U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN EASTERN EUROPE
the non-official level. The travel of Americans in the satellites and reciprocal visits to the United States can become an effective means of serving to remind the captive peoples of U. S. interest in their ultimate freedom, and correcting the distorted image of the West as mirrored in Communist propaganda media.

Covert

27. Covert operations can be directed to the satellites (a) to gain intelligence, (b) to build up organizational arrangements which will constitute an asset in the event of war or other situation where action against the regimes may be feasible and desirable, and (c) to reinforce official U. S. propaganda, especially with the purpose of keeping up the morale of the anti-Communists and sowing confusion among the Communists. To be most effective, operations of this kind should be conducted so as to avoid encouraging divisive forces among the anti-Communists at home or the exiles abroad.

28. It is recognized that the difficulties of conducting covert operations are considerable because of the concern of the Kremlin for security throughout the Soviet bloc and the effectiveness of the bloc-wide security apparatus. In consequence of these considerations, as well as of physical difficulties, the mounting of any specific operations necessarily requires considerable time for adequate preparation. Furthermore, in the light of recent experience it is of the utmost importance to proceed with extreme care in this field with a view to solid accomplishment for the long run.

29. Among the means at hand to assist in the attainment of U. S. objectives are defectors and refugees from the satellites. The defection of key personnel offers considerable benefits to the United States and should continue to be encouraged in accordance with existing policy.

30. However, the effectiveness of emigre leaders and their organizations in promoting U. S. objectives toward the Eastern European satellites remains problematical. Particularly, in a fluid situation such as has developed since the death of Stalin, effectiveness of political exiles will depend to considerable degree upon their own flexibility and resourcefulness. Many variable factors are involved. In addition to the exiles' cohesiveness and substantive activities, there are such factors as adequate financial support, the amount of publicity given to them by free world media directed at their captive countries, and the
policies and actions of the United States and its allies. Manipulation of these factors can act to modify up or down the degree of favor, indifference, or disfavor with which the exile leaders and their organizations are regarded by the Communist regimes and the captive peoples. U. S. moral and covert financial support of political emigres has not and should not be directed at restoring any particular group of emigres to power or at establishing any particular economic or social system in any of the satellites should independence and freedom be achieved by one or more of the captive nations. Under present conditions exile organizations can accomplish only limited objectives. Nevertheless, they form an asset, which, when the aforementioned variable factors are skillfully handled, may encourage developments in the satellites in the direction sought by U. S. policies.
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

The Three Alternatives

31. One alternative is to take direct action for the liberation of the satellite peoples from the USSR by military force, either through direct military intervention or through armed support of revolutionary movements. Such use of military force would in all probability start a global war. This alternative is not in accordance with current U.S. policy and must therefore be rejected.

32. The contrary alternative is to accept the fact of Soviet control of the satellites for an indeterminate period, possibly as a basis for reaching some kind of negotiated accommodation with the USSR, while U.S. efforts are devoted to blocking Soviet expansion in areas beyond the present limits of Soviet control. Such a course, besides being inconsistent with the U.S. position in defense of the right of the satellite peoples to freedom, would deny us the possibility of seeking to reduce the over-all Soviet power position vis-a-vis the United States and its allies. It may be reasonably assumed, moreover, that our acceptance of the legitimacy of the present satellite regimes, even if it should require limited Soviet concessions to the West, would be the course which the Kremlin would desire the United States to follow.

33. There is a large area between the extremes mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs in which policy and action can be developed with the purpose of limiting or weakening the Soviet grip on the satellites. U.S. policy should be directed toward the weakening and the eventual elimination of dominant Soviet power over these peoples, although the accomplishment of this goal in the near future cannot be expected. The more immediate criteria for judging the desirability of any particular measures would be their effectiveness in promoting and encouraging evolutionary change toward the weakening of Soviet controls and the attainment of national independence by the countries concerned. Increased freedom of communication, increased cultural and technical exchanges, American tourism, increased trade, all offer us opportunities to exert greater influence on developments in satellites and should give us a leverage in our dealings with them which has previously been lacking. However, there is a constant danger that efforts on our part to influence the situation, to build up or exploit pressures, might easily be counter-productive if they have the effect of associating the opposition forces with the United States and hence stimulating and justifying the regimes in a crackdown.

