HISTORY OF THE CUSTODY AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)
JULY 1945 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1977

PREPARED BY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)
FEBRUARY 1978

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SUBJECT: History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons

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Milton E. Key
Major General, USA
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

Attachments
1. List of Page Substitutions (Unclas)
2. History Update (TSRD)

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Prepared By

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

February 1978

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(U) This history provides the reader with a basic understanding of how we arrived at our present posture in nuclear weapons in order that he may be better able to cope with the problems of the future. It traces the evolution of the custody, deployment authorizations, and dispersals of nuclear weapons from July 1945 through September 1977. It illustrates, as factually as possible within data collection sources, the development of, and statistical data associated with, the United States nuclear force.

(U) The material was derived from the records of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), the Joint Staff and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Every effort was made to reconcile disparities in numbers; however, due to different accounting procedures particularly prior to 1961, there are some minor conflicts pertaining to individual totals by weapon authoritative accounts of the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Energy Research and Development Administration (now Department of Energy).

(U) Many of the key individuals who were intimately involved in the policy discussions and decisions are no longer available to provide a first-hand account of the happenings. It was therefore necessary to borrow liberally from many sources, most of whom are identified.

(U) This history does not reflect the opinions or views of the Department of Defense.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

(U) On Friday the 13th of July, 1945, at the site of Project Trinity near Alamagordo, New Mexico, Brigadier General T. F. Farrell, deputy for General Leslie R. Groves, signed a receipt for the active material and handed it to Dr. Louis Slotin who was in charge of the nuclear assembly. Dr. Slotin was to be one of the first casualties of a nuclear accident. He died a year later on May 31, 1946 as a result of an excursion during a critical experiment at Los Alamos Laboratory. The acceptance of this receipt constituted the formal transfer of Plutonium 239 from the scientists of Los Alamos to the Army to be expended in the test explosion. Thus, the first transfer of the nuclear components of an atomic weapon was conducted. It was not until 14 years later that the Department of Defense gained full custodial rights for all atomic weapons dispersed to Army, Navy and Air Force storage sites. During these intervening years, the legal and the philosophical struggle for custody of nuclear weapons was waged between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

(U) On the one side was the conviction that custody of nuclear weapons in peacetime should lay in the civilian hands of the AEC. The military and the DoD, on the opposite side, were convinced that military preparedness demanded not only the positioning of nuclear weapons with or near the delivery units but also the transfer of custody of these weapons to full control of the military.

(U) Over the years we have progressed from an initial scarcity of uranium ore and weapons to the point where there is an abundance of fissionable materials and extensive stockpiles of sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The problems of managing a small number of weapons located at a few sites in the United States pale by comparison with the multitude of tasks associated with the storage, handling, transportation, access, and safety of thousands of nuclear weapons located at hundreds of locations worldwide. The need for quick reaction by complex nuclear delivery systems coupled with reliable, swift release procedures is not by any means compatible with the requirements for safety and protection against
unadverted detonation or launch. Thus, the controversies and problems were not only between the AEC and DoD but within the DoD itself, at times, between the Executive Branch and Legislative branches of the government and, lastly, between the U.S. and its allies.

(GPRD) It is interesting to note that as late as January 1969, there existed a problem of custody of Nike Hercules nuclear warheads for the air defense of the United States. The National Guard of the various states manned over fifty percent of the active CONUS air defense units. Present at each of these sites was a U.S. custodial detachment which controlled access to the warhead arming plug. The National Guard units could not have custody of the nuclear warheads even though they were under the operational control of the North American Air Defense Command. They were not employees of the Department of Defense and therefore could not be given custody of the warheads.

(U) During the years between July 13, 1945 and the present there occurred major changes in national security policies as well as in the technology and quantity of nuclear weapons. The attempted takeover of Greece by the Communists in 1947, the 1948 Berlin crisis, the Soviet nuclear capability in 1949, the Korean conflict in 1950 and the developing cold war, among other factors, governed the evolution of the concepts of custody and control of nuclear weapons.

(U) To say that the issue of civilian versus military control of atomic energy had been a burning acrimonious issue for years would be an understatement of classic proportions. An indication of the intensity of one view is given by Byron Miller in his article "A Law is Passed... The Atomic Energy Act of 1946" in the 1948 Summer edition of the University of Chicago Law Review.

"To many, this was a simple choice between war and peace. To others, advocacy of civilian control was a means of preventing 'brass hat' abuse of our precious asset, atomic energy. To many scientists, the issue was posed in related terms: military control meant a continuance of arbitrary decisions, incomprehending bureaucracy, and an intellectual gap which the military officers showed little interest in bridging. To a few historically-minded souls, the issue was one of democratic tradition--the armed forces with their essentially authoritarian training and discipline would not be adequately responsive to the public will."
(U) The military, on their part, did have definite opinions as to the competence of exclusive civilian control, particularly in the field of atomic weaponry. They could well point with pride to the spectacular success of the military operated Manhattan Engineer District (albeit autonomously operated). Their views in this area are well documented (although not as colorfully stated) in subsequent developments.
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(U) During the fall of 1945, in the consideration of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), a proposal to permit active military officers to serve on the part-time governing Board of the AEC and as the Board’s full-time Administrator and Deputy Administrator was contained in the May-Johnson bill. This proposal was soundly defeated and the McMahon Act was passed which established a full-time civilian five-man Atomic Energy Commission, a civilian General Manager and a congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Under the law, the AEC was responsible for the development, manufacture and custody of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy. The President, however, did have the authority to transfer or delegate any of these functions to the military departments. Military participation in the atomic energy program was provided by the establishment of a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to provide a two-way channel of communication between the military and the civilian AEC. The MLC had been created by Senator Arthur Vandenburg’s amendment to the McMahon Act. Senator Vandenburg had stated “in my opinion it will not be satisfactory if there is anywhere a single closed door to the military liaison or congressional committee. The responsibility is too great.” The MLC was to be the interface between the AEC and the military on policy matters. The McMahon Act also stipulated that the post of Director of the AEC Division of Military Application (DMA) would be filled by a military officer. Thus, participation in the atomic energy program was afforded to the military and Congress.

(U) The McMahon Act emphasized the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy though it did not slight the military uses. It was thought that civilian control would be more efficacious in soliciting the cooperation and participation of the scientific community as well as providing a better image to the international community. Lastly, there was the fundamental constitutional concept that control of this new and awesome force should be vested in civilian hands directly responsible to the President.

(U) With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585) and the issuance of Executive Order 9816 in implementation of the Act, all atomic weapons and material of the Manhattan Project became the property of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was established by means of a memorandum from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of Staff, Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Dated 29 January 1947, this memorandum was retroactive to 1 January 1947. There was no Secretary
of Defense until the office was established under the National Security Act of 1947. The first Secretary of Defense, the Honorable James V. Forrestal, took the oath of office on 17 September 1947. On 21 October 1947 he issued a memorandum addressed to the Chief of Staff, Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, Air Force, regarding AFSWP. This order was almost identical to the one issued by the Secretaries of War and Navy on 29 January 1947 except for such changes as were necessary to include the recently created U. S. Air Force and its Chief of Staff.

(U) The organization was placed under the command of General Leslie Groves and given the responsibility for representing all the services in the military application of atomic energy. It was designed to serve as an operational link between the AEC and the services much the same as the MLC provided at the policy level. The AFSWP operated at Sandia Base without a charter until July 8, 1947. The charter agreed to by General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, restricted the authority of General Groves to policy and staff functions, certain special weapons ordnance work and training of military personnel. Air Force participation in the AFSWP was anticipated in this charter but was not forthcoming until after July 27, 1947, the date the National Security Act was signed by the President.

(U) In the period from the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 until the spring of 1950, there was a serious and continuing consideration of the desirability of DoD custody of atomic weapons and the problems connected therewith. Sandia Base became the initial focal point for the question of custody of nuclear weapons and fissionable material. The AEC considered that the question of custody of weapons and parts had been clearly settled by the executive order which transferred the atomic energy program from the Manhattan District to the AEC. The existing stockpile of weapons was transferred from the control of the Manhattan District to the AEC during the last few weeks of 1946. From December 1946 to May 1948 the Secretary of the Navy and the Chiefs of the Army and Air Force expressed their views in favor of the desirability of transferring custody of atomic weapons from the AEC to the Armed Forces.

(U) Obviously an agreement between the AEC and the AFSWP on the division of responsibilities was necessary. Various solutions were proposed ranging in degrees of complexity. General Groves made a simple suggestion that the Commission and the Secretary of Defense request the President to transfer all the weapons to the services. General McCormack of the AEC's Division of Military Application (DMA) proposed to let the Sandia Base Commander and the senior AEC official, Carroll L. Tyler, manager at Los Alamos, arrange the details upon receipt of a short directive.
The Military Liaison Committee under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Brereton believed that the military needed instant access to the weapons and that the present arrangement did not provide for this. They tried to enlist the support of Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower, Secretary of the Army Royal and Secretary of the Navy Sullivan. Only the Navy offered positive support. Despite this, General Brereton wrote to the Chairman of the AEC, Mr. Lilienthal, on November 12 that "in order to insure that all interested agencies of the Armed Forces are prepared at all times to use the available bombs, it is necessary that they have actual custody of the completed weapons." The AEC was asked to provide formal comments on the proposal.

The same subject was raised a week later by Admiral Solberg, a member of the MLC, with Lilienthal. The Chairman believed that the Commission exercised custody as a result of an executive order. Any change in custodial arrangements would have to be authorized by the President. Lilienthal was not overly impressed by the military's argument that they would not have instant access to the weapons for use and even if they did, they could not rely on the weapons because they had no experience in handling, storing or maintaining them. He countered with a complaint that the Commission was not informed about a forthcoming training exercise involving nuclear weapons to be conducted by AFSPW and the Air Force, and consequently had no opportunity to send observers. The Admiral was also informed the Commission expected better treatment in the future.

The MLC proposal in the meantime was sent to General McCormack of DMA and eventually wound up on Dr. Bradbury's desk at Los Alamos for comment. Dr. Bradbury, Director of Los Alamos and the AEC "Z" Division at Sandia Base, opposed the philosophy of the AEC producer-Military user concept. He believed the weapons in the stockpile were too complicated for the military to maintain. The relationship between AFSPW and the AEC personnel at Sandia Base left much to be desired with suspicion and distrust on both sides.

In early February, 1948, Carroll Wilson presented a study on the question of custody to the General Advisory Committee of the AEC. The study concluded that the AEC should retain custody for the present but would reopen the issue the next year. The Advisory Committee agreed that there were valid technical reasons for not transferring the stockpile to the military at that time.

Meanwhile Secretary Forrestal was reorganizing the MLC. The new charter for the committee called for a civilian Chairman and two representatives from each military department. General Brereton was replaced by Mr. Donald F. Carpenter who had been a vice-president of the Remington Arms Company. Mr. Carpenter had been importuned to accept the job by the service secretaries and Lilienthal at a Pentagon dinner on March 5. He finally accepted that night and the way was now clear to move on another front. General Groves had retired at the end of February and this fortuitously (as far as Lilienthal was concerned) made it possible to find a military man who would be more compatible with the Commission.
(U) General Kenneth D. Nichols, Assistant to General Groves, was Lilienthal's choice. The Czechoslovakian crisis, culminating in Jan Masaryks' death, had accentuated the need for closer teamwork between the Commission and the military. This requirement was pointed out to Nichols, Lilienthal and Secretary of the Army Royal by President Truman at a meeting in the White House on March 11, 1948, concerning the appointment of General Nichols as head of the AFSWP.

