1 Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 22, 1971.

2 Relatively few primary sources are available that shed light on the strategic relationship between the United States and Japan during the Nixon-Ford years. The Nixon Administration National Security Files in the National Archives remain largely closed, as do Henry Kissinger's papers at the Library of Congress. The official records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and Department of State for these years also remain closed. The Ford Presidential Library has opened very few materials relating to U.S. - Japan relations.

Some valuable sources are available within the Nixon Presidential Materials project located in the National Archives. These include Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman's daily notes of his meetings with Nixon and the separate entries known as the Haldeman diary. Several White House files relating to the textile dispute contain useful information on the overall state of U.S. - Japan relations.

In lieu of official documentation, several of the principles have written memoirs. Among the most important are Henry Kissinger's two volume account of his service under Nixon, The White House Years and Years of Upheaval; the less useful Nixon memoir, RN, Ambassador Armin Meyer's account of his service in Tokyo, Assignment Tokyo, and the memoir by U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power. All these are cited in the notes. Gerald Ford's account of his brief presidency mentions that he stopped in Japan while en route to Seoul and Vladivostok, but adds little more.

Several biographies of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon contain useful information on Japan, much of it based on interviews with participants. Among the most important of these books are Tad Szulc, Illusion of Peace, Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power, Robert Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger, Walter Isaacson, Kissinger, Stephen Ambrose, Nixon, Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness. Two excellent monographs on post-occupation Japanese foreign policy contain treatments of the Nixon years which make extensive use of Japanese press and memoir materials. They are John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, and F. C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy.

3 Stans is the likely source of the quote which appeared in Time , May 10, 1971; Connally quoted in Haldeman daily notes, Aug. 13, 1971, H. R. Haldeman files, White House Special Files, Nixon Project, National Archives. Hereafter, "Haldeman daily notes." This collection consists of handwritten notes kept by Haldeman of his conversations with Nixon and of talks between the president and visitors which Haldeman either sat in on or was told about by Nixon. They are distinct from his so-called diary which he dictated at night and was published in 1995; Nixon spoke of "sticking it to Japan" to Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (N.Y., 1994), 140.

4 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1984), 520.

5 Biographer Stephen Ambrose revealed that in Nixon's initial draft of this article, he spoke of Japan expanding its "non-nuclear" armed forces. When Dwight D. Eisenhower suggested that Japan should possess its own nuclear capacity, Nixon removed the qualifier "non-nuclear" from the published version. See, Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician (N.Y., 1989), 115.

6 Kissinger to Nixon, "Memorandum on a new NSC System," Dec. 27, 1968, copy given to author by Morton Halperin; Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Power: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (N.Y., 1978), 168.

7 Szulc, The Illusion of Power, 169-69; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 521.

8 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, 1979), 321-25, 950; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), 735-46. In his memoirs, Kissinger offered readers a lengthy but superficial description of Japanese political culture and history. He attributes most of the problems encountered by the Nixon administration to the complexities of consensus decision making in the Japanese government. This did not really explain the growing economic, diplomatic, and strategic tensions between Washington and Tokyo nor the origin of the two Nixon shocks of 1971.

9 Kissinger, White House Years, 326-27.

10 Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (N.Y., 1983), 148, 381; Kissinger, The White House Years, 327. In their memoirs, neither Nixon nor Kissinger mention any interest in helping Japan acquire nuclear weapons. Morton Halperin told the author that Nixon and Kissinger opposed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty promoted by the Johnson administration and believed that acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries such as Japan and Israel would stabilize and strengthen the "free world."

11 Kissinger, White House Years, 329; Hersh, The Price of Power, 93-94; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 540-41; NSDM 13 quoted in memorandum from Winthrop and Brown to U. A.. Johnson, Oct. 28, 1969, FOIA; Morton Halperin to author, March 11, 1996.

12 Morton Halperin to author, March 11, 1996; Kissinger, White House Years, 329; Hersh, Price of Power, 94, 101-02.

13 Armin H. Meyer, Assignment: Tokyo An Ambassador's Journal (Indianapolis, Ind., 1974), 36-37; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 542-44.

14 Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 544-46; Meyer, Assignment: Tokyo, 37-43.

15 Kissinger, White House Years, 223-25; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 125-27.

16 Kissinger, White House Years, 330-31.

17 Kissinger, White House Years, 332-33; Destler, et. al. Textile Wrangle, 112

18 Agreements reached prior to the Nixon-Sato summit on the issues of nuclear storage, Japan's support for the defense of South Korea and Taiwan, and the use of the Okinawa bases for Vietnam operations are discussed in the following documents: "Okinawa - preparations for Sato visit," Winthrop and Brown to Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Oct. 28, 1969, Department of State, FOIA; William Rogers to Nixon, "Sato Visit, - with talking points," ca. Nov. 1969, ibid; memorandum for President from Secretary of State Rogers, "Meeting with Congressional Leaders on Okinawa," ca. Nov. 1969, ibid; Meyer to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, 1969, ibid; Johnson to Rogers, "Okinawa Talking Points," Nov. 13, 1969, ibid; Kissinger, White House Years, 335.

19 Hersh, The Price of Power, 381; Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 142; Japan signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty early in 1970 but delayed ratification until 1976. This reflected concern in Tokyo that the treaty might inhibit Japan's effort to develop a "breeder" nuclear reactor. This technology would make Japan less dependent on imported uranium, but would produce weapons grade reactor fuel that might cause a problem under the treaty. After technical issues were resolved, the Diet ratified the pact.

20 Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 104-05; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 170-71; Kissinger, White House Years, 336-37; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 448-50; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 134-35.

21 Kissinger, White House Years, 334-36; Meyer, Assignment: Tokyo, 44; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 546; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 139; Welfield, Empire In Eclipse, 246-250. Welfield notes that Japanese government spokesman modified Sato's pledge of prior approval of the bases to defend Korea and Taiwan. According to statements made by Foreign Minister Aiichi, requests to use the bases would be studied sympathetically, but approval was not automatic. For China's criticism see, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Nov. 28, 1969 and Peking Review, Nov. 28, 1969, 28-30.

22 Kissinger, White House Years, 336; entry of Nov. 25, 1969, Haldeman diary (CD-ROM version); Patrick Buchanan to Nixon, "Notes from Legislative Leadership Meeting," Feb. 17, 1970, Nixon Presidential Project, National Archives.

23 Entry of April 27, 1970, Diary of H.R. Haldeman (CD-ROM version), National Archives.

24 U. A. Johnson for Nixon, "Meeting with Prime Minister Sato," October 21, 1970, Flanigan Files, box 11, Nixon Project; Kissinger for Nixon, "Meeting with Prime Minister Sato," Oct. 23, 1970, ibid.; Kissinger, White House Years, 339; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 220-22.

25 "Memorandum for the Files," Jan. 26, 1971, Peter Flanigan, WHSF, Flanigan papers, box 11, "textiles", Nixon project; Flanigan for Nixon, March 9, 1971, "Meeting With Ad Hoc Textile Group, ibid; Flanigan for Nixon, March 11, 1971, ibid; Memorandum for the Files, March 12, 1971, ibid; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 251-74. During May and June, Kennedy negotiated draft export restraint agreements with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Implementation depended upon Japanese cooperation.

26 Bergsten to Kissinger, March 18, 1971, CO 75, Japan, WHSF, Nixon project; Flanigan to Kissinger, March 31, 1971, CO 75 Japan, ibid; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 283-84.

27 Nixon to Kissinger, Sept. 29, 1969, WHSF, CF, box 6, CO 34, China, 1969-70, Nixon Project. The evolution of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy is discussed in several sources. among the best are, Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (N.Y., 1989), 75-101; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (N.Y., 1992), 333-54; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American - Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C., 1985), 199-247; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (N.Y., 1978); Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-89 (Stanford, Ca., 1995). Hersh, Price of Power, 374-82; Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 275-324; Kissinger, White House Years, 163-94, 684-787, 1049-96; Nixon's published account of the opening to China adds little to the public record. Kissinger's lengthy discussion of his China diplomacy is rich in dramatic detail but thin on details. Both men have gone to great lengths to prevent scholars from gaining access to their diplomatic records.

28 Kissinger, White House Years, 687.

29 Nixon comments to Cabinet members, June 13, 1971, Haldeman notes, WHSF, Haldeman papers, Nixon project; Kissinger, White House Years, 687.

30 Kissinger, White House Years, 685, 745-50; Isaacson, Kissinger, 435; Hersh, Price of Power, 376.

31 Haldeman daily notes, July 13, 14, 15, 19, 1971, WHSF, box 44, Nixon Project; Kissinger, White House Years, 762.

32 Kusada recounted these events in a presentation at the Wilson Center, March 11, 1996; for Laird's assurance to Sato, see, Meyer to Secretary of State, "Secretary of Defense Lair Visit to Japan, 4-11 July, cable # 6522, July 6, 1971, Department of State, FOIA; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 553-55; Meyer, Assignment: Tokyo, 111-12; Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics, Informal Mechanisms and the Making of China Policy (Westport, Conn., 1993), 70.

33 Haldeman daily notes, July 23, 1971, WHSF, box 44, Nixon Project; Whitlam's account quoted in Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 295.

34 Peking Review, Nov. 28 and Dec. 15, 1969; Apr. 10, 1970; Renmin Ribao, Nov. 28, 1969; Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 289-91.

35Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 294.

36 Isaacson, Kissinger, 348; on Radford's activities, see, Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate (N.Y., 1990), 116-19; Ambrose, Nixon, II, 486-90. The Joint Chiefs and Kissinger deeply mistrusted each other. JCS chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer encouraged Radford's theft of material relating to subjects such as SALT, detente, and the secret China negotiations.

37 Meyer to Secretary of State, "Secretary of Defense Lair Meeting with Sato," cable # 6522, July 6, 1971, Department of State, FOIA; Meyer to Secretary of State, "Secretary of Defense Laird Visit to Japan," cable # 6718, July 11, 1971, ibid; Japan Times, July 10, 1971; Kissinger, White House Years, 740; Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 295.

38 Hersh, The Price of Power, 380-81. The Watergate prosecution team's interest in the Radford affair centered on the White House response to his pilfering, which included wiretapping, not the foreign policy implications. The prosecutor who described Nixon's testimony told Hersh he remembered the exchange because of how angry Nixon became when discussing it. Radford's only direct involvement with China occurred during Kissinger's July 1971 trip, but he may have pilfered documents relating to earlier and later contacts. Radford's activities were exposed at the end of 1971 and he was reassigned but not prosecuted.

39 Terrill quoted in Hersh, Price of Power, 382; "The Dispensable Ally," Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 28, 1971, 21-22.

40. Japan Times, Aug. 15, 1972.

41 Angel, Explaining Economic Policy Failure, 117.

42 Kissinger, White House Years, 951; Ambrose, Nixon, II, 457; Hersh, Price of Power, 462.

43 Haldeman daily notes, Aug. 12, 13, 14, 1971, WHSF, Nixon project; Kissinger, White House Years, 954-55; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 454-56; Ambrose, Nixon, II, 458-59.

44 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 140.

45 Haldeman daily notes, Aug. 14, 1971, WHSF, Nixon project; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 292-93.

46 Meyer, Assignment: Tokyo, 169-70; Nixon remarks to Veterans of Foreign Wars, Aug. 19, 1971, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington, D.C., 1971), 1198-1204.

47Angel, Explaining Economic Policy Failure, 165-67; Destler, et. al., Textile Wrangle, 296-97.

48 Volcker and Gyohten, Changing Fortunes, 80-90, 95-100; Kissinger, White House Years, 957-62; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 461-64; Angel, Explaining Economic Policy Failure, 220-41, 259-60.

49 Volcker and Gyohten, Changing Fortunes, 96; memorandum from Kissinger for Nixon, "The President's private Meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath," Dec. 20, 1971, Nixon Project, FOIA; Nixon described both Germany and japan as needing a "home" as the framework of the cold war changed. The "biggest reason for staying on n Vietnam is Japan....We have to reassure the Asians that the Nixon Doctrine is not a way for us to get out of Asia but a way for us to stay in."

50 Hori's December 1971 article is cited in Welfield, Empire In Eclipse, 297.

51 Even as Sato placated Washington in public, he dispatched intermediaries to China during October and November in hope of arranging a rapprochement. However, Sato's reluctance to recognize the PRC as the sole, legitimate government of China with authority over Taiwan or to abrogate Japan's peace treaty with the Nationalist regime doomed the effort. Sino-Japanese rapprochement would have to await political change in Tokyo. On Sato's abortive effort to strike a deal with China see, Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 304-05; and, Kusano Atsushi, Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations (Princeton, N.J., 1987), 30-31.

52 Meyer, Assignment Tokyo, 161-62; Anderson column in Yomiuri Shimbun, Jan. 7, 1972.

53 Memoranda for the President's File from James J. Wickel, "Meetings with Eisaku Sato, Jan. 6-7, 1972," Jan. 7, 1972, Nixon project, FOIA; Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 308. Kusano, Two Nixon Shocks, 34-35, 37-38. In news coverage and an editorial on the San Clemente meeting probably inspired by a presidential leak, The New York Times (Jan. 6, 11, 1972) criticized Sato for giving into "Peking's pressure for change" by not standing firm enough behind Taiwan and South Korea. The Times also chastised Tokyo for encouraging a "kind of yen block in Asia that faintly recalls the World War II Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and for contemplating a self-reliant "nuclear defense." This was especially odd given Nixon's hectoring of Sato on military issues.

54 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (N.Y., 1978), 560-67; Kissinger, White House Years, 1061-63.

55 Kissinger, White House Years, 1053, 1072; Nixon, RN, 560-67; Szulc, Illusion of Peace, 521-24.

56 For the text of the Shanghai Communique and a discussion of its preparation, see, Kissinger, White House Years, 1490-92.

57 Information on the meetings with Green and Kissinger was published in the Japanese press and is cited in Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 310.

58 Memorandum of Foreign Minister Ohira's call on the President, Oct. 18, 1972, National Security Files, Nixon Project, FOIA. Nixon took credit for China's change of heart, telling Ohira that he had hammered home the point during his February 1972 visit to China that the "security treaty serves the interests of the PRC as well as the United States in maintaining peace in the Pacific." He did not report his other point, that the treaty helped contain Japan; Kissinger to Nixon, Meeting with Chairman Mao, February 24, 1973, copy in National Security Archive and reports of Feb. 24 and 27, Presidents Personal File, box 6, Nixon Project; Kissinger, White House Years, 1061-62, 1072, 1089 1490-92; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), 47-60.

59 Kissinger briefing of March 1974, quoted in Hersh, Price of Power, 382.