REPORT ON JAPANESE ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

AND

REMARKS BY NOBORU HOSHUYAMA

FORMER JAPANESE DEFENSE AGENCY OFFICIAL

ON U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

THE NIXON SHOCKS AND U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1969-1976

A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE U.S.-JAPAN PROJECT

AND

THE ASIA PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL

CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Tuesday, March 12, 1996

Smithsonian Castle Building

Washington, D.C.


DR. ROBERT WAMPLER [Director, U.S.-Japan Project]: We are starting a little bit late but I think we are still in good shape. This morning, we are doing slightly different things from yesterday. We are going to start off with a discussion of about one hour about the oral history efforts that are underway in connection with this project, here in the United States and in Japan. And we are going to start off with a discussion of the Japanese efforts. This is going to be led by Professor Makoto Iokibe from Kobe University and by Professor Koji Murata from Hiroshima University.

Koji and Professor Iokibe have been extremely energetic over the course of the past year in locating and interviewing a number of the key Japanese officials who were in some way associated with the Japanese Government during the Sato and Tanaka governments. And I believe they are beginning to move forward beyond Tanaka now. And I am looking forward to hearing about the progress that you have made and the plans that you are making and so I will turn it over to you right now.

PROF. MURATA: Thank you very much. My name is Koji Murata from Hiroshima University. Actually, we have conducted interviews with former Government officials in Japan, about seven people so far. They include Mr. Seiki Nishihiro, the former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense. We interviewed with him November 16th and Mr. Kusuda here, the same date. And Ambassador Sasako Okasaki, the former Japanese Ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia, on December 18th; and we also interviewed with Mr. Hosomi Takashi the former Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, January 25th; and Ambassador Nakae Yosuke, the former Japanese Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, February 22nd; and we also interviewed with Mr. Kashiwage Yusuke, also a former Vice Minister for Finance for International Affairs, and Mr. Gyoten Toyo, former Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs and recently the President of the Bank of Tokyo, both of them on February 29th. So far, we have interviewed with seven former Government officials in Japan.

So, let me briefly introduce the highlights, or summary, of the interviews with these former government officials, quite briefly. In terms of the interview with Mr. Nishihiro, it was quite unfortunate that Mr. Nishihiro passed away so suddenly after our interviewing with him. He passed away, I guess, last December. And Nishihiro-san made a lot of interesting remarks but, unfortunately again, so far we cannot get the confirmation, means a clarification. So, we have some problem how to make the transcript of his interview public.

But Nishihiro said that before the returning of Okinawa the JDA had some special study about the contingency plans of the emergency in Korea. And he said he and some civilian officials in JDA and the uniformed officials made several plans and he says that even now, these are several studies of the contingency plan in Korea, maybe available or maybe useful for any kind of emergency in Korea.

And he also said that in terms of the introduction of the nuclear weapons, as far as he understood the introduction does not include the transit of nuclear weapons. So, he says that it was sort of a common sense among the military specialists. So, as an introduction, only means that as the United States does not have any nuclear weapons on the territory of Japan, so it does not necessarily mean that the United States brings some nuclear weapons with Poseidon submarines and just dropping by in Japanese ports. It does not mean introduction, it just means transit. So, in this sense Ambassador Reischauer's remarks were quite correct.

Then, Mr. Kusuda here, published an article about his involvement in the Sato administration. His article appeared on 'Seijikisha obikaiho'. I don't know what does it say in Japanese. Anyhow, sort of a newsletter of a retired newspaper correspondents in charge of the political affairs. And as he told yesterday, he explained in his role and involvement in the Sato administration and he also at the meetings he played a sort of liaison between Prime Minister Sato and Professor Wakaizumi but he also says that he doesn't know the content of the dialogue or the conversation between Prime Minister Sato and Professor Wakaizumi.

This newsletter is not available in the public but fortunately this newsletter his article also appeared on the latest issue of Seiro, a Japanese monthly magazine, April issue. So, you can read his article. It is in Seiro's latest issue.

[UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER] : Who was that again?

PROF. MURATA: Mr. Kusuda, the former chief and former assistant to Prime Minister Sato. He made those remarks yesterday. As for Ambassador Okazaki is a past secretary of Japan's embassy in the United States in the early 1970s. And actually because he was in the United States, his involvement in policy making was not a direct one but let me tell you some interesting episodes.

Okazaki-san also admitted he knew Professor Wakaizumi played a sort of 'kuroko' using Dr. Shaler's expression yesterday, it means a special envoy for Prime Minister Sato in those days, and Okazaki told us that one day he and Ambassador Ushiba, in those days he was Japanese Ambassador to the United States, visited Mr. Kissinger in the White House and as they were waiting for a meeting with Dr. Kissinger in the White House and then when they entered into the room of Dr. Kissinger, Professor Wakaizumi had been already there.

And so, he admitted that in those days, Wakaizumi did something for the Japanese Government and they didn't know what Professor Wakaizumi was actually doing. But also, unfortunately Ambassador Holdridge is not here today though. Okazaki says that just three days before Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing, Okazaki visited Mr. Holdridge, and Holdridge told Okazaki said that why don't you read President Nixon's Kansas City speech? It is quite an important one.

