give economic assistance." Puzanov concludes that the dispatch of large group of Soviet advisers to work in the state apparatus and on the five-year plan will help "build sympathies" towards the USSR and "secure and consolidate our positions in Afghanistan." (Briefing Book, Tab 2)

**June 2, 1978** - The United States responds to an earlier Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) request for diplomatic relations by issuing a letter through the U.S. Embassy in Kabul that extends official U.S. recognition to the new government of Afghanistan. (*Acknowledgement of and Response to DRA Request for U.S. Recognition; Includes DRA Letter, 5/17/78*)

**June 11, 1978** - Nur Ahmad Nur, member of the Politburo of the CC PDPA, and a Parcham member, tells Soviet Ambassador in Kabul Alexander Puzanov that "there is only one leading force in the country - Hafizullah Amin." He also says that "in the Politburo everybody fears Amin." (Westad, p. 53)

**June 17, 1978** - In a new round of the power struggle in Kabul, the Politburo of the CC PDPA decides to send a number of Parchami officials abroad as ambassadors.

**June 18, 1978** - A group of CPSU advisers, including V.I. Kharazov, alternate member of the CC CPSU, arrive in Kabul. The leader of the Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, in Taraki's presence, tells Puzanov and Kharazov that he "was isolated" and the PDPA was on the verge of "collapse." Taraki responds angrily that "the party is united ... and we will run over those who oppose unity with a steamroller." (SCCD-W; Westad, p. 54)

**June 18, 1978** - Babrak Karmal openly clashes with Taraki and Amin and asks for permission to leave the country as an ambassador "or under pretext of medical treatment." (Record of Puzanov-Taraki conversation, 18 June, Briefing Book, Tab 2)

**June 19, 1978** - The U.S. Embassy in Kabul obtains a Dari-language document entitled "Constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan." The authenticity of the document is not confirmed. If genuine, the Embassy believes, it would "leave little doubt" as to the Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet nature of the PDPA. The Embassy believes that the document is genuine, but questions its date. It probably predates the coup in April and may be the Party's founding document from 1965. The document states that the PDPA's "ideology is the practical experience of Marxism-Leninism." Since the overthrow of Daoud in April, however, Nur Mohammad Taraki has denied that the PDPA is a

communist party and says accusations to the contrary stem from "international reactionary circles." (*"Constitution" of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan Proclaims a Belief in Principles of Marxism-Leninism*, 6/19/78)

**June 24, 1978** - President Ahmad Hussein al-Ghasmi of North Yemen is murdered. Shortly afterwards, President Salem Rubayi Ali of South Yemen is killed by South Yemeni security forces, which have been trained by Cuba and East Germany. Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, with backing from the Soviet Union, emerges as the new ruler of South Yemen. In July, Carter sends Department of Defense representatives to North Yemen to initiate a new military aid program in an attempt to "counter Soviet influence." The U.S. fears that if North Yemen is weakened, South Yemen will move closer to Moscow. (Garthoff, pp. 655-656)

**June 25, 1978** - In Minsk, Brezhnev criticizes the United States for trying to "play China off against the USSR." (FAC, p. 6; NYT 6/26/78)

**June 27, 1978** - A group of 48 Soviet advisers, assigned to work in the government of the DRA, arrives in Kabul. (SCCD-W)

**Summer 1978** - A major uprising takes place in Nuristan, in eastern Afghanistan, reflecting a simmering dissatisfaction with the nature and pace of reforms, many of which have the effect of wiping out traditional social and religious practices. By the following winter, most of the country's 28 provinces are experiencing the rise of armed resistance to the Taraki regime. (Garthoff2, pp. 989-990)

**July 1, 1978** - Taraki and Amin announce a purge of Parcham members of the PDPA. Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmad Nur and Sultan Ali Keshtmand are removed from their cabinet posts, and Karmal named ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Puzanov refuses to meet Karmal. He informs Taraki about Brezhnev's invitation to come to Moscow in October-November. (SCCD-W)

**July 13-14, 1978** - Taraki meets with David Newsom, undersecretary of state for political affairs. Newsom concludes that the Taraki-Amin regime "hadn't found itself. There were divisions in it and it was still on probation in Soviet eyes. I felt it was justifiable to keep what assets we had and to continue a ... monitoring action." According to Taraki, Newsom expressed concern with "the new chill" in U.S.-Afghan relations and asked a "provocative question": what would the DRA government do if the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan. (Harrison, p. 32; SCCD-W)

**July 15, 1978** - Carter approves a sale of \$600 million in weapons to Iran. (NYT 7/16/78)

**August 3, 1978** - A KGB delegation headed by chief of First Directorate (intelligence) Vladimir Kryuchkov ("V.A. Alexandrov") visits Afghanistan. The impressions of one member of the delegation, KGB General Oleg Kalugin, are that Taraki "did not have the physical strength or the backing to continue to lead the country for long" and that Amin "was a far more impressive figure." During the visit the officers of the KGB station in Kabul describe Amin "as a homosexual and said it was rumored he had been recruited by the CIA." The delegation instructs the police and state security of the DRA on "how to fight the growing CIA presence in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan." Kryuchkov signs an agreement "to share intelligence and deepen cooperation" between the KGB and the Afghan state security. (SCCD-W; Kalugin, pp. 232-233)

**August 10, 1978** - New U.S. ambassador in Afghanistan Adolph Dubs states confidentially to a visiting U.S. official that, over time, a more positive American approach to the Afghan regime could "significantly reduce" the existing level of Soviet influence in Kabul. Afghanistan would still have a pronounced pro-Soviet tilt, but "it would not be a Soviet satellite, militarily or otherwise." Amin, in his estimate, "can't go as far as Tito or even Ceausescu." (Harrison, p. 33)

**August 22-23, 1978** - Taraki and Amin arrest Keshtmand, A. Kadyr, minister of defense, and other Parchamis. Taraki tells the Soviet ambassador that he has unmasked an "anti-government plot" which allegedly involved the PRC, the United States, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the FRG. He points out that "the Chinese are even more dangerous enemies [for Afghanistan] than Americans." (SCCD-W)

**Fall 1978** - The Soviets move to resume talks on Indian Ocean demilitarization, but the U.S. declines the offer. (Garthoff, p.762)

**September 7, 1978** - In Tehran and several other cities, the Iranian government declares martial law for a six-month period. The next day, massive protests break out in response. (NYT 9/9/78, 9/10/78)

**September 22, 1978** - The U.S. Senate passes by voice vote an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill, which prohibits funding for assistance to Nicaragua and Afghanistan unless it "serve[s] to promote democratic process" in those countries. The bill is expected to pass quickly. (*Senate Amendment on Aid to Afghanistan*, 9/22/78)

**September 25-27, 1978** - Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the CC CPSU and head of the International Department, visits Kabul to talk with Taraki, Amin and other leaders of the PDPA. The main purpose of the visit is "to stop mass repressions," especially against the members of the Parcham faction. Taraki and Amin tell Ponomarev that there is only one solution to the factional strife in the PDPA: "either us, or [Parchamis]" (Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, from Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und

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Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin; reproduced in the Briefing Book, tab 2; Garthoff2, pp. 998-999)

**October 1978** - "The fourth-ranking man in the Soviet Politburo," (initially thought to be Andrei Kirilenko) visits Kabul, according to East German Ambassador to Afghanistan Hermann Schwiesau. (*High-Level Soviet Visitor Reportedly Visited Kabul Last October*, 8/8/79; *High Level Soviet Politburo Member Visited Amemb Kabul Last October*, 8/14/79)

**October 6, 1978** - Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini arrives in Paris from Baghdad. (NYT 10/7/78)

**October 22, 1978** - Amin tells the Soviet ambassador that the Afghans would like the Soviet Union to pardon their loan debts "in a comradely fashion." (SCCD-W)

**October 31, 1978** - At a meeting in Washington with Crown Prince Reza of Iran, Carter expresses his support for the Shah. (NYT 11/1/78)

**November 7, 1978** - During a speech, Hafizullah Amin describes the Saur Revolution of April 1978 as an "historical extension of the Great October Revolution" in Russia in 1917. (*Afghan-Soviet Relations on the Eve of Taraki's Trip to Moscow*, 12/6/78)

**November 14, 1978** - Amin asks for relief from payments on Soviet loans and for Soviet advisers. Puzanov responds that "already more than 700 Soviet advisers and experts work on a free-of-charge [bezvozmezdnoi osnove] basis in civil ministries and in the military field in Afghanistan." Amin asks for permission to send to the USSR "several thousand unqualified Afghan workers." (SCCD-W)

**November 17, 1978** - Brezhnev writes to Carter concerning Iran. (Garrison)

**November 19, 1978** - In a formal response to a warning from Brezhnev not to intervene in Iran, Vance denies any U.S. intention to do so. (FAC, p. 16)

**November 22, 1978** - Carter responds to Brezhnev's November 17 letter on Iran. (Garrison)

**November 22, 1978** - Leonid Brezhnev, opening the session of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, says that Soviet assistance should be reserved only for "our most important, justified and first-priority goals. It ... should go first of all to the state with the expressed and consistent socialist orientation. I have in mind such states as the People's Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan and some others." (Minutes, Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin).

**November 27, 1978** - On the eve of Taraki's visit to Moscow, Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia Yuri Sinelnikov declines an appeal for support from a group of Parchamists-in-exile to the Soviet leadership. The ambassador responds that it is an "internal matter of Afghanistan and should be resolved by the Afghans themselves." (SCCD-W)

**December 1978** - A U.S. study team is sent to the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area to look into the availability of base facilities in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia and Kenya. The facilities are needed for the prospective Rapid Deployment Force. (Garthoff, p. 974)

**December 5, 1978** - Afghanistan and the Soviet Union conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation. The treaty, signed by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Brezhnev in Moscow, envisions a 20-year commitment for "cooperation in the military field." Taraki vows at the same time that Afghanistan will remain nonaligned. The treaty allows Afghanistan to call on Soviet military assistance if needed. State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter III says that "our initial reaction is that the treaty seems to reaffirm the basic thrust of previous agreements between the USSR and Afghanistan," but officials acknowledge in private that U.S. concern is greater than official statements indicate. (Garthoff, p. 901; Anwar, p. 152; NYT 12/6/78; BS 12/7/78)

**December 15, 1978** - Carter announces that China and the United States have agreed to establish diplomatic ties on January 1. (*Joint Communique Issued by the United States and the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 12/15/78*)

**December 17, 1978** - Puzanov informs Taraki of the decision of the Soviet government to supply Afghanistan with military equipment and armament at a cost of 24 million rubles. Afghanistan will receive a "bonus" loan of 12 million rubles for 10 years to pay for it, and the rest will be supplied for free. (SCCD-W)

**December 19, 1978** - Amin sends a letter to the Soviet leadership requesting 20 million rubles of assistance to expand state security and create a military intelligence network for the DRA in Iran, Pakistan and "some Arab countries." (SCCD-W)

**December 29, 1978** - Shahpour Bakhtiar is named prime minister of Iran. (FAC, p. 44)

**Late 1978-early 1979**- Brzezinski persuades the President to transfer jurisdiction over the CIA from the Inter-Agency Policy Review Committee, headed by Vance, to the National Security Council's Special Coordination Committee, which Brzezinski chairs. Having control over covert operations enables Brzezinski to take the first steps toward a more aggressively anti-Soviet Afghan policy without the State Department's knowing very much about it. Brzezinski thinks the Americans should be doing something covertly to frustrate Soviet ambitions in Afghanistan. (Harrison, pp. 32-33)

1979

**January 1979** - On the recommendation of U.S. Ambassador to Kabul Adolph Dubs, the Defense Department proposes a \$310,000 program for 1979-80 to resume training Afghan officers. A similar program was cut in April 1978. (Harrison, p. 34)

**January 1, 1979** - The United States and China formally resume ties. (NYT 1/2/79)

**January 2, 1979** - In his first public appearance in two months, the Shah of Iran announces that he is willing to take a vacation as soon as the government of Prime Minister-Designate Bakhtiar is firmly in place. (FAC, p. 44)

**January 5, 1979** - Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe Gen. Robert Huyser begins a month-long series of meetings in Iran with military leaders. (FAC, p. 44)

**January 6, 1979** - Bakhtiar and his 14-man civilian cabinet are installed in Iran. From Paris, Khomeini requests that workers disobey the new government and calls for a national day of mourning in memory of the 2,000 killed in the struggle against the Shah in 1978. (NYT 1/7/79)

**January 11, 1979** - Vance tells reporters that the Administration supports the Regency Council, formed by the Shah, with Shahpour Bakhtiar as the prime minister. (*Statement and Replies by the Secretary of State to Questions Asked at a News Conference, 1/11/79*)

**January 15, 1979** - Amin informs Puzanov about his conversation with Thomas Thornton, an assistant to Brzezinski. (SCCD-W)

**January 16, 1979** - The Shah of Iran and Empress Farah leave Iran for Aswan, Egypt. (NYT 1/17/79)

**January 16-17, 1979** - A delegation of the Soviet ministry of defense in Kabul, headed by General V.E. Kuznetsov, works out an agreement concerning the supply of armaments and other "special property" [spetsimuschestvo] to Afghanistan in 1979-1980 in the amount of 236 million rubles. The Soviet side agrees to pay 75% of the costs and give the DRA 15-year loans to cover the rest of the sum. (SCCD-W)

**January 29-February 1, 1979** - Deng Xiaoping meets with Carter in Washington and the U.S. re-establishes full relations with the PRC. In a joint communique, the two leaders state that they will continue strengthening their friendly relations and cooperation and that both countries are "opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or domination over others." (*Joint Press Communique Issued at Washington,*

*D.C., by the President and the Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2/1/79; Garthoff, p. 720)*