Annex to
NSC 5608
U. S. Policy

34. Soviet domination of the satellite peoples violates the principle of freedom and self-determination of nations. It has also, by bringing Soviet power into the heart of Europe, created a fundamental disequilibrium on the Continent and a continuing pressure on Western Europe. So long as it remains, the task of achieving security, stability and orderly progress in Europe must encounter grave difficulties. The United States should make clear by its words and deeds that it does not accept this situation as right or as permanent and that no accommodation with the Soviet Union to the contrary effect can be countenanced.

35. A deliberate policy of attempting to liberate the satellite peoples by military force must be rejected. The United States should, however, direct its efforts toward fostering conditions which would make possible the attainment of national independence by the satellites in the future and toward obstructing meanwhile the processes of Soviet imperialism in those areas.

36. In general, full advantage should be taken of the means of diplomacy, economic policy, propaganda, and covert operations, to maintain the morale of anti-Soviet elements, to foster desired changes in Soviet-satellite relationships, and to maximize Soviet difficulties. Policies and action to be undertaken by the United States should be judged on the basis of their contribution to these purposes within the context of over-all U. S. policy.

37. In its efforts to encourage anti-Soviet elements in the satellites and keep up their hopes, the United States should not encourage premature action on their part which will bring upon them reprisals involving further terror and suppression. Continuing and careful attention must be given to the fine line, which is not stationary, between efforts to keep up morale and to maintain passive resistance, and invitations to suicide. Planning for covert operations should be determined on the basis of feasibility, minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the fundamental interest of the United States.

38. The United States should vigilantly follow the developing situation in each satellite and be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity to further the emergence of regimes not subservient to the USSR. U. S. action in any individual case would have to be determined in the light of probable Soviet reactions, risks of global war, the probable reaction of our allies, and other aspects of the situation prevailing at the time.
39. U.S. interests with respect to the satellites can be pursued most effectively by flexible and adaptable courses of action within the general policy of determined opposition to, and the purpose of the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over those peoples. Such action must be within the limits of our capabilities as conditioned by our general policies.
Hungary

32. Hungary, with a population of about 10,000,000 and a landlocked area of approximately 36,000 square miles, most of it a flat plain, is one of the smaller countries of East-Central Europe. Its history as an organized state goes back for nearly a thousand years and, despite constant Slav ethnic pressures and a long period of conquest by the Turks, it has preserved its cultural, linguistic and political identity through the centuries. Traditionally, the economy of Hungary has been agricultural -- based upon its principal natural resource, its fertile soil. Since World War II, the importance of this branch of the economy has tended to decline under Communist policy, which has concentrated on the rapid development of industry, particularly heavy industry. All sectors of the economy, except agriculture, have been nationalized. Independent peasants still farm about 70% of the arable land, but have been subject to continual economic and political pressures aimed at forcing them into the Communist collectives.

33. Since October 1944, when the Soviet occupation began, the course of affairs in Hungary has been marked by four distinct phases which may be broadly outlined as follows:

a. The period of coalition government, during which there was participation by all important political parties including the minority Communist Party, was characterized by a decisive struggle between the majority democratic elements on the one hand and the Communist Party and its collaborators, supported by Soviet intervention, on the other. Under constant Soviet-Communist pressure and encroachments, the democratic parties were progressively fragmented -- a process which Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian Communist boss, has accurately described as "salami tactics". This period came to an end in June 1947 with the open usurpation of governmental authority by the Communists.

b. The second period -- from June 1947 to June 1953 -- was a time of consolidation of political and economic control by the Communists, of widespread political purges and efforts to propagate the Communist ideology, establish Communist programs and institutions in all fields and to develop and activate a vast Party and administrative bureaucracy in the service of Soviet-Communist objectives. These endeavors were quite effective in destroying all organized and overt political opposition to the regime, isolating the Hungarian people from free intercourse with the West, and forcing Hungary into a satellite relationship with the Soviet Union. They were an almost complete failure, however, in terms of the proselytization of
the Hungarian people and the achievement of Communist economic goals. The prime cause of these failures was the profound and implacable antipathy of the Hungarian people to Communism and Slav domination and their stubborn passive resistance against the regime.

c. (1) In 1953 the mounting internal difficulties confronting the Hungarian Communist regime reached a peak. The impact of Stalin's death and the events which followed in the Soviet Union and East Germany greatly added to the growing confusion in Hungary but opened the way in mid-year to reorganization of the regime under Imre Nagy as Prime Minister, an ostensible shift to "collective leadership", and the adoption of a "New Course" policy of popular concessions on both the political and economic fronts. The "New Course" was born of essential weakness and the failure of the regime's policy of harsh repression. However, firm its political control remained, the Communist regime had failed miserably to broaden its narrow base of popular support and was unable to cope with the steadily deteriorating economic situation.

(2) It is reasonable to conclude that most of the top-ranking Soviet and Hungarian leaders at that time were convinced that a change of tactics, based on the newly-approved principles of "collective leadership" and "socialist legality" and projecting a series of political and economic concessions ostensibly aimed at improving conditions of life under Communist rule, must be tried to avert the deadening effects of the harsh policy followed from 1947 to 1953. The Hungarian people, however, assessed these changes accurately as a temporary shift in tactics and not as a change in basic Communist aims. They were not deluded; peasants and workers alike viewed the "New Course" as stemming from failure and weakness not from strength or a new sense of humanity on the part of the regime. While taking quick advantage of the policy changes by mass withdrawals from the collective farms, by seeking licenses for private enterprise, and by measuring promise against fulfillment in the matter of increased production of consumer goods, the people continued to withhold their cooperation in those phases of the Communist program which remained unaltered and exerted cumulative pressures on the regime for further concessions. Faced with this continuing...
popular resistance but, more importantly at the moment, with growing confusion and disagreement at the highest levels of the Party, the Nagy experiment had little opportunity to evolve and strengthen its conciliatory direction. During the relatively short life of the "New Course" as conceived by Nagy, economic conditions worsened rather than improved, with attendant dislocations of productive resources, including widespread unemployment and depressed production levels in industry and agriculture.

(3) The "New Course" experiment under Prime Minister Nagy came to an end in April 1955 with his removal from the Government and his expulsion from his Party positions at Rakosi's instigation. The policy of concession had ended in failure not only because it fell far short of placating the Hungarian people but also because it was eventually openly opposed by Rakosi, First Secretary of the Party and the dominant Communist in Hungary, who shrewdly perceived that it had opened the way to gradual modification of the Communist system itself and was rapidly weakening Party discipline. Dissension within the Party was not ended by Nagy's ouster. But Rakosi, seeking to reconsolidate his own position of power within the Party and to place the Party in a position of unquestioned strength vis-a-vis the Hungarian people, moved vigorously to restore the semblance of Party discipline and to re-establish firmer political controls in the fields of collectivization, labor and industry, the youth movement, and the arts. He did not, however, carry this reversion to a hard policy so far as to recreate the atmosphere and conditions of open terror and repression which were characteristic until 1953. His reversal of the "New Course" was only partial and, as events of the past year demonstrate, has been subject to continued and increasingly insistent and substantial, though not yet decisive, challenge by anti-Stalin elements within the Party.

d. The fourth and current phase of events in Hungary has followed in the wake of Nagy's removal, the Geneva Conferences of 1955, and the decisions of the recent 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, which included the down-grading of Stalin. There are many indications that serious intra-Party strains are continuing in Hungary, that they are being constantly aggravated by discord at all levels of the Party over the
tactics to be pursued at home and abroad, that Rakosi, a close disciple of Stalin, and the Party as a whole are under greater pressures than ever before, and that there is no sign as yet that the Communist leadership in Hungary has resolved the basic dilemma which besets its choice of a present and future course: progressively greater concessions to the people, or continuing repression with inevitable economic failure and general instability. Among the most recent evidences of the struggle going on within the Party and the country are the continuing unrest and failures of the Communist youth movement (DISZ), the recurrent conflict in the universities between the Party and students, and the writers' revolt. These disturbances have been so persistent and open that they have even erupted in the officially-controlled press on occasion.

34. The dictatorship which the Communist minority established in Hungary in 1947 with Soviet support remains firmly ensconced and outwardly unimpaired. Open popular revolt is not possible and, if attempted under present conditions, could only be abortive and result in useless bloodshed. The Communist monopoly of political power, like the acts of usurpation which brought it into being, is enforced ultimately by the sanction of Soviet intervention through Soviet forces still in Hungary or those on call across the common frontier. It is directly maintained by the Communist security apparatus under the Communist Party leadership. Utilizing these instruments of power, the Communist regime has been engaged for almost a decade in systematically suppressing the rights and liberties of the Hungarian people, imposing the political, social, economic, and cultural institutions of Communism, and attempting to spread the ideology of Communism by compulsory indoctrination and unceasing propaganda. It is of the utmost significance that, notwithstanding these persistent efforts at coercion, the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people remain morally and ideologically unassimilated by Communism and bitterly antagonistic to the regime and to its Soviet masters. Thus, however firm its grasp of sheer political power may be by reason of its position as a satellite in the Soviet orbit and its use of force and repression, the Hungarian Communist regime has failed to achieve a position of real stability.

35. It is noteworthy that the Hungarian Communist regime has moved more slowly than some of the other satellites, since its partial retreat from the "New Course", to join in the denunciation of Stalin and to apply the "Geneva spirit" and the principles of "Socialist legality" and "Collective leadership". The cause of this lag is understandable only in terms of Rakosi's importance in the eyes of the Kremlin and his dominating role within the Hungarian Communist Party. Rakosi has
been compelled by events, however, publicly to acknowledge the dictums of the 20th Congress and to pay lip-service to the latter principles by limited self-criticism with regard to his past encouragement of the cult of personality and responsibility for violations of "Socialist legality". To his obvious discomfiture, Rakosi has also been compelled as a result of the impact of the 20th Congress and opinion within the Hungarian Communist Party itself to acquiesce publicly in the rehabilitation of the deceased Bela Kun and Laszlo Rajk, of whom he was the chief denigrator, and in the release of former Social Democrats whose imprisonment he had originally instigated.

36. If Hungary has proved a particularly hard kernel for the Kremlin and the Hungarian satellite regime to digest, the fundamental reasons may be discerned in several significant historical factors which, though present in part or to varying extent in the other captive countries, are all operative in the Hungarian situation and constitute a formidable psychological barrier to Communism. Thus: (a) Hungary is non-Slav and anti-Slav; (b) It is strongly oriented toward the West by religious faith and tradition with a population preponderantly Roman Catholic (66%) and Calvinist (21%). Church attendance in Hungary today is impressive by sheer weight of numbers, and religious worship, despite the persecution of many church leaders and the collaboration of others, is openly tenacious and fervent; (c) Hungarian nationalism is strong with deeply-rooted ethnic, cultural and historical foundations. Hungarian legal and political development down to World War II was derived institutionally and historically from the West, and Hungary has always regarded itself as an integral part of Western civilization; (d) Hungary has no collectivist tradition; the Hungarian peasant is highly individualistic and has traditionally aspired to own the land he tills; (e) Finally, the Hungarian people have lasting bitter memories of a previous experience with Communist rule -- the Bela Kun regime of 1919. This experience produced a popular antipathy so deep and widespread that Communism remained a feeble force in Hungary until the Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. The fact that Rakosi and others among the present Communist leadership were participants in that earlier regime reinforces the psychological barrier between them and the Hungarian people.

37. Whether the persistent failures of the Hungarian Communist regime in the face of the people's passive resistance will in time so weaken its political control or compel it to so moderate its policies as to occasion, in turn, some diminution and perhaps gradual withdrawal of Soviet domination is highly problematical. Rakosi, Gero and certain other top Hungarian Communists, who returned to Hungary with the Soviet
Army in 1944 after long residence and training in the Soviet Union (the "Muscovites"), have survived in their Party and Government positions of power remarkably long. Nevertheless, Rakosi and his supporters appear to be more vulnerable at this juncture than ever before. Unless the Communist leadership can bring about some real improvement of conditions and a greater degree of popular acceptance, if not support, of the regime, the problems of the regime seem bound to increase as time goes on. It appears doubtful at this stage that Rakosi, with his past record and despite all his shrewdness and his considerable prestige in international Communism, will be able to find a practicable solution, and his retirement or downfall, when it occurs, may well be a decisive turning point toward evolutionary changes in the Communist rule of Hungary and consequent changes in Soviet-Hungarian relationships.

38. U.S.-Hungarian relations have undergone severe strain during the past year because of continued harassment of the U. S. Legation by the Hungarian police authorities and failure by the Hungarian Government to make any effort for the settlement of outstanding issues with the U.S. There is, as yet, no clear sign of change in this situation. However, the Hungarian Communist regime has recently moved, though with only minor success thus far for its motives remain suspect, to resolve its difficulties with Titoist Yugoslavia, to expand its cultural relations and to increase much-needed trade with the West, to promote tourist travel to Hungary, and to encourage by amnesties and promises of full rehabilitation and economic security the redefection of Hungarian emigres abroad. Increasingly sensitive to the charge of maintaining the Iron Curtain, and following the example of outwardly conciliatory moves by the Soviet Union and some of the other satellites toward the West, the Hungarian Government recently announced its decision to dismantle artificial barriers along the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers. The full implications of these steps and their practical results cannot yet be accurately assessed.

39. As long as the Hungarian people maintain their deep antipathy to Communism and its objectives, the dilemma of concessions or repression will continue to plague the regime in Hungary. The passive resistance of the people has effectively sabotaged the Communist economic program, obstructed the process of Communization, and contributed to confusion and dissension within the Party. The policy of harsh repression has been tried and has utterly failed to produce the economic and political results desired by the regime and needed to put the Hungarian economy on a sound footing. In
these circumstances and in view of the present atmosphere being generated from Moscow, there may be increasing pressure on the Hungarian Communist regime to seek a solution to its domestic ills and its outstanding issues with the U. S. and other Western Governments by embarking anew upon policies of moderation at home and conciliation abroad. If this occurs, the way may be opened once again, as in the short-lived period of the "New Course", for the Hungarian people to capitalize on the situation and for the U. S. to attempt to give impetus to developments favorable to the realization of its immediate and long-range objectives respecting Hungary.
Poland

40. Poland has a population of 27.5 million and is the largest of the satellites both in number of inhabitants and in amount of territory. Strategically it is of the utmost importance to the USSR. It is the main approach to Germany and Western Europe and has been occupied since the end of the war by Soviet military forces nominally serving as line-of-communication troops. This fact, together with the country's easy accessibility to the USSR, the direct control of its own armed forces by Soviet officers, the rule of Party leaders loyal to Moscow, and supervision by Soviet "advisers" ensures Soviet military and political domination.

41. Economically, Poland is important to the Soviet bloc primarily as the chief coal-producing country of Eastern Europe, but also because of its merchant fleet and some of its other products such as railway cars. Heavy industry has been ruthlessly emphasized at the expense of agriculture and consumers goods and Polish industry now compares favorably with Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia in size if not in technology, and considerably surpasses the Balkan satellites in output. The situation as regards consumers goods still represents one of the most serious and obvious failures of Communist economic performance. The poor agricultural record reflects not only the intensive industrialization program but also the unpopularity of collectivization and the peasants' deep-seated hatred and suspicion of the regime and of Communism. At present about 24% of the arable land is held by state farms and collective farms combined. Publicly announced plans call for this figure to rise to about 45% by 1960. However, the current official line urges collectivization through persuasion and frowns on "ruining" the kulak (and thus further lowering agricultural output). Collectivization has not been pushed strongly for several months, but it has not been abandoned as a long range goal.

42. Poland's overwhelmingly Roman Catholic character (95% of the people are Roman Catholic), its strong sense of cultural and political community with the West, and its historic antagonism toward Russia combine to render political assimilation to the Soviet system difficult. The Soviet wartime annexation of the eastern two-fifths of Poland, the Katyn Forest massacres, and the Soviet refusal to aid the Warsaw uprising of 1944 against the Germans have deepened the anti-Soviet disposition of the nation. Moreover, the successful large-scale wartime underground movement against the Germans established an immediate precedent for resistance to alien rule. Nevertheless, underground resistance has been reduced
to an absolute minimum, if it exists at all. Nor is there reason to believe that the withdrawal of Soviet army units would diminish Moscow's control to any extent unless, possibly, if Poland were to become contiguous with the Free World.

43. The Catholic Church is the only important element in Polish society in addition to the uncollectivized peasant which is not entirely under the Party's direct economic and political control. In general the Party has been clever in its campaign against the Church, and although it has not hesitated to be ruthless and brutal on many occasions, it has refrained from a direct and frontal assault which would produce a multitude of famous martyrs and shock the Free World. Rather, its tactics have been to undermine and infiltrate the hierarchy, to organize and foster a "Catholic" movement friendly to the Government, to bring the Church gradually under its control, and to pay much lip service to freedom of religion, the reconstruction of churches, etc. These tactics have succeeded in fooling a surprising number of visitors to Poland and are also obviously useful for Communist propaganda in the Free World.

44. A special feature of the Polish situation is the role of the former German territories which were placed under Polish administration after the war and which amount to approximately one-fourth of the total area of present-day Poland. Moscow and its satellites insist that the present German-Polish frontiers are final, and the fact that we maintain that they are only provisional and subject to the final German peace treaty gives the Communists one of the very few propaganda advantages they enjoy in Poland. There seems little doubt that most of the nation, regardless of political attitudes, supports the Polish claim to these territories and the Communist regime exploits this feeling as much as possible.

45. Communism has never been popular in Poland in any form and the Soviet-imposed Communist regime lacks the foundation of a historically strong Communist Party, as the prewar Party prior to its dissolution in 1938 was numerically small, illegal and without major influence. The present organization (called the United Polish Workers' Party), though numbering about 1.4 million members, is almost entirely a postwar creation based on Soviet support.

46. Until very recently Poland's Communist leadership had remained unusually stable and had been subjected to relatively little turnover in comparison to other satellite Parties. But in 1955 there were important changes in the security apparatus (reflecting to some extent the reorganization of the Soviet police following the downfall of Beria) and in recent weeks
there have been changes in top Government posts and even in the Politburo itself. Following Bierut's death in Moscow and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU Edward Ochab became First Secretary of the Central Committee and Jakub Berman was subsequently removed from the Politburo. Ochab has been just as devoted a follower of Moscow as Bierut and Berman and has had the backing of both Stalin and Kruschev, and there is no justification for assuming that he will be any less faithful to the Kremlin in the future. However, these changes should be considered in the light of (1) the Polish Politburo's past difficulties in running the Party as well as in governing the country, and (2) Moscow's new policies of de-Stalinization and closely controlled "liberalization". As regards the first point, the Polish Politburo has not only been inevitably compromised to some extent by its careful emulation in the past of Soviet methods of rule now officially criticized in Moscow as "Stalinist" but it has also been embarrassed by the devastating Swietlo revelations and by serious opposition in Party echelons below the Politburo, to say nothing of its unpopularity and lack of prestige throughout Poland. Criticism, both public and inside the Party, has been stimulated and encouraged by Moscow's "liberalization" (which is called "the thaw" in Poland) and it is clear that it has already exceeded the limits originally intended and is proving far more difficult to control than in the USSR. To some extent the changes at the top help to provide scapegoats for discontent. Berman, for instance, was responsible for both security and propaganda matters, fields in which there have been particular difficulties and controversy. But Party critics of the Politburo hope for still further concessions and for more democratization of Party procedures, while eagerness for additional relaxation of regime controls is apparent throughout the country. Thus, Ochab and those of his colleagues who may remain in the Kremlin's good graces are confronted with the awkward and delicate task of applying Moscow's policies within the expanded limits of the new "liberalization" without allowing things to get out of hand.

47. In foreign affairs the Polish Government has shown considerable enterprise and energy and has been very useful to Moscow in the fields of diplomacy and propaganda. The Warsaw regime has made particular efforts to penetrate those countries which have large Polish minorities, particularly France and Belgium. In addition to its widespread and aggressive repatriation campaign Warsaw has attempted to influence anti-Communist Poles abroad by such devices as paid vacations in Poland for Polish children, the lavish use of funds and personnel for propaganda, schools, clubs, newspapers, etc., and clever exploitation of the poor living conditions of Polish refugees and escapees. A determined effort has also been made to reduce the strength and effectiveness of the badly disunited Polish anti-Communist organizations in the West. That these tactics have not been attended with more success is due more to the
resolve hostility of most individual Poles to the USSR and to Communism rather than to the modest anti-Communist opposition thus far organized.

48. Warsaw has also been skillful in its exploitation of the opportunities presented by the so-called "Geneva spirit" which the Polish propaganda machine interpreted as tantamount to co-existence, recognition of the status quo, and general relaxation and reapproachment with the West. In Poland the Communists made clear that those who looked forward to the overthrow of the present system must now realize that they were misled and unrealistic. To encourage further reconciliation with the regime widely heralded amnesties for political opponents at home and abroad were also promulgated. Abroad the Polish Government has been active in its requests for visas for dependable official and "cultural" representatives, apparently planning to interpret refusal as proof of an Iron Curtain in the West and approval as indicative of Western acceptance of the Warsaw regime as permanent and sovereign, a point on which Warsaw is very sensitive. "Tourism" from America has also been officially encouraged but it is clear that thus far Warsaw prefers a few organized tours, which are relatively easy to control, rather than a general and genuine relaxation of travel barriers. There has been no liberalization of the very stringent Polish exit permit policy for travel to America.

49. In general it may be said that there is no indication whatever that Moscow does not retain effective control over Poland or that recent changes in Communist tactics have in any essential way altered long range plans for complete and thorough Sovietization of the country.