If you read it, you can understand what we are going to do right now. But Okazaki didn't understand the meaning of what Holdridge suggested, so he just looked at briefly the manuscript of the Kansas City speech but he didn't understand why it was so important. But later, he realized that looking at that speech, it was clear that the Nixon administration tried to normalize its diplomatic relations with Beijing. So, he admitted it was a great fiasco for him to ignore the importance of that Kansas City speech. But, yesterday, I asked this point to Ambassador Holdridge, but he says that he didn't remember it.

And, as a whole there are Hosomi-san, Hosami was Vice Minister of Finance for Intentional Affairs in the crisis from 1973, as Mr. Ando yesterday presented, and Kashiwagi was an advisor to the Ministry of Finance in 1971, and as Ando-san said, Kashiwagi had a nickname as the Emperor. He was a boss of Japan's intentional monetary policy. And interestingly enough, Kashiwagi-san still believes that it was not a mistake to open the Tokyo Exchange Market for two weeks after the Nixon shock. So, he still believes that floating-rate system is not good.

So, the intentional monetary system should return to the fixed rate system. He still believes that with a quite strong belief.

[INAUDIBLE QUESTION]

PROF. MURATA: Yes. As a whole, their interview with a Mr. Gyoten and a Mr. Hosomi. They have already published books and memoirs so we could not figure out any particular quite interesting new findings, but we could, I guess, confirm a lot of facts by interviewing with them. And Mr. Gyoten in 1971, his position was relatively low. He was sort of a secretary for vice minister of finance for international affairs. In Japanese, Okurasho zaimukan shitcho.

So, his involvement in the policy making was not a direct one, but he admitted that when the Nixon shock came, means 1971, he did not understand the meaning of the Nixon shock. And he observed that through probably even the Nixon administration did not know what they were actually doing. And the Hosomi-san, Hosomi-san has already published the memoir and he admitted that the impact of the Nixon shock was so wide and it included not only the intentional monetary issue but the trade issue and the issue of expenditures of U.S. troops in Japan. So, the issue is so wide, so, only it couldn't be managed by only the officials of international monetary bureau of the ministry of finance.

And, finally, Ambassador Nakae, he was a deputy director general of Asian Bureau and later director general Asian Bureau in the 1 970s and he served as Japanese ambassador to China in the mid-1980s. Nakae-san told us that as far as he remembers, they, meaning the officials and diplomats of the Bureau of Asian affairs, did not have any consideration about the United States, was influence on the United States in terms of formulating Japanese policy to China.

We didn't care of what the United States was thinking of, he said so. And also, in an interesting vein, probably some of you know, that the late minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Sonoda made remarks that in terms of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Pact and Peace and Friendship Treaty, Sonoda-san wrote some article and says that he asked U.S. Secretary of State Vance to push the pressure to the Fukuda administration to facilitate to conclude a treaty with China.

Because Fukuda was a little bit reluctant to conclude the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, but Sonoda-san believes that we have to conclude the treaty with China. So, according to Sonoda, he asked Mr. Vance, when Vance dropped by Tokyo, he asked Vance to put the pressure to the Prime Minister Sato to facilitate the concluding process of a treaty with China.

But Nakae-san says it was not necessarily correct, as far as he remembers, there was no such exhort. He didn't see any direct pressure from the United States. Even without the American pressures, Japan had already decided to conclude the treaty with China soon. So, we couldn't see any direct influence from the United States for this issue.

Then, these are just a summary of our interviews and I hope now we have transcripts of these interviews and I hope that Dr. Wampler is planning to translate these transcripts into English in order to make them available for American scholars. So, I think it is quite a beneficiary project.

Now, we have a Mr. Hoshuyama here and we can ask him directly today. Mr. Noboru Hoshuyama is a graduate of Waseda University and he entered into Japan's Defense Agency. In 1963, he served as the director general of bureau of the budget with JDA and deputy vice minister of defense with the JDA, and finally he served as director general of defense facility administration agency from 1994 to 1995.

So, now, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Noboru Hoshuyama.

MR. HOSHUYAMA [Speaking through a translator]: Thank you very much for your kind introduction. I was requested by Mr. Murata to explain the background of the origin of the Japanese National Defense Program outline. So, hereafter, I am going to say outline. And also guidelines for the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation, hereafter I say guidelines.

And I have also received a number of questions at the coffee table time yesterday. So, I am going to include all answers as far as possible, therefore, my answer will be long enough to the applied time of 20 minutes. Therefore, I would like to cut my Japanese sentence as short as possible and leave tasks to the interpreter. Therefore, you find the English runs much longer than the Japanese, but, please this is actually a lot of sentences. So, please do not hesitate to ask things based on the English.

The concept of the outline and the guidelines were developed during the post-defense buildup program between 1972 and 1976 related to a discussion on Japanese defense policy. These concepts were also influenced by the first public crisis in 1972, which actually forced to scale down the first defense buildup program seriously from its original size.