(U) The issue of custody was being pushed to the fore. As the crisis grew in intensity, General Nichols, the three secretaries of the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed Forrestal to present the issue to the President. In another aspect, the necessity for a rapid "emergency transfer" of weapons was recognized by all. By the middle of April, Wilson could report at a meeting with Lilienthal and Carpenter that emergency transfer arrangements had been completed, training of military technicians at Sandia had been accelerated and that generally there had never been such an air of rapport between the military and AEC at Sandia.

(U) The possibility of a meeting at Sandia to discuss custody was mentioned by Carpenter at the meeting and subsequently in his report to Forrestal who thought it was a good idea. The meeting between the new MLC membership and the Commissioners took place at Sandia Base and Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Los Alamos the week of May 24, 1948. The first two days were spent observing the training of military technicians and visiting storage facilities at Albuquerque. Dr. Bradbury opened the discussion at Los Alamos the third day citing the technical reasons why military custody was illogical. The present weapons were complex, and had to be inspected, tested and maintained. This surveillance of the weapons not only assured reliability but also could lead to improvement developments with highly skilled personnel. Bradbury believed that the military were incapable of becoming qualified in recognizing the need for, and developing improvements in the weapons. It therefore followed that custody should remain with the technically qualified civilians of the AEC and that effective procedures for emergency transfer be worked out jointly.

(U) General Nichols presented the service views the next day (Thursday) at Sandia. The main points were:

a. The weapons must be readily available in an emergency and under control of a single military command.

b. The men, who would use the weapon in battle, must have handled, assembled, and repaired the weapon if there was to be any reliability to the weapon.

(U) Carpenter thought he saw a logical compromise between the two positions. He believed that the military had demonstrated that they could perform all of the functions involved in custody except developmental surveillance. The AEC would be given access to the weapons for this purpose. He told Nichols to draft a memorandum
covering the discussions and conclude it by a joint recommendation to the President that the stockpile be transferred to the military.

(U) During these considerations on 26-27 May 1948, the term "custody" was presented to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Military Liaison Committee as involving the following responsibilities:

(1) Accountability of weapons and components both nuclear and non-nuclear.

(2) Physical protection of weapons and components in storage.

(3) Operational and routine inspection.

(4) Repair of components where necessary and when within the capabilities of the custodian.

(5) Making weapons available for training of combat personnel through inspections, drills, and operational maneuvers.

(6) Making weapons available for continued scientific observation and study to develop improvements in the design, methods of storage or use of the weapons.

(U) The memorandum which Carpenter had requested General Nichols to draft summarized the reasons for requiring transfer of weapons to the Department of Defense as follows:

"......

"Just as the Commission has statutory responsibilities, the Military Establishment under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, has by the Constitution and laws of the United States, clearly defined responsibilities to provide for the defense of the United States. This involves preparation of suitable war plans and the maintenance of an effective fighting force in readiness.

"In order effectively to carry out the responsibilities of the Military Establishment, experience has shown that unity of command is essential. There must be a clear chain of authority originating with a single individual, the Commander-in-Chief, acting with the advice of such bodies as the National Security Council, the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others. This chain should run straight and clean from the Commander-in-Chief to the basic units which will be called upon to fight. Wherever a division occurs or wherever a single function is to be controlled by two masters, there is room for failure to act on an essential matter -- not necessarily from irresponsibility nor from willful neglect but from confusion or lack of full understanding as to what must be done and by whom."
"Unity of command must necessarily include control over material -- the implements without which a fighting force cannot be effective. This is manifested in a number of ways. In order to integrate logistic and operational plans, the planners must know exactly the location, state of readiness and physical condition of weapons and men, and the same type of knowledge is essential in order to provide in the best possible manner for adequate defense of storage depots. Moreover, flexibility must exist in order that storage of weapons may be arranged to fit military requirements. In addition, there are many intangibles which in the aggregate are extremely important. One of the most important of these is complete familiarity with the particular weapons to be used. The user must know what the weapons look like, how to handle them, their state of readiness and the extent to which minor alterations or repairs may be made without impairing their effectiveness. And he must have the confidence which comes only from complete familiarity with both components and test equipment so that he can be completely certain that they will operate effectively."

(U) The memorandum was discussed at a special meeting of the MLC and the AEC Commissioners on June 18, Chairman Lilienthal refused to budge and no agreement could be reached. A week later at a meeting with Secretary Forrestal and MLC Chairman Carpenter, Mr. Lilienthal admitted only that the Commission could not maintain custody of weapons deployed to military bases overseas. Five days later, as a result of the Soviet blockade of Berlin on June 24, the President ordered a group of B-29 bombers to England and West Germany. The delivery vehicles were now overseas, the weapons were in the States.

(U) Secretary Forrestal made a strong bid in recommending to the President that weapons be transferred to the custody of the Department of Defense. By his letter of July 21, 1948, based upon the recommendations of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Forrestal urged the President to advise the Atomic Energy Commission that delivery to the armed forces of stockpiled atomic weapons would be directed. This recommendation was denied by the President who, essentially, concurred with the AEC Chairman's recommendation.

(U) According to Secretary Forrestal, the President had informed him that it might be possible to reexamine this issue at a later date, perhaps after the fall elections. On July 24, 1948, the President declared in the course of a public statement on the occasion of the release of the fourth Semi-Annual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. His statement is quoted below:

"As President of the United States, I regard the continued control of all aspects of the atomic energy program, including research, development and the custody of atomic weapons, as the proper function of the civil authorities. Congress has recognized that the existence of this new weapon places a grave responsibility on the President as
to its use in the event of a national emergency. There must, of course be very close cooperation between the civilian Commission and the Military Establishment. Both the military authorities and the civilian Commission deserve high commendation for the joint efforts which they are putting forward to maintain our nation's leadership in this vital work."

(U) In a letter received by Secretary Forrestal on August 6, 1948, the President reiterated his position by stating the "I do not feel justified ... to order the transfer of the stockpiles to the armed services." In his formal reply the President explained that he did not feel justified in exercising his authority under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to order the transfer of the stockpile to the armed services. He stated that his decision was based on considerations of public policy, the necessarily close relation between custody and weapon research, the efficiency of existing methods of custody, and surveillance, and the general world situation.

(U) However, at this point it is worth noting that the National Security Act of 1947, strengthened civilian control of the armed forces by providing in the Declaration of Policy that:

".....it is the intent of Congress to provide....three military departments......to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control..."

(U) In addition, after establishing a National Military Establishment and providing that the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof, (Section 201) the Act further provided in Section 202 that:

"There shall be a Secretary of Defense who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: PROVIDED, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a regular component of the Armed Forces shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense." This concept of civilian control has been carried through and reemphasized in subsequent amendments to the National Security Act.

(U) As a result of the President's decision, efforts were concentrated within the Department of Defense, with the assistance of the Atomic Energy Commission, to improve to the maximum, the plans for emergency transfer of weapons. The plans were exercised, reviewed and revised as necessary to maximize efficiency and speed using the complicated transfer machinery and assure that weapons were made available to the armed forces and placed in usable position in the shortest possible time.
Also, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was directed by the three Service Chiefs to "take steps to train sufficient personnel to enable the National Military Establishment to assume full custody and surveillance as soon as possible, if and when the President authorizes the transfer of such responsibilities to the Department of Defense."

All weapons including both nuclear and non-nuclear components remained in custody of the Atomic Energy Commission except for short periods for maneuvers and training by the military until the Spring of 1950. An Agreement Between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project on Storage Site Operations and Maintenance, which was concluded in May of 1949, delineated the responsibility assigned to the military and AEC personnel at sites in this regard.

The dispute over custody was not the only dispute during these early years. The euphoria generated by the end of hostilities in 1945 had been quickly overwhelmed by the sobering developments in East-West relations in 1947. The threat of Soviet aggression in 1947 increased the demands for more weapons as well as the need for better rapport and communications between the AEC and the military, in particular the Military Liaison Committee. A draft Presidential stockpile directive for calendar year 1947 was prepared by the AEC staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy and approved by the Commission on March 27. It declared that the JCS and service secretaries believed the "the present supply of atomic weapons...not adequate to meet the security requirements of the United States." They further urged that the production of weapons receive first priority.

At a meeting in the White House on April 3, 1947, for the purpose of briefing President Truman on the existing stockpile situation, the President was shocked to learn that the nuclear stockpile was so small (and that none of the bombs had been assembled nor were there competent teams available for assembly). The number of weapons available (about 13) was left blank on the report but provided orally to the President by Chairman Lilienthal. The meeting ended on that grim note. The question turned to which had first priority, reactors for the peacetime application of atomic energy or new weapons for war. It was not until a year and a half later however that it became possible to make any large increases in the stockpile. Secretary Forrestal had become convinced after the Berlin crisis of 1948 that nuclear weapons offered the cheapest means of buying security. Mass production of large quantities of smaller and lighter weapons was now technologically possible and both Secretary Forrestal and General Nichols shared the belief that a substantial increase in the number of weapons were needed as a cornerstone for our national security.

In the past, the projected stockpile had not been based on the number of nuclear weapons required for strategic nuclear warfare but rather on the present and planned AEC production capacity. Independent studies, analyses and targeting plans, however, now justified the need for a substantial increase in production to meet the new requirements for weapons sent by the Chairman MLC to the Commission on May 26, 1949. Mr Lilienthal viewed the military requirements as arbitrary and not based
on solid military and political evaluations. He was wary of the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Louis A. Johnson, Forrestal's successor, did not assuage Lilienthal's apprehensions.

(U) After much maneuvering by the DoD, the AEC, the JCSC, and the Bureau of the Budget, President Truman ordered the executive secretary of the National Security Council, Admiral Souers, to review all plans for production of nuclear materials and weapons. The Secretary of Defense would comprise a special committee to assist Admiral Souers in the study.

(U) The study had been completed in draft form when President Truman announced on September 23, 1949 that evidence of a Soviet nuclear explosion on August 29, had been detected by the U. S. The reaction in Congress was predictable. The push was on for more weapons, which was exactly what the draft report to the President had recommended.

(U) To Lilienthal, however, the conclusion that a substantial increase in the production of nuclear weapons was needed in the interest of national security was not justified by any supporting evidence available to the AEC. This was the conclusion of the military and not of State and AEC. Where there had been hope that State and AEC would participate with Defense in determining the need for weapons by the establishment of the special committee, there now was apprehension that Secretary of Defense Johnson had no intention of allowing State and AEC to enter into military planning. The push for increased production received additional emphasis with the advent of the Korean conflict nine months later.

(U) Returning now to custody, there was, by 1950, no doubt of technical competence in surveillance, inspection and maintenance activities by the military because the military was, in fact, performing these functions at that time. As a demonstration of this technical competence the military now performed such functions as inspection, acceptance, surveillance and routine maintenance of stockpile items at the operating storage sites. This work was performed by personnel of the AFSPWP drawn from the Army, Navy and Air Force, under AEC supervision. The AFSPWP had been organized in the manner of a technical field service and a special weapons depot system for support of the operational units. There were approximately 1,500 trained personnel available for this purpose.

