U. S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe
July 18, 1956

NOT BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
of
U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1530-c, as approved
by the President, this note, the enclosed statement of
policy, supplementary to the statement of policy contained
in NSC 5608/1, is circulated herewith for implementation
by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies
of the U. S. Government.

This Appendix to NSC 5608/1 is being given a
special limited distribution, and the contents hereof
should be subject to special security precautions with
access limited to those individuals having a strict "need
to know" in the performance of their official duties.

JAMES J. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the
President for Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES
IN EASTERN EUROPE

1. Avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U. S. objectives. In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. Operations which might involve or lead to local violence will be authorized only by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President on the basis of feasibility, minimum risk, and maximum contribution to the basic U. S. objectives in NSC 5606/1.

2. As a means of encouraging the eventual establishment of freely elected governments in the satellites as a disruptive device and not as an end in itself, be prepared on a case-by-case basis generally covertly and under appropriate policy guidance to assist nationalism in any form where conducive to independence from Soviet domination and where U. S. and free world cohesion would not be jeopardized thereby.