**February 1979** - During the Iranian revolution, the U.S. loses significant technical intelligence monitoring stations. The loss of these stations, important for monitoring Soviet missile tests, later causes senators such as John Glenn (D-Ohio) to refuse to support the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 940; Vance, p. 354)

**February 1, 1979** - Ending his 15-year exile, Khomeini arrives in Iran. Bakhtiar resists his call for a provisional Islamic government. (NYT 2/2/79, 2/3/79)

**February 2, 1979** - The *Washington Post* publishes an eyewitness report to the effect that at least two thousand Afghans are being trained at former Pakistani Army bases guarded by Pakistani patrols. The program is the result of coordination between the CIA and the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI). (Harrison, p. 34)

**February 2, 1979** - Ivan Arkhipov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, meets with Taraki in Kabul. He advises him to borrow from the Soviet experience "as a time-proven treasure-box" and informs him of the Soviet government's decision to grant Afghanistan assistance in the amount of 88 million rubles annually for the next five years (1979-84). The funds cover consumer goods and the construction of 17 plants, factories, and other industrial installations. (SCCD-W)

**February 8, 1979** - Over one million Iranian marchers, joined by the military, call for Shahpour Bakhtiar's resignation in favor of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. (NYT 2/9/79)

**February 11, 1979** - After the Iranian army withdraws its support of Bakhtiar's government, he resigns. Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and SAVAK chief Nematollah Nassiri are seized by armed civilians. About 11,000 political prisoners escape from jail. (NYT 2/12/79)

**February 14, 1979** - Leftist guerrillas attack the U.S. Embassy in Iran, trapping Ambassador William Sullivan and his staff. They are later freed by Khomeini forces. (NYT 2/15/79)

**February 14, 1979** - U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs is kidnapped by a Tajik, anti-Pushtun separatist group, the Setam-i-Milli (Oppressed National Movement) and taken by force to a room at the Kabul Hotel where he is later killed during a rescue attempt by Afghan security forces. U.S. officials had explicitly asked that no action be taken before consulting them. Later, despite repeated requests, authorities refuse to allow U.S. officials to examine the "rescue" scene. The United States is convinced that the Soviet advisers on the scene refused to let U.S. diplomats negotiate for Dubs. One week later, the Carter Administration decides to make deep cuts in the U.S. aid program for

Afghanistan because of the killing. The aid cuts are decided upon to protest the incident and because of the "abysmal human-rights record" of the leftist government. (*The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs*, 2/80; WP 2/22/79)

**February 15, 1979** - The United States issues a formal protest to the Soviet Union about Soviet anti-American activities in Iran. It states that such activities and the possible Soviet connection to the murder of Ambassador Dubs in Afghanistan could strain relations and delay the conclusion of SALT. (NYT 2/16/79)

**February 19, 1979** - Kabul rejects the U.S. protest over Dubs' February 14 murder and denies allegations of a Soviet advisory role in his death. (NYT 2/20/79)

**February 20, 1979** - In a speech at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Carter states that the events in Iran, Afghanistan and Southeast Asia will not mandate a revision in U.S. policy. He warns other countries, namely the Soviet Union, against interfering in Iran. (*Address by the President at the Georgia Institute of Technology*, 2/20/79, NYT 2/21/79)

**February 25, 1979** - In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador to Iran Vladimir Vinogradov, Khomeini stresses his policy of nonalignment with foreign nations. (NYT 2/26/79)

**February 26, 1979** - During his Supreme Soviet election speech, Gromyko criticizes the U.S. for "playing--to put it mildly--the 'China card'....If this is being done to pressure the Soviet Union, such attempts are futile and can only yield the opposite effect." His basic point is to warn the U.S. against Chinese exploitation of U.S. support. The same day, a Radio Moscow commentator warns against a Chinese plan to precipitate a U.S.-Soviet war. (Garthoff, p. 725)

**February 28, 1979** - Brzezinski proposes to Carter that a "consultative security framework" be established for Southwest Asia as the basis for reasserting U.S. influence. This contributes to the promulgation, 11 months later, of a policy for U.S. involvement in the region that comes to be known as the "Carter Doctrine." (WP 1/24/80)

**February 28, 1979** - The United States accelerates deliveries of defensive arms previously committed to North Yemen in response to requests by that government. (*Statement Issued by the Department of State*, 2/28/79)

**March 1, 1979** - The State and Defense Departments announce that the listening post in Kabban, Iran, is now closed. Some officials say that this will damage the ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty; State Department officials deny this. (NYT 3/2/79)

**March 5, 1979** - Vance warns Dobrynin against a Soviet-Cuban role in the Arabian Sea. (FAC, p. 39)

**March 6, 1979** - Carter orders a task force into the Arabian Sea. (FAC, p. 39)

**March 9, 1979** - Carter approves a \$390 million aid plan for North Yemen. On March 16, the arms aid, provided with assistance from Saudi Arabia, is shipped. A few months later, the Soviet Union makes an arms deal with North Yemen twice the size of the U.S. deal. (NYT 3/10/79; Garthoff, pp. 657, 659)

**March 12, 1979** - The United States estimates that there are 800-100 Soviet advisers in South Yemen, perhaps half of them military, and 500-700 Cuban advisers, half of whom are military. (*Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Crawford) Before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3/12/79*)

**March 14-September 1979** - According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the number of Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan increases to between 3,000 and 4,000. Many of them are said to "have taken over roles that exceed strictly advisory ones," although no evidence exists of Soviet troops participating in actual combat operations. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has forced some Soviet personnel to take on "direct security responsibilities," particularly at Bagram Air Base where some 400 Soviet troops are stationed. (*Dialogue on Afghanistan, 10/19/79*)

**March 15, 1979** - *Pravda* and *Izvestia* report that by promoting the Middle-East peace accords, the United States is seeking to extend its military and political hegemony in the Middle East following the loss of its foothold in Iran. (Sobel, p. 249)

**March 16, 1979** - On the same day that Carter sends weapons to North Yemen, the Arab League arranges a "cease fire" between North and South Yemen. Two weeks later, President Saleh of North Yemen and President Isma'il of South Yemen announce "talks on unification." Later CIA analyses indicate that reports the U.S. had received on the conflict between the two countries were exaggerated. Raymond Garthoff writes later that there is no evidence of Soviet involvement in the conflict. The Soviet Union was interested in power over a harmonious, rather than conflicting, North Yemen and South Yemen. (Garthoff, pp. 657-659)

**March 1979** - This month, and on several other occasions in succeeding months, Puzanov and senior KGB representative Boris Ivanov urge that Moscow send troops, either openly or covertly, to guard the Bagram air base and Kabul itself. Initially, Moscow declines, but in early July an airborne battalion is sent undercover to Bagram. (Garthoff, pp. 1001-1002)

**March 17-19, 1979** - A major mutiny in Herat reaches its peak. Numbers of Afghan Army soldiers defect to the rebels, and in the fighting several Soviet military advisers and their families are killed. The uprising shows the extent of unrest in the country and convinces Moscow of the need to increase the Soviet presence. (Garthoff2, p. 991)

**March 17-19, 1979** - The Soviet Politburo meets in three extended sessions during the height of the Herat crisis to discuss pleas from Taraki and Amin to send troops. Among those present on the first day, Ustinov does not press for deploying Soviet forces while Gromyko insists "under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan." The next day, however, even though the situation in Herat has worsened, Kosygin, Andropov and others -- even Gromyko -- advocate staying away from a commitment of troops. Gromyko delivers a detailed rundown of the reasons why such a commitment would be a mistake (see the relevant documents in this collection). He also points out that the conflict is an internal Afghan affair. The Politburo decides to invite Taraki to Moscow to discuss the situation directly. (Garthoff2, pp. 991-994)

**March 19, 1979** - *Pravda* prints charges that Pakistan, Egypt, China, and "some Western countries" are responsible for the uprising in Herat. The U.S., Britain and West Germany are soon identified by name, and Iran is given part of the blame as well. This flatly contradicts internal Politburo assessments at the time that the Afghan government itself is largely the problem. (Garthoff2, p. 995)

**March 19, 1979** - KGB Lieutenant General Boris Ivanov arrives in Kabul as a political representative of Yuri Andropov. He is accompanied by the head of staff of the Soviet Border Troops, Yuri Neshumov. Ivanov informs Taraki that his main task would be "on-the-spot decisions regarding cooperation with the security organs of the DRA" and "tactfully advises" Taraki to undertake propagandist and educational measures that could help, "besides military struggle," to "win the population over." Ivanov in time becomes a main Moscow's "watcher" of Amin. He shares Amin's admiration for Joseph Stalin, but is suspicious of Amin's possible connections with the CIA. (SCCD-W; Morozov, 38, 1991, p. 37)

**March 20, 1979** - Taraki arrives in Moscow at the Soviets' invitation. He is offered assurances of all manner of assistance except the introduction of Soviet troops. Taraki leaves generally satisfied with the gesture of support, but he and Amin continue to solicit direct military assistance in the coming months. (Garthoff2, p. 994)

**March 1979** - Brzezinski instructs Stansfield Turner "to generate more information regarding the nature and extent of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan." (Brzezinski, p. 346)

**March 23, 1979** - The United States warns the Soviet Union against interfering in the fighting in Afghanistan between rebel and government forces. Noting recent increased

movement of Soviet advisors and military equipment into Afghanistan, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter says that while aid to the pro-Soviet government would not be considered interference, actual participation in combat by Soviet forces would destabilize the whole area. He says that there is no indication that Soviet troops have engaged in combat against the Muslim rebels. (WP 3/24/79)

**March 25, 1979** - Puzanov informs Taraki that the Soviet embassy in Iran approached Khomeini and Bazargan "with the aim of terminating [Iranian] interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan." Brezhnev and Kosygin talk with Taraki on a high-frequency phone and advise him to find "a subtle approach" to the Muslim clergy. Soviet APCs and helicopters arrive in Afghanistan. (SCCD-W)

**March 25-28, 1979** - The Soviet Union reportedly intensifies arms supply efforts to the Afghan government, including the provision of 25 large helicopters designed to drop Afghan troops into remote areas where rebel tribesmen are contesting government control. State Department officials express doubts that the Afghan military will be able to fly the helicopters themselves and speculate that Soviet advisors will have to ferry Afghan troops to battle areas, thus increasing the chances of direct Soviet involvement in actual fighting. (WP 3/28/79)

**March 27, 1979** - Amin is appointed Afghanistan's prime minister while retaining his position as foreign minister. Nur Mohammad Taraki maintains his positions as president, secretary-general of the PDPA and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. A new 18-member cabinet, all of whom are Khalqis, is named. (Sen Gupta, pp. 69-70; Urban, p. 31)

**March 28, 1979** - The House Committee on Foreign Affairs approves an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act introduced by Congressman Edward J. Derwinski (R-Illinois), stating that "[n]one of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the amendments made by this title may be made available for assistance for Afghanistan unless the President determines, and reports to Congress, that assistance for Afghanistan is in the national interest of the United States." (*House Committee Cuts Aid to Afghanistan*, 3/28/79)

**March 28, 1979** - The Soviet Union is reportedly building a submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba. (FAC, p. 60)

**April 1979** - Brzezinski chairs a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting on Afghanistan. In assessing growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the participants agree to "be more sympathetic to those Afghans who [are] determined to preserve their country's independence." According to Brzezinski, Vice President Mondale is helpful in overcoming "rather timid opposition" from the State Department. The resulting program helps finance, orchestrate, and facilitate weapons purchases and related assistance by others. In addition to the covert CIA role, American diplomats begin to make relatively open contact with rebel leaders. Brzezinski also writes later that he personally "consulted

with the Saudis and the Egyptians regarding the fighting in Afghanistan.” (Brzezinski, p. 427-429; Harrison, p. 38)

**April 2, 1979** - The State Department angrily refutes "slanderous and baseless" Soviet allegations that the United States is interfering in Afghanistan, suggesting that the charges are a "smokescreen" to hide the increased Soviet military presence in the country. (WP 4/3/79)

**April 4, 1979** - Kosygin meets with Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow Yakub Khan who delivers a personal letter from Zia ul-Haq. In the letter, Zia affirms that Pakistan is pursuing a policy of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan and forbids the use of its territory for anti-Afghan activities. Puzanov informs Taraki in Kabul about the letter and advises him "in a tactful form" to cancel Afghan plans for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. (SCCD-W)

**April 4, 1979** - Puzanov sends a political letter to Moscow on the first anniversary of the DRA. The letter reports on the considerable assistance to the opposition coming from Pakistan, Iran, the PRC, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain and the FRG. (SCCD-W)

**April 5, 1979** - Alexei Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces, arrives in Kabul with six other Soviet generals for a week-long visit. The inspection tour results in more Soviet arms and advisors being sent to Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 902; Sen Gupta, p. 87; IHT 4/14-15/79)

**April 6, 1979** - The United States rescinds a \$40 million economic and military assistance aid package to Pakistan after the Carter Administration concludes that Karachi is building an enrichment plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. Warren Christopher meets with President Zia ul-Haq, but fails to persuade him to cancel the facility. The cut-off is required under the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. (CRS, p. 44; Spector, p. 83; *Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 14, April 11, 1979*, 4/11/79)

**April 10, 1979** - The Egyptian People's Assembly ratifies the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 329-13. (Sobel, p. 254)

**April 12, 1979** - U.S. intelligence officials reveal that up to 100 Soviet military advisors have been killed in Afghanistan in the last month. Currently, some 3,000 Soviet personnel are believed to be in the country, at least 1,000 of which are fulfilling military functions. (NYT 4/13/79)