The first program originally designed an ambitious one. I think this was reflecting the two Nixon doctrines in July 1969 and this idea actually showed the substantial size of the Japanese defense capability in 10 years.

However, the Socialists, which was very active at that time, and we were badly condemned by the Socialists of this ambitious idea. And also we had a very unhappy accident, the so-called Shizukusha Accident, which is a quest between civil aircraft and air self-defense versus aircraft and we had a number of casualties of the civilians there.

And because of these pressures we had to give up this ambitious plan finally. Therefore, the final paper of the first defense program plan, itself, is not very different from its previous one, the Third defense buildup program, itself.

And also Prime Minister Sato was about to retire just at the time of the return of the Okinawa as his final success, therefore, there was the growing pressure upon the Sato administration, itself, from the opposition side and this pressures the defense issue very much.

Therefore, the major issues of the first defense program plan, some of the major issues of the First Defense Program itself was suspended. So-called PCR, T-2, the training aircraft C and C-1 the transport airplane and RF-4E the reconnaissance airplane, this budget was suspended because of the pressure from the opposition.

Therefore, it was necessary for the administration side to make a great concession about the first defense program itself. And, therefore, the first plan, itself, was not really successful compared to its previous plans.

And also, the first defense program, itself, was not really successful in its executing period, because of the oil crisis we have to scale down it substantially.

At that time, Socialists and other opposition parties requested to show the limitation of the Japanese defense capability, itself. This was a very difficult question to answer and the administration's effort to answer to this question we came to the idea that the peacetime defense capability and this concept, itself, was actually answered as a parliamentary debate. However, this was not acceptable for the Socialists, because they were so-called No Armed Neutral Policy. Therefore, if they accept that the concept of the peacetime limitation of the defense capability, this means they are going to admit the existence of the defense capability, itself. Therefore, in principal, this was totally unacceptable for the Socialists side at all.

In summary, the first defense program plan, itself, was quite different from its previous plans, from first to the third. They were very successful and very smooth; however the first one is really in difficult time, its origin and its executing period. The fourth, in Japanese is pronounced 'shi', that phonetically the same of the 'death' and actually I am afraid the first plans died, so bad. Therefore, this requires us to promulgate the new idea of the post-force defense program concept. In other words, a new idea like the outline.

The task we faced for designing a post-force defense buildup program was the following issues. Honestly speaking, these issues were not only the task but also the pressure upon us to work out an answer to these questions. First of all, the issue is--this became clear in the defense debates throughout the first program that it was important to get public consensus for the defense policy to promote further defense buildup owing to the fact that the Japanese defense buildup was still on the way, even though we spent about a half a century, already, after the end of the Second World War.

It was understood, therefore, to show a certain limit to the public about the defense buildup both in quality and in quantity. Secondly, we were in the time that it cost a lot to keep the present defense capability due to the necessary replacement and modernization of present weapons systems. The necessary payment for the increasing retirement personnel pays, and also the climbing personnel cost as a result of the rapid economic growth, of course, were huge and became a big burden upon the defense budget, itself.

This means that we enter the period where our purchase of weapons systems did not necessarily increase our defense capability directly and straightly. At the same time, the Japanese economic development was in the transition from the former rapid growth to the new era of steady increase. Owing to this change, it became difficult to expect a high growth of defense expenditures.

It became necessary, therefore, to propose a new concept for the defense buildup to secure necessary allocations of national budgets for the post-force defense buildup program. Thirdly, it became clear that the balance between major front-line equipment and the logistics support in the rear was not well balanced due to the fact that we focused on the buildup of major weapons in the first quarter century. A post-force program, therefore, became necessary to improve the balance between the front and the rear, as well as the quality of its capability to the contrary to a past buildup programs focused on the enlargement of capability in quantity.

The first point is that as for the operational aspects, we appreciated the necessity for the Japan-U.S. cooperation, however, they were not well trained nor prepared in reality. In order to promote a deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty it was important to study as well as to exercise how to cooperate between each services of both countries effectively.

This point is there was no systematic approach to a defense buildup compared to the United States. The United States already adopted the concept of the PPBS, the Planning Programming and Budgeting System. However, we did not have any systematic approach to the defense buildup.

It is difficult to trace the origin of the concept of the basic defense force, the Japanese say, 'kibanteki boeiryoku'. And we often ask when this concept started? Professor Tanata quoted so-called KB papers which is written by the director general of the defense policy bureau, Mr. Kubo for the purpose of debate inside of the JDA and the concept as quoted in that paper.

And, also, Mr. Nishihiro, who was the director of the defense planning division then also expressed the almost same concept in a different way of expression.

I still remember the concept of the basic defense force is discussed between Mr. Nishihiro and I about three years before the KB papers, that was 1968, I think it was spring. At that time Mr. Nishihiro was a deputy director of the defense planning division and I was responsible officer of the defense planning of the grand self-defense force. And this debate was done in the context of the so-called Nakasone defense buildup plan which is, as I said, almost a self-reliance defense policy and later it came to an end.