(U) An example of military participation in custodial operations with the Atomic Energy Commission was at Site BAKER, a permanent storage site for stockpiled weapons. There were eleven AEC personnel and approximately 500 military. The military personnel consisted of two assembly teams of 77 technically qualified men each, 140 to 150 additional technical and administrative personnel and approximately 200 security personnel. In addition to training activities and supporting military maneuvers involving atomic weapons, the AFSPWP personnel performed surveillance, inspection, maintenance, conversion,
and retirement functions for the Commission. Based on the previously mentioned agreement between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, this pattern had been pursued since June 1949. The same pattern was then in effect at all storage sites on a similar basis. The Atomic Energy Commission was not at that time staffed to perform the necessary functions without military assistance and had no plan for other arrangements. The military assistance was in both non-nuclear and nuclear activities.
CHAPTER 3
THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION
1950 - 1952

(U) The establishment of a National Military Establishment with its concept of civilian control of the Department of Defense, and the demonstrated proficiency of the AFSWF in participating with and assisting the AEC in nuclear and non-nuclear activities "greased the skids" for the next phase in the evolution of control of atomic weapons.

(U) The MLC recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of Defense should have operational control of the operational storage sites and non-nuclear components including war reserve kits and spares at the operational sites. A month and a half later in a letter to Mr. Early, the Chairman of the MLC, Mr. LeBaron, advised him that the AEC was considering a staff study which recommended that the AEC obtain the concurrence of the President to "transfer of custody of stockpile of non-nuclear components of atomic bombs to the Department of Defense", and "delegation of responsibility for routine maintenance of nuclear components of stockpile atomic weapons to the Department of Defense." The JCS supported the AEC recommendation to DoD provided that the terms would be mutually agreed to by DoD and the AEC.

(PR) The onset of the Korean War gave rise to grave doubts within the DoD concerning our military posture particularly in Europe. The JCS requested permission to store non-nuclear components in England. Only the nuclear capsules would then have to be moved from the States. This proposal was discussed in a meeting on June 10 between the AEC and the MLC. Mr. Robert LeBaron, the MLC Chairman, convinced the AEC Commissioners that they should request the President to authorize the transfer of those components to the military and the storage in the United Kingdom.

(PR) The next day, Defense Secretary Johnson and AEC Chairman Gordan Dean met with President Truman who approved the request. Twenty days later the President authorized the transfer of additional non-nuclear components to Guam and the aircraft carrier, [redacted].

(CFRD) In view of the seriousness of the world situation at the time it had been decided to deploy additional medium bomb wings at overseas locations. By having non-nuclear components readily available to these units, the initial strikes against their assigned targets could
be mounted in a much shorter time, and the time schedule for subsequent attacks could be advanced. The nuclear components could be flown to these units by fast air transport. In addition, airlift was becoming more critical due to the situation in the Far East and the reduction in airlift required to implement the strategic air offensive by storing non-nuclear components with the deployed units would result in an important saving. The ship was equipped to carry and maintain atomic bombs, and AJ-1 aircraft with an atomic weapon capability were scheduled to operate from this ship.

Before the end of the year non-nuclear components had been moved to the United Kingdom, and to Guam. Eleven non-nuclear components were aboard when it deployed to the Mediterranean in September, 1950. By agreement among the military services the components deployed to operational bases overseas or aircraft carriers were under the accountability and security responsibility of the service concerned, while necessary functional surveillance was performed by its units subject to technical direction and control by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. The nuclear components for these weapons remained in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Continental United States.

This transfer of non-nuclear components of atomic weapons by no means satisfied the requirement of the Department of Defense that forces and weapons be placed in strategically sound locations and that the divided and overlapping responsibilities in the field of military material and operations be eliminated. The transfer, however, did partially eliminate a most difficult problem of logistical movement of material to strategic locations.

The readiness program necessitated storage of non-nuclear components aboard other CVB class carriers, equipped similarly to the when the vessels were operating outside continental limits of the United States.

When the in the Mediterranean, it also had non-nuclear components aboard. This action had been approved by the President on 6 December 1950. Subsequent, the was loaded under similar conditions with non-nuclear components in May of 1951. Here, also, the nuclear components remained in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States, to be transferred to the ship by air upon approval of the President.

The legal basis for the transfer was Section 6 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which provided that:

"The President may from time to time direct the Commission to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense."
The following is quoted from a memorandum from the General Counsel for the Department of Defense to the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, dated 10 April 1950:

"Section 6(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provides that the Commission is authorized to do research and development work in the military application of atomic energy and to engage in production of atomic bombs, bomb parts and other military weapons utilizing fissionable materials at a rate determined by the President. This Section further provides, however, that "The President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense or (2) to authorize the armed forces to manufacture, produce, or acquire any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon." The House Committee Report paraphrases subsection (2) of the above quoted language as follows: '(2) To authorize the armed forces to manufacture, produce or acquire any equipment or device capable of making use of fissionable material or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy as a military weapon.' It seems clear from the foregoing that the President may direct the Commission to transfer atomic bombs or parts thereof to the Department of Defense and there is no provision of law which would prevent the Department of Defense from receiving weapons and parts so transferred."

On 14 June 1950, the President had approved the permanent transfer of 90 MK 4 non-nuclear assemblies to the armed forces for training. This transfer was based on a requirement established by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, for

"a. AFSWP training programs for assembly organizations stationed at Sandia Base and Sites Able, Baker and Charlie. The ability of these assembly organizations to produce properly assembled bombs at a rate not less than that called for by war plan schedules can be proved only by frequent actual performance of continuous assembly work for several days on bombs in stockpile condition.

"b. USAF and USN training requirements for their respective atomic bomb assembly and delivery organizations.

"c. A desire on the part of the Department of Defense to determine combat readiness of the atomic stockpile."

These non-nuclear assemblies were transferred to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and since they were not transferred for operational purposes, they are not believed subject to further consideration here.
(U) The transfer of nuclear components from the AEC to the DoD, however, is to be one of the major historical issues. AEC Chairman Dean believed (as did all the Commissioners) that the AEC was responsible for safeguarding nuclear material and, that in the exercise of this responsibility, the authority of the AEC would extend to weapons in the custody of the DoD. It was also the general AEC belief that the Chairman along with the Secretaries of State and Defense would be able to present their views to the President on any JCS request for transfer of nuclear weapons or expending a weapon on a certain target. Chairman Dean, having somehow found out that the JCS had requested the President to transfer a small number of nuclear weapons to the military, called the White House. Much to Dean's dismay, the President had already decided to approve the transfer when he invited Dean to the White House on the afternoon of April 6. Dean did, however, receive the definite impression that the President would call for State and AEC participation in any deliberations on the use of nuclear weapons.

(U) The transfer was directed in the interest of national defense and General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force was designated as the personal representative of the President for custody of the weapons acting as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) The consideration of transfer of the nuclear components of atomic weapons in the Spring of 1951 was not without surprises however, in both the AEC and JCS. At least one member of the AEC thought that AEC custody was "an empty concept." Curiously enough, the JCS disapproved as "untimely" a joint MLC/AEC memorandum which proposed that nuclear components be transferred to the custody of the DoD in numbers to match the non-nuclear components already deployed.

(SECDEF) After details incident to the transfer had been completed, the weapons were moved to Guam in late June of the same year and placed with the Air Force Special Weapons Unit there. This unit was assigned to the Air Force task organization deployed to Guam.

(U) The same general reasons for this transfer were to accommodate the DoD requirement as explained in the letter from the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, to the Atomic Energy Commission of 14 June 1948 which was quoted earlier, and the same provision of the Atomic Energy Act applied as for the original transfer of non-nuclear assemblies.

(U) At this time, and partially as a result of the transfer actions noted above, it became necessary to revise the Agreement Between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project on Storage Site Operations and Maintenance. This was done and a new agreement became effective on 3 August 1951.
(U) In January 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the requirement for a minimum number of atomic weapons to support military operations. Realizing that the number would be unattainable for a period of years, the JCS stated practical requirements which they felt must be fulfilled. It became obvious to the Department of Defense as a result of this action that for operational flexibility in the offensive use of atomic weapons, it was essential that, until such time as the minimum requirements of atomic weapons could be produced, all weapons should be in the custody of the Department of Defense, except for such weapons as might be returned to the Atomic Energy Commission for quality inspection.

(CFRD) In June 1952, a requirement was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deployment of additional non-nuclear components overseas. The Air Force had deployed a fighter wing and a light bomber wing to Europe to augment the air forces allocated Supreme Allied Command, Europe. These units were equipped with aircraft capable of delivering the smaller atomic bombs. Two aircraft carriers, the [redacted], were scheduled to depart the Continental United States enroute to the Western Pacific in September. These two CV-9 class carriers in addition to the three CVB class carriers mentioned earlier would be modified by that date to give each vessel a full capability for storage and handling atomic bombs. The carrier air groups aboard these carriers would have aircraft capable of delivering the weapons.

(SEAD) Additional non-nuclear components were requested for deployment to the United Kingdom, Guam, [redacted], and for carriers in an operational status. In each location adequate storage facilities either existed or were scheduled for completion prior to deployment of the additional components. The Secretary of Defense supported this requirement and the President approved the transfer and deployment on 22 July 1952. The components were subsequently received by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and delivered to the Special Weapons Units at the designated destinations.
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CHAPTER 4

DoD QUEST FOR CUSTODY

1951 - 1953

(U) Meanwhile the long-standing contention of the Department of Defense that it should have overall custody of stockpile atomic weapons had been quiescent but not forgotten. An AEC-DoD agreement on "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations" in August 1951 was not implemented until June 1952 when AEC and AFSWP agreed on the Operations of National Stockpile sites under the command of AFSWP. It appears that both sides were not too anxious to commit themselves.

(U) On 11 December 1951, the matter of custody was raised again by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They expressed the view that the current system of divided responsibility for storage, surveillance, maintenance and security of the stockpile was harmful to the best interests of the United States and that the Armed Forces should have sufficient numbers of atomic weapons in their custody to assure operational flexibility and military readiness. A proposal, initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported by the Secretary of Defense, resulted in the President's approval of the following concepts regarding atomic weapons on 10 September 1952:

"a. Use of Atomic Weapons"

"In the event of a positive decision, the President would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as the President may specify."

"b. The Department of Defense should have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic weapons outside the continental United States and for such numbers of atomic weapons in the continental United States as may be needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use, subject to subparagraph a. above."

"c. The Atomic Energy Commission should maintain custodial responsibility for the remainder of the stockpile of atomic weapons."

"d. Each agency should provide the facilities for storage of atomic weapons over which it maintains custodial responsibility."

"e. Where custodial responsibilities may be changed by Presidential directive without physical movement of weapons, reimbursement for existing storage facilities should not be required."
"f. The Department of Defense should provide physical security and services required for the operation of all storage sites for atomic weapons.

"g. For storage facilities for which the Atomic Energy Commission is responsible, the services provided by the Department of Defense should include normal administrative services, and under the technical supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission the performance of such maintenance, surveillance, modernization and modification work as is deemed appropriate for accomplishment at the site.

"h. The Department of Defense should provide the Atomic Energy Commission with surveillance information on atomic weapons under Department of Defense custody and access to such weapons for such purposes as the Atomic Energy Commission may determine to be necessary, including the determination of the effects of environmental and operational conditions and rotation, modification and major retrofit programs.

"i. The Department of Defense should state its military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons including the desired military characteristics thereof.

"j. The Atomic Energy Commission should propose rates of production and production goals for weapon materials in the light of stated military requirements and of the Commission's capabilities for meeting these requirements.

"k. The President, in light of subparagraph i. and j. above, will determine the atomic weapon production program.

"l. The Department of Defense should establish appropriate criteria and conduct such tests and evaluations beyond those conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission as deemed necessary to ascertain acceptability of weapons to meet the stated military characteristics."