**April 16, 1979** - CIA Director Turner says it will take five years to fully restore the intelligence capability that the base in Iran provided for monitoring Soviet missile tests and development. The next day, Harold Brown rejects Turner's assessment, stating that the necessary capabilities will be restored in one year. (NYT 4/17/79; NYT 4/18/79)

**April 19, 1979** - Chinese Prime Minister Deng tells a group of visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee members that the United States is free to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT from its soil. (NYT 4/20/79)

**May 2, 1979** - The Ministry of Defense in Moscow orders the GRU [Glavnoie razvedivatelnoie upravleniie] to organize a special battalion from the well-trained commandos of Central Asian origins. Later this "Muslim" battalion would play a considerable role in the assassination of Amin. (Lyakhovsky, p. 82)

**May 9, 1979** - The U.S. Embassy in Kabul outlines two possible scenarios for Afghanistan. The first is "a 1968 Czechoslovakia-type situation," likely if the Soviet Union feels that the "Afghan Revolution" is endangered. Political preparations for Soviet intervention may have already begun with repeated accusations of U.S., Pakistani, Iranian and Chinese support for the Afghan rebels. The second, more probable scenario, according to U.S. Charge d'Affaires Bruce Amstutz, is that Moscow will avoid direct involvement in Afghanistan's domestic turmoil, possibly resulting in a situation similar to Vietnam. Amstutz adds that Soviet activity in Afghanistan has "increased perceptibly in recent weeks," although not to the extent reported in the world press. (*The Current Soviet Role in Afghanistan*, 5/9/79)

**May 24, 1979** - A State Department memorandum suggests that the Soviet Union may be moving ahead with plans to remove Afghan President Taraki and other members of the Khalqi leadership, possibly replacing them with exiled Parchami leaders including former Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal. According to the State Department, the Soviet Union may be annoyed at the careless manner in which reforms are being undertaken by the Khalqi government, without first building the popular support or institutional framework necessary for these reforms to be successful. The Soviet leadership is probably concerned with its image among Third World and Muslim nations. The memorandum concludes, "[w]e doubt that the Soviets will turn loose of the Afghan tar baby, although they may try to engineer some changes at the top." (*Soviet-Afghan Relations: Is Moscow's Patience Wearing Thin?*, 5/24/79)

**May 25, 1979** - Vasily Safronchuk, head of the Third European Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, arrives in Kabul as a personal emissary of Gromyko. During June-July, Safronchuk pushes for creation of a broad-based "national democratic" leadership, headed by a non-Communist, in which Amin, Taraki, and Karmal would all play a prominent role. Safronchuk makes a point of letting the American Embassy know what he is up to. However, Safronchuk finds Amin to be "an extreme Pushtun nationalist" bent on accumulating personal power. (Harrison, p. 38; Safronchuk, MZh, no. 12, 1990, p.90)

**May or June 1979** - Presumably at about this time, the Politburo in Moscow establishes a commission on Afghanistan, consisting of Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev.

**May-July 1979** - The struggle intensifies between the supporters of Amin and the anti-Amin forces of the Khalq. A "gang of four" powerful ministers emerges around Taraki, including Watanjar, Sherjan Mazdooryar, Asadullah Sarwari and Syed Gulabzoi. In return, Amin creates an all-powerful "Homeland Defense Committee" under his chairmanship and pressures Taraki into surrendering the post of Prime Minister. (Harrison, p. 38)

**June 1979** - According to a Soviet source, the freighter "Al-Kasum" arrives in Karachi, Pakistan, carrying weapons for the Afghan rebels. The weapons, which are mostly Soviet-made, have allegedly been purchased by the CIA for the mujahidin. (Urban, p. 29)

**June 9, 1979** - Puzanov informs Taraki about contacts by the Soviet embassy in Islamabad with Zia ul-Haq and Zia's willingness to meet with Taraki at any time to discuss the reduction of tensions between the two countries. Puzanov advises that Taraki could promise Zia to support Pakistan's application to become a member of the Non-Alignment Movement, in exchange for a written promise to bar political activities for Afghan groups on the territory of Pakistan, to stop propaganda among the Pushtun tribes, and to stop sending armed groups into Afghanistan. (SCCD-W)

**June 10, 1979** - Amin informs Puzanov of a decision to invite Zia ul-Haq to visit the DRA. (SCCD-W)

*June 11 Brezh. speech re'd by Safonchuk 6/25/79 with D of W*

**June 15-18, 1979** - Carter meets with Brezhnev at Vienna, where they sign the SALT II agreement. In one of his statements, Carter criticizes Soviet policy in Africa and Vietnam. He also declares that improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations will not be at the expense of relations with Moscow. Regarding Afghanistan, Carter states that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union should interfere in its internal affairs. In response, Brezhnev rejects U.S. concerns about Vietnam and strongly attacks the Chinese for wanting to incite a world war. He asks that the U.S. join the Soviet Union in preventing attacks on the Afghan government. The two sides disagree over human rights issues. Brezhnev claims that human rights is not a "legitimate" item of discussion because it is so "sensitive." Carter responds that the Soviets "voluntarily signed the Helsinki accords, which made this issue a proper item in state-to-state relations." (*International Issues*, 6/17/79; McLellan, p. 124; Garthoff, pp. 732-740, 762; Carter, pp. 247-260; Brzezinski, pp. 340-344)

**June 26, 1979** - Bruce Amstutz at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reports on a meeting with Soviet diplomat Vassily Safonchuk in which the Soviet denies "that the Soviets would consider bringing in Soviet troops to save the DRA....Reflecting on our conversation, I think he genuinely believed what he was telling me, namely that Soviet physical

intervention would be more harmful than helpful for Soviet interests, and therefore it would not occur." (*Meeting with Soviet Diplomat: Part II of III--Soviet-Afghan Relations*, 6/25/79)

**June 28, 1979** - The Politburo in Moscow approves the recommendation of the commission on Afghanistan to send a battalion of airborne troops to protect Soviet technicians at the Bagram air base, and a special group (125-150) of KGB commandos to protect the Soviet embassy. (The commandos and a 600-man battalion both arrive in early July.) The Politburo also approves an appeal to Taraki and Amin, arguing that they have exacerbated the "objective" problems of the economy and insurgency by instituting purges, and by failing to strengthen local authority and constitute a "national front" including noncommunist groups. (Lyakhovsky, pp. 85-86; Garthoff2, pp. 998, 1002)

**July 1979** - The Politburo sends Ponomarev to Kabul to: urge that the Afghan leadership ease up on purges of Parchamists and expand their political base; underline the seriousness with which the Kremlin is following developments in Afghanistan; and observe first-hand and assess the PDPA's position in the country. The trip is not very successful, in part because the Afghan leaders simply acknowledge Ponomarev's arguments then go about things just as they always have. Also, in Ponomarev's words, the Kremlin dealt with the situation only "superficially. Brezhnev in general was little interested in Afghanistan." (Garthoff2, pp. 998-999)

**July 10, 1979** - Taraki informs the Soviet ambassador in Kabul that the Pakistanis are preparing a break in Afghan-Pakistani talks. Puzanov recommends continuing negotiations with Islamabad, and making "an analogous step" towards Iran. (SCCD-W)

**Mid-July 1979** - A series of "night letters" secretly disseminated at night in Kabul attack Amin, but not Taraki. Among the charges is that Amin is a "CIA agent." Karmal and the Soviets later repeat these same charges after Amin's death. (Garthoff2, pp. 999-1000)

**July 18, 1979** - Amstutz reports to Washington on an extraordinary conversation with East German Ambassador Hermann Schwiesau. The Soviets, according to Schwiesau, are deeply worried about the situation in Afghanistan and particularly about Amin, whom Schwiesau blames for the worsening developments. Moscow is reportedly considering replacing the prime minister and has sent Safronchuk to the country with that task in mind. The Soviets are "determined to save the revolution." (*GDR Ambassador Reports That Soviets Hope To Replace Prime Minister Amin with A Broader Based Govt.*, 7/18/79)

**July 21, 1979** - Amin requests the Soviet government to send 8-10 helicopters with Soviet crews. Puzanov refers to the Soviet policy of not engaging Soviet military personnel in fighting in Afghanistan. Puzanov advises Amin to "find a form" of government that would "preserve Taraki's authority," but allow it "to ameliorate the leadership's operational control." (SCCD)

w/ Bourgeois  
~~July 12/13/79~~  
w/ Hsu  
(p. 27)  
July 13:  
Sen-Hsu conf.  
w/ Hsu  
w/ to Aff. (Amstutz 7/18/79 para. 7)  
July 14:  
Taraki's 62 w/ 8 day, big celebration (Sbid)

**July 25, 1979** - The State Department announces that U.S. government dependents and non-essential personnel are to be evacuated from Afghanistan due to deteriorating internal security conditions. The evacuation order will affect some 100 people. (*Afghan Government Complains about Evacuation of American Dependents from Afghanistan*, 7/25/79)

**July 27, 1979** - Aware that the Soviets are growing more displeased with him, Amin moves to strengthen his position in the regime. He removes Watanjar from the Defense Ministry and takes over the portfolio himself. He also fires Maj. Mazduryar from Interior, among other personnel shifts. (Garthoff2, p. 1001)

**August 1979** - According to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, at about this time Moscow concludes that there is no favorable alternative in Afghanistan to President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin. However, the Soviet Union is said to have decided to support the more moderate Taraki against Amin. (*Dialogue on Afghanistan*, 10/19/79)

**August 2, 1979** - Brzezinski gives a speech in which he warns the USSR against deeper involvement in Afghanistan and asks for non-intervention in the Persian Gulf. (Brzezinski, pp. 402, 427; NYT 8/3/79)

**August 5, 1979** - "Severe fighting" breaks out as Afghan Army troops at the Bala Hissar fortress in Kabul take on the Khalqi regime. The mutiny is crushed but, as Amstutz reports, the episode "foreshadowed growing problems for the Khalqi regime and its Soviet mentors." (*An Initial Evaluation of the Bala Hissar Mutiny*, 8/6/79)

**August 6, 1979** - Puzanov meets with Taraki in an attempt to save the lives of the former leading members of the PDPA indicted in a "counterrevolutionary plot." Taraki responds that the plot was "inspired" by the United States, Iran and Pakistan. (SCCD-W)

**August 11, 1979** - Amin meets with senior military adviser Gorelov and urges the Soviets to speed up the sending of Soviet commandos in Afghanistan. Amin assures him that "the [presence of] Soviet troops will be required until spring." (Lyakhovskiy, p. 89; Gai and Snegirev, no. 4, 1991, p. 217)

**August 17, 1979** - Thirteen Soviet ~~generals~~ and six colonels, led by Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces Gen. Ivan Pavlovsky, arrive in Afghanistan for what becomes a two-month stay. His visit is not announced in the Kabul press. Prime Minister Amin has given lower-ranking officials at the defense ministry permission to sign routine agreements with the visiting Soviet officers. Amstutz reports that the delegation could indicate either an effort to improve the counterinsurgency operations of the defense ministry or an

attempt to "lay...the detailed contingency groundwork for the future intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, should Moscow eventually decide that that step is necessary."

In fact, the main goal of the commission was to assess the strength of the opposition to the regime, the combat readiness of the Afghan army, and to determine reasonable limits to Soviet military assistance. The mission had instructions from Ustinov not to discuss any proposals of possible introduction of Soviet troops. Soon after their arrival, KGB representative Boris Ivanov shared with them information that Amin might have been recruited by the CIA during his four years at Columbia University Teachers College and was national president of the Afghan Student Association in 1963. Upon Pavlovsky's return to Moscow he informs Ustinov that there is no need to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. (*Pavlovskiy Mission to Kabul*, 9/21/79; [*Continuation of the Steps Taken to Begin an Intelligence Relationship with the Bazargan Government*], 9/19/79; Arnold, p. 81; Merimsky, NNI, 1995, p. 76; Garthoff2, pp. 1001-1003)

**August 30, 1979** - The CIA station in Los Angeles cables Kabul and CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, that an Afghan informant has supplied the agency with information on the assassination of Adolph Dubs. In return, the informant requests that the CIA send money in the name of a rebel faction to a bank account in Tehran. (*[A. Information on Assassination of Adolph Dubs, B. Request to Washington to Send Money to Afghan Rebel Account in Iran]*, 8/31/79)

**August 31, 1979** - The State Department announces: "We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit." The announcement continues: "Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000-3,000 men. The unit includes armored, artillery, and infantry elements. In addition, we estimate that the Soviet maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba." (*Statement Issued by the Department of State*, 8/31/79)

**Early September 1979** - Soviet troops estimated at brigade strength arrive in Kabul, possibly to protect Soviet citizens and facilities. (*[Continuation of the Steps Taken to Begin an Intelligence Relationship with the Bazargan Government]*, 9/19/79)

**Early September 1979** - Taraki leaves for the conference of non-aligned states in Cuba, despite warnings from the Soviets. In his absence, Amin moves to destroy the "gang of four" in the Kabul government. (Gai and Snegirev, no. 3, 1991, pp. 204-205)

**September 10, 1979** - A CIA field officer reports that Pakistan leader "General Zia has ordered that no weapons, ammunition or other supplies of Chinese origin should be supplied to Afghan insurgents who are being covertly supplied by the government of Pakistan." (*Discussion of Afghan Situation during the Visit of a Chinese Military Delegation to Pakistan*, 10/30/79)

**September 11, 1979** - Brezhnev and Andropov speak with Taraki on his way back to Kabul from the summit of non-aligned states in Havana. They inform him of Amin's actions in his absence. Brezhnev warns him of Amin's intentions, and guarantees Soviet assistance and personal protection. Initially, the Soviet leaders plan to send a special Soviet "Muslim" battalion [composed of commandos of Central Asian origin] to protect Taraki, but the plan is canceled. (Lyakhovsky, pp. 92-93)