But this concept became more matured in the context of this Nakasone debate, Nakasone plan, itself, and the expression may be a bit different but still the core of the concept was almost the same. And I think this concept was quite applicable to the grand self-defense force because it can be expanded speedily in case of contingency while it will be very difficult for air and naval self-defense forces because the rapid expansion is not really easy for these services.

Therefore, I think the origin of the concept of the basic defense force started in 1968. Later, Nakasone's ambitious plan came into being, and the fourth defense buildup plan originally came to the end by the end of the Nakasone plan itself. However, it became necessary to introduce a new concept for the post-force defense program itself. And there came the concept of the basic defense force again.

It was necessary to introduce that concept again in order to hit back the pressure from the uniformed side who expect the bigger size of their capability based on the concept of the Nakasone plan itself, while we have to push back the pressure from the outside, the public opinion. Therefore, we faced the pincer attack from both sides, from inside and from houtside. And the concept of the basic defense force actually was a necessary concept to push down all pressures around us.

In the beginning the concept was introduced and the direction from the defense minister, at that time, Mr. Sakata, for designing the post-force defense program, itself. And that direction it was said that the defense capability should be kept in peacetime or the standing defense capability. That was the word in that direction.

And later this language is modernized and improved that the capability that should be basic for the case of contingency. Therefore, the concept of the basic defense force is really the final stage of the whole debate of the concept itself and this was the way to get consensus in the defense agencies.

I also find the concept of the basic defense capability, itself, when I studied about the American defense priority, itself. Because the United States is already ready for the rapid expansion of its military capability in case of contingency. In other words, the American standing force in peacetime or the unusual case is really the basis for the future expansion.

Therefore, I explained that what we have to have is really the basic force that can be expanded in case of contingency, and I applied this logic to explain to the headquarters of the grand self-defense force. And I think I got approval for this idea from the army side.

Therefore, the concept of the basic defense force is, rather it came from the United States of the self-defense force, itself, is really taken care by the United States. It was necessary to design a new system for a defense buildup which reflected the continuing of planning buildup. Excuse me, I made a mistake. Mr. Sakata was assigned to the defense minister in December of 1974. He took the initiative of establishing a board for defense debate with members of various backgrounds. He also published a defense white paper, the second time in the history. The first one was published by Nakasone.

He took such initiatives to promote public attention on defense issues in general. The most important and the most difficult point was whether we were in the right time to slow down our defense buildup effort which was requested by the public opinion. Needless to say, we had a heated discussion. The confrontation between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union as well as the normalization of the diplomatic relations between China and the United States was the most important for us to promote the concept of the outline in 1975.

These issues were considered to relax the military pressure upon us. These understandings promoted the consensus inside the Japanese defense office. In a sense, the China card worked effectively to promote a new defense policy.

Let me mention something about the so-called 1 percent of GNP ceiling for the defense expenditures. This ceiling is widely misunderstood but this was not really the precondition for defense buildup. This is actually the reflection of the assessment of the Japanese economy, defense office's estimate of defense buildup costs, and in order to meet the outline's goals. The ceiling was determined in order to promote the understanding, as well as the support of the public opinion for the new defense policy because the new policy did not have an idea to show the cabinet level decision about the necessary cost of middle-term defense buildup.

And from the first to the fourth, there actually exists the total amount of budget which will be necessary for the defense buildup. But in the post-first program, there is no budgetary limitation as shown by the Cabinet level.

The ceiling was regarded to compensate the new policy by showing a ceiling of defense expenditures of coming five years. But in reality, the 1 percent of GNP ceiling gave the misunderstanding to the public that this scale of budget was preconditioned. We did not expect that the ceilings survived for 10 years either.

Also the defense planning system, itself, we studied the American PPBS, as I said, and I, myself, had a chance to come to the United States to discuss about these issues and this actually contributed to designing our own system for defense planning.

As for the guidelines, I was asked questions yesterday so I am going to expand something additional. The guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation came out from understandings between summit meeting between the Prime Minister Miki and President Ford and the defense summit meeting between Minister Sakata and Secretary Schlesinger following the summit meeting. The subcommittee for defense cooperation, so-called SDC, was established. The mission of the SDC--The mission of the subcommittee was to study and consult the Japan-U.S. cooperation based on the bilateral security treaty for the sake of effective fulfillment of the treaty and related agreements.

The concept of the Japan-U.S. cooperation included guidelines for joint operations between SDF and the U.S. forces in case of contingency. It was agreed, however, I quote, "Matters concerning prior consultation, matters concerning the Japanese constitutional limitations, and the three non-nuclear principles will not be the subject of the SDC's studies and consultations."

It was also agreed that, "Those conclusions will not be such as would place either government under obligation to take legislative budgetary or administrative measures."

I realize that the agreed contents in 1978 did not meet the level which both sides of, people of the operational fields expected to have. Still, I appreciate guidelines of the first institutionalized framework for study and consultation of joint studies, as well as discussions of roles and missions.

I am afraid that studies and consultations, since 1978, were not really smooth, however, I still find it gave us good opportunities to drill subjects of cooperation.

I am confident guidelines contribute to enhance bilateral security ties. Yes, the issues in 1994 related to the possible contingency in the Korean Peninsula, the guidelines was focused again. However, we are still on the way to develop our efforts.

Let me add a few words. I realize the development of studies and consultations based on guidelines were not satisfying to both sides. And though, I dare say, it was not the responsibility of these people who worked for guidelines.

Current Japanese political situation and its past environment, not being supportive to promote the study further than the present situation. Needless to say, studies and consultations of guidelines is closely related with the Japanese studies on legal problems regarding the emergency situations. In Japanese, we say 'yuji hosei'.

The studies have been developed since the mid-1970s. However, owing to conditions of interpretations of constitution, political environment in Japan, they are slow in progress. The legislation of necessary regressions for emergency situations has no possibility to be carried out now.

I realize the importance for Japan of guidelines and legislation of necessary regulations for emergency situations. They are subjects which we, Japanese people, have to be able to develop, however, I find little possibility of its future under current political situation. And also let me answer to the question raised in the coffee break time yesterday. The question was about the Japanese logistic support to U.S. forces in Japan. And if this issue which is well discussed in Japan and the United States now was really included in the original phase of guidelines in 1978. My answer is this, at that time there wasn't any specific request on the U.S. side about the logistic support. At that time the United States was still powerful and capable enough to fulfill its mission by itself totally.

Therefore, in the process of the study based on guidelines, it was rather an occasion to find that what Japan was not able to do and honestly speaking many of the people related to this mission were really surprised that Japan cannot do even such small tasks. But still it was good occasion for us to clarify what Japan can do and what Japan cannot do.

Lastly, let me discuss something about the non-nuclear principles. We mentioned this in the outline in 1976, as follows: "Against nuclear threat, Japan rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States."

This was agreed in the beginning of the whole debate for the post-force buildup plan, itself, related to the third principle of introduction, so-called transit, as well as port calls, raised difficult question to answer.

Are they against the concept of non-introduction? If so, how can Japan secure non-introduction if it faced the possibility? Since the existence of nuclear weapons was a top secret issue and Japan had no capability to clarify the existence of nuclear weapons, I am afraid that does not meet any logic to discuss the non-introduction principle. Since Japan has adopted the policy against nuclear threat that means that Japan will rely on the American nuclear deterrence. This means that we have to secure American nuclear deterrence. That is the first task.

Therefore, I realize that the non-introduction principle can be fulfilled only when the American nuclear deterrent capability is fully secured of its function. If not, Japanese security will never be maintained. At the same time, it was impossible for me to answer how to apply the principle toward the Soviet Union effectively.

Thank you, very much.

DR. WAMPLER: I would like to give an opportunity if you are willing to have some questions asked if anyone wants to ask a question now of you. Does anybody in the audience have anything you would like to follow up on?

[UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER] : When I left Japan, there was a question about buying American military equipment. And we were pushing for JDA to buy some aircraft, for example. What was the result? I mean, do you buy much equipment from America?

MR. HOSHUYAMA: As I mentioned earlier, in the post-defense program itself has the so-called frauds and issue of the TCR. And the R is the RF-4E reconnaissance airplane which is imported from the United States. But the T, the training aircraft and the C, the transport aircraft they are Japanese own development. And at the time the United States was rather generous [and it's equipment was] getting more and more improved. And we find it necessary to import many sophisticated weapons from the United States. And based on our own decision, we started to import various types of weapons from the United States. This was done by our own decision and also we paid attention what is the most effective manner to equip things. Therefore, some equipment came from European countries.

Looking at the past history, I think the import of American equipment is steadily increasing but this was because of the necessary requirement for the quality and quantity issues for the defense policy itself.

DR. WAMPLER: I have one quick question. In your description of the development of the guidelines, you seemed to give the impression that this was sort of a turning point for establishing a basis for carrying out things such as joint planning, planning for joint operations, things of that nature. I have the sense, though, perhaps this had been going on somewhat already on a bilateral military-to-military basis. And I am wondering to what degree you can inform us how the U.S. tried to enter into the planning process?

I know from looking at NATO, the U.S. was always very interested in trying to get in at a very early stage to make its views known on what was desirable for planning requirements for the NATO allies and would make its views known as forcibly as it could in hopes of trying to influence decision making to go in the direction it thought was necessary.

What do you know about any efforts by the U.S., at least, to keep abreast of your planning as it went through the various stages and to make known what they thought to you, Japan, should be trying to plan for in terms of the requirements and capabilities?

MR. HOSHUYAMA: Your question is really the issue. We had to think in the debate of the post-force defense program, itself. So, Japanese defense cooperation with the United States was not really as good as the NATO's level of cooperation which is far more premature and as for the coordination of the operation plans with the United States between the United States and Japanese self-defense forces. Unfortunately, I was not really responsible for that business so, therefore, better to reserve comment.

However, what Japan has to develop for the defense cooperation is really up to the NATO's level of cooperation. That is what the Japanese defense office said would like to develop.