As set forth in the above concepts, the Department of Defense would have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic weapons outside the Continental United States and for such numbers within the country as might be needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness. The concept also recognized that the Department of Defense should provide the physical security and services required for operation of all storage sites.

(U) A study made within the Department of Defense of the custody situation as of 30 September 1952, pointed out that the Department of Defense then exercised custodial responsibility for weapons deployed to overseas sites, weapons stored aboard aircraft carriers, training weapons, and maneuver weapons. Working agreements had brought greatly increased DoD participation in weapons production, handling, safeguarding
and maintenance both of nuclear and non-nuclear components. It further indicated that the growth of the stockpile during the coming decade would place the storage and care of atomic weapons in the category of big business and that this called for business-like methods and clear-cut functions and responsibilities. Three major problems were considered to be involved: security, availability, and storage.

(U) The study proposed essentially that the Department of Defense continue to be responsible for security and that availability be satisfied by the custody of the non-nuclear and nuclear components of atomic weapons which are stored at overseas storage sites, aboard aircraft carriers, and in all national and operational storage sites in this country, except for such weapons as might be returned to the Atomic Energy Commission for quality inspection. It indicated, however, that the Atomic Energy Commission would retain legal and "technical" custody of fissionable material.

(U) The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, using the study as a basis, proposed to seek from the President an executive order which would affect the complete reorganization of the custody situation. This would include transfer of the entire stockpile of weapons both nuclear and non-nuclear components to the Department of Defense and assumption by it of responsibility for storage and security, as well as accomplishment of such surveillance, modification and maintenance mutually agreed with the Atomic Energy Commission as appropriate for storage sites. The proposal would leave the Atomic Energy Commission only with responsibility for the establishment of standards for surveillance, for quality control measures and for major retrofit and modification programs. After consultation by the Secretary of Defense with the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, it was concluded that the proposed action was then inadvisable and the action therefore was suspended.

(U) In October 1952, the Secretary of Defense requested the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the deployment of nuclear components of atomic weapons to those areas where non-nuclear components were already deployed in light of the approved "concepts regarding atomic weapons" enumerated above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reply, stated that it was essential to operational readiness and military flexibility that nuclear components be deployed outside the Continental limits of the United States at the earliest practicable date. They recommended that approval be obtained, as an immediate step, to effect deployment to storage locations ashore and afloat wherein the decision to do so rested solely with the United States and stated that diplomatic negotiations necessary to accomplish the remainder of the forward deployment should be undertaken.
On 8 June 1953, the Secretary of Defense initiated action to obtain the consideration of the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for this requirement. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary requested Presidential approval to effect transfer of custody from the Atomic Energy Commission and to deploy nuclear components in numbers equal to the non-nuclear deployments then approved to those storage locations afloat and ashore wherein the decision to do so rested solely with the United States. The President approved this request on 20 June 1953, subject to the understanding that the number of nuclear components deployed to each storage location would not exceed the number of non-nuclear assemblies actually deployed to that location and that adequate surveillance procedures would be available at each storage location before actual deployment.

Arrangements were made with the Atomic Energy Commission for specific types of components and the initial deployment under this authorization was made to Guam and to carriers of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

With the advent of the construction and operational status of operational storage sites under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission and the military services, it became necessary for agreements to be made between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Services concerned to delineate more specifically the responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the individual Services. In May 1952 the Atomic Energy Commission and the Air Force reached agreement as to the procedures to be applicable at those operational sites within the United States under control of the Air Force Material Command. These sites, according to the agreement, would function under the same arrangement as that concluded between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project on 9 November 1951. By memorandum of 16 October 1953, the Secretary of Defense delineated responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the individual Services as follows:

"1. The following responsibilities of the Department of Defense pertaining to atomic weapons in its custody will be exercised by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.

"a. Advising the Secretary of Defense as to the technical status of the stockpile of atomic weapons and recommending action to correct any deficiency or condition limiting employment.

"b. Maintaining a centralized system of reporting and accounting to ensure that the current status and location of atomic weapons and components in the custody of the Department of Defense will be known at all times by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project."
"c. Arranging for the distribution to the various sites of atomic weapons including both nuclear and non-nuclear components by number and type required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to satisfy war plans.

"2. The following responsibilities of the Department of Defense pertaining to atomic weapons in its custody will be exercised by the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, reporting to the respective Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force or their designated representatives.

"a. Scheduling and performance of nuclear and non-nuclear maintenance and minor modernization programs at National Stockpile Sites.

"b. Scheduling nuclear and non-nuclear maintenance and minor modernization programs at Operational Storage Sites.

"c. Establishing major modernization schedules in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission.

"d. Intra-site handling at National Stockpile Sites.

"e. Inter-site transportation and enroute security between

"(1) National Stockpile Sites and

"(2) National Stockpile Sites and ZI Operational Storage Sites, except as required for quality assurance and major modernization.

"f. Initial functional surveillance inspections at National Stockpile Sites.

"g. Internal security of National Stockpile Sites.

"h. Budgeting for:

"(1) Construction of facilities at National Stockpile Sites and ZI Operational Storage Sites, except for those facilities required by the Atomic Energy Commission for quality assurance.

"(2) Equipment required for maintenance of nuclear and non-nuclear components except as provided in subparagraph 3h(2).

"(3) Transportation prescribed in paragraph 2e above.

"3. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force are charged with the following residual custodial responsibilities of the Department of Defense for the ZI and overseas Operational Sites under their operation:
"a. Performance of nuclear and non-nuclear maintenance and minor modernization programs.

"b. Intra-site handling.

c. Inter-site transportation and enroute security, except as required for quality assurance and major modernization.

d. Preparation of weapons for shipment to meet shipping schedules.

e. Receiving and unloading shipments at railheads.

f. Initial functional surveillance inspections.

g. Internal security.

h. Budgeting for:

"(1) Transportation prescribed in subparagraph 3c above.

"(2) Equipment required for maintenance of nuclear and non-nuclear components as agreed by the Service operating the Operational Site and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project."

The contents of this directive were partially covered in the mission of the Defense Atomic Support Agency when the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was reorganized and so designated. The directive was rescinded by the Secretary of Defense on 2 February 1960. The new mission of the Defense Atomic Support Agency was formalized in May 1959.
CHAPTER 5

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD WIDE DISPERALS

1952 - 1955

(SECDEF) In June 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a long range program for the storage of non-nuclear components at overseas locations. Five of the storage areas were not involved in negotiations. These were Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and aircraft carriers. Satisfactory arrangements were in effect concerning two of the storage locations. These were the United Kingdom and Germany. Authorization had been received from the President for storage at an additional location which was . The remaining areas in the long range plan were the . The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that negotiations to obtain storage rights at these locations proceed on a priority basis as expeditiously as each case would permit.

(SECDEF) In discussing this long range plan with the President, the Secretary of Defense was informed that the President:

(a) was prepared to release reasonable numbers of non-nuclear components for deployment outside the Continental United States and areas under U.S. control, and to approve allocations to aircraft carriers;

(b) would approve deployment of reasonable numbers of non-nuclear components to areas not under U.S. control where the country was politically and economically stable, and where adequate U.S. forces were on the spot to provide security and defense, if necessary.

(c) was of the opinion that with the wide distribution which (a) and (b) above would permit and with the assurances given him of the ability to transport promptly by air or otherwise the components required, he did not at this time feel justified in widening the area of risk through release and deployment and was inclined to feel that the security of the non-nuclear components ranked equally with that of fissionable material.

(SECDEF) The President stated that if the ability to transport and to deliver to the target had not been overstated to him by the Services involved, the amounts authorized for deployment would appear adequate for any plans known to him.
He indicated, however, that after considering his views if his military advisors were able to show compelling reasons for shipment outside the United States of additional non-nuclear components beyond those which his program would provide, he would be glad to reconsider the matter. The President specifically expressed concern over the political instability and security of

(SPRD) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of the President’s views and after reconsideration they informed the Secretary of Defense that they still believed their recommendation was sound, particularly in light of the atomic delivery capability of forces then in or soon to be deployed to West Germany, the United Kingdom, and in consideration of the following factors:

(a) Under duress of hostilities any arrangements made to furnish complete atomic weapons to forces in the combat areas from the storage locations in areas contiguous thereto would be subject to delays resulting from communications difficulties, logistic complexities and hostile actions. Realization of the most effective support for allied and U.S. forces could only be attained by the forward storage of complete atomic weapons in areas occupied by U.S. forces; delays in bringing weapons to bear on a target were considered to be unacceptable in the fluid situation which would exist in the period immediately following the outbreak of hostilities.

(b) The military risks inherent in the storage of complete atomic weapons were acceptable and no greater than the risk which had been accepted with respect to US troops and other equipment already there. US forces could be depended on to furnish a degree of protection for atomic weapons against overt and covert actions under both peacetime and wartime conditions.

(c) It was realized that many political and psychological considerations offered deterrence to foreign concurrence in the deployment of atomic weapons overseas. For that reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it unpriopitious to store atomic weapons at that time. However, deployment of weapons elsewhere in Europe was timely and could serve as assurance to allied people that allied forces would have the ability to counter any acts of Soviet aggression.

(SPRD) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Presidential approval be obtained for the storage of nuclear and nonnuclear components of atomic weapons in West Germany, the storage of nuclear components in
the United Kingdom and [redacted]; and that after approval the Secretary of State be requested to initiate diplomatic negotiations necessary to accomplish these actions.

(SRDP) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the requirement for storage in November 1952 to support the then current operations orders, in that such storage would "facilitate deployment of strike forces, relieve D-Day demands on air transport and increase the capability to strike in critical days following the commencement of hostilities." In December the Department of State was asked to initiate action as required to permit this deployment, and in February 1953 the Secretary of Defense was informed that the existing base agreements covered construction of atomic weapons storage facilities and storage of non-nuclear components at these locations.

(U) On June 20, 1953, the President approved the request of the Secretary of Defense to effect deployment of nuclear components "in numbers equal to the nonnuclear deployments now approved to those storages afloat and ashore wherein the decision to so deploy rests solely with the United States" provided that:

(a) The number of nuclears deployed will not exceed the number of nonnuclears at each location.

(b) Adequate surveillance procedures will be available at each location prior to deployment.

(SRDP) This action was recommended by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy. The action authorized the deployment of up to [redacted] nuclears. As of June 30, 1953, over [redacted] nonnuclear components were located in overseas areas; [redacted] in the United Kingdom, [redacted] on Guam, with the remaining [redacted] on carriers in the Atlantic and Pacific.

(U) The authorization for deployment of nuclear components "to match the nonnuclear components already deployed" evidently was now timely for the JCS as opposed to their previous position two years earlier.

(SRDP) The Secretary of Defense initiated action on the Joint Chief's recommendation for storage of nuclear and nonnuclear components in West Germany and for storage of nuclear components in the United Kingdom
In memoranda to the AEC Chairman on August 8, 1953 and April 12, 1954, he also requested the release of nuclear components under the Presidential approval. In April 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were notified that authority had been obtained to deploy complete weapons to the United Kingdom and ... At the same time the Secretary of State was requested by the Secretary of Defense to arrange for necessary authority for the storage of complete weapons in West Germany .... In June 1954, the Secretary of Defense was able to notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were authorized to deploy and store both nuclear and nonnuclear components in West Germany; however, only nonnuclear components were authorized for deployment ...

