The main purpose of this paper is to review past studies on U.S.-Japan military technology relations and defense industry, and to assess their main charateristics and to draw implications for the necessity of further studies. In carrying out the review, the studies by Japanese are drawn from the topics related to technology transfers between the United States and Japan, frictions between the United States and Japan over military-related technologies, and the Japanese defense industry in general. In the first section, the studies on technology transfers and military technology frictions are reviewed. In the second section, the main characteristics, their problems, and some of the puzzles concerning military technology relations between the U.S. and Japan in the late 1980s are explained along with the review of studies in Japanese defense industry in general. Based on the reviews in section one and two, we will describe our study plan for this project in the final section.
The studies on technology transfers between the United States and Japan can be divided into the following four categories. The first category is relates to the political process of formulating the military technology transfer policies of Japan.
As is widely known, Japan has one of the strictest policies in restraining weapon exports. The Three Principles on Arms Exports were established in 1967 and Japan refrained from the exports of weapons to such countries as 1) communist bloc countries, 2) countries subject to embargoes on arms export under United Nations Security Council's resolutions and 3) countries engaged or likely to be engaged in an international conflict. These principles were further strengthened in 1976 by the Policy Guideline on Arms Export that virtually prohibited the exports of weapons to every area in the world. These principles were, however, relaxed only for the United States in 1983, allowing the flow of arms technology from Japan to the United States. This political process is analyzed by Akiyoshi Sakuragawa in the article (1995) published in Kokusai Seiji (International relations) which focused on arms transfers in the post-Cold War world. The article describes in detail such arguments as the definition of arms and the desirability of arms exports within the Cabinet and Diet, and analyzes how political decisions on arms exports and technology transfers were reached. Similar but less detailed studies also can be found in Sumi (1993) and Kinoshita (1988).
The second set of studies are on real-world experiences of technology transfers from Japan to the United States that started due to the changes in Japan's arms export control policies in 1983. The books and articles were written mainly by industry people and former government officials who actually had experiences in dealing with technology transfers. They, in general, discuss the actual workings of the system, concrete examples of technology transfer projects and describe difficulties and obstacles as well as their importance. For instance, Kozu (1993) of the National Defense Academy explains difficulties of technology exchanges such as differences in policies concerning arms exports, problems arising from project leadership, differences in organizations, institutions, culture and needs of respective countries concerning weapons requirements, after describing such issues as the roles of technologies in national defense, relations between military and commercial technologies,and the importance of technology exchanges. At the end of the article, he briefly argues the necessary conditions for successful technology exchanges. In the same issue of Bouei Ronshu, Kotaki (1993) argues the same topic from the industry perspective and Takao (1993) approaches the issue using the FSX co-development project as an example.
Kinoshita, who was in a position in the Japan Defense Agency and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to negotiate with U.S. representatives regarding technology transfer, wrote a book entitled What Does the U.S. Want from Japan: High Technology and National Security (1988). After describing characteristics of high technologies and relations between technologies and weapons, he explains the background and content of U.S. demands for technology transfers from Japan. This is one of the most interesting sources for understanding such topics as how the U.S. approached Japan to transfer commercial technologies which are applicable to military uses and the Japanese industry and government responses to these approaches. Kinoshita himself is positive toward technology transfers from Japan and urges people to think about the issue without leaning on "the conspiracy theory" that tries to read a hidden strategy of the United States behind the demand for technology transfers.
The third group of books and articles belong to this "conspiracy theory" school. Sumi (1993) argues that the hidden reason behind the pressure for technology transfers from Japan is for the United States to keep the number one position in high technology area by obtaining advanced Japanese technologies. U.S.-Japan security relations, he argues, were used as a lever to push Japan toward this direction. Sadayuki Sato (1987) interprets the reason behind the pressure of technology transfer as the U.S intention to establish predominace in military technologies and to put technologically-rising Japan in a dependent and supplemental position to the United States. Fujii (1992) also argues that the basic technology policy behind the pressure of technology transfers is to integrate Japanese high-tech industries into the U.S. military system and use them as subcontractors (shitauke). Through this arrangement, he argues, the U.S. can restrain Japan and establish its monopoly position in technology areas.
Studies in this category argue against technology transfers to the United States. Kibino (1987) made this point using the problems of Japanese companies' participation to SDI program and Inoue (1986) argues using telecommunication industry as an example. They argue that the trend of increasing transfers of Japanese dual-use technologies contradicts Japan's policies based on pacifism and make the Three Principles on Arms Export meaningless.
The fourth group puts emphasis on the importance of technology transfers for U.S.-Japan security relations and Japanese technology policy itself and tries to draw out the strategic implications of technology transfers. Ueda (?) argues that technology transfers between the United States and Japan are mutually beneficial, namely, the U.S. can supplement its supremacy of military technologies by absorbing Japanese manufacturing and component technologies and Japan can obtain such military technologies as software and system integration through technology exchanges, and collaboration in this area itself would help to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Ueda also discusses the necessity of constructing the technology strategy by assessing the importance of technologies in a broader or more comprehensive concept of national security. Murayama (1993, 1994, 1996a) puts the emphasis on the concept of economic security that emerged in the U.S. in the late 1980s. He argues that internationali-zation of the defense technology base and the increasing importance of dual-use technologies have changed U.S. technology policy and Japan also needs to adjust to this change. He then argues that technology exchanges would help both countries to develop cost-effective defense technology bases and to stabilize U.S-Japan relations in both the security and economic perspectives.
There are numbers of studies available on the issue of high-tech frictions that are related to military technologies in comparison to the studies on technology transfer issues. One of the main reasons is that books and articles that deal with U.S.-Japan economic frictions usually describe such topics as trade friction over semiconductors and friction over the codevelopment of FSX.( for instance , see Hideo Sato, 1991) However, if we limit studies to the ones that mainly deal with high-tech frictions involved with military technologies, the number of studies are not abundant. These studies could be divided into three groups.
The first group is concerned with the increasing Japanese abilities in dual-use technologies and its military implications. Six journalists at the Asahi Shinbun conducted extensive interviews on the dual-use nature of Japanese high technologies and wrote a book entitled Military Technology Power (1989). The interviews were done with about four hundred people both in Japan and overseas and tried to find out the military implications of Japanese commercial technologies using concrete examples. They found out that there are a number of examples of Japanese technlogies such as semiconductors and new materials that have military importance. They also describe how the United States and other countries see this new development and try to provide factual backgrounds for dealing with the issue. Journalists at N.H.K. conducted similar interviews, although not as extensive as the Asahi book, on the dual-use nature of Japanese technologies as a part of arms control project (N.H.K. 1990).
Ebata, who is a leading researcher of military technologies, also warns about the military implications of Japanese commercial technologies in The Weapon Mafia (1992). This book mainly deals with black markets for weapons and describe such topics as the international network of secret weapon trading and proliferation of weapons of mass destructions in third world countries. In the final chapter, he explains that Japanese commercial technologies such as fax machines, flat panel displays, and car navigation equipments have significant military applications, and warns of the possibility that exported Japanese commercial technologies are diverted to military uses in foreign countries. The dual-use nature of Japanese technologies are also discussed in Ebata's other book (Ebata 1994).
The second set of studies deal with U.S-Japan frictions over military technologies that developed in the second half of 1980s. One of the main charateristics of the economic friction between the United States and Japan was that economic competition between them started to become entangled with security relations and main area of friction was over dual-use technologies. As a result, trade friction over machine tool industry, Fujitsu's intention to acquire Fairchild Semiconductor, Nihon Sanso's acquisition of Semi Gas, and frictions over codevelop-ment of FSX all were involved with entangled problems of economic competition and national security.
Murayama in his book, Economic Security Strategy of the United States(1996), argues that the main reason for this new kind of conflict the rise of the economic security concept in the United States. He traces how this concept gained popularity in the American political scene by examining the political activities of the semiconductor industry and changes in Pentagon attitudes toward dual-use technologies. Then he overlays this internal change upon U.S.-Japan technology relations and interprets how the relation between economic and security issues were altered in this period and serious frictions over dual-use technologies developed as a result. At the end, he suggests the importance of military and dual-use technology exchanges between the United States and Japan and the necessity for cooperation in nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in order to establish new cooperative technology relations based on the lessons from the frictions in the late 1980s.
Hideo Sato's article (1993) also deals with the concept of economic security and its implications for U.S.-Japan relations. After comparing concepts of economic security in Japan and in the U.S., he explains the characteristics of the newly-emerged concept of economic security in the United States, that is, the recognition that the U.S. cannot engage in effective diplomacy without strengthening the U.S industrial and economic bases, and interprets the emergence of a result-oriented trade policy in this framework. He warns against this trend in the United States and suggests both the United States and Japan should adopt "active" economic security strategy, by making efforts to ease economic frictions and working toward materializing the true global partnership without leaning on protectionism or managed trade approaches, what he calls a "passive" type of economic security strategy.
Yakushiji (1991) suggests "techno-detente" between the United States and Japan to ease tensions in technology areas. In the chapter that deals with U.S.-Japan technology relations, he holds that the U.S. attitudes toward Japan in terms of technology have become ambivalent due to the changing environments of international politics and such arguments as technology containment and techno-revisionism, and suggests the change in diplomatic policy toward Japan from high-tech perspectives emerged as a result. He suggests, in order to ease the tension, that Japan, considering the importance of international politics in technology development, should make a strong alliance with the United States in technology areas by transfering Japanese commercial technlogies that could be emulated in the United States.
Ohta, who was in charge of science and technology issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, describes technological situations in the United States in his book entitled The Waning Technological leadership(1992). Mainly using reports by the U.S. government agencies and think tanks, he describes how the U.S. technological situation deteriorated and Japanese technologies became a threat to U.S. technological leadership. He also describes concrete frictions between the U.S. and Japan over technology issues and schemes discussed in the United States to revitalize the technology sector. At the end, he warns against techno-nationalistic trends in the United States and suggests techno-globalism should be the way to approach the problem.
Discussion in Sekai (1989) regarding military technology frictions, between Funabashi, a journalist at Asahi Shinbun and the editor of the above-mentioned book (Military Technology Power), and Shindo, a scholar on international politics, is worth mentioning. Funabashi thinks that there are five changes in international politics and technology trends behind the military technology frictions that developed in the late 1980s. They are 1) the concept of national security based on high technologies emerged in international politics, and it became an issue for the United States how to incorporate Japanese technologies into U.S. strategy. 2) the U.S. financial deficit put pressure on burden sharing among U.S. allies on research and development expenses in military technologies, 3) the U.S. started to fear the money power of Japan, as it might hurt the infrastructure of U.S. military hegemony as well as American economic hegemony, 4) both the United States and the Soviet Union could not catch up with the electronics revolution since 1970s, 5) commercial sectors are leading the technological advancements and the globalization of economic activities are taking place at a rapid pace.
Shindo draws attentions to the following three factors in considering military technologies and U.S.-Japan relations. They are: 1) the Pax Americana is in the process of collapsing and competitive relations are developing between the United States(the hegemon) and Japan and Europe(supporting countries), 2) the distinction between military and commercial technologies became blurred and "spin on (incorporation of commercial technologies by military technologies) " became the major technology trend, 3) military technology friction, especially the case of FSX, was the end result of the policy advanced by prime minister Nakasone and the Liberal Democratic party toward military expansion, such as allowing technology transfers to the United States. Both of the discussants agree that it is no longer possible to separate defense issues from economic and trade issues in U.S.-Japan relations.
A number of researchers raised this issue of the changing character of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the case of friction over the codevelopment of FSX. Teshima, a journalist of N.H.K. who was stationed in Washington, D.C. during the FSX incident, wrote a detailed account of the FSX friction based on his own interviews. His book, Shooting Down the Nippon FSX (1991), describes how the friction developed and came to a settlement from the point of view of Washington. Ohtsuki and Honda, journalists from Asahi Shinbun, also wrote a book entitiled The U.S. -Japan FSX War (1991) describing the same process, but putting more emphasis on the Japanese side. Both of these books seem to suggest that fundamental changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance were revealed in the FSX incident through the problems of military technologies. Murayama (1996a, 1996b) also agrees with this point arguing that the balance of economics and national security in U.S.-Japan relations took a turn in the second-half of 1980s.
One of the main charactristics of the Japanese studies on technology transfers and military technology frictions is that most of them start with the situation in the United States and describe the Japanese policies and the frictions as the response to the changes in the Uinited States. This tendency is common both for realist analyses as well as leftist analyses. Part of the reason is simply that more research has been done on the subject on the U.S. side, therefore, it is necessary to refer to materials in the United States to find out the facts as well as the issues.
The second characteristic, related to the one above, is that the most of the studies deal with the political (both domestic and international) aspects of the issues and not many studies have been done on technological and industrial aspects. In addition, it is unfortunate that virtually no in-depth studies on the Japanese defense industry are available in the Japanese language. In this respect, U.S. researchers such as Samuels (1994) and Chinworth(1992) have done more extensive and detailed work in analyzing the industry.
The most comprehensive study of the industry by Japanese researchers is The Japanese Defense Industry by Toyama (1979). This book deals with such topics as industry history after World WarII, explanations of defense institutions and industrial organization, characteristics of R & D programs and issues related to kokusanka (indegenization of technologies), and political aspects of the industry. However, the book is already outdated and it concentrates on fact-gathering rather than analysis of the industry. Factual sources on the Japanese defense industry can also be found in company histories written by the defense companies themselves (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry---1956 and 1983, Kawasaki Heavy Industry---1986 and 1987, Fuji Heavy industry---1984). Although they contain rich information on industry-based data, they must be augumented by analysis and supplemental facts in order to make sense of Japanese defense industry out of the various data.
Several studies came out in the early 1980s as a response to the strengthening military ties between the United States and Japan during the Reagan-Nakasone era. Journalists especially were active, writing reports on the defense industry. The books written by the journalists at Asahi Shinbun (1983,1986) are good examples. They visited and interviewed such defense-related companies as Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Kawasaki Heavy Industry and described the details of weapon manufacturing and the management strategies of these companies. The journalists at Mainichi Shinbun wrote a book (1982) from a weapons trade perspectives and describe environment surrounding the Japanese military and industrial complex. Maeda, a freelance journalist on military affairs, wrote a book (1983) that warned against the trend of military technology development by Japanese companies and its implications. These works by journalists are generally critical about Japanese development toward military technolgy and productions. The same trend is most distinct in the book by Kihara (1994). Although his work describes details of military production and policies, the interpretations and analysis are biased by his Marxist economics background.
As the above review shows, not many studies have analyzed Japanese defense industry from technological and industrial organization perspectives. It seems that the lack of solid research on the Japanese defense industry made frictions on military technologies between the United States and Japan in the late 1980s more severe because arguments tended to be more sensational due to the pausity of factual informations on the Japanese defense industry and its actual working. In addition, it also worked to widen gaps in both countries' opinions regarding military technology frictions.
It seems that there were misjudgements in the 1980s about technological abilities of the United States and Japan and their future courses. On the U.S. side, arguments such as by Ferguson (1989), who stated that "Japanese industry will eliminate the collective technological superiority previously enjoyed by the United States," and this will "have major economic and geopolitical consequences" appeared and drew attentions. On the Japanese side, Ishihara (1989) argued that Japan could change the world's military balance by favoring the USSR over the U.S. in its semiconductor supply, due to Japan's technological superiority. This kind of view, i.e. a technologically-declining America and rising-Sun Japan, was shared widely among Japanese studies written in the late 1980 and early 1990, gained popularity on both side of the Pacific and fostered a crisis mentality in the United States and unfounded confidence in Japan, and as a result, confrontation between the countries became unnecessarily severe. It is clear by now that this view is based on misjudgements about the status and future course of the technological abilities of both countires. The puzzle is why this kind of misjudgement occured and gained popularity both in the United States and Japan.
Another important consideration is the wide discrepancy in perceptions about military technologies between the United States and Japan. This point can be clarified using the example of the technological dependency issue. The U.S. military sector increasingly used Japanese dual-use technologies and components throughout 1980s and this became a political problem in the latter half of the 1980s, when some saw it as a trend that would lead to vulnerability in the U.S. security position. Many in the U.S. Congress demanded autarky in military goods as the response to this problem. One bill passed in the House and the Senate, although it was not in the sequence necessary for enactment, requiring that all equipment used in U.S. weapon systems would have to originate in the U.S. within five years after its enactment.(Gansler 1993) This bill is a reflection of the techno-nationalism that was widespread in the United States in the late 1980s and the early 1990s and which tried to avoid dependence on the Japanese technologies.
While similar efforts toward kokusanka have been made in Japan's defense production, very interesting responses were made in Japan regarding this dependency problem. The Japanese view became clear during the Gulf War, because the media reported that various Japanese-made electronics components were used in U.S. high-tech weapons. Some argued that Japan aided the Gulf War effort from a technological standpoint because the U.S. high-tech weapons could not have functioned well without Japanese-made components (Karatsu 1991, Ishihara and Eto 1991). Others warned that the trend of supplying Japanese components to the U.S. high-tech weapons would make the Japanese policy on prohibition of arms exports (the Three Principles on Arms Export) meaningless (Fujishima 1991, Fujii 1991). The latter position is especially popular in Japan, as was found in the review of studies based on "conspiracy theory" in the first section.
It seems that the techno-nationalistic argument in the U.S. ignored the internationalization of the military technology base and reflected the past memory of the United States' monopolization of excellence in military. On the other hand, Japanese views simply reflected the confidence in the excellence of Japanese technologies and the philosophy of pacifism. It seems that recognition gaps on this issue was fairly wide and military technology frictions in the late 1980s were magnified as a result.
It is not difficult to summarize the political process in the U.S. and Japan that led to military technology frictions in the late 1980s, as well as both countries' views on technology transfers and what went wrong in the transfers. The more difficult part of the proposed study is to check whether the political arguments at that time were based on a factual foundation. For instance, we do not know for sure that technology transfers from the U.S. in the codevelopment of FSX would actually contribute to development of commercial aircraft industry in Japan. In order to answer this question, we need to explore in depth the workings of the Japanese defense industry in relation to Japanese commercial technology bases. This kind of research would involve the period before 1970s as well as more recent developments. However, it would take a great deal of time and effort and it probably would be difficult to come to a conclusion and meaningful policy recommendations, although it will remain a central research topic in this field.
More appropriate research topic that would fit well with the purpose of the project is to examine the various gaps that existed between the U.S. and Japan about technology transfers and trade frictions that became entangled with military technology and national security issues. Without examining the gaps that existed between the countries, it is difficult to explain why such cooperative technology projects among allies as the FSX developed into major points of friction and such regular economic activities as acquisition of U.S. companies by Japanese companies became a major political issue in the late 1980s.
It seems that if future trends of the technological abilities of both countries had been predicted correctly (that is, the U.S. technological position would improve considerably, while the Japanese position would deteriorate, its peak being in the late 1980s), the frictions would have been much less and lighter. To examine the reason why people who studied the issue overshot Japanese technological abilities while underestimating the U.S. abilities would provide important insights into U.S.-Japan technology relations.
In addition, it seems that to explore reasons for the U.S. approach to the issue that were heavily influenced by national security considerations and Japanese approaches that were heavily influenced by commercial considerations is a worthwhile research objective. To look into this topic in depth would clarify such issues as the relationship between economics and national security in the context of U.S.-Japan relations, and changes (or persistence) in perceptions of the relationship.
The major part of this research could be carried out by interviewing the key persons in this field and digging into archival materials, and making analytical assessments of technology trends. This would fit well within the characteristics of the project and in addition, this kind of research is appropriate to pursue during a period when U.S.-Japan technology relations are relatively calm after having experienced severe confrontations in the late 1980s.
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