However, in order to fulfill this issue, we have to face the question coming from the constitution itself. Because in the present interpretation of the constitution, it was not allowed to go to the collective self-defense. Therefore, this is the biggest task for us to discuss this issue. Without clarifying the collective self-defense issue, we are not able to promote further cooperation with the United States in detailed operation levels.

Of course, this cooperation is necessary for the defense of Japan as well as for the effectiveness of the security treaty, itself. However, we are now in the position to work for the further development of the debate of the collective defense issues.

PROF. JAMES AUER[Vanderbilt University] (?) : If I understood your question correctly, Professor Wampler, you were asking how the U.S. would get its idea in. In fact, the guideline was specifically, it was U.S.-Japan guidelines to involve the United States and Japan together.

However, as your question also asked, there was a great deal of cooperation even before the guidelines on a service-to-service basis and particularly the closest service-to-service cooperation was between the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and the U.S.-Navy.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, the great World War II naval hero, who just died on January 1st of this year, Admiral Burke was instrumental in getting the United States Navy to loan ships to Japan in the early 1950s as the foundation of the maritime self defense force.

And the U.S. Navy and the maritime self-defense force literally started exercising together from the early 1950s. And by the 1970s, this cooperation had become quite significant and sophisticated. And my impression was that Minister Sakata was very impressed how much was going on and in his discussions with Mr. Schlesinger wanted to legitimize and make the Japanese public aware of the benefits of cooperation so that this type of cooperation that had already existed on a service-to-service level could become broader and more sophisticated. And I think he was quite successful in doing that, but there was quite a bit going on; especially, navy-to-navy was quite close.

DR. WAMPLER: I was sort of motivated because I know there is a sense in which the U.S. draws up its own plans, capabilities plans, requirements plans, joint outline emergency war plans, which will then have a niche for, okay, this is what we would like to see Japan do. And then there is some point at which it makes common sense to try to make sure Japan is moving in that direction if at all possible. And just from some cables I have seen, going back even to the 1960s, we are always very interested in seeing how the defense budget is working out, the sorts of purchases they are making, the levels they are shooting towards and whether this makes sense in terms of what we would like to see Japan doing.

And, at least, in Europe, not only through NATO, but on a bilateral nation-to-nation relationship, there is a lot of close interaction going on between the two countries as the U.S., in essence, would try to say, we hope you can do this and this and here is why.

For a point of comparison, I wanted to see if something similar was going on within Japan.

PROF. AUER [?]. : Again, the only personal experience I can speak to is the navy-to-navy one and because they were operating together from some early point, again, my belief is that the Japanese maritime self-defense force, itself, was inputting through its civilian superiors such as Mr. Hoshuyama, as to what direction the maritime self-defense force could go.

When we exercised with other navies in the Pacific, with the Koreans, with the Filipinos, with others we would have to slow down. But, increasingly, we could exercise with the maritime self-defense force on a very sophisticated level. I would say equal to the level that we exercise with NATO navies, at least by the late 1 970s and certainly in the 1980s.

MR. KOMORI: Mr. Hoshuyama expressed rather candid opposition to the last component of the so-called Japan's non-nuclear free principle. That is not to introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, including the Japanese territorial waters, as interpreted by the Japanese side.

And as we all know, this has been the subject of the very heated controversy among Japanese defense thinkers for many, many years. I, myself, almost got accidentally involved in this controversy after reporting on the rather unequivocal remark made by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, who stated that despite all the years of denials, pledged the otherwise by either government of Japanese and the U.S. that American vessels coming into Japanese territorial waters have not carried nuclear weapons. The reality was the contrary. And this led to the, again, the very heated debate in the Diet.

My question is that at least despite this public skepticism in Japan, successive Japanese Governments maintained seemingly sort of unshaken position that there is no intention, no interest in changing this last component of the non-nuclear principles. But since you are in the heart of this government mechanism to address this issue. How seriously was it contemplated and possible change of this among people like yourself in those days?

MR. HOSHUYAMA: I am sure this is issue which Mr. Komori understands much better than me. But honestly speaking what we discussed inside of the Japanese defense agency is whether it is possible to reduce non-nuclear three principles into two-and-a-half. And that means related to the introduction. And though three principles, itself, is a model of the minister of foreign affairs, it is their responsibility to discuss the principles. And it is their responsibility whether they have to amend it or not.

Therefore, we, very loyal government officers, stay as behind the whole debate. However, we have the anxiety as the responsible side for the operation itself. That in case of contingency what we should do? Do we have to support principles or do we pay more attention on the security of Japan, itself?

Our answer is this, that the security of the country is the first and the most important thing for us to work for. Therefore, the principle is coming next to this basic understanding. Therefore, for the security of Japan, we have to think non-nuclear three principles should be considered in the context of the security of Japan, itself.

This was the understanding inside of ourselves.

DR. WAMPLER: We will take four more and then give Professor Iokibe a chance--Ando, Igarashi, Kreisberg, and Watanabe.