(U) Also, in September 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that approval be obtained for on-base storage of atomic weapons in the Continental United States. The Secretary was informed that there was a requirement for 22 storage facilities for strategic air operations and that additional facilities would be required for air defense installations and anti-submarine bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the same principle of improved combat readiness should be applied to atomic operations conducted from or within CONUS as had been provided by overseas deployment of atomic weapons and that the necessary atomic storage facilities on or near CONUS operating bases should be constructed to provide this readiness capability. It should be noted that this action would be covered by the concepts previously approved by the President.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not request transfer of weapons but noted the willingness of the Services to undertake the necessary construction provided budgetary authorization could be obtained. It was believed that the Services should provide these storage facilities in that many existing facilities could be modified, details of storage plans would be intimately related to operational needs, and some time could be saved by having the Services prepare and implement the construction plans. This was recommended even though the existing AEC-DoD Agreement provided that the AEC was responsible for construction of all initial storage facilities and major additions thereto.

(U) The Secretary of Defense expressed concurrence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the principle of dispersed storage and designated the Military Liaison Committee as the agency of the Department to negotiate with the AEC such revisions of existing storage agreements as may be necessary to implement the dispersal program and initiate action to obtain the coordination and cooperation of the Commission in this regard. The Secretary submitted the program to the President in December of 1954 and informed him of an agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the AEC Chairman, and the
desirability of transferring weapons to the custody of the Department of Defense if the on-base dispersal program was implemented.

(U) Recognizing concern as to the possible impact on the American public, our Allies and the USSR of the military controlling custody of large numbers of weapons and considering that these possible reactions should not justify a lower degree of readiness, the Secretary of Defense felt that the possible reactions should be considered in the authorization and actual scheduling of weapons in order that adverse reaction could be kept to a minimum or avoided. The President was requested to concur in the concept of on-base dispersal as outlined and to direct the AEC to transfer to the Defense Department a sufficient number of nuclear weapons components to meet July 1955 schedules.

(S) The long range plans for overseas deployment provided for increasing the present authorization of nuclear and nonnuclear components to ... respectively. As in the past, no deployments would be made until adequate storage facilities and security arrangements had been provided. The Secretary of State also had to agree that the storage of weapons in any area not under US jurisdiction had been cleared diplomatically and was politically expedient.

(S) The plans called for on-base storage for weapons for each heavy bombardment wing for a total of approximately ... weapons. Authorization was requested for a total of nuclear and nonnuclear components to be transferred to the DoD to meet the July 1, 1955 deployment schedule as shown on the following page.

(U) The President replied that he had reviewed the policy considerations connected with large scale dispersal of atomic weapons both overseas and on operational bases in CONUS and approved the plan set forth in the letter from the Secretary of Defense. He further determined that, in the interest of national defense, atomic weapons would be dispersed overseas and within CONUS to the extent required by military readiness. Custody of the weapons would be transferred to the DoD in accordance with mutually acceptable arrangements between the AEC and the DoD in regard to readiness, maintenance and improvement responsibilities and in accordance with mutually acceptable arrangements in regard to dispersal of such weapons as the AEC deemed not yet ready for full release and transfer to the DoD. The numbers of weapons to be transferred were to be directed by the President in separate actions from time to time. At the same time, the President directed the AEC to transfer to the DoD the numbers of weapons components requested by the letter from the Secretary of Defense.
# Table I

## Long Range Deployment Plan

**FY 1955**

### Nuclears

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Dec 54</th>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jan 55</th>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jul 55</th>
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<th>1 Jul 56</th>
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<td>%</td>
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<td><strong>39.7</strong></td>
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### Non-Nuclears

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<th>1 Jul 54</th>
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<th>1 Jul 56</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>41.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>42.1</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Subject to increase if the Joint Chiefs of Staff increase current allocation to Strategic Air Command.

** Authorized: deployment not completed.
(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of the Presidential approval and the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was granted authority to receive the weapons components for the DoD in accordance with instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The AEC Chairman was also informed of the above action and arrangements were made between the DoD and the AEC to accomplish the dispersal program which the President had approved.

(U) It is interesting to note that the President stated in his letter of December 1, 1954 to Mr. Wilson regarding dispersals for FY 1955 that "I approve the general dispersal and employment plan..." and "the number of weapons to be transferred in connection with the dispersal program will be as directed by me in separate actions from time to time as heretofore." Mr. Wilson's memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, stated that "only transfer of additional components to meet subsequent schedules will require further Presidential approval." Even though there appears to be a difference in meaning and intent between the two documents, there is no evidence of any controversy having developed.

(U) A compilation of the actual FY 1955 deployment authorization is shown on the following page.

(U) At this point, actions had evolved to a fairly stable pattern for establishing requirements for weapons deployments and obtaining authority for transfer of weapons from the AEC to the DoD and for dispersal of the weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a requirement for a given period for both nuclear and nonnuclear components for dispersal both overseas and to operational units in CONUS. These requirements had been approved by the President for transfer from the AEC to the DoD. The Department of State had been requested to obtain rights for storage at certain overseas locations. Storage facilities had been completed and additional ones were under construction. Special weapons units had been trained and deployed to receive, store, maintain, secure and deliver weapons at dispersed locations to delivery units when properly authorized to do so. Weapons were received from the AEC for the DoD by the AFSWP when transfers were made. The AFSWP then arranged with the Services for weapons to be delivered to the appropriate special weapons units.

(U) A new Storage Operations Agreement was entered into by the DoD and the AEC on August 3, 1955. This superseded the AEC-DoD Agreement, "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations" of August 3, 1951. (NOTE: This new agreement was later amended on February 9, 1959.)
### Table II

**SFRD NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION (U)**

**FY 1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Authorization</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Non-Nuclear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Disposition of Authorization:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Components Requested from US Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Deployed &amp; Dispersed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release Requested but not Deployed</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Disposition by Command:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCFE</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Disposition by Location:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Storage Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**TOP-SECRET**
In addition to the dispersals previously described, the President had approved the dispersal of atomic weapons to ammunition ships in the Atlantic and Pacific in April of 1954 to supplement storage ashore. Warheads for REGULUS missiles had also been approved for storage aboard cruisers and submarines equipped with these missiles.

With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, there was no significant change in the legal basis for the transfer of custody of atomic weapons from the AEC to the DoD in that Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides that:

"The President may from time to time direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of special nuclear material or atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense, or (2) to authorize the Department of Defense to manufacture, produce, or acquire any atomic weapon or utilization facility for military purposes: Provided, however, that such authorization shall not extend to the production of special nuclear material other than that incidental to the operation of such utilization facilities."

At the end of January 1955, nuclear and nonnuclear components of atomic weapons had been dispersed to the United Kingdom, Guam, Hawaii, aboard three Naval vessels in the Atlantic and five Naval vessels in the Pacific. Nonnuclear components only had been dispersed to the United Kingdom, three Naval vessels in the Atlantic and two Naval vessels in the Pacific. Dispersal had been authorized in Alaska, and West Germany but neither weapons or components had been stored at these locations at that time.

The table below illustrates the National Storage Sites (NSS), Operational Storage Sites (OSS) and the schedule showing which bases were to receive nuclear weapons.
TABLE III

SCHEDULE OF BASES (U)

Continental United States

National Storage Sites (AFSWP)

Operational Storage Sites

- Limestone, Maine (AF)
- Rapid City, South Dakota (AF)
- Spokane, Washington (AF)
- Travis AFB, California (AF)
- Yorktown, Virginia (Navy)
- Westover, Massachusetts (AF)
- Hunter AFB, Georgia (planned)
- Seneca, New York (planned)

Schedule for Bases to Receive Weapons

- Five AFB 1st Half 1955
- Eight AFB 2nd Half 1955
- Nine AFB 1956 - 1957

Follow on:

- Ten Naval Bases (ASW)
- Twenty-one Nike Sites (ADA)
- Thirty-five Air Defense Interceptor Bases (AD)
(U) In June 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense their recommended dispersal of atomic weapons for the Unified and Specified Commands through June 30, 1956. This recommended dispersal plan specified both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons at overseas and CONUS bases as a requirement for dispersal and was based both on an anticipated increase in the stockpile and approximately 75% of it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation was predicated upon emergency war plans of the Unified and Specified Commanders which, when analyzed, showed that these Commanders planned to employ a major portion of their allocation of atomic weapons within the first few days after the outbreak of hostilities. In view of the logistical complications involved in the replenishment of atomic weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Commanders have on hand at the outset of hostilities the weapons to be employed in the first few days of war and in accordance with the existing plans. Additionally, their rationale incorporated the concept that further overseas deployment and dispersal within CONUS would greatly decrease the overall vulnerability of the stockpile to enemy attack.

(U) It should be noted that for the first time authorizations for weapons dispersal were requested by commands rather than by locations only as had been done previously. This method was considered preferable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it provided flexibility to the commanders and could be related to their weapons allocations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their requirements thus: "that dispersed nuclear components be stored in close proximity to delivery forces in order to minimize the possibility of capture and to provide rapid availability for use, and that weapons in overseas locations be in consonance with the principle of equitable collocation of weapons and delivery forces."

(U) The Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands concerned were to submit their recommendations for dispersal into those areas where the United States did not have full operational control for review and approval prior to accomplishment. The plan was submitted to the President and thus initiated the next era in the history of the custody of nuclear weapons.
(SECRET) When the Secretary of Defense presented to the President the
requirements for dispersal of weapons for the period to 1 July 1956, the
matter of custody of thermonuclear weapons was discussed. On August 29,
1955, the President indicated his general approval of the numbers of weapons
for dispersal, including thermonuclear weapons, which were recommended
to him. A total of [redacted] nuclear and [redacted] non-nuclear components, exclusive
of weapons exceeding a yield of 600 KT, were authorized to be in the custody
of the Department of Defense as of July 1956. However, he decided that high
yield weapons, those in excess of 600 KT yield, would remain in the custody
of the Atomic Energy Commission at dispersed operational sites in the United
States and at overseas bases. A total of [redacted] high yield weapons were author-
ized for dispersal. The table on the following page illustrates the FY 1956
deployment authorization.

(U) Recognizing that it would be difficult to establish suitable procedures
on a firm basis for AEC custody of a portion of weapons to be stored at DoD
bases until some experience was gained, the Department of Defense and the
Atomic Energy Commission developed and agreed to interim procedures.
The procedures agreed to on September 6, 1955 provided for the following:

"a. The Atomic Energy Commission will limit its custodial control
and custodial surveillance to those components, assemblies or complete
weapons which contain special nuclear material. Designated capsules
dispersed for the high yield weapons concerned will be stored at all times
in AEC controlled structures or compartments or be accompanied by AEC
custodians, unless transferred in accordance with Presidential directive
implementing the Emergency Transfer Plan. No active capsule will be
inserted in any high yield weapon under AEC custody except with the ex-
pressed approval of the AEC custodian and in the custodian's presence.
Components other than capsules containing special nuclear material will
remain stored in AEC controlled structures or compartments or be
accompanied by AEC custodians except:

"(1) When transferred in accordance with Presidential directive
implementing the Emergency Transfer Plan;

"(2) For the period when in possession of base personnel for
on-base inspection, maintenance, modification and readiness exercises;"
### TABLE IV

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION**

*FY 1956*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Authorization</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Non-nuclear</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Disposition by Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Dispersal of Nuclear Components by Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>West Germany</td>
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<td>Guam</td>
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<td>CINCFE (Guam)</td>
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<td>CINCPAC (Hawaii) (Afloat)</td>
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<td>CINCSAC (Continental U.S) (Guam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>
"(3) For periods of actual transport in tactical aircraft to and from AEC facilities and dispersal bases;

"(4) When the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, or the appropriate Unified or Specified Commander designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines that emergency conditions exist within his command necessitating the loading of weapons in bomb bays for possible, or actual dispersal.

