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By *R. D.* NARA Date *4/99*Consists of *3* pages.Number *1* of *10* copies, Series *A...*DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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*EUR*DATE: *WL*

TO: The Secretary *SAW*  
 THROUGH: S/S *WL*  
 FROM: EUR - William R. Tyler *WmT*  
 SUBJECT: Handling the Impasse on Berlin

AUG 7 - 1962

1. While the need to exhaust every possibility of talking the subject either to death or to an acceptable understanding requires that we continue our dialogue with the Soviets over Berlin, it is difficult to see how we can break out of the present impasse so long as the Soviets continue to maintain that the Western presence must be diluted or ended. This raises the question of what we should talk about when we resume contacts with Dobrynin prior to the discussions which we must anticipate if Gromyko (and perhaps Khrushchev) attend the UN General Assembly session beginning September 17.

2. Our Intelligence people estimate that the Soviets will presumably be trying to do two things in any future discussions:

a. To see, if by pressures, threats, and possibly renewed harassments, they cannot still squeeze enough out of us in concessions to make some sort of agreement possible; and

b. To test our limits of tolerance for the post-peace treaty period.

3. If this assessment is correct, an important decision for us will be at what point we should reveal to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal with GDR personnel on access on the basis of present procedures.

There is no indication so far that the Soviets are operating on the assumption that this is what we are prepared to do, although they might, through their intelligence, or by deductive reasoning, have come to consider this a possibility. You will recall that our original version of the "principles paper" had in it acceptance of GDR substitution. This was stricken when Ambassador Thompson argued that its inclusion might well encourage the Soviets to move ahead with their peace treaty.

4. Ideally, we should expose our position on this question when we can gain maximum advantage from it. This might be when we are convinced that the Soviets have reached a firm decision to move ahead with their peace treaty whether or not any prior agreement has been reached with the Western Powers. Our primary emphasis at this point will presumably

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shift from attempting to reach an agreement which the Soviets could incorporate in their peace treaty to a direct attempt to influence the post-peace-treaty situation.

5. You will recall that, in preparing for your recent trip to Geneva, we suggested the possibility of giving a new twist to our "principles" approach for use with Gromyko in extremis. This is still available and could be injected at an appropriate time in discussions with the Soviets (outline of proposal at Tab A). It provides inter alia for disclosure of acceptance of GIR substitution.

6. Underlying such an approach and any arrangements which we might hope to make as a result would be the essentials of what has become known as Solution C. One advantage is that it does not necessarily involve French active participation. As an adjustment to a factual situation, either prospective or actual, it has, in effect, been agreed within the framework of existing contingency planning. The French would scarcely be in a position to proceed unilaterally, even if de Gaulle refused to abide by prior agreements.

7. Your next round with Dobrynin will probably be too early for movement in this direction, but the situation may well have reached the necessary stages of ripeness by the time of the talks with the Soviets which will presumably take place on the margin of the UN General Assembly session.

8. There is, of course, also the possibility that Dobrynin will come back with something positive on the idea of a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The paper at Tab B suggest how we might wish to handle such a development.

9. The foregoing comments are within a conventional framework, following out the inner logic of our position as it has been developed over the past year both in the light of inter-Allied discussions and our protracted talks with the Soviets. The question arises whether some new and possibly dramatic approach could not still be devised to divert the course of developments. We are giving thought to such a possibility, but the prospect of coming up with anything which would be both acceptable to our Allies and the Soviets is not large, given the history of the post-war period and the rather narrow universe of discourse within which discussion of the German problem has become constricted.

10. As a start, we have undertaken a comprehensive review of the negotiating history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958. A summary paper is attached at Tab C, together with a synopsis of proposals which have been advanced or at least suggested for consideration. A review of this kind reveals both a consistent US effort to inject imagination and initiative into the development of the Western position, and the limited success we

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we had in doing this, because of Allied resistance and the harsh  
realities of the situation we are in in Europe and in Berlin.

## Attachments:

- Tab A - A Possible New Twist for Use In Extremis.
- B - Meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers.
- C - Negotiating History of Berlin Crisis Since November, 1958.

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8-7-62.

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