MR. HIROSHI ANDO: For the convenience of the speaker, actually for my own convenience, I would like to make a question in Japanese. Please translate my question before the answer.

[Translation] : Let me summarize the question. We amended the outline in December of 1995 and the major difference between the outline 1976 and outline 1995 is that the delete of the line that the limited scale of the invasion will be coped by the Japanese own initiative. This line was closed in the new outline. Therefore, [my] question is, why this line is deleted in the outline 1995, and also if this change had an influence upon the basic force concept?

MR. HOSHUYAMA: Let me first explain about the origin for the concept of the limited scale of the invasion. In our defense buildup plan, itself, until the third plan we mentioned that Japanese defense capabilities should be prepared for the effective management against the conventional level warfare. This means that this shows the certain limitation or certain levels that what Japan should be prepared for with its defense capability.

But, at the same time, in the debate of the post-force program, itself, we find it necessary to show a certain scale down of its defense capability or the target of the defense buildup itself. In order to fulfill the scale down of the target of the defense buildup it is necessary, needless to say, to scale down the imagined case of the invasion to Japan. Therefore, it is necessary to scale down the conventional warfare levels to a certain extent, a smaller size.

In this debate, the Sino-Soviet confrontation actually is reflected. And, therefore, the scale of the invasion can be minimized, can be scaled down, based on the understanding of the confrontation between China and the Soviet Union. And this was the reason that we could establish the consensus inside of the defense office between civilian and uniformed side about the size of the defense preparedness.

And, also the type of the invasion can be differed when, where, how and in what size? Therefore, it was difficult to clarify that what type of case we should be prepared for.

But I was often asked, how long are you going to keep the outline in 1976? And my answer was, say, about 10 years and after that it will be necessary to revise the outline, itself.

And what is the logic to revise the outline in 1976? My answer was, because of the development of the international situation until now and because of the development of all other elements. Surely, the concept of the limited scale of invasion can be changed or it will be necessary to update the concept of the limited invasion, itself.

Needless to say, the defense office should be prepared for the answer that this means that we have to set an image or have to set the input that what type of invasion we should be prepared for? And we use computers and very lengthy preparation for it. And, of course, this is the study inside of itself, not necessary to make it public, but setting data of the possible invasion and input it. And then we input our own capability and whether our capability can meet the imagined size and scales of invasion or not.

And, actually we did this type of detailed clarification to support the concept of the limited size of the invasion.

Professor Ando also asked that whether the new outline in 1995 had the same clarification process or not? Unfortunately, I was not in the responsible office for the drafting of the outline in 1995, therefore, I should reserve my comment. However, the outline in 1995 showed the line that to cope with the possible invasion. This means that the responsible office has its own idea in case of invasion. In other words, they have certain data to input to a computer to work out whether our defense capability is sufficient to meet the situation.

Therefore, the expression of invasion did not say anything about limited or something like that. That is simply the matter of the expression, I think.

Therefore, we should be prepared for the potential invasion to Japan and Japanese defense capabilities should be sufficient to meet that type of contingency. That is the necessary thing.

As for the relation with the United States, again, I have to say I don't know the background, the U.S.-Japan relations too well of the outline 1995, but it is quite clear that due to the security treaty we are always in a condition to consult with the United States against any possible emergency.

Therefore, even in the outline 1975, though the expression is the Japan should cope with indigenously against limited size of invasion, but this doesn't exclude the consultation with the United States from its basis, from its beginning of the case of contingency.

In other words, we are always ready to consult with the United States for any potential cases and this is the basic principle of the security treaty. Therefore, as far as we keep the security treaty we are always ready to consult with the United States for any cases. Therefore, again, this is the matter of the expression how you define or how you clarify that U.S.-Japan security consultation in case of contingency.

The outline, itself, is a paper, a document showing the principle, but it is not necessary to show the whole details of the cases. And the security consultation between two countries is actually a basic principle of the security treaty, itself, therefore, not necessarily mentioned in the outlines, I think.

PROF. TAKESHI IGARASHI[Tokyo University]: There are three questions. The first one is the threat perception. There are any discrepancy about the threat perception inside of the defense office, itself, remember the civilian staff side and the uniformed staff side. That is about the threat of the Soviet Union.

Their invasion is possible or probable. The concept is a bit different. Possible is more potential and probable is less potential in this case. Are there any discrepancies of the threat perception of the Soviet Union or not?

The second question is related to this first question. If it is regarded that Soviet invasion is probable, that if that is regarded by the Japanese defense office side, then when do you have that concept? And related to this concept, when did you start thinking of blockade of three straits--Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya? These are necessary pass for Soviet naval ships to go to the Pacific from Valdivostok.

The third question is related to the contingency in the Middle East. The defense of Syrian communication up to 1,000 nautical miles which is decreed by the Prime Minister Suzuki when he came to the United States in 1981. And so related to Suzuki's comment, when the defense office has started for the preparation of this concept?

These are questions from my side.