"It is understood that exceptions (2), (3), and (4) above do not constitute a transfer of custody from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense and that AEC custodians will make such periodic observations and inspections as are feasible and appropriate to the retention of custody.

"b. The Atomic Energy Commission will furnish to each base concerned a small custodial detachment for the accomplishment of its custodial responsibilities. In addition, designated capsules in transport between AEC facilities and dispersal bases will be accompanied by an AEC custodian. Other components in transport which contain special nuclear material, except while in tactical aircraft, will be accompanied by an AEC custodian.

"c. Transportation will be furnished under the same procedures as for weapons transferred to Department of Defense custody, until and unless later agreed otherwise.

"d. Facilities to be made available by the Department of Defense to the Atomic Energy Commission for the fulfillment of the latter's responsibilities will be arranged by mutual agreement prior to dispersal. Service to be made available to AEC custodians by the Department of Defense will be arranged by mutual agreement.

"e. Reporting of status of weapons will be in a manner similar to that for weapons which have been transferred to Department of Defense custody pursuant to Presidential authority. Reporting by AEC custodians will be only that necessary to verify custody.

"f. It is understood that the Atomic Energy Commission, for communication with its custodians, will be dependent to a major degree on DoD communication networks. Mutually agreeable arrangements will
be made as early as possible between the DoD and AEC agencies concerned to enable the Atomic Energy Commission to make use of appropriate DoD networks, particularly insofar as may be necessary for implementation of the Atomic Energy Commission Emergency Transfer Plan.

"g. A separate agreement will be made between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense as early as practical to cover maneuver use of weapons and no such maneuver use is authorized until such agreement is reached.

"h. The Atomic Energy Commission will inspect facilities and AEC detachments at dispersal bases as necessary for insuring fulfillment of its custodial responsibilities, securing necessary advance clearance with the appropriate Department of Defense agency for the visit."

It was agreed that final procedures would be developed on or about 1 March 1956.

(U) Operational experience showed that implementation of the restrictions imposed by AEC custody of high yield weapons had introduced serious limitations on operational readiness of units in the field. In addition, administrative difficulties in handling the transportation of weapons and capsules had been experienced. This was particularly true in air shipments and on supply ships during resupply operations where capsules were required to be accompanied by an AEC custodian.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out the above difficulties, explaining them in some detail to the Secretary of Defense in February of 1956, by stating they believed that too many complications were being introduced in an attempt to secure physical custody of high yield weapons by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff restated their opinion that dispersed high yield weapons should be under military control in order to insure operational readiness and that this objective should be pursued at the earliest propitious time. In case this objective could not be obtained, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided recommended changes to the agreed procedures.

(U) In March 1956, AEC agreed to provide storage space at AEC storage sites for certain DoD weapons. This, however, in no way ameliorated the situation.

(U) In supporting the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Charles Wilson, then Secretary of Defense, provided comments to Mr. Strauss, then Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in a letter dated April 21, 1956, to the effect that the dual custodial arrangement involving AEC custody of high yield weapons which had been dispersed served
no real purpose and that it should be abandoned as early as practicable; that in view of the trend toward high yield weapons, it appeared that either the principle of operational readiness would have to be compromised or custody by the Commission would have to be exercised on a more practical basis; that since he understood that the Commission felt strongly that the question of custody of dispersed high yield weapons should not be reopened at that time, he would not press the matter. However, he believed it necessary that the interim agreement be amended to render it as fully compatible with operational readiness as possible. He pointed out that the changes recommended fell into two categories: (1) those which bore directly on the problem of operational readiness; and (2) those having the effect of simplifying administrative procedures and reducing costs.

(U) Excerpts from Mr. Wilson's letter highlight some of the reasons for the requested changes.

"The proposed amendment to Par. 3a is designed to insure the immediate availability of complete weapons under conditions short of a national emergency wherein responsible commanders may find it necessary to make all preparations for emergency dispersal or to evacuate a base to preserve the integrity of their commands and equipment. As you are aware, the President on April 4, 1956, approved transfer procedures which will have the effect of insuring immediate availability of weapons under the emergency conditions specified in our joint letter to him of March 23, 1956. There are certain conditions short of the specified cases, however, under which the immediate availability of complete weapons may be essential to the national security but which, at the same time, would not justify a national alert under which the complete stockpile transfer would be set in motion. Such conditions would include the receipt of strategic warning of possible attack or evidence of impending local sabotage which would necessitate maximum preparatory action short of a national alert.

"In current designs of high yield weapons, capsules must be installed in the in-flight-insertion mechanism before a weapon is loaded in an aircraft. If weapons are loaded in strike aircraft prior to the receipt of Presidential authority for transfer, they must be unloaded to install the capsule. If the aircraft are scheduled for evacuation under subparagraphs 3a(4) of the agreement, only components other than capsules may be loaded, and if the aircraft is evacuated with the incomplete weapon, it is committed to return to a base prior to strike. The proposed addition to Par. 3a would permit loading of the complete weapon when the appropriate commander designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff determines that emergency conditions such as indicated above exist within his command."
"The remainder of the amendments set forth in the inclosure are proposed for the following reasons:

"a. Supply and transport operations set forth in subparagraphs 3a(3) and 3b impose restrictions on shipments which appear to serve no purpose in the interests of the Commission's custodial responsibilities. The current agreement provides that the commander of a tactical aircraft may act as a custodial agent of the Commission for the transport of weapons components containing nuclear materials other than capsules. Extension of this custodial arrangement to the movement of capsules and to shipments in other than combat type aircraft would not seem inconsistent with the Commission's custodial responsibility and would greatly simplify the supply operation as well as reduce costs.

"b. The Department believes that the principle of utilizing designated military commanders as agents of the Commission, as indicated above, is particularly appropriate for dispersals to combatant and ammunition ships where the presence of a civilian employee of the Commission, however, well disguised by a cover plan, is nonetheless a possible source of important information to a potential enemy as to the nature of a ship's armaments. I need not emphasize that such military commanders as may be properly designated would be equally amenable to orders and restrictions concerning the handling of atomic weapons as are civilian custodians and that, in my opinion, the Commission's custodial responsibilities could be exercised in the manner suggested without compromise."

(U) By the spring of 1956, the procedures established for the transfer of atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense in an emergency had become a matter of serious concern. A practice alert in June 1955 had demonstrated definite and potentially serious delays in authorization and notification procedures. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission both considered it essential that steps be taken to eliminate all sources of possible delay or confusion in the transfer procedures which might compromise our readiness to react to an attack or threat of attack.

(U) An Atomic Energy Commission-Department of Defense Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons was prepared so that the automatic transfer of all finished weapons in AEC custody to the Department of Defense would be assured under specified emergency situations. The President directed the implementation of the proposed procedures on April 4, 1956, and one month later the Atomic Energy Commission-Department of Defense Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons became effective. This memorandum was later revised and reissued on February 3, 1960, with an effective date of March 4, 1960.
In this authorization, President Eisenhower gave advance authority for the use of nuclear weapons in the air defense of the United States. Standard rules of engagement were approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State with an interim agreement negotiated with Canada to apply to overflights of Canadian territory.

To further improve the state of readiness, the President approved the automatic transfer of all finished weapons from the AEC to the DoD in the event of a defense emergency, air defense readiness of a Red or Yellow Warning Alert. The defense emergency could be declared by CINCONAD or one of the Unified or Specified Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On such a declaration, notification was to be sent to the AEC custodians through normal military channels. Upon receipt of the notification, the AEC custodians would initiate the transfer. This procedure avoided the necessity of obtaining specific approval from the President for the transfer of weapons in the event of a defense emergency.

During the negotiations of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Atomic Energy Commission additionally agreed to eliminate civilian custodians from vehicles, ships and aircraft transporting weapons to and from AEC-DoD sites and combatant and ammunition ships carrying dispersed weapons with the proviso that a properly designated military representative of the AEC would exercise custody for the AEC. After the President was informed of the proposed changes to the custodial agreement, the finalized version was consummated on June 4, 1956. This agreement continued in effect until February 2, 1957 when, at the direction of the President, the procedures were again revised wherein designated AEC military representatives would be utilized at all dispersed locations for maintaining custody of high yield weapons for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been successful in obtaining everything they desired but had come a long way in the short span of three years. They would continue to press for the immediate availability of complete weapons under conditions short of a national emergency.

In promulgating the dispersal of weapons as had been approved by the President on August 29, 1955 for the FY 1956 period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established principles governing dispersal as follows:

1. **Close Proximity.** Nuclears will be stored in close proximity to the related delivery forces, in those overseas locations wherein the United States does not exercise unrestricted operational control. In this connection the term 'nuclears' includes thermonuclear weapons and other weapons in
which the nuclear component is an integral part of the weapon. It is intended that if the related delivery force is repositioned or withdrawn from the area, the nuclears will be shifted in consonance therewith.

"2. Equitable Collocation. Nuclear dispersals in those overseas locations wherein the United States does not exercise unrestricted operational control, will be in consonance with the principle of equitable collocation of weapons and delivery forces. That is, there will be no imbalance of nuclears at these locations in relation to the numbers required by the delivery forces to accomplish their initial scheduled strikes nor shall the numbers of nuclears so located exceed the numbers which could be removed expeditiously in an emergency. Initial scheduled strikes are those strikes required prior to receipt of scheduled resupply.

"3. Control of High Yield Weapons. Dispersed weapons of yields exceeding 600 KT will be retained in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission. The interim procedures established by agreement between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense will govern custodial relationships for high yield weapons. Dispersal of these weapons will be limited to bases in the United States, U.S. naval vessels whether at sea or in port, and overseas locations under the full control of the United States. The numbers so dispersed will be limited to the initial scheduled strikes of the delivery forces concerned.

"4. Specific Approval for Foreign Areas. Commanders of the unified or specified commands concerned will submit their recommendations for initial dispersal into those areas where the United States does not have full operational control to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval prior to accomplishment. Components of atomic weapons will be dispersed only to those countries with which appropriate diplomatic arrangements are in effect.

"5. Adequate Facilities. Atomic weapons may be dispersed only to locations where adequate storage and surveillance facilities are available.

"6. Mutual Use of Facilities. Commanders will make arrangements with one another as required for use of storage facilities. In case of irreconcilable differences, the matter will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.

"7. Allocation Limits. Weapon types and numbers to be dispersed will be in consonance with commanders' allocations.
"8. **Use for Maneuver and Test.** Weapons transferred to the Department of Defense may be used for maneuvers and operational suitability tests, provided none is expended for those purposes. Weapons which have been specifically produced and purchased for operational suitability testing involving expenditures are excluded from the foregoing. Tests and maneuvers of non-transferred weapons of yields in excess of 600 KT require special arrangements to be made with the Atomic Energy Commission.

"9. **Dispersal by Commands.** Dispersal authority is granted by command rather than by location. Subject to compliance with all of the conditions stated above, commanders of the unified or specified commands are authorized to effect changes in the locations of their dispersed weapons. Commanders will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff any significant changes from planned dispersions previously approved."
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In early March 1956, the Department of Defense requested a change to President Eisenhower's Dispersal Authorization of August 29, 1955. There was an availability shortage of high yield weapons (exceeding 600 KT) authorized for dispersal due to production slippages and a slow transport time. The President amended his August 1955 directive and authorized DoD a total of 85% nuclear and 15% non-nuclear components exclusive of weapons exceeding a yield of 600 KT. A total of 85% weapons exceeding a yield of 600 KT were authorized for dispersal under AEC custody. This amendment provided DoD the measure of flexibility which they requested to maintain the desired state of readiness. It increased the August Dispersal Authorization by 85% low yield weapons in lieu of the unavailable high yield weapons. It also established a ceiling of 85% weapons as the total number (low and high yield) authorized for dispersal.

