A:

Agitation, thank you for helping me. Much agitation around they convo..., the aggriculturals meeting to Prague, there about ten thousand of their people coming to Prague crying; we will have communist government, and so on and so on, then some other, I do not, well this militia had a special meeting, big meeting, it was always in a very very big hall here in Prague. So, and they were marching through Prague, and this police forces, so the people was afraid, that was one thing. And everywhere, and I remember quite clearly in offices and on the faculties/factories and the university and so on, they were forming so called action committees. That means committees formed of people of very very better conscience, let's say, and they were throwing out non-communists. Many students, many professors, many high ranking clerks. So practically, not all, but many non-communists were thrown out from their offices, from their positions, and so on and so on. Of the high ranking officers in the army, even in our ministry in, I was already in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, so many old members of the ministry, the clerks and so on, were thrown out. So that was an atmosphere of fear, absolute. So, and at that time, Benes, who asked the parliament to be convened, ...... because Gottwald didn't want the session of the parliament at the time, because about sixty members of the parliament were thrown out too by the action committee of the parliament, so Benes finally seeded, and I stress again that at that time he was seriously ill. Now it is known, but at that time not very many people knew that. In December he had a stroke, it was a third stroke already. So that means, and the fourth was in '48, in August, and it was the last one. So everybody here who didn't know that thought that Benes seeded, as it was in Munich. In Munich it was absolutely something other, but in this case Benes ceded, taking in view his physical situation, his illness, and secondly he didn't want at that time the bloodshed, I'm repeating, it's true, some, it was the reason. And it was the twenty fifty, the day which is called now the big victory of the communists, yeah. So that means the day normally thought as the communists, ...... it was only the final day, or the end. So since that day the reparations came on, the persecutions, the putting of people in jail, and so on. And afterwards Mr. Mas.., if you allow me only to to finish it, Benes saw it, Masaryk saw it, because both of them were promised by Gottwald before that that nothing would happen, no persecutions, no jailings, and so on. And he, they saw, both of them, that he betrayed them. Yeah. So Masaryk was the first who saw it absolutely clearly, and he wanted to protest against that. He didn't want to get out from the country. There was a thing which is not known, he was very well acquainted with Paul Henry.. Spark..? who was the Prime Minister of Belgium at that time, and Spark.. sent through clandestine channels a message to Masaryk, I saw it myself because I was intermediary in this thing, asking him you know when he wants, well that he should re.... him whether he will go out from the country that Spark... would invite him to an immediate very urgent meeting in Brussels, yeah, and Masaryk said no, I can't go there, I have to stay here. Yeah, so he wanted to stay here, knowing that he has to do something, yeah.

A:

Well, in this time the feeling was quite general, especially in the circles where there were information, and as far as I remember, and I will state another case in this respect, our colleagues from the military services informed the ministers, especially Masaryk knew it, and and most probably the President Benes too, that there were concentrations around our frontiers, especially in Hungary, that means against Slovakia, and in around Moravska Ostrava, Marich Ostrau the Germans call it, that means from the Polish sides. And at once they were very big Soviet concentrations at that time. So that means they were prepared to bring some kind of friendly or brotherly help, as we saw in 1968. So that means it was known, it was one point of view, and the second was that Mr. Zorian... that was the, at that time he was Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, came to Prague, he was formerly Ambassador here in Prague, and he went away to Moscow and became vice-minister, and he came at once to Prague, officially to cover some food, some deliveries of grain. Why should a vice-minister discuss these questions? And he asked to be received by the President. The President said no, I don't want to receive him, and then he went to the Foreign Office, to our office, and Masaryk was, just at that time he had influenza, unfortunately, and he was lying in his bed upstairs in his small apartment, in the second floor of the ......... Palais, and he didn't want to receive him too, but Zorian... forced his way up to his flat, just came to him, he spoke several words to him, he was about two or three minutes there, I wasn't there, it was my colleague here, Dr. Sp......, present, and he said to him that the grains will be delivered and so on and so on. And went away. And going out from the door he turned and said; not to forget Stalin is sending you his, well greetings. And he went away, it was a warning. Clear, Masaryk took it as a warning, at that moment. So it was just in connection with these armies. They should know that if something would go wrong, wrongly, so that they are prepared.

A:

That means this month, it's the second half, or the end of February...

A:

...And the beginning of March, because before that everybody, especially Masaryk, knew that everything is going wrong, since his return from the session of the United Nations in in August, sorry, sorry, say, Autumn 19, 1947, he was warned not to return and so on, he returned, but it was clear, yeah, that things were going worse and worse. In January he had a visit to B....., he has got a honourary doctorship there, at the University, the Mas.... University in B......, that was one thing where he had a very nice speech, but stressing some details which were, once seen afterwards, quite profess....? And another one, I was with to his last visit to Moravia, it was about the fifteenth of February, S....ov cities and so on, there were some visits to the graves of our friars who were, who came over from Britain, or who were the, not who came, the coffins of ...., yeah, is the right expression, sometimes, I'm sorry but sometimes I don't know the right expression because it's not usual. So he had some speeches there and so on. And, even at that time it was a fine occasion, or several occasions, so he had some warnings, already at that time. And after the coup, that means the last week of February and the first week of March, only two weeks he was living, or alive still, so he was absolutely p...t?, yeah. He was very sad, normally he was a very gay man, he made a lot of ....ds, and he reacted quite fine and gaily and so on. But these days no, absolutely not. And it was worse and worse all the time. So that means he realised that the things are going so that he, Masaryk, with his name, couldn't spend long time in this position. Yeah. So that was one of the principal reasons why we are absolutely clearly ...... that his death was a decision of his own, to warn not only his own country, but the world. And especially there in England and even in America, they understood it better than here. Mr. Churchill, I know it because I have got the materials, he had founded with Mr. Marshal a special foundation, in Geneva they have erected a small monument to Masaryk, and so on, so that means their friend was honoured by them, they understood it. And the Marshal, I'm sorry, at L..... pact was signed on the ninth of April the following year, and one of these questions discussed at the time was that the Masaryk's case was a warning, that they should be much more aware.

A:

...And Fulton...