A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
on
FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN

November 17, 1948

WASHINGTON
NOTE BY-THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN

Reference: Agenda for 27th NSC meeting on Thursday, Nov. 16, 1943, dated Nov. 12, 1943.

At the request of the Acting Secretary of State the enclosed copy of a telegram dated October 27, 1943 from the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly outlining the future course of action to be followed with respect to the Berlin case, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its discussion of Item 3 on the agenda for the NSC 27th meeting on November 18, 1943.

The Department of State stated that the United States Delegation was proceeding on the basis outlined in the enclosure. No action on the enclosure was requested.

SIDNEY H. SCHEuers
Executive Secretary

Distribution:
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board

DECLASSIFIED
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Date: 11/14/63
By: SEYMOUR ALLEN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: DELSA 503, October 27, 5 p.m.
Urgent

At meeting with Secretary yesterday approval was given to memo relating to future courses of action in Berlin case, summary of which is set forth below.

Memo based on assumption that case remains on SC agenda and any program would be fully coordinated with French and UK.

1. Reference to OA. Although we would probably receive overwhelming supporting vote in OA, recommended that this step not be taken at present stage on ground that it would make actual settlement of case more difficult and zero OA condemnation would not result in lifting blockade; furthermore present flexibility and potential of SNA or other influential delegates would be lost.

2. Wait and see period of ten days to three weeks. This course would involve deliberate non-action in UN and at same time taking steps in Berlin first of which would be introductions Western mark B as sole currency in Western sectors. Recommended that this step not be taken until after other measures have been tried on the ground that it would indicate a conclusion that there is no likelihood of securing Soviet agreement to any solution of problem and that steps taken in Berlin would be interpreted in SC and elsewhere as deliberate aggravation of the situation.

3. Attempt to carry out SC resolution despite Soviet vote. This program could be put into effect by a letter to SC President referring to USSR statement that it wants a settlement and that blockade measures are necessary to protect economy of Soviet Zone. Letter would inform President that Western powers would present rail, road and barge traffic at border Soviet Zone on stated future date, that such traffic would be subject to safeguards against currency abuse, that meeting of Military Governors would be called, that restrictions imposed by Western powers would be lifted and thenceforth a CMR meeting held. If traffic were permitted to move through Soviet Zone, Military Governors would immediately meet. Recommendation that this procedure not be followed at present stage on ground that no indication that Soviets would acquiesce and that it would exclude the six neutral members of SC from participating in attempt to find a solution.

4. Implementation of arrangements for currency, etc., through an intermediary. This procedure would make use of intermediary actually to frame the kind of regulation for currency in Berlin which under SC resolution would have been drawn up by Military Governors. Procedure has many variants, one of which was suggested by Secretary General.
sented in Department's 4124 of October 22. Another variant would be for SC to ask the US to have operational arrangements prepared and authorize him to use such means as he desired. Another variant would be to have President make similar request to SC in order to avoid formal SC resolution. Both Soviet and Western Powers might be invited to supply SKG or neutral experts with suggestions as to terms of satisfactory operational arrangements.

Authority of SKG or expert group might be either to prepare operational arrangements which would be submitted to SC for consideration and adoption as recommendation to the parties or for submission to the parties for voluntary agreement. Consideration should be given to time of lifting the blockade in relation to report of SKG or expert group.

Recommendation that immediate steps be started along this line. Wide variation and flexibility of possibilities within general framework of this procedure make it desirable to discuss forthwith with British and French so that we may obtain their general reaction and so that we can work on elaboration of details of the plan.

Secretary is meeting Bevin and Schuman this afternoon, but not probable that program set forth in paragraph 4 above will be discussed.

HARSHALL