In presenting their requirements for dispersal of atomic weapons to 1 July 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of a JCS general reserve of approximately 25% of the stockpile, to remain under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thermonuclear weapons were recommended for dispersal to the United Kingdom. This would be the first of this type weapon to be dispersed to locations not under full U.S. control. The high yield weapons to be dispersed to these as well as to other locations under full U.S. control were to remain in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Secretary of Defense recommended that the President approve the requirements on 21 November 1956, and the President's approval was obtained on 24 November. The President also stated in his approval letter that "Responsibility will rest with the Department of Defense for the security and safety of all weapons transferred to dispersed Department of Defense bases."

The President directed the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to transfer to the Department of Defense sufficient numbers of atomic weapons to provide in DoD custody as of July 1, 1957 up to a total of 85% nuclear components, up to a total of 15% non-nuclear components, and up to a total of complete weapons exceeding a yield of 600 KT provided that AEC retain custody. Approval was given to the substitution and transfer of custody to DoD of lower yield weapons up to a total of 85% if sufficient high yield weapons were not available for dispersal. The President approved the dispersal of thermonuclear weapons and the United Kingdom, as well as to bases under full U.S.
control. However, he retained specific approval authority for dispersal of high yield weapons to territories over which the U.S. did not exercise sovereignty. He further stipulated that high yield weapons dispersed to bases not under full U.S. control would be subject to the same custodial arrangements as were in effect for high yield weapons aboard naval vessels.

(U) Between April and June in 1956 and 1957 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy conducted hearings on the stockpile and dispersal of nuclear weapons. Summaries of the testimonies given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of the Services reveal some rather startling and somewhat contradictory opinions.

(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, stated that no major expansion of AEC production facilities was justified at the time. Admiral Burke (Navy) and General Twining (Air Force) stated that the Navy and Air Force were satisfied with the 1957-1959 stockpile figures. General Twining, however, also made the remark that the Air Force would like to have a fantastic number of weapons. The Army was even more ambivalent. General Gavin gave 151,000 weapons as the Army's total requirement with 106,000 for tactical battlefield use, 25,000 for air defense and 20,000 for support of our allies. He estimated that a typical field army might use a total of 423 atomic warheads in one day of intense combat not including surface-to-air weapons.

(U) General Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, on April 4, 1957, presented a stockpile analysis to the JCAE as shown in the table on the following page.

In processing requirements for dispersal through 30 June 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended continuation of the 25% general reserve with the exception of air defense and anti-submarine warfare weapons which would be in short supply throughout this period. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended dispersal of nominal quantities of high yield weapons to These locations were in addition to those areas under full U.S. control and those not under full U.S. control which had been approved previously. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further presented the following "Principles Governing Dispersal of Atomic Weapons" as part of their representative dispersal plan:

1. Dispersal to Commanders. Weapons are dispersed to the commanders of the commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of war plans. Weapon dispersal authorized for one commander may be dispersed to another commander by mutual consent. Commanders are authorized to adjust dispersal locations within their commands to meet operational needs, and will inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff of changes appreciably at variance with the scheduled dispersals.
## STOCKPILE ANALYSIS
(As of 28 January 1957)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percent in Storage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>OSS</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Ships-Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ships-Pacific</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>West Germany</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total AEC Custody
Total DoD Custody
Percent Overseas

Thermonuclears form X% of total stockpile. Of the total stockpile, X% is overseas. Of the total stockpile X% is in DoD custody.
"2. Readiness for Use. Atomic weapons will be dispersed in close proximity to the related operational forces, in consonance with the objective of immediate readiness for use.

"3. Adequate Facilities. Atomic weapons will be dispersed only to locations where adequate storage, surveillance, and security facilities exist. The joint use of dispersal facilities by two or more commanders is encouraged.

"4. Dispersal Dates. Atomic Weapons dispersals will proceed on an orderly schedule, insofar as weapons are available, to provide for the attainment of the authorized levels of dispersals by the authorized dates.

"5. Foreign Sovereignty. Atomic weapons will be dispersed to locations under foreign sovereignty only where appropriate diplomatic arrangements are in effect. In locations under foreign sovereignty, a capability for the immediate withdrawal of atomic weapons will be constantly maintained."

The Secretary of Defense supported the dispersal requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exception of dispersal of high yield weapons to _________________. The requirements were presented to the President on 5 August 1957, and approved by him on the following day. Responsibility for security and safety of dispersed weapons was again specifically assigned to the Department of Defense by the Presidential action.

The President authorized DoD custody as of July 1, 1958 up to a total of __________ nuclear and __________ non-nuclear. Up to a total of __________ complete weapons exceeding 600 KT were authorized to be dispersed under AEC custody. A ceiling of __________ was placed on lower yield weapons if sufficient high yield weapons were not available. Dispersal of high yield weapons to ________________ was authorized subject to the standard custodial arrangements.
CHAPTER 8
DOD CUSTODY OF DISPERSED WEAPONS
1958-1959

(U) Between May and September 1958, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Quarles made several proposals to AEC Chairman Strauss regarding the
custody of dispersed high yield weapons (in excess of 600 KT). This laid
the groundwork for submission of a proposal to the AEC in conjunction with
the request for dispersal of weapons for FY 59.

(U) On 22 September 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the require-
ments for dispersal of atomic weapons through 30 June 1959. At this time
they recommended that the general reserve not be maintained on a fixed
percentage basis. They recommended that the reserve be sufficiently
large to provide adequate control of military operations as well as sufficiently
flexible to meet unforeseen contingencies. The reserve would be used when-
ever feasible to absorb the impact of production shortfalls, weapon modifica-
tions and sampling programs and other operations which would affect alloca-
tions to commanders. This would assist in maintaining, at dispersed locations,
the commander's full authorization of operational weapons. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff also reiterated their position that all dispersed weapons be transferred to
the custody of the Department of Defense.

(U) The Secretary of Defense sought AEC concurrence of the proposal for
transfer of all dispersed weapons to the Department of Defense and, upon
receipt of this concurrence, presented to the President the dispersal require-
ments which included the proposal for transfer of dispersed high yield weapons
from the AEC to the DoD. Additional locations were also recommended for
dispersal of these high yield weapons.

(U) Meanwhile, the AEC and DoD agreed to procedures on positioning
U.S. nuclear weapons in England. This agreement provided the basis for future dispersals of weapons in support of non-
US NATO units.

(U) On 3 January 1959 the President approved the recommended dispersal
plan and also approved the transfer of custody to the Department of Defense
of all dispersed atomic weapons. Transfer of custody was to be implemented
as soon as appropriate arrangements between the Department of Defense and
the Atomic Energy Commission had been made.
(TS/PRD) The dispersal plan authorized DoD custody of up to __ nuclear components, __ non-nuclear components and __ complete weapons exceeding a yield of 600 KT, as of July 1, 1959. There were __ sealed pit weapons earmarked for air-defense and anti-submarine application. The President authorized dispersal of high yield weapons to __ West Germany, __ in addition to those previously authorized. He also authorized transfer to the DoD of an unspecified number of weapons over the totals established in the plan to replace weapons prior to withdrawal from dispersal locations.

(U) On 12 February 1959, after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been informed by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission forwarded a letter to the President notifying him that satisfactory arrangements had been completed for transfer of custody of high yield weapons to the Department of Defense and that change in custody of the dispersed weapons could be completed in approximately 30 days.

(U) On 26 February 1959, the President directed the transfer of custody of dispersed complete high yield weapons to the Department of Defense. Implementation of this directive left only the JCS general reserve at National and Operational Storage Sites in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission.

(SPRD) The President authorized the transfer of up to __ nuclear components including __ sealed pit weapons for air defense and anti-submarine warfare, and up to __ non-nuclear components. Additionally, he continued his approval of exceeding these numbers by an unspecified amount in order to preclude loss of weapons in the pipeline during periods of replacement. Any weapons lost to DoD would be replaced by AEC on a one-for-one basis.

(U) The directive replaced in entirety the President's directive of January 3, 1959. The total numbers of weapons were not changed by the President directed that AEC turn over custody of numbers of atomic weapons and non-nuclear components to DoD without regard to high or low yield.

(U) With the promulgation of this directive, the end of an era had arrived. During the past decade, effective transition of custody from the AEC to the DoD had progressed from the initial transfer of non-nuclear components, to nuclear components and complete weapons, followed by low-yield weapons and, finally, to high yield weapons.
This evolution was not unmarked by philosophical acrimony; President Eisenhower's decision did not set well with all as shall be noted later in this study.

The number of weapons under AEC and DoD control from the end of fiscal year 1947 to the end of fiscal year 1959 is summarized below.

### TABLE VI

**Custody of Nuclear Weapons (1947-1959)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AEC</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12305</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The program for the dispersal of weapons to June 30, 1960 was submitted to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who approved it in toto and submitted it to the President on October 29, 1959. The AEC coordinated on the plan and interposed no objection. President Eisenhower approved the dispersal of nuclear components and complete weapons and non-nuclear components for dispersal to areas under full U.S. control. Totals of nuclear components and complete weapons and non-nuclear components were authorized for dispersal to foreign countries. Nuclear components and complete weapons and non-nuclear components were authorized to be stored for the first time in The Presidential approval also provided for weapons in the JCS reserve. The Atomic Energy Commission was directed to transfer to the DoD a total of nuclear components and complete weapons and non-nuclear components by June 30, 1960. Authority was also granted for a one-for-one replacement of lost weapons and the temporary transfer of weapons to DoD to replace those withdrawn for stockpile modernization, quality assurance and retirement.
(U) Nothing much transpired during the next 12 months regarding the actual dispersal of weapons. The question of custody of nuclear weapons did arise, however, relating to measures with respect to US nuclear weapons available to Allied Forces. This controversy and its related developments is the subject of the next chapter.

(U) One final action did occur relating to the transfer of weapons remaining under AEC control. As a result of an exchange of correspondence in the fall of 1959 between the DoD and the AEC regarding revisions to the May 4, 1956 AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons, a new memorandum was approved by the President and became effective on March 4, 1960. The revised Memorandum differed from the Memorandum of Understanding of May 4, 1956, in the following respects:

1. Automatic transfer to the Department of Defense of all finished atomic weapons remaining in the Atomic Energy Commission custody had been eliminated. Responsibility to effect the transfer was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or higher authority, to be executed at any time following a declaration of a Defense Emergency. The purpose of this change was to centralize authority in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to effect the transfer of weapons remaining in Atomic Energy Commission custody, whereas transfer had formerly been automatic upon declaration of Defense Emergency by one of the commanders of unified and specified commands. Since the memorandum did not apply to dispersed weapons, which had already been transferred to the Department of Defense, it did not affect DoD's ability to respond immediately to a Defense Emergency.

2. Authority to effect transfer of atomic weapons from Atomic Energy Commission to Department of Defense custody, following declaration of a Defense Emergency, was extended to include those weapons of the "red tag" category (withdrawn temporarily from availability) which were militarily usable and which the military site commander or his designated representative desired to have transferred.

3. CINC NORAD was included in the Memorandum of Understanding as a commander authorized to declare air defense conditions which constitute a Defense Emergency.