MR. HOSHUYAMA: All are difficult questions, so let me answer the point very briefly. As for the threat perceptions from the Soviet Union, yes, the Soviet threat existed in the mind of defense policy planners very early, like 1951, 1952, in that earlier stage of the defense problem, period.

And the Soviet threat is really a major issue of when we discuss and design the Japanese defense policy, itself. Therefore, the origin of the Soviet threat is starting in the very early stage of the history. As for the discrepancy of the threat perception of the Soviet Union between Mr. Kubo and military officers, may have some difference about the threat perception. However, let me say that in the debate of the post-defense plan itself, there was no discrepancy about the threat perceptions.

But, when we discussed the outline of 1976, we actually in the time of the detente and the public opinion was so keen to scale down the Japanese self-defense forces. Therefore, of course, Mr. Kubo himself did not pay attention for the rapid scale down of the SDF itself. However, he might be regarded from the major officer side that Mr. Kubo is rather close to the Socialist idea or the concept by the potential scale down of the SDF.

Therefore, this type of difference of concepts caused some internal debate, inside of the JDA, but of course, Kubo's position is very different from the Socialist side. Therefore, the difference between Socialists and Kubo and Socialists are much bigger than the difference between Kubo and the major officers.

Answering to your second question, as far the three straits blockade, the wide blockade is debatable because I don't know whether the Maritime self-defense force is this idea, this concept, blockade itself. However, the Soya Straits has been the very important issue for the maritime self-defense force for many, many years. Therefore, they have their own plan how they secure these straits in case of contingency.

Therefore, this was a common sense inside of the JDA and inside of the service, itself. Surely this would be a new concept for the public but I think this study when Minister Sakata came to the defense office, he encouraged us to show our information public. And so his effort, I think, our concept is becoming more and more public and the security of the Soya Straits is becoming to be known by the public. But, again, the concept of blockade is really used in the Maritime staff office or not, that is a debatable issue.

The third one is the 1,000 nautical mile sea lane defense. This was first mentioned by the Prime Minister when he came to the United States, but the concept itself was well known and almost common sense inside the defense office, not only inside of the defense office but also inside the Government, itself.

The 1,000 mile sea lane communications defense as well as a few hundred miles territorial around Japan, that was the area that we have targeted for defense.

Therefore, maybe somebody informed to the Prime Minister Suzuki that this is the common sense inside the Government, therefore, they should be no problem to mention this in your speech in the United States. Unfortunately this invited a lot of debate.

I had a chance to mention this once in a magazine so, if necessary, I am going to check with the background information.

DR. WAMPLER: We need a break and I believe that Hoshuyama-san would really like to have a break. We, obviously are getting into some interesting discussion here. I have let this go longer quite a bit than we had planned. I would like to have us back in 15 minutes, so I'll tell you to be back in 10. Hopefully we'll all be back in 15. If Mr. Kreisburg and Professor Watanabe have a chance to pursue their concerns over a coffee break that would help us, if you really want to take it up when we come back. Professor Yokibe has a few thing he wants to say; I will roll my remarks into the next session, which is the conference planning. Thank you.

[Recess.]

DR. WAMPLER: ---so let us move on to that question because it did sound like an interesting one and I do think the audience would be interested in hearing the answer.

MR. PAUL KREISBERG[Wilson Center]: Well, I thought I would give Mr. Hoshuyama an idea what I was going to ask him. It is a follow-up on the last question before we broke for coffee which focused on the threat from Russia. My question is whether there has been, what kind of discussions have there been in the JDA about contingency planning for a threat from China, in the aftermath of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and passage of the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act, and particularly, what the assumptions are in Japan about what they would or would not do should there be a conflict in the Straits over Taiwan, of the kind that we see, potentially--unlikely but potentially--in the wings right now? What Japan's obligations are in terms of or concerns would be in terms of the stationing of U.S. forces on Okinawa and in Japan which might, then, be used against China in this kind of a contingency?

MR. HOSHUYAMA: As for the threat perception of the People's Republic of China, the power projection capability of China at that time was quite limited. Therefore, even if they have the possibility of contingency with Japan, their power projection against Japan would surely be very limited, therefore, not necessary to have a plan on the central government level.

Therefore, the defense during that program, itself, did not pay much attention on China issue for scaling its size and preparing the operations against potential Chinese cases.

As for the Japanese military capability in Okinawa, which is quite limited size, therefore, the Senkaku Islands, which is the disputed territory between China and Japan, well, if something is gone wrong over there, Japanese capability is not really sufficient to cover, to go down there, just mentioning our capability even from Okinawa.

Therefore, the Japanese capability is quite limited over there for the territorial dispute between China and Japan. As for the U.S. forces in Okinawa, there have, of course, they are in operation for their own plan. And that is a matter of the consultation between the United States and Japan, if there is any substantial change of U.S. forces deployment in Japan.

But this doesn't necessarily to be connected to the defense buildup plan, itself. Therefore, nothing is discussed in the defense buildup position.

And the same for the contingency case for Taiwan. This was not, again, discussed in the context of the defense buildup, itself. Therefore, I have limited, I have little knowledge about this issue.

Thank you very much.


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