AG: Oh, I've no doubt that it did and I think that... the conference that was set up for May of 1960, the summit that broke down because the U-2 affair, would have continued the negotiation and Eisenhower, I think, like... Prime Minister Macmillan and the French and the Germans, understood that the Soviet Union really had a problem and the East Germans had a problem in the flight of people into Berlin and I think they would have been prepared to discuss that, to look to see whether some other solution could be found in what Khrushchev had proposed, which was simply to walk away and leave it. But we felt that the Soviets had entered into a commitment, accepted an obligation in the agreements that were reached after World War Two as to the status of Berlin.

AG: That never was.

(INTERRUPTION - SIREN)

AG: Oh, Eisenhower very much welcomed the summit. In fact he thought that a great deal had been accomplished at the summit in 1955, when we really opened dialogue with the Soviets and moved toward a greater measure of civility in our relationship. He saw this as a step in the process that he was working toward to reduce the militarisation of the confrontation and to move toward dialogue and negotiation. Also at Camp David, he and Khrushchev had come to some pretty definite conclusions about the possibility of reducing the level of armaments and the military burden that each country was bearing. Khrushchev told Eisenhower, he said, my generals come to me and tell me what the United States is doing and now we must rush to catch up. He said, does that happen to you? And Eisenhower said, all the time, that's what I have to deal with all the time.

AG: Oh yes. I think they saw good possibilities of future negotiation.

AG: I think the idea of showing gradually the danger to the Soviets, in case of disorder or any hostility, any conflict in Berlin, they would be confronted with the question is it worth it? As the allies took steps to move troops to probe the possibility of sending additional forces into Berlin. And they would be confronted with the question of whether they wished to see this break out into actual conflict.

AG: It was not in any specific way at all, but of course it was constantly in the background and Eisenhower had made clear that his view was that if there were to be actual conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would move quickly to large scale, all out conflict, where everything would be drawn into it and that was the danger, that was the risk, and he wanted the Soviets to ponder very carefully, as I myself put it in later years, what is there West of the Iron Curtain for which they were prepared to see the destruction of the Soviet Union?

AG: The two issues were being dealt with quite separately, but there was an interconnection. at one time during the Suez affair, the Soviets had threatened to take action against our allies and we received word about this and Eisenhower authorized his press secretary to make a statement that regardless of what had happened up to that time, we would stand with our allies in case there should be any attack, he didn't expect any attack, but we would stand with our allies. The fact that we did not have a united front with our allies, I think may have had some weakening affect in our ability to exert influence and pressure on the Soviets in what they were in Hungary. But essentially, with the exception of a few connections of that kind, they proceeded separately.

AG: I did not see sitting where I was, working with Eisenhower, I don't think we saw a big interplay.

AG: When was this?

AG: (Interrupts) Oh I think that's when Eisenhower was responding to... I think the statement was made by Khrushchev, as I recall, that the rockets will fly and at that point Eisenhower got word from... He regarded that as bluster and nonsense, but he got word from General Grunther, who was the (unintelligible) at that time that our European allies were deeply concerned about this and it was in response to that that he made the statement that an attack on our allies would find us standing with them.

AG: We thought that was the end of that.

AG: Eisenhower always felt that ultimately but we couldn't define ultimately, this attempt to maintain totalitarian control would break down. And it was for that reason that he wanted to keep, as he put it, keep the hope of freedom alive in the Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called satellites, that had been set up under Soviet domination. With regard to the Soviet Union itself, he felt that the Communist ideology and attempt of the Communists to maintain totalitarian control would be bound to crumble in due time, but nobody could say just how soon that would be.

AG: Yes, and he felt that that would be bound to break down. My guess is that he thought that it would happen sooner than it did, but he did think it would happen.

AG: We were quite concerned about it. When Stalin died there were proposals that this was a time to take psychological warfare initiatives against the Soviet Union. It was out of that that Eisenhower set up a very thorough going study in the summer of 1953 to decide what our policy should be. And he had three lines of policy evaluated, each team charged with making the best case possible from their line of policy. One was containment, one was drawing a line with the threat of retaliation if the sphere of influence were breached, and the last was roll back, that had been talked about during the campaign. At the end of it, Eisenhower drew out of this that roll back, any idea of use of military forces for roll back was out of the question, that our effort would be to keep the hope of freedom alive in these countries and that we would really pursue a policy of containment, backed by the threat of massive retaliation if there should be any egregious violation of the safety of our allies.

AG: That's correct. We excluded the military, any military option as a result of that study.

AG: He allowed for the conduct of covert activities to try to support dissident groups, try to support groups committed to the freedom of their countries, while recognizing the limits that such covert action would have under a totalitarian regime, as had been established in most of these countries and in the Soviet Union.