**September 12-13, 1979** - At midnight, Gromyko instructs Puzanov, Pavlovsky, Gorelov and Ivanov to visit Taraki and Amin and -- on behalf of the Soviet Politburo, and "Brezhnev personally" -- to warn them that a split in the party and state leadership would be inadmissible. (Lyakhovsky, p. 93; Westad, p. 61; Gai and Snegirev, 3, 1991, p. 205)

**September 14, 1979** - Intending to assassinate Amin, Taraki invites the prime minister to the Presidential Palace along with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov. Amin arrives at the palace before Puzanov, accompanied by two other officials. Upon entering the main corridor leading to Taraki's room, guards suddenly open fire, killing the two officials but only wounding Amin who escapes down a staircase and flees in his car. Arriving at the Ministry of Defense, he places the armed forces on a full-scale alert, orders Taraki detained in the palace, then telephones Puzanov to describe the attack. Puzanov condemns the incident. (Anwar, pp. 170-172)

**September 14, 1979** - In the wake of the failed attempt on his life, Amin orders tanks from the 4th Armored Corps to enter Kabul at 6:30 p.m. and surround important government buildings and town squares. (Anwar, pp. 170-172)

**September 15, 1979** - Puzanov recommends to the Kremlin to start a dialogue with Amin. Gromyko sends instructions to all Soviet representatives in Kabul "not to refuse to deal with H. Amin," to restrain him from undertaking repressive measures against Taraki's supporters, and "to use contacts with H. Amin for further clarification of his political face and intentions." (Merimsky, NNI, 1995, p.84; Gromyko's instructions, September 15, Briefing Book, Tab 6)

**September 16, 1979** - At 8:00 p.m. local time, Kabul Television announces that Taraki has informed the PDPA Politburo and the Revolutionary Council that he is no longer able to continue his duties. These two bodies, at a session chaired by Foreign Minister Shah Wali, are then reported to have named Amin general secretary of the PDPA and president of the Revolutionary Council. Amin retains his position as prime minister. Kabul Television also reports that four people died at the Presidential Palace, including Sayyid Daoud Tarun. (*Hafizullah Amin Takes Over Rule in Afghanistan, 9/16/79*)

**September 18, 1979** - Soviet forces near the Afghanistan border are placed on modified alert following the coup by Amin. (WS 9/19/79)

Sep 19 Dots warning of intervention (Bradsher)

**September 19, 1979** - Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin send a message of congratulations to Hafizullah Amin, three days after the announcement that Amin has been named PDPA general secretary. (KT 9/19/79)

**September 22, 1979** - Vance advises the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to make a "short, non-substantive courtesy call" on Amin, indicating that the United States "share[s] Amin's publicly expressed desire for friendly relations." Vance asks that the meeting be as low-key and non-confrontational as possible. (*Charge's Proposed Call on President Amin, 9/22/79*)

**September 26, 1979** - Harold Saunders expresses concern over the growing involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs. (*Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 9/26/79*)

**September 27, 1979** - Amstutz is "received warmly" by Afghan President Amin in Kabul. During their meeting, which is publicized in the local press, Amin again calls for improved relations between the United States and Afghanistan. (*Implications that DRA Seeks Better Relations with USG: A Commentary, 10/1/79*)

**Late September 1979** - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan summons the chief of the military advisory group, Gorelov, and KGB representative Ivanov to Moscow on short notice. Questioned separately, Gorelov strongly contends that it would not be a good idea to increase the Soviet military presence in the country; Ivanov's specific views on the internal situation and on Amin are not known, but generally he is said to have indicated the likelihood that greater levels of Soviet assistance could carry the day. (Garthoff2, p. 1009)

**Fall 1979** - Soviet leaders systematically replace virtually every senior official and adviser in Afghanistan. Termed "defeatist," the old group was almost unanimous in opposing the idea of a military intervention. (Garthoff2, p. 1012)

**October 1979** - KGB spetsnaz force "Zenith" dispatches a covert group of specialists to determine potential local Afghan reactions to the presence of Soviet forces in the country. They present their results -- that deploying troops would be unwise and would even mean war -- in December but Andropov reportedly ignores their conclusion. (Garthoff2, p. 1010)

**October 1979** - Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornienko notices that Gromyko this month suddenly stops talking about sending troops to Afghanistan. He states much later that he believes Andropov and Ustinov brought Gromyko around to the idea of a military intervention. (Garthoff2, p. 1010)

**October 3, 1979** - In a cable from Kabul, Amstutz estimates that the number of Soviet uniformed personnel in Afghanistan is now 7,200. This number, the Embassy believes, is probably on the conservative side and includes 4,200 Soviet combat personnel and 3,000 military advisors. The latter often serve in combat against rebel forces and thus can at times be categorized as combat troops. Some shift back to advisory roles once their regions have been stabilized. (*Soviet Combat Troops in Afghanistan*, 10/3/79)

**October 3, 1979** - A think piece by Harold Brown suggests that the United States should increase China's military potential so that China will be an ally in case of war with the Soviet Union. (NYT 10/4/79)

**October 4, 1979** - The *New York Times* reports on the Pentagon "Consolidated Guidance" paper on military aid to China (see entry for May 1979). Vance responds to the leak by declaring that "We are not going to sell arms to the Chinese." (Garthoff, pp. 750-751)

**October 7, 1979** - With Gromyko chairing, the Politburo commission on Afghanistan meets to discuss the situation. Immediately afterward, a regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in Vitebsk receives orders to move to the Turkestan Military District to conduct exercises. (Garthoff2, pp. 1009-1010)

**October 8, 1979** - Taraki is killed on Amin's orders. His death (reported to be caused by a "serious illness") is announced by the media two days later. (Garthoff2, pp. 1005-1006; Anwar, p. 181; Urban, p. 38)

**October 8, 1979** - On Amin's instructions, his foreign minister, Shah Wali, openly complains at a meeting of ambassadors from Socialist countries, including China and Yugoslavia, about Soviet involvement in the attempt on Amin's life on September 14. Safronchuk, who attends the meeting, asks Shah Wali "whether he realized that his allegations could have irreparable adverse effects upon Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union." (Safronchuk, no. 1, 1991, p. 134-135)

**October 10, 1979** - Andropov is authorized to bring Babrak Karmal from Czechoslovakia to Moscow. (Garthoff2, p. 1010)

**Mid-October 1979** - A mutiny by the 7th Infantry Division near Kabul, and later in the month a failed major offensive (with direct Soviet military assistance) against the rebels in Paktia, indicate that Amin is not proving capable of pacifying the country, either politically or militarily. (Garthoff2, p. 1008)

**October 16, 1979** - Marshall Shulman testifies before Congress that neither Washington nor Moscow are "satisfied with the current state of our relations." He observes that "perhaps the strongest source of concern to the U.S.S.R. remains whether the United

States will enter into a military supply relationship with China." Shulman also implies that the U.S. will seek Congressional approval for Most-Favored-Nation status for China without seeking the same for the Soviet Union. Regarding Afghanistan, he states that the 1978 coup "brought this previously neutralist government into close alignment with the Soviet Union." (Garthoff, pp. 751-752, 948)

**October 16-17, 1979** - Pakistani and U.S. officials meet in Washington, D.C. to discuss a broad range of regional and international concerns. The U.S. delegation includes Vance and Under Secretary David Newsom. The U.S. officials confirms that Washington will use "whatever leverage we ha[ve] in Kabul" to encourage restraint from the new Afghan regime in regard to Pakistan, as well as "continue to impress upon the Soviets that we expect them to respect Afghan independence and to refrain from interfering in Afghan internal affairs." (*US-Pak Talks: Regional Issues*, 10/24/79)

**October 22, 1979** - The Shah of Iran flies secretly to New York for surgery and cancer treatment. (FAC, p. 45)

**October 23, 1979** - Carter transmits to Congress a proclamation extending most-favored nation treatment to the People's Republic of China. (*Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate*, 10/23/79)

**October 24, 1979** - In formal discussions between U.S. and Pakistani officials, the United States "reaffirm[s] that in the event of Afghan aggression against Pakistan we would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant...." This discussion foreshadows the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent change in U.S. policy toward aid to Pakistan. (*U.S.-Pak. Talks: Regional Issues*, 10/24/79)

**October 25, 1979** - The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Soviet Union sign a 20-year treaty of friendship in Moscow. The treaty consolidates Soviet economic and military influence in the Southwest corner of the Arabian peninsula. (NYT 10/26/79)

**October 25, 1979** - Amin makes an explicit appeal to Washington in an interview with the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*. He says: "We want the United States of American to consider realistically the affairs of this region and further provide us with aid." (Harrison, p. 43)

**October 27, 1979** - Amin meets with Charge d' Affaires of the American Embassy in Kabul Archer K. Blood. According to Blood, the meeting lasts one hour. Amin reaffirms his desire for a resumption of American aid. "I told him," Blood reports, that "he couldn't expect that until he could satisfy us about their role in [Ambassador] Dubs' death. I was slightly encouraged that over time we could work out a modus vivendi if we could have got rid of Dubs's memory. He was no rockbound ideologue. I found him a guy in a very difficult position who was tough and was trying to survive." (Harrison, p. 43). The

*Oct 27, 79  
Harrison*

Soviets believe that during the meeting Amin suggested an improvement in U.S.-Afghan relations, and that in their minds this confirmed reports about Amin's CIA connection. (Lyakhovsky, p. 105)

**October 29, 1979** - In a conversation with Safronchuk, Amin shares information about his meeting with Archer Blood. Blood, according to Amin, hinted at the possibility of American economic assistance to Afghanistan on the condition that the Soviet military presence there be reduced. Amin allegedly rejects the offer. (SCSD-W)

**October 29, 1979** - Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Wali meets with David Newsom and Harold Saunders and proposes to improve U.S.-Afghan relations. (Lyakhovsky, p. 105)

**October 29, 1979** - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan submits a memorandum detailing growing concerns about Amin. In particular, they worry about the Afghan leader's evident attempts to establish a more balanced policy with respect to the West. The paper charges Amin with duplicity with respect to relations with Moscow. (Garthoff2, p. 1011; *On the Situation in Afghanistan After the Events of 13-16 September* October 29, 1979)

**October 31, 1979** - Islamabad informs the United States that Amin is "talking with new enthusiasm about reciprocal visits." Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, would go to Kabul "probably in the latter half of November," and Amin and Zia would exchange visits. (Harrison, p. 43)

**October 31, 1979** - At a Politburo meeting, Soviet leaders may have discussed the possibility of ousting Amin. (Garthoff2, p. 1011)

**November 1, 1979** - A CIA cable reports an increase in the number of Soviet military personnel stationed in Kabul during September and October. (*Increase in Soviet Military Presence in [illegible]*, 11/79)

**November 3, 1979** - Puzanov informs Amin about the readiness of the Soviet leadership to see him in Moscow, and about their "satisfaction with the measures taken by the Afghan leadership in the field of party and state construction." (Puzanov's Cable, Briefing Book, Tab 6)

**November 4, 1979** - The U.S. Embassy in Tehran is attacked and seized by Iranian "students following the Imam's line." Sixty-six Americans are taken hostage in an effort to force the United States to extradite the former Shah who is undergoing medical treatment in New York. (Iran Chronology, pp. 94-96)

**November 6, 1979** - Amin tells Safronchuk that according to information from the Afghan Embassy in Pakistan, Iran is preparing to denounce the 1921 treaty with the USSR. (SCCD-W)

**November 8, 1979** - The Soviet Union names Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeyev, a Tatar Muslim by origin, to replace Puzanov as ambassador to Kabul. (Garthoff2, p. 1007) 17.

**November 9-12, 1979** - A spetsnaz airborne battalion made up of Central Asian troops deploys covertly in Afghanistan. On the 18th, it moves next to the Tajbeg palace, where Amin plans to move his residence. Dressed in Afghan Army uniforms, the force becomes known as the "Muslim battalion." (Garthoff2, p. 1010; Lyakhovsky, p. 107)

**November 13, 1979** - Puzanov sees Amin on a protocol visit, at the request of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, to express satisfaction "with the line and practical policy of the DRA." (SCCD-W)

**Mid-November, 1979** - The Nuclear Planning Group of NATO approves the deployment of U.S. Pershings and Tomahawks in Europe.

**November 19, 1979** - Amin tells Safronchuk that the deterioration of U.S.- Iranian relations could work positively for Afghanistan, since it would make it more difficult for Iran to help counterrevolutionary gangs operating from its territory. (SCCD-W)

**November 20, 1979** - After the White House hints that "other remedies" (military action) will be used in Iran if diplomatic efforts fail. Carter orders the second Navy task force to the Indian Ocean. (NYT 11/21/79)

**November 20, 1979** - Amin gives an interview with American author Rhea Talley Stewart, who later writes that Amin "said he would like to have another U.S. Ambassador in Kabul." (Harrison, p. 43)

**November 21, 1979** - Anti-American mobs attack and burn the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and two American cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore, Pakistan, in response to radio broadcasts from Iran claiming U.S. and Israeli involvement in the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on November 20. (NYT 11/22/79)

*Nov. 21 - Puzanov not re propaganda (Brodsher)*

**November 28, 1979** - Lt. Gen. Viktor Paputin, Soviet deputy minister of internal affairs, arrives in Kabul for official talks. (Arnold, p. 92) *Paputin*

**Late November 1979** - Soviet Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov, sets up headquarters in the Soviet city of Termez near the border with Afghanistan; Warsaw Pact forces are placed in an advanced state of readiness. (Arnold, p. 91)

**Late 1979** - The U.S. and China reach agreement on establishing intelligence collection facilities in China for observing Soviet missile tests. (Garthoff, p. 719)

**December 1, 1979** - Ustinov reportedly refers to a "possible" decision to send troops to Afghanistan during a meeting with top advisers Ogarkov, Akhromeyev and Varennikov. (Lt. Gen. V.A. Bogdanov, cited in Garthoff2, p. 1013)

**December 1-12, 1979** - During this period, Ustinov directs his senior aides, Ogarkov, Akhromeyev and Varennikov, to prepare tentative plans to deploy Soviet forces into Afghanistan in case the Kremlin decides to do so. All three resist the idea because the limited size of the contingent envisioned would do little good, and because of the likelihood that local antagonisms against the Soviets would flare up as a result. Gen. Makhmut Gareev later reports that Ustinov rebuked Ogarkov when the latter tried to draw attention to the high political costs of the planned action. (Garthoff2, pp. 1014-1015)

**December 4, 1979** - A special National Security Council meeting is held during which administration officials decide to explore the possibility of improved access to military facilities in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. (WP 12/4/1979)

**December 5, 1979** - State Department spokesman Hodding Carter alleges that the role of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan has expanded, especially in the area of command-and-control functions. Reports of Soviet personnel assuming combat roles cannot be confirmed. Soviet military advisors are now estimated to number between 3,500 and 4,000 and Soviet civilian advisors around 1,500. (*Excerpts from Noon Briefing: Afghanistan, 12/5/79*)

**December 5, 1979** - West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt win support for U.S. medium-range missile deployment at the convention of the ruling Social Democratic Party. (Harrison, p. 47)

**December 6, 1979** - During his first and only meeting with Soviet Ambassador Fikryat Tabeyev, Amin refers to Puzanov who allegedly told him about an agreement by the Soviet leaders to invite Amin in Moscow. Tabeyev later reveals in an interview that during his tenure in Kabul he was instructed not to file any reports or messages of any kind with Moscow unless specifically directed. (Garthoff2, p. 1013; SCCD-W)

**December 6, 1979** - The Politburo authorizes the KGB and Ministry of Defense to send a uniformed, 500-man GRU spetznaz unit to Afghanistan. According to Lyakhovsky, this was a post-hoc order: the "Muslim battalion" had already been deployed at Bagram on November 10-12. (Garthoff2, p. 1013; Lyakhovsky, p. 107)

**December 8, 1979** - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan meets in Brezhnev's office. As arguments for intervention, in case Afghanistan is "lost," Ustinov and Andropov cite dangers to the southern borders of the USSR, and the possibility of American short-range missiles being deployed in Afghanistan and aimed at strategic objects in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere. (Lyakhovsky, p. 109)

**December 10, 1979** - Vance begins a tour of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to seek support for economic sanctions against Iran. (FAC, p. 46)

**December 10, 1979** - By a vote of ten to zero, (with seven abstentions), the Senate Armed Services Committee recommends against ratification of Salt II, stating that without major changes, the treaty was "not in the national security interests." (Garthoff, p. 743)

**December 10, 1979** - Ustinov issues an oral order to call up reservists and bring to combat readiness two army divisions in the Turkestan Military District. The move follows Ogarkov's and Akhromeyev's assertion to Ustinov that the limited number of Soviet troops called for in plans for military action would not resolve the situation. Ustinov gets them to concede that they might be able to help stabilize the regime, however. According to Lyakhovsky, Ustinov tells Ogarkov that the Politburo has taken a "preliminary decision about a temporary introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan," and orders him to work out plans for deploying 75-80,000 troops. In the evening Ustinov speaks to the collegium of the Ministry of Defense about the task of forming a new army for an invasion. (Garthoff2, pp. 1015-1016; Lyakhovsky, p. 109)

**December 12, 1979** - The NATO foreign and defense ministers, meeting in Brussels, unanimously approved the two-track play for deployment of "Pershings" and "Tomahawks" in Europe coupled with arms control limitations. (Garthoff2, p. 953) According to Georgy Kornienko, "it was no accident that the Afghanistan issue was finally settled on that particular day in the early evening, after Moscow learned about what NATO had done. All the arguments previously made about the negative impact in the West [of Soviet intervention] suddenly became irrelevant. People felt that relations were already spoiled, so there was nothing much left to lose." (Harrison, p. 47)

**December 12, 1979** - Early in the evening, the Soviet Politburo commission on Afghanistan gets Brezhnev to agree to dispatch troops to the country. He also delegates authority to implement the decision to the group (minus Ponomarev). Major readiness preparations begin immediately after the decision is taken. The full Politburo does not meet to ratify the move until December 27, after Amin has already been killed.

The main reason for the intervention, according to new archival evidence and the conclusions of Raymond Garthoff and other observers, was to defend Soviet security interests in the face of deteriorating political and military conditions. Amin's inability to put a brake on the forces gradually engulfing the country, as well as his unreliability as an

ally, likely convinced the Kremlin of the need to prevent the loss of Afghanistan as a buffer state on its southern border. The threat of losing their accumulated strategic, political, ideological, and economic investment in Afghanistan probably forced Soviet leaders to conclude that the "risks of inaction ... [were] at least as great as the risks of action." (*Regarding Situation in "A"*, 12/12/79; Garthoff2, pp. 1016-1017, 1031-1042)

**December 14, 1979** - The Operational Group (OG) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, under deputy head of the General Staff, General of Army Sergei Akhromeyev, arrives in Termez and starts preparations for intervention. Later in the month, he is replaced by Marshal Sergei Sokolov (see December 25 entry below), and on January 3 returns as Sokolov's deputy on the OG. (Lyakhovskiy, pp. 126-127)

**December 17, 1979** - An attempt on Amin's life fails, leaving him slightly wounded and his nephew, Assadullah Amin, head of the country's counterintelligence secret police, more seriously so. It is later reported that on December 14, Gen. Akhromeyev told Gen. Merimsky that Amin had been "removed." But on the 19th, Akhromeyev speaks to Merimsky again and says that "the action" had not been carried out after all. He does not get more specific. (Garthoff2, p. 1014)

**December 17, 1979** - At a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Brzezinski obtains approval to publicize more intensely the situation in Afghanistan and rising Soviet influence there. (Brzezinski, p. 428)

**December 20, 1979** - In Vienna, the West rejects a plan by which the United States would remove 13,000 and the Soviet Union 30,000 troops from Central Europe. (FAC, p. 36)

**December 21, 1979** - Carter announces that he will call on the United Nations to vote for economic sanctions against Iran. (NYT 12/22/79)

**December 22, 1979** - Safronchuk pays a final visit to Amin before leaving the country. Amin notes his satisfaction that Soviet troops will finally be sent to Afghanistan. (Garthoff2, p. 1008)

**December 22, 1979** - A State Department official says that the Carter Administration has expressed its concern to the Soviet Union several times in the last several days over the build-up of Soviet troops on the Afghanistan border. (NYT 12/23/79)

**December 22, 1979** - Carter announces that the United States has told the Soviet Union that their effort to block economic sanctions against Iran would strain U.S.-Soviet relations. (NYT 12/23/79)

**December 23-24, 1979** - A group of spetsnaz commandos of the KGB and GRU in Kabul starts preparations for seizing the Tajbek residence of Hafizullah Amin. KGB Gen. Boris Ivanov supervises the preparations. (Lyakhovsky, p. 133)

**December 24, 1979** - Soviet Minister of Communications Nikolai Talyzin arrives in Kabul with a large number of aides. In the late afternoon of the 27th, he pays a courtesy call on Amin. (Garthoff2, p. 1018; Arnold, p. 94)

**December 24, 1979** - Ustinov holds a conference with senior officials of the Ministry of Defense and announces the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. Ustinov and Ogarkov sign directive no. 312/12/001 specifying the tasks and deployment of Soviet troops. (Lyakhovsky, pp. 128-129, 134)

**December 25, 1979** - First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei Sokolov is recalled from vacation in Kislovodsk and replaces Akhromeyev as head of the Operational Group of the General Staff to supervise the introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. (Merimsky, NNI, p. 89; Lyakhovsky, p. 126)

**December 25, 1979** - Just before Soviet troops enter the country, the commander of the 40th Army flies to Kunduz in northern Afghanistan to meet with Amin's older brother, Abdullah Amin, a provincial governor, and Gen. Babadzhan of the Afghan General Staff. The trio iron out details such as initial routes into the country and locations for Soviet forces. Amin himself is not only aware of the plans to send Soviet troops -- he is in favor of the operation. (Garthoff2, p. 1017)

**December 25, 1979** - Soviet troops begin to arrive in Afghanistan: the 103rd Guards Airborne Division at Kabul and the 3rd battalion of the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment at Bagram air base. According to Valentin Falin in 1990, last-minute preparations for the move into Afghanistan included -- erroneously -- the readying of tactical nuclear warheads for artillery-missile forces. These and other inappropriate categories of equipment are quickly retired. (Garthoff2, pp. 1018, 1020)

**December 27, 1979** - Amin dies in the course of the Soviet-backed coup. According to one account, an initial attempt to poison him, then hold him at the headquarters of the Soviet Medical Corps while Parcham leaders stage the uprising, fails. At precisely 6 p.m., both Amin's residence and the Army General Headquarters are shelled by Soviet tanks, which have surrounded both buildings. At the same time, Pul-e-Charki Prison is taken by Soviet troops in order to ensure the safety of Parchamis being held there. A Soviet attempt to take control of the Kabul television and radio station meets with fierce resistance, but the facility is finally occupied at 6:30 p.m. At 6:45 p.m., Soviet Tajik troops, under the command of Sayyid Mohammad Ghulabzoi and Asadullah Sarwari, enter Amin's residence, calling to Amin that they are there to protect him. Amin orders all lights

extinguished. He is reportedly later found in his chair with a bullet in his head. (Anwar, pp. 187-190)

**December 27, 1979** - At 22:40 Greenwich Mean Time, Kabul Radio's Dari Service announces:

Because of the continuation and expansion of aggression, intervention, and provocations by the foreign enemies of Afghanistan and for the purpose of defending the gains of the Saur revolution...and on the basis of the treaty of friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation dated 5 December 1978, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgent political, moral, and economic assistance, including military aid, to Afghanistan. (Sen Gupta, p. 187)

**December 27, 1979** - The U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to "deplore the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan." In the months following the Soviet invasion, Carter embargoes the export of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, stops the sale of computers and high-tech equipment, boycotts the 1980 Olympics to be held in Moscow and withdraws the Salt II Treaty from the ratification process in the Senate. He also announces a new policy later dubbed the *Carter Doctrine*, which states that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault against the vital interests of the United States. (Bhasin, pp. 72, 137-138)

**December 27, 1979** - A meeting of the Politburo in Moscow approves "a telegram of congratulations to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the PDPA, Prime Minister of the DRA com. Babrak Karmal." (Lyakhovsky, p. 141)

**December 28, 1979** - Members of Carter's Cabinet meet at the White House to consider the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A preliminary decision is made to send Warren Christopher to consult with President Zia of Pakistan. Plans are also made to further enhance U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt regarding Afghanistan. It is decided to send a strong message of protest to Brezhnev on the hotline. (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, p. 949)

**December 28, 1979** - Carter telephones British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga and Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq to consult about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each head of state reportedly agrees that the Soviet move is a "grave threat to peace." (P 12/29/79)

**December 28, 1979** - Carter sends Brezhnev a message on the hot line stating that the invasion of Afghanistan is a "clear threat to the peace" and "could mark a fundamental and

long-lasting turning point in our relations." He urges quick withdrawal of Soviet forces and a halt to intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. (Carter, p. 472)

**December 28, 1979** - Vance states in a cable that the "very substantial military buildup" of Soviet forces along the Soviet-Afghan border signifies that the USSR has "additional military objectives beyond the change of government in Kabul." (*Our Assessment of Recent Events in Afghanistan*, 12/28/79)

**December 29, 1979** - The Politburo in Moscow approves Brezhnev's hotline answer to Carter's letter. Brezhnev rejects Carter's "advice" to withdraw Soviet troops immediately, and writes that "we intend to withdraw Soviet military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan as soon as the causes that have produced a demand from Afghanistan to the Soviet Union, would become void." (Briefing Book, Section IV)

**December 29, 1979** - White House Press Secretary Jody Powell publicly calls the movements a "Soviet invasion" for the first time and places the number of Soviet combat troops involved at 25,000 to 30,000. (WP 12/30/80)

**December 30, 1979** - Carter reportedly sees Brezhnev's hotline message as "devious" and an insult to his intelligence. A few hours later, during a television interview, Carter says that this "action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office." (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, pp. 949-950)

**December 30, 1979-January 4, 1980** - High-level Carter Administration policy makers meet to discuss policy toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Brzezinski believes that some limits on grain sales, further technology transfers to China and a large aid program for Afghanistan are sufficiently punitive and strategically important. Carter later writes that Brzezinski was "remarkably sober, concerned about future relations with the Soviet Union." Carter, however, is "determined to make them pay for their unwarranted aggression." He contemplates further steps such as a boycott of the summer Olympics scheduled for Moscow "as the most severe blow." (Carter, pp. 474, 476; Brzezinski, p. 431; Garthoff, p. 951)

**December 31, 1979** - The members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan sign a memo for the record justifying the intervention and removal of Amin. They specifically mention his weaknesses as a leader, the party purges he authorized and his contacts with counterrevolutionaries. They also expand on their October 29 warning of Amin's attempts to balance his relationship with the Soviets by approaching the Americans, including "confidential meetings with the American charge d'affaires in Kabul." (Garthoff, p. 1028)