The detailed procedures for the transfer included:

1. Upon notification in writing, by a certificate signed by the military site commander or his designated representative (including the authenticating code word), that transfer of all finished atomic weapons in Atomic
Energy Commission custody has been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or higher authority, each Atomic Energy Commission custodian will immediately release for transfer all finished atomic weapons in his custody to the military site commander, or his designated representatives. From the moment of transfer, custody will rest with the Department of Defense.

2. The authenticating code word will accompany any order for the transfer of atomic weapons, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority. The code word, determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, will be disseminated to the custodians by the Atomic Energy Commission, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authorities by the Department of Defense.

3. An immediate report that transfer action has been ordered will be made by the Department of Defense to the President and to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

(SPRD) On January 16, 1961, President Eisenhower approved the proposed DoD weapon dispersal program as of June 30, 1961. The AEC was directed to transfer on call to the DoD a total of [redacted] nuclear components/complete weapons dispersed to the DoD and stored at the National Stockpile Sites (NSS) and Operational Storage Sites (OSS), those dispersed to commanders, and those of the JCS Reserve dispersed in the custody of DoD. The standard authorizations for replacement of lost and withdrawn weapons was also given.

(SPRD) This was President Eisenhower's last dispersal authorization prior to his leaving office four days later. During his tenure the number of nuclear components/complete weapons transferred from AEC to DoD custody had risen from [redacted]. These dispersal authorizations were very closely guarded and kept to an extremely limited disposition. The President personally reviewed and signed each authorization. There were actually two sets of papers at the JCS, OSD and Presidential levels. One contained everything except the actual numbers of weapons. The other papers contained the numbers of weapons which were keyed to the appropriate paragraphs and sentences in the basic letters. The President received the letters and General Goodpaster was given the key with the numbers. The same procedures were observed at OSD and JCS levels.

(U) In these eight years, many problem areas had been resolved regarding the dispersal and custody of nuclear weapons. Other problems, however, were arising and would have to be dealt with by the next administration.
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CHAPTER 9

NATO
1957 to January 20, 1961

(SECRET) The question of custodial arrangements for nuclear weapons support of Allied Forces first arose in November 1957 when the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that in furtherance of the objectives of Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty the following concept would be applied:

a. The United States would provide personnel for the technical surveillance and custody of the weapons as required by U.S. law.

b. Other NATO nations, as appropriate, would:

(1) Provide physical facilities for the additional storage sites which will be required because of this expansion of capability.

(2) Assure external security of these storage sites.

(3) Provide certain support for the U.S. contingent responsible for the custody and technical surveillance; e.g., housing and administrative facilities.

c. Custodial arrangements would be such as to assure availability of the weapons for timely and effective use in the defense of NATO in accordance with SACEUR's plans for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

(SECRET) Following the approval of this concept by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, it was used as a basis for the NATO stockpile proposal presented by the Secretary of State to the NATO Heads of Government. The NATO Stockpile Plan was prepared pursuant to the Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council after the December 1957 Heads of Government meeting in Paris which stated that the North Atlantic Council "desires to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which would be readily available for the defense of the Allies in case of need." This decision was based upon the proposal that the United States would deploy nuclear warheads under U.S. custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment of nuclear capable forces.
The JCS further recommended that the system, as described below, be extended in its application to NATO forces, other than U.S., in implementation of SACEUR's plans, as these non-US forces developed the capabilities to maintain and effectively utilize atomic delivery means. The concept advanced by the JCS provided that:

a. The United States makes an annual allocation of nuclear weapons to USCENTUR in accordance with U.S. deployment of forces and overall weapon dispersal programs approved by the President. The allocation to USCENTUR is developed to meet requirements generated by SACEUR's plans for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

b. When the yearly allocation is made, SACEUR applies it to:

(1) Theatre-wide scheduled counteratomic program;

(2) Interdiction program;

(3) Theatre reserve;

(4) The conduct of campaigns within each region of Allied Command Europe, in support of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plans.

c. After allocations have been made SACEUR informs the Regional Commanders of the respective planning numbers in weapons for the conduct of operations within the regions. The Regional Commanders then prepare their plans for the use of this planning number and submit them to SHAPE for approval by SACEUR.

d. In accordance with these approved plans, USCENTUR positions the weapons with U.S. special weapons organizations as the weapons arrive from the United States in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff schedules. These organizations maintain custody of the weapons and are distributed so that the weapons are readily available to the appropriate delivery forces.

e. In the event authority should be received by SACEUR for the use of atomic weapons, necessary action would be taken by USCENTUR to have the U.S. special weapons organizations release the weapons to the appropriate delivery forces, thus providing a very definite centralized control of the stockpile of all weapons available for Allied Command Europe.

With regard to the U.S. custody of nuclear weapons, the following established rules apply:
a. U.S. custody requires that control or access to the weapons must
be maintained to the extent that it would take an act of force to obtain
either weapons or information concerning the weapons without proper
authorization.

b. The NATO country whose atomic delivery unit is being supported
will be relied on for the security of the weapons against attacks from
enemy forces, saboteurs or para-military forces.

c. Release procedures will be U.S. controlled.

d. Custodial arrangements will be consistent with the principle of
military readiness which provides for short reaction times and for the
dispersal of weapons essential to our defense posture.

(SECRET) By early 1960 in Allied Command Europe the stockpile plan had
been implemented incorporating a number of weapons systems with varying
degrees of readiness, as for example: SACEUR's concept for strike
squadrons (F-84-F or F-100 aircraft).

"A few atomic weapons may be stored on or in strike aircraft,
as specifically authorized by SACEUR. The remainder will be
stored in the custodial storage sites until released for employ-
ment by the delivery forces. In periods of tension, when
specifically authorized by SACEUR, the number of weapons
stored on or in aircraft may be temporarily increased. In all
circumstances, prior to release by SACEUR a US custodian
must keep the weapons under his control.

"Maintenance and check-out of the weapons normally will be
performed in the facilities within the custodial storage sites.
Maintenance beyond the capabilities of these facilities will be
performed in the United States."

(SECRET) SACEUR had specifically authorized, for those Allies he believed
were capable, two aircraft per squadron to be on a Quick Reaction Alert
(QRA) Status (15 minutes). In addition, portions of the
were on a fifteen-minute reaction status. All other
units with the various delivery systems were on lesser degrees of readiness.

(SECRET) The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been informed from the
outset of the NATO Stockpile Plan. In addition, detailed information had
been conveyed to the Committee through hearings held in connection with
the processing of bilateral agreements as prescribed under the Atomic
Energy Act.
(SPRD) During the course of hearings in early 1960, the Committee, including the Chairman, indicated agreement in the definition of custody as it applied to the stockpile arrangements in Europe. However, the Committee also indicated considerable reservation with regard to the application of this custody in the case of an Allied interceptor aircraft becoming airborne with an atomic weapon aboard. It may be noted that the Defense Department had not implemented the concept to this degree. However, the Executive Branch of the Government maintained that under the Act its definition of custody still held, providing the interceptor is operating under carefully screened rules of engagement.

(SPRD) DoD believed that the underlying purpose of military cooperative agreements, the NATO stockpile concept and the supporting technical, operational and logistic arrangements was to enable our Allies to use our weapons for the common defense in a timely and effective manner. To assure the timely and effective use of nuclear weapons (or of any weapons), properly trained and adequately equipped Allied Forces should be able to maintain essentially the same posture of readiness as our own forces. To do so requires an evaluation of the time factors involved in furnishing nuclear weapons for the several weapons systems employed by allied forces.

(SPRD) An example of the time factor problem was the proposed interceptor aircraft maintained on an alert status during peacetime to assure quick reaction to air attack. Upon declaration of a condition of maximum readiness confirmed by U.S. COMMANDER, the aircraft, under authority derived from the President and under specified controls could be airborne to engage the attacker. In a hearing of 2 February 1960 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy raised two questions concerning this arrangement:

a. As a priority point, the authority of the President to release physical control or possession of the U.S. weapon in a situation short of actual attack by an enemy. Here the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy defined "attack" or "hostilities" as the actual firing of a weapon or a dropping of a bomb on Allied Forces or territory.

b. As a secondary matter, the degree of "possession" maintained by the United States when the weapon is attached to the aircraft.

(SPRD) In a general summary of his views on these points Mr. Holifield, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), stated: (p. 54 of the Transcript of the hearing on 2 February 1960)
"I think you make a case for it [blue] sits on the ground. I think you make a case for the custody which is at least almost equal to that of having a soldier guarding an igloo but certainly after the wheels are up then there is no doubt in my mind (that the President has no constitutional authority to release possession of the weapon under the circumstances stated)."

Note: The parenthetical phrases are derived from the context of the transcript.

(SECRET) By separate letters to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense of May 16, 1960, and in a Joint Committee hearing on June 24, 1960, Senator Anderson implied that he did not agree with Mr. Holifield's conclusion regarding U.S. possession of a weapon attached to an Allied delivery vehicle and that he considered all cases of this kind to represent something less than exclusive custody as intended by the Congress. He submitted proposed legislation covering both joint possession and transfer. Inasmuch as the development of an allied posture as regards quick reaction forces depended upon peacetime mating of weapons and carriers, it was essential that this issue be dealt with promptly.

(SECRET) The proposed legislation would admit joint possession by the United States [redacted], and by the United States and multinational forces of NATO, subjecting the arrangements to the approval of the Congress. The legislation would also authorize the DoD to transfer weapons to allied nations after the outbreak of war or hostilities or after a public declaration of a national emergency by the President.

(U) Thus, there were actually three positions on the question of custody. Senator Anderson believed that Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act had to be amended as the loading of U.S. weapons on allied aircraft constituted a loss of U.S. custody and actually was "joint custody." Mr. Holifield believed that the U.S. lost custody when an allied aircraft was airborne with a U.S. weapon and that the President did not have the constitutional authority to release possession of the weapons until the outbreak of hostilities. DoD and State contended otherwise.

(SECRET) DoD's rationale was as follows:

a. The degree of possession which can be exercised over unauthorized access to or use of our weapons is dictated by the characteristics of the weapon and the delivery system and the time available to prepare the weapon for use. For relatively slow reaction forces, such as forces which may be
expected to have several hours warning of an impending attack, it is not only possible but positively prescribed that until the weapon is released for expenditure the U.S. detachments supporting the unit, in addition to maintaining armed guards over the weapon, will maintain complete and absolute control over some element of the weapon without which the weapon cannot be used or detonated. For example, ground-based systems such as the HONEST JOHN, LACROSSE, CORPORAL and 8" Howitzer would be handled in the following sequence:

(1) In normal peacetime conditions the warheads or shells would be maintained in storage and would not be mated with the delivery vehicle.

(2) In a situation calling for an advanced state of alert, the weapon and vehicle may be mated, but only by the specific authority of the U.S. Commander of the Specified or Unified Command concerned; e.g., CINCEUR.

(3) When so mated the U.S. custodian would maintain his full and absolute possession, and separately from the weapon, the nuclear capsule, or, in the case of sealed-pit weapons, the arming plug without which the weapon cannot be detonated.

(4) When authority to expend is received and authenticated, the U.S. custodian would insert the capsule or arming plug as appropriate.

b. For some quick reaction forces, modifications of this sequence are required in the interests of time; and, in some cases, modifications are dictated by weapon characteristics. For example, effectiveness of the NIKE HERCULES air defense missile system depends upon having some missiles mated on launchers at all times. However, with the NIKE HERCULES system three positive and absolