

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



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REPLY TO  
AUTHORITY: AFUCIN-Y

SUBJECT:

8 May 1961

TO: Mr. W. W. Rostov  
Deputy Special Assistant to the  
President  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Walt

If it is decided to resume testing, I think the President's statement should cover the following points:

1. It is impossible to prove or disprove whether or not the Soviets have been conducting nuclear tests and other tests designed to enhance their nuclear weapons programs. There are numerous indications which arouse strong suspicion.

2. Yet the United States does not feel it should accuse the Soviet Union of bad faith. Without recriminations or complaints, the U. S. Government merely sees itself compelled to act in conformity with its objective and unaltered security requirements.

3. The inability of the United States Government to determine exactly what the Soviets are doing -- an inability caused entirely by the Soviet Government -- makes it entirely too risky for the U. S. to continue with the present arrangement which, in fact, is a unilateral test moratorium. If we were to refrain from resuming testing, the risk exists that by clandestine testing, the Soviets, in time, would gain technological superiority in all significant weapon systems. As a result, they would have the U. S. at their mercy.


4. Although the United States is resuming testing to enhance military and industrial nuclear technology across-the-board, the Government commits itself to conduct only those types of tests which would not produce fallout endangering the health of people.

5. There have been significant advances in concepts for the design of new types of weapons. It is now believed possible to develop weapons which would greatly strengthen the capability of the United States and its allies

to defend themselves against nuclear blackmail and nuclear attack. Though highly effective militarily, these new type weapons would lack the mass destruction characteristics of most weapons presently in American and Soviet stockpiles. They would be ideal for ground, air and missile defense, and they would make it possible for the U. S. to acquire truly effective second-strike forces.

6. Given the impossibility or undesirability, in the near future, or ever, of achieving a fully disarmed world, development of such weapons is of the highest significance for the Free World. From the humanitarian point of view, only such technological advances hold out the hope that should war unhappily come, the destructiveness of war can be reduced and the danger of large scale extermination be obviated.

Sincerely



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