**December 31, 1979** - In an interview, Carter says Brezhnev was "not telling the facts accurately" when he claimed that the Soviet Union had been "invited" by the Afghan government. Carter also states that "my opinion of the Russians has changed most [more] drastically in the last week than even the previous two and one-half years before that." (The *New York Times* the following day publishes a slightly different quote: "This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office." See Garthoff<sup>2</sup>, pp. 1059-1060.) Pakistan and other Third World countries suggest a U.N. Security Council meeting to condemn Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (*Replies by the President to Questions Asked at an Interview with Correspondent Frank Reynolds of ABC*, 12/31/79; FAC, p. 40)

**December 31, 1979** - The U.N. Security Council passes a resolution giving Iran one week to free the hostages before it imposes sanctions. Included is a statement that Kurt Waldheim will go to Iran. (*Resolution 461 (1979), Adopted by the U.N. Security Council*, 12/31/79)

## 1980

**1980** - Because of the Afghanistan trade boycott, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union drops by almost 60 percent from 1979 to 1980, from \$4.45 billion to \$1.96 billion. By contrast, Soviet-European trade increases. For example, Soviet-French trade rises 100 percent and Soviet-German trade grows by 65 percent. Various contracts canceled by U.S. firms are taken up by their European competitors. (Garthoff, pp. 969, 977, 979-980)

**Early 1980** - When Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing meet in Paris they agree that detente has become "more difficult" because of the "Afghanistan incident." They warn that "detente would probably not be able to withstand another shock of the same type." Schmidt declares that "[w]e will not permit ten years of detente and defense policy to be destroyed." Giscard speaks of keeping Europe out of U.S.-Soviet conflicts; the "balance of power in Europe is a separate problem." (Garthoff, p. 978)

**January 1980** - The U.S. at this time is supplying military aid to the Afghan resistance, according to a "very senior and knowledgeable member of the Carter Administration" interviewed several years later. The official refuses either to confirm or deny whether Washington was providing any such aid prior to January 1980. (Garthoff<sup>2</sup>, p. 1031)

**January 1980** - Bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms talks and anti-satellite ASAT weapons negotiations cease after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 969)

**January 1, 1980** - In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council discusses the specifics of a plan to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan. (*NSC Discussion of Support for Pakistan*, 1/1/80)

**January 2, 1980** - At a major session of the National Security Council, Carter's top aides debate a lengthy list of possible responses to the intervention. (*Iran, Christopher Mission to Afghanistan, SALT and Brown Trip to China*, 1/2/80)

**January 2, 1980** - Carter recalls Ambassador Watson from Moscow for consultations in response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (Carter, p. 476)

**January 2, 1980** - U.S. military officers maintain that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates the inability of the U.S. armed forces to react to a crisis. According to spokesmen of the U.S. Navy, the invasion of Afghanistan in itself has no relevance to U.S. national security but it does raise the question of "[h]ow the hell are you going to get there" if more vital interests in the region are attacked. (WP 1/3/80)

**January 3, 1980** - Carter asks Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter later writes that the invasion was "the worst disappointment to me personally" because of the impact on SALT. (*Letter from the President to the Majority Leader of the Senate*, 1/3/80; Smith, p. 224; Carter, p. 473)

**January 4, 1980** - In an address to the nation, Carter denounces the Soviet invasion of the "small nonaligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan" as a "callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter." He announces that he has requested the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II and outlines a series of other steps the Administration will take in response to the Soviet action. Among these are embargoes on exports of grain and high technology to the Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S. will delay opening any new U.S. or Soviet consular facilities, curtail Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters and provide Pakistan with military and economic assistance "to defend its independence." (*Address to the Nation by the President*, 1/4/80)

One analysis of the administration's response notes that Carter overreacted based on a personal assessment of the Soviet move as "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War." Terming the intervention "unacceptable," the administration is said to have mortgaged U.S. policy to a *fait accompli*. Vance shares Carter's view of the unacceptability of the Soviet occupation and presses for a wide range of sanctions, possibly in part because of feeling let down by Soviet leaders, possibly because he wanted to counter the image of being overly eager to pursue detente in the past. (In the same way, Carter may have wanted to undo the perception that he was naive about the Soviets.) Brzezinski, meanwhile, is said to see a geopolitical pattern in the Soviet move, yet he does not advocate suspending bilateral relations or tying the future of the relationship to

the ongoing Soviet occupation. Instead, he hopes to take advantage of the situation to improve America's global position. (Garthoff2, pp. 1066-1068)

Garthoff concludes his analysis by saying that the American response actually got in the way of an earlier resolution to the crisis. This was largely because Washington failed to understand that Moscow's main purpose was to defend vital interests. As a result, the Americans made demands (amounting to a restoration not of the status quo prior to the intervention but of that prior to April 1978) which led the Soviets to conclude the administration was not being serious. Instead, the Brzezinski-dominated line, according to the Kremlin, aimed at exploiting the Soviet move to further undermine detente and otherwise ratchet up global tensions. "A serious American misreading of the Soviet purpose thus in turn helped engender a serious Soviet misreading of the U.S. position." (Garthoff2, pp. 1073-1075)

**January 4, 1980** - Foreign Minister of the DRA Shah Mohamed Dost visits Moscow and receives "advice" from Gromyko on tactics at the discussion of the Afghan case before the U.N. Security Council. Safronchuk is dispatched to New York to assist Dost. (Minutes of the Gromyko-Dost meeting, Briefing Book, Tab 8; Lyakhovsky, p. 160)

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**January 5, 1980** - A press account reports a "hush-hush decision ... [within the Carter administration to] do everything possible to ship weapons to the Moslem insurgents" in Afghanistan. According to William Beecher, the weapons supply is to be coordinated with China and with Egypt, which has agreed to provide anti-aircraft missiles obtained from the Soviet Union before Sadat expelled Soviet advisors in 1972. In exchange, the United States will supply Egypt with more up-to-date U.S. weapons. (BG 1/5/80)

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**January 5-9, 1980** - Harold Brown travels to Beijing to discuss security matters with the Chinese government. According to one report, "the secret part of his agenda deal[s] primarily with Afghanistan." Brown reportedly obtains Chinese government permission for planes carrying weapons to Afghan rebels to overfly Chinese territory. Chinese arms supply to the rebels is also assured. Brown refuses to provide any details of possible joint

**January 1, 1980** - In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council discusses the specifics of a plan to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan. (*NSC Discussion of Support for Pakistan*, 1/1/80)

**January 2, 1980** - At a major session of the National Security Council, Carter's top aides debate a lengthy list of possible responses to the intervention. (*Iran, Christopher Mission to Afghanistan, SALT and Brown Trip to China*, 1/2/80)

**January 2, 1980** - Carter recalls Ambassador Watson from Moscow for consultations in response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan. (Carter, p. 476)

**January 2, 1980** - U.S. military officers maintain that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates the inability of the U.S. armed forces to react to a crisis. According to spokesmen of the U.S. Navy, the invasion of Afghanistan in itself has no relevance to U.S. national security but it does raise the question of "[h]ow the hell are you going to get there" if more vital interests in the region are attacked. (WP 1/3/80)

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actions, however. He does add later, however, that China and the United States have "taken [a] big step in strategic relations." (WP 1/10/80; Brzezinski, p. 424; CT 7/22/81)

**January 6, 1980** - *The New York Times* reports that U.S. officials are divided in their interpretation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some characterize the intervention as the most serious international situation facing the United States since World War II. State Department officials, on the other hand, see the intervention as a "predictable reaction to the Soviet Union's fears that it was losing control" in Afghanistan and a logical extension of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a reference to Soviet military protection of socialist, Soviet-aligned countries. Regardless of how Soviet intentions are interpreted, U.S. officials agree that the move should be met by a "credible American response." (NYT 1/6/80)

**January 7, 1980** - Carter expresses his commitment to sending military aid to Pakistan for their defensive needs in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (*Replies by the President to Questions Asked at an Interview with John Chancellor of NBC, 1/7/80*)

**January 8, 1980** - In spontaneous remarks to members of Congress, Carter states that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the "greatest threat to world peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union...The Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgment our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan...would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies." (*Remarks by the President to a Congressional Group, 1/8/80; Garthoff, p. 972*)

**January 12, 1980** - In his first speech since late December, Brezhnev defends the Kremlin policy toward Afghanistan and attacks Carter for his "lies" and "harsh accusations" about the invasion. Brezhnev reiterates his government's contention that Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government and declares that Soviet policy will not be altered in any way by U.S. actions. (WP 1/13/80)

**January 13, 1980** - In comments to the press, Brezhnev states that "[i]t was no simple decision" to send troops to Afghanistan. Intervention was necessary, he says, because there was a "real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border....In other words, the time had come when we could no longer fail to respond to the request of the government of a friendly Afghanistan....To have done otherwise would have meant to watch passively the origination on our southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state." Brezhnev asserts that Harold Brown was in Beijing at the time to coordinate with the Chinese assistance to forces making military sorties into Afghanistan. (Garthoff, pp. 928-929, 932)

**January 13, 1980** - The Soviet Union vetoes the U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran. (*U.S. Draft U.N. Security Council Resolution, Vetoed by the Soviet Union, 1/13/80*)

**January 14, 1980** - The U.N. General Assembly passes a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The vote is 104 in favor, 18 opposed and 18 abstentions, a large enough margin to avoid the possibility of a Soviet veto. (Amstutz, pp. 325-326; *Resolution ES-6/2, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 1/14/80*)

**January 14, 1980** - In an interview with *Time* magazine, Brzezinski says that Soviet military action in Afghanistan has "imposed a severe strain on detente" and has had an "adverse impact" on SALT II. He also states: "Without SALT, the world could be confronted by a more acute arms race between the two superpowers." (*Replies by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Questions Asked at an Interview with "Time," 1/14/80*)

**January 15, 1980** - Former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon says that he had sent "almost daily" warnings to Washington of Soviet intentions to intervene militarily in Afghanistan just prior to the invasion. The next day, the State Department contradicts his assertions by pointing out that Toon had sent numerous cables downplaying the possibility of a Soviet invasion. Spokesman Hodding Carter says that a number of cables bearing Toon's signature argue that the chance of a massive invasion is slim. (WP 1/17/80)

**January 15, 1980** - In a *New York Times* interview, Vance refers to two competing explanations of Soviet motives for the invasion of Afghanistan: 1) that it is the first step in a move toward the south, or 2) that it aimed at preventing deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan because of the possible impact on Soviet Central Asia. He declares that "I don't think it does any good to try, at this point, to psychoanalyze which of these was the reason--or what combination of them...there must be a sharp and firm response." He wants the Soviets to "recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan." (NYT 1/16/80)

**January 16, 1980** - A group of 16 CPSU advisers, headed by L.I. Grekov, leaves Moscow for Kabul to consult with Babrak Karmal and his government on how to consolidate the regime. (Minutes of the Politburo, January 17, 1980, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**January 17, 1980** - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi comments on India's nuclear policy and on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. She states, "we do not believe in producing atom bombs. But, we should have the freedom in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." She further declares that "India does not support outside intervention in any

country," but adds, "the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan Revolutionary Council." (*Mrs. Gandhi on Nuclear Policy, Soviet Intervention*, 1/17/80)

**January 17, 1980** - At a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow, Gromyko concludes that "the international [tension] around Afghanistan has begun to abate. The noise that has been especially widespread in the U.S., also is getting weaker. There is no unity in NATO with regard to sanctions against the Soviet Union. At least, Western countries did not follow after the Americans, particularly the FRG, Italy, Turkey and other countries are not in agreement on the sanctions that are being undertaken by the United States." (Minutes of the Politburo, January 17, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**January 18, 1980** - As part of a dramatic turnaround in U.S.-Pakistan relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter proposes giving \$400 million in military and economic assistance to Islamabad as an emergency exemption to the Symington Amendment. However, President Zia ul-Haq calls Carter's offer "peanuts" and presses instead for a security treaty with the United States. Brzezinski and Warren Christopher meet with Zia ul-Haq and hold out only the promise of more aid, continuing to warn that a Pakistani nuclear test would end all U.S. efforts in this regard. (Spector, p. 85; *U.S. Assistance for Pakistan*, 1/18/80; *Zia Criticizes U.S. Aid Offer in Interview with U.S. Press*, 1/18/80; *Zia's Remarks to U.S. Newsmen on U.S. Aid Offer, Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue*, 1/18/80)

**January 20, 1980** - Analysts from the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System send a memorandum to the CC of the CPSU and the KGB, concluding that the Soviet intervention already has brought about many negative consequences for the USSR, among them "considerable expansion and consolidation of the anti-Soviet front of the states surrounding the USSR from West to East." The analysts also conclude that "detente is blocked and political preconditions for the reduction of the arms race are liquidated; [there is] sharply increased economic and technological pressure on the Soviet Union; Western and Chinese propaganda have gained strong cards to play in the campaign against the Soviet Union...; the preconditions for possible normalization of Sino-Soviet relations have been liquidated for a long period; [the intervention] served as a catalyst for ... the reconciliation between Iran and the United Nations; the Soviet Union has to shoulder the burden of economic aid to Afghanistan." Also the analysts note that the Afghan intervention opened for the West a new vista of "active intervention into the sphere of relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and open exploitation of contradictions and divergent interests among them." (Lyakhovsky, pp. 171-173)

**January 20, 1980** - Carter announces on "Meet the Press" that the U.S. will send a message to the International Olympics Committee, stating that unless the Soviets withdraw their forces from Afghanistan within a month, there will be no participation in the Moscow Olympic Games. (Carter, pp. 481-482)

**January 21, 1980** - As a way of demonstrating U.S. power projection capabilities, the Carter administration orders a series of B-52 overflights of a Soviet naval task force in the Indian Ocean, and further expands the ongoing naval buildup in the region. (Garthoff2, p. 1065)

**January 22, 1980** - Nobel Laureate Andrei Sakharov, the most distinguished Soviet dissident, is compelled to leave Moscow for internal exile in Gorky after his criticism of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. (Garthoff2, p. 1115)

**January 22, 1980** - *The Washington Post* reports that Soviet policy toward Afghanistan is formulated by a special "quick reaction group" in the Politburo. The "inner circle" probably consists of Ustinov, Gromyko, Andropov and Ponomarev. The group was formed because of Brezhnev's illness, with his consent. Fred Halliday alleges that the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was decided after several days of discussion within the Politburo. Politburo member Mikhail Suslov was reportedly the strongest advocate for Soviet intervention, supported by Brezhnev, Ustinov and Gromyko. Andropov, however, was somewhat wary of direct intervention, and his support within the Politburo is unknown. (WP 1/22/80; Sen Gupta, p. 88)

**January 23, 1980** - In his State of the Union address, Carter stresses the major significance of U.S.-Soviet relations to world peace. The relationship has "not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation." At present, the United States' basic purpose is to lead other nations "in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power."

Carter also describes a "regional security framework" for the Gulf, which later becomes known as the Carter Doctrine:

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Moscow later criticizes this assertion of U.S. vital interests in an area "which lies thousands of miles away from the American shores" as an attempt to maintain "the dominant position of American monopolies in the region." Brezhnev exclaims, "[n]obody will intimidate the Soviet Union." (WP 1/24/80; Sen Gupta, p. 101; Brzezinski, p. 443)

**January 23, 1980** - Indian Foreign Minister P.V.N. Rao expresses "grave concern" over the decision by the United States to "rearm" Pakistan. (*Indian Foreign Minister Expresses "Grave Concern" over U.S. Moves to Rearm Pakistan*, 1/23/80)

**January 23, 1980** - A press report indicates that thousands of Soviet bureaucrats have been transferred to Afghanistan to run the government. East German intelligence agents are helping to direct the security forces. As the Soviet Union tightens its hold on the Karmal government, Afghan administrators are being dismissed or executed. The Afghan government orders all non-communist news reports off the air and refuses to grant visas to foreign journalists. (WS 1/23/80)

**January 24, 1980** - A Carter Administration official tells *The New York Times* that the status of the Persian Gulf region has been elevated to that of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, all "areas where Washington is prepared to risk a conflict to contain Soviet influence." White House aides admit their surprise at "how few military options the United States had at its disposal" in the Persian Gulf. (Tahir-Kheli, p. 98)

**January 28, 1980** - Thirty-five countries at an Islamic Conference meeting in Islamabad condemn the intervention in Afghanistan. (Garthoff2, p. 1060)

**January 28, 1980** - At a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow, Soviet leaders accept the program of the Commission on Afghanistan on "long-term measures to secure the state interests of the USSR with regard to the events in Afghanistan." The Commission proposes to actively counteract the U.S. policy in the Middle East and South Asia, "to concentrate on the Islamic countries, particularly Pakistan and India," to prevent "reorientation of Islamic fanaticism into an anti-Soviet movement." Among other things, the Politburo approves a series of measures, "including special channels," to make Zia ul-Haq curb the activities of the Afghan guerrillas on Pakistani territory and a set of measures "aimed at maintenance of ... anti-American aspects in the foreign policy of Iran." Inside Afghanistan, the crux of the approved policy is to achieve unity of the PDPA, consolidation of "all progressive and national-patriotic forces in the framework of a united front," the search of "a speedy compromise" with the tribal leaders. (Minutes of the Politburo, January 28, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**January 29, 1980** - By a vote of 88 to 4, the Senate joins the House of Representatives in recommending that the United States boycott the Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan. (WP 1/30/80)

**Early 1980** - The Soviets accept the U.S. proposal to establish a seismic station but the U.S. has to backtrack because the tightening up of technology transfer after the invasion of Afghanistan prevents shipment of the seismographs. (Garthoff, p. 758)

**February 1980** - By this point, Soviet leaders have decided on the need to help mount operations against Afghan rebels. The decision leads to a nine-year war involving 620,000 Soviet military personnel with losses of 14,453 killed, 53,753 wounded and 415,932 seriously ill (mainly from infectious diseases). (Garthoff2, p. 1022)

**February 1, 1980** - Vance says that Presidential Special Envoy Clark Clifford was "more dramatic than necessary" when he said recently that a Soviet push to the Persian Gulf would mean war. "I would have used different language," says Vance, because it is a mistake to "draw lines" which could force the United States to take a position that it would later regret not being able to defend. (WP 2/2/80)

**February 1, 1980** - The United States announces that it is now willing to sell India sophisticated military equipment that it had previously refused to transfer to any country in South Asia. The U.S. offer to discuss the sale of guidance systems for aircraft and "smart bombs" is conveyed by presidential envoy Clark Clifford in a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. (WP 2/5/80)

**February 1-3, 1980** - Brzezinski and Warren Christopher visit Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for negotiations on the Soviet invasion and to lay the groundwork for a regional security framework. The United States offers Pakistan \$200 million in economic assistance and \$200 million in military assistance. Zia refers to this offer as "peanuts," claiming that it is "not the quantity of aid but the quality of the U.S. commitment." Zia wants stronger assurances that the United States will protect Pakistan against Soviet intervention, citing China as an example: "They did not give that much aid, but their word is as good as gold with us." (Brzezinski, p. 448; Tahir-Kheli, p. 76; LAT 2/2/80)

**February 2, 1980** - A U.S. official leaks a document referred to as the Wolfowitz Report to Richard Burt of *The New York Times*. The report concludes that U.S. forces could not stop a Soviet thrust into northern Iran and should therefore consider using tactical nuclear weapons in any conflict in that region. (NYT 2/2/80)

**February 3, 1980** - Brzezinski poses for photographers at the Khyber Pass, on the Afghan-Pakistani border. (Harrison, p. 54)

**Early February 1980** - Yuri Andropov visits Kabul and meets with Babrak Karmal, A. Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, M. Watanjar, Nur Ahman Nur, and Abdul Qader. The purpose of the trip is to find out if Soviet troops have achieved stabilization necessary for the survival of the Karmal government.

**February 1980** - According to still-classified documents in the Soviet General Staff, the Soviet leadership, probably on Brezhnev's initiative, discusses the possibility of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ustinov and Gromyko oppose the withdrawal of troops because, in their opinion, it would mean a concession to the hard line of the United States and strengthen the advocates of this line in the West; hurt the prestige of the Soviet Union as a state that is loyal to treaties of friendship; destabilize further the situation in the DRA given the weakness of the party-state apparatus and the armed forces, which would end up in a "loss" of Afghanistan; and provoke a rapid rise of Muslim extremism along the borders of the Soviet Union. In the end, the Soviet leadership decides to return to the

question of withdrawal later, as the situation in the DRA becomes more stable. (Lyakhovskiy, p. 177)

**February 5, 1980** - The Defense Intelligence Agency reports evidence that Soviet military forces may be preparing to intervene in Iran and that at the current rate of preparations would be ready to do so within a few weeks' time. (*USSR: A Military Option*, 2/5/80)

**February 7, 1980** - At a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow, Andropov reports on his trip to Afghanistan. He concludes that "the situation in Afghanistan is now stabilizing, according to all facts. However, the situation remains complicated and requires most urgent measures ..." Ustinov comments that "one should be careful about the withdrawal of troops. I think the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan will require a year, maybe a year and half. Until then, we should not even think about the withdrawal of troops. Otherwise, we can create many problems for ourselves." Brezhnev proposes "to build up the contingent of troops in Afghanistan somewhat." Gromyko argues that one cannot simply withdraw troops until the Soviet Union ensures the security of the DRA in accordance to the Soviet-Afghan treaty. (Minutes of the Politburo, February 7, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**February 8, 1980** - Vance, with Carter's approval, writes to Gromyko proposing a dialogue based on the premise that "if there was restraint on both sides and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region, our respective interests need not lead to confrontation." (Vance, pp. 349-405). Gromyko responds favorably, and Vance asks Carter for the authority to arrange a meeting. However, Carter, siding with Brzezinski's objections, instructs Vance not to pursue his initiative further. (Brzezinski, pp. 435-36; Harrison, p. 54)

**February 10, 1980**- First Deputy of the Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov returns to Kabul after making a report at the Politburo with instructions to expand the functions of the Operational Group of the General Staff in Afghanistan and prolong its work "interminably." (Merimsky, NNI, p. 97)

**February 12, 1980** - Marshall Shulman says in a published interview that he thinks the Soviet government invaded Afghanistan out of "a broad fear of the creation of a crescent of militant Islamic, anti-Soviet nations" on its southern border, not because it is seeking to gain control over Middle East oil. While he concedes that some Soviet officials and the Soviet military did consider the strategic opportunities, he believes that the real motivation was political instability in Afghanistan. (DSD 2/12/80)

**February 13, 1980** - During a news conference, Carter states that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is "not acceptable." The U.S. cannot "accept Soviet occupation and domination of Afghanistan as an accomplished fact." (PPP, 1980-81, I, p. 309)

**February 16, 1980** - The Soviet Union begins to move five more battle ships into the Indian Ocean in response to the increased United States naval presence. The Soviet fleet, comprised of 31 ships, is the largest Soviet naval contingent in the region in recent history. The U.S. fleet consists of 20 ships, including 13 warships. (WS 2/21/80)

**February 21-23, 1980** - Mass demonstrations take place in Kabul. The number of demonstrators reaches 400,000 on February 22. All central streets and approaches to administrative buildings are controlled by the crowds. The Afghan government is in disarray, and the Soviet command blocks all roads and accesses to the Afghan capital. On the recommendation of Marshal Sergei Sokolov, the Revolutionary Council of the DRA declares martial law and imposes a curfew in Kabul. Soviet troops open fire without permission. Police arrest 400 activists. (Merimsky, NNI, p. 98)

**February 26, 1980** - Carter sends a letter to Yugoslavia's President Tito, saying that the United States would be willing to participate in a "guarantee" of Afghanistan's "true neutrality" given a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops. (WP 2/27/80)

**February 26, 1980** - Leonid Zamyatin calls on Carter to stop supplying aid and arms to "mercenaries" in Afghanistan. (NYT 2/27/80)

**February 27, 1980** - The Soviet Union hints that it might be ready to pull its troops out of Afghanistan, but U.S. officials firmly discount the significance of these hints. The London-based *Evening News* quotes Soviet officials as being willing to accept U.N. peacekeeping forces, while Brezhnev expresses interest in U.S.-Soviet talks to visiting American businessman Armand Hammer. American analysts see the initiatives as an attempt to split a "wavering" European alliance and to derail U.S. attempts to lead a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. (WP 2/28/80)

**February 28, 1980** - Carter holds a meeting in the Oval Office to determine how to react to indirect communication from Moscow that the USSR may be willing to withdraw from Afghanistan if the United States reconsiders its stance on boycotting the Olympics. (Brzezinski, p. 435)

**February 28, 1980** - Fidel Castro suggests to the Soviet leadership that Cuba could play an intermediary role in arranging talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Protocol of the Politburo, February 28, Briefing Book, Tab 8).

**February 29, 1980** - Vance and Dobrynin discuss the situation in Afghanistan. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter denies reports that further talks are scheduled for

next month and dismisses speculation that the two countries are near an agreement to end the crisis. Hodding Carter reiterates U.S. insistence that Soviet troops be withdrawn before a solution can be reached. (WP 3/1/80)

**March 3, 1980** - Vance warns that sanctions against the Soviet Union will remain in place until all Soviet troops leave Afghanistan. Saying that the Soviet government shows no signs of ending the occupation, Vance gives the first indication from a senior Carter Administration official of the likely duration of the sanctions. U.S. officials say that the speech is meant primarily for Western European allies, who have complained about the "lack of clarity" in the U.S. sanctions. Vance outlines "five key objectives" of the Carter policy:

1. to impose a heavy price for the aggression through economic sanctions;
2. to encourage a withdrawal of Soviet troops through efforts on the part of the international community to create a truly nonaligned, neutral government;
3. to manage East-West relations in a way that "preserves their essential framework" and allow a resumption of détente when the crisis ends;
4. to work with Southwest Asian countries to strengthen the "security, stability, and independence of the region;"
5. to make a renewed commitment to "building the basic military and economic strength of America." (WP 3/4/80)

**March 3, 1980** - In a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Vance states that "our relations with the Soviet Union have been and will be essentially competitive." Nevertheless, he states that it is not in the U.S. interest "even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation." (Garthoff, pp. 968-969)

**March 5, 1980** - Carter has a meeting with Schmidt. He writes in his diary that the Chancellor "was primarily on the defensive because I persisted in asking what more the Federal Republic would do to help us in Afghanistan, and what actually they had done that provides pressure on the Soviet Union. The answer to both those questions apparently is 'Nothing.'" (Carter, p. 500)

**March 9, 1980** - Zia ul-Haq discusses with American scholar Selig Harrison why he decided to reject the U.S. aid package. Zia states that the effort to pair reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral agreement with an aid package was viewed as an inadequate response to the Soviet invasion. He adds that the U.S. offer implied that the amount of aid was tied to the degree of assurances given. (*U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Zia Expounds to American Scholar*, 3/9/80)

**Early March 1980** - The first major Soviet military operation takes place in the Kunar valley.

**March 10, 1980** - At a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow, the members approve Brezhnev's answer to Castro's proposal. The draft is written by Gromyko, Ustinov, Andropov, Ponomarev and Oleg Rakhmanin from the International Department. Their memorandum concludes that it is "most likely that a successful settlement of domestic problems and consolidation of new regime in Afghanistan will require considerable efforts and time." The Politburo approves Castro's initiative, but also finds it necessary to disabuse him of "illusions about a simple and speedy settlement." Among the long-term prerequisites for Soviet withdrawal the Politburo mentions the necessity to make Pakistan, Iran and the United States cease their anti-Kabul activities. (Minutes of the Politburo, March 10, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**March 20, 1980** - The United States and China agree to pursue separate but "mutually reinforcing" efforts to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Meetings between Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin and Vice President Walter Mondale focus broadly on aid to the anti-Soviet rebels. (WP 3/21/80)

**March 28, 1980** - Brzezinski informs Carter that there is continuing inter-agency disagreement over the explanation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. "I lean toward those who see the invasion as part of the current phase of Soviet assertiveness. Soviet behavior is symptomatic of the long-term historical drive, with military power supplanting Marxist ideology as its basic dynamic source. The drive toward the Persian Gulf is a historic element of Soviet foreign policy." (Brzezinski, p. 567)

**April 4, 1980** - The Soviet news agency Tass announces the ratification by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of a Soviet-Afghan treaty (probably signed on March 14, 1980) "on the conditions for the temporary stay of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan territory." The treaty is also approved by Afghanistan's Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers. (*Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response*, 2/16/82)

**April 7, 1980** - Harold Brown says that there is increasing evidence that the Soviet Union is using nerve gas against the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan. Afghan refugees, in separate, independent interviews, have allegedly described symptoms which match those caused by the nerve agent Soman. (WP 4/8/80)

**April 10, 1980** - During a meeting with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Carter downplays the significance of Soviet motivations for intervening in Afghanistan: "We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude. Regardless of its motives, there can be no doubt that the Soviet invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sealanes." (PPP, 1980-81, I, p. 635)

**April 10, 1980** - The Afghan government claims Afghan rebel forces are using U.S.-made chemical grenades in Afghanistan. (*Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response*, 2/16/82)

**April 10, 1980** - The Politburo in Moscow approves a series of measures on Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Members conclude that the intervention in December was a "correct and timely" action. The Politburo decision mentions that, among other functions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, "the closing, together with Afghan forces, of the country's frontiers." It also says that "one cannot solve the Afghan issue without acknowledging the fact that Afghanistan, being a direct neighbor of the USSR, is part of the zone of special interests of the USSR." The Politburo finds that the Soviet rejection of the British plan of "neutralization" for Afghanistan and removal of the Karmal regime helped the evolution of some West European countries away from the U.S. hard-line position. The Politburo also discusses the possibility of signing a "new treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance," which would be a defensive treaty similar to the "dozens" of treaties the U.S. has concluded "with many countries." (Minutes of the Politburo, April 10, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**April 11, 1980** - Gen. Aleksei Yepishev, chief of the Political Department of the Soviet armed forces, says in a signed article in *Pravda* that all the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to "guarantee the security of such Marxist nations as Afghanistan against attacks by imperialism." While all Warsaw Pact members except Romania have supported the Soviet intervention, only the Soviet Union has sent troops into Afghanistan. Moscow has called for a meeting of European communist parties to discuss--and presumably endorse--further "military assistance" to Afghanistan. The Italian, Yugoslav and Spanish communist parties have already indicated that they will not attend such a conference. (NYT 4/12/80)

**April 12, 1980** - In response to the movement by the Soviet Union of additional military units into Afghanistan, Carter states that the Soviets are "threatening the advantages of detente, now and in the future." (*Replies by the President to Questions Asked at a News Conference*, 4/12/80)

**April 21, 1980** - Vance submits his resignation to Carter based on concerns arising from the planned hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The resignation is to take effect after the mission, which is set for April 25. On April 28, Vance meets with the President who formally accepts his resignation. Edmund Muskie is later appointed to replace Vance as secretary of state. (McLellan, pp. 160-161)

**April 21, 1980** - The United States concludes military and economic accords with Oman and Kenya, granting the United States access to air and naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Oman will receive \$100 million in aid for the use of the bases; Kenya will receive roughly half that amount. Also, renovation of the bases will cost some \$100 million. (NYT 4/22/80)

**April 23, 1980** - Gromyko arrives in Paris for a three-day visit, his first to a Western country since the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet military reportedly refuses to consider a symbolic gesture of removing a few divisions from Afghanistan for the trip. (WP 4/24/80)

**April 25, 1980** - A secret U.S. government attempt to rescue American hostages held in Iran ends when a helicopter and refueling aircraft involved in the operation collide at a desert staging area in Iran. (Iran-Contra Chronology, p. 30)

**April 27, 1980** - Seven U.S. naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier "Constellation," arrive in the Indian Ocean, raising fleet strength to a record 34 ships. Three more ships are expected to arrive within the week. (NYT 4/28/80)

**April 27, 1980** - H.N. Kaul, a respected Indian journalist who is senior correspondent for the independent Press Trust of India, says that the Soviet Union has moved medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles into Afghanistan. Kaul, who has just returned from Afghanistan, argues that the missiles could be intended either to counter U.S. intercontinental B-52 bombers or to threaten the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Kaul's accusations are considered serious because of India's generally pro-Soviet stance and Kaul's personal reputation. (WP 4/28/80)

**May 5-June 18, 1980** - Liu Huaqing, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, tours industrial and military facilities in the U.S. During the visit, Vice Premier Geng Biao and his party meet with Carter, Brown, Mondale and others. They also tour military facilities and discuss the Afghanistan situation. (Garthoff, pp. 986-987)

**May 8, 1980** - Edmund S. Muskie replaces Cyrus Vance as secretary of state. (Principal Officers, p. 3)

**May 13, 1980** - Walter Mondale alleges that the Soviet Union is building a major airfield in Afghanistan with which to threaten the Persian Gulf. Mondale retracts the statement when U.S. intelligence sources inform him that no such base is being built. (WP 5/14/80)

**May 15, 1980** - The Warsaw Pact releases a major policy statement calling for disarmament, détente and a "political settlement" of the Afghanistan situation. The statement, signed by Brezhnev and the leaders of the other six members of the Warsaw Pact, comes shortly before the first high-level U.S.-Soviet talks since the invasion of Afghanistan. According to the statement, "once any forms of outside interference directed against Afghanistan are completely discontinued, the Soviet armed forces will begin to be pulled out from Afghanistan in accordance with the Soviet declarations." (WP 5/16/80)

**May 16, 1980** - Muskie and Gromyko meet in Vienna for three hours but make no progress toward resolving the crisis in Afghanistan. Regarding the meeting, Gromyko writes in his memoirs: "Everything Muskie said confirmed that the Carter administration was drifting in the direction of raising world tension, sharpening Soviet-US relations and widening the gulf between us on nuclear issues." (Gromyko, p. 296; WP 5/17/80)

**June 1, 1980** - The Pentagon announces that it is withdrawing 1,800 Marines that the United States had sent to the Arabian Sea in response to the Iran and Afghanistan crises. A spokesman says that Washington does not rule out the possibility of sending them back to the region if the situation warrants it. (WP 6/2/80)

**June 4, 1980** - A press account reports that Poland, Hungary and Romania have privately informed the Soviet Union that they consider the invasion of Afghanistan a serious and damaging mistake. While the Warsaw Treaty countries--with the exception of Romania--have publicly supported the Soviet action, privately they have been extremely anxious about the intervention. In the words of one East bloc official, "Call it what you like, when you put troops across someone else's frontier, it's invasion...." (CSM 6/4/80)

**June 1980** - Soviet Ambassador Tabeev reports optimistically from Kabul to Moscow about "a certain consolidation of the PDPA." "The leadership of the DRA has begun active measures on consolidating the military successes by creating local party and state organizations, organizing political work in masses." (Lyakhovsky, p. 186)

**June 13, 1980** - Babrak Karmal attempts to commit suicide according to rumors circulating in Kabul. During the next week, however, the Afghan leader makes several public appearances, seeming "cocky as always." (*Situation in Afghanistan*, 6/19/80)

**June 19, 1980** - The Politburo in Moscow agrees that "it is advisable to carry out a withdrawal of some military detachments" and to use this for reaching agreement with Pakistan and Iran about termination of the guerrilla's bases on their territories. (Politburo discussion, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**June 20, 1980** - Carter warns U.S. allies in Europe against the "false belief" that they can maintain détente with the Soviet Union while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. Carter strongly disputes Moscow's argument that Soviet actions in Afghanistan should not damage the essential "fabric" of détente. "The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace or still enjoy the benefits of cooperation while pursuing a policy of armed intervention," Carter insists. (NYT 6/21/80)

**June 23, 1980** - Brezhnev reaffirms Moscow's long-term commitment to Afghanistan in a speech before the Communist Party Central Committee which is made public today. Radio Moscow also announces the partial withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. This

withdrawal, reported yesterday by Tass, involves one division of soldiers and 108 tanks. (WP 6/24/80)

**June 23, 1980** - The CC CPSU asserts that the "rapprochement between aggressive circles of the West, above all the United States, with the Chinese leadership is taking place on an anti-Soviet basis, hostile to peace. The partnership of imperialism and Peking hegemonism is a dangerous new phenomenon in world politics..." (Garthoff, p. 988)

**June 24, 1980** - Muskie concedes that, in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Senate hostility to SALT II, prospects for further arms control are "diminished." (Basic Documents, p. 216)

**June 25, 1980** - The United States informs the Soviet Union that it is ready to support a "decent and constructive" resolution of the Afghanistan crisis which will protect the "legitimate security interests" of the USSR. The proposal offers Soviet officials a face-saving way of withdrawing from Afghanistan, providing for a transition government which will lead to a neutral, independent Afghanistan. (WP 6/26/80)

**July 1980** - In the first half of the month, Zia ul-Haq approaches Moscow with a proposal to organize with Soviet mediation talks among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran in the second half of August. The purpose of the negotiations, according to Zia, would be normalization of bilateral relations and preservation of "the status Afghanistan as neutral and friendly towards the Soviet Union" with guarantees of non-intervention into its domestic affairs. The Politburo agrees "in principle," but then Zia, as the Soviets suspect, withdraws his proposal. (Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, July 18, Briefing Book, Tab 8)

**July 7, 1980** - Responding to a question about the linkage of SALT II and Afghanistan, Muskie states: "I think we had a fighting chance of getting ratification before the invasion of Afghanistan...I can't conceive of being able to rally support of the Senate to achieve ratification of SALT II unless there is a significant change in Soviet behavior." (*Replies by the Secretary of State to Questions Asked at a Question-and-Answer Session Following an Address before the Foreign Policy Association, 7/7/80*)

**July 18, 1980** - A report from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research suggests that the Soviet Union has "long-range intentions" in Afghanistan. The report claims the USSR will only agree to negotiate the withdrawal of its troops from the country after the Muslim insurgency has been brought to an end. (*Moscow's Afghan Strategy, 8/28/80*)

**July 19 - August 3, 1980** - The Soviet Union hosts the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. (Terry, p. 80-81)

**August 1980** - Due in part to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States agrees to send military aid to Somalia, and Somalia agrees to give U.S. armed forces right of access to military facilities in Somalia. Meanwhile, Cuban and Soviet troops remain in Ethiopia. (ICAR; Smith, p. 156)

**August 8, 1980** - The State Department reports that the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan by Soviet forces is "highly likely." (*Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response*, 2/16/82)

**September 5, 1980** - An NSC Special Coordination Committee meeting is held to assess the policy implications of intelligence reports indicating that the Soviet military may be contemplating intervening in Iran. (Brzezinski, p. 451)

**September 22, 1980** - Iraq mounts a surprise attack upon Iran, launching the Iran-Iraq war. (Spector, p. 177)

**October 1980** - The Carter Administration and several Islamic states commit themselves to a significant increase in the level of aid to the Afghan rebels, with particular emphasis on heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. (CT 7/23/81)

**Mid-October 1980** - President Babrak Karmal meets with Brezhnev in Moscow. The Soviet news agency Tass reports that discussions centered on reaching an agreement with Pakistan which will end Islamabad's support for the Afghan rebels. The meetings conclude with a joint statement by Brezhnev and Karmal that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan only when resistance to the DRA government comes to an end. (*Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response*, 2/16/82; Sen Gupta, p. 103)

**October 14, 1980** - Muskie remarks that the Soviets are linking their behavior in Afghanistan to the hard-line approach taken by the United States toward them, including the Senate's rejection of the SALT II treaty and the escalation in defense expenditures. (*Remarks by the Secretary of State at a Press Briefing, Ann Arbor, Michigan*, 10/14/80)

**November 1980** - Babrak Karmal claims that the Soviet Union supplies 80 percent of Afghanistan's foreign aid. (*Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation*, 12/81)

**November 20, 1980** - The U.N. General Assembly adopts Resolution 35/37 calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. (*Resolution 35/37, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly*, 11/20/80)

**December 8, 1980** - Carter feels that world condemnation of the USSR invasion of Afghanistan is hindering military intervention in Poland. He notes in his diary: "We're continuing our worldwide effort to arouse ... interest in the Soviet moves ... The Soviets

have not denied our public statements, and Brezhnev has not answered my hot-line message" for the first time. (Carter, p. 585)

**December 12, 1980** - Brzezinski sends a memo to Harold Brown entitled "Weapons for China," asking for DOD evaluation of possible weapons sales to China as a sanction taken against the Soviets. (Orbis, p. 48)

### 1981

**January 20, 1981** - Ronald Reagan is inaugurated the 40th president of the United States. On the same day, Iran releases the remaining American hostages being held in Tehran. (WP 1/20/81 [special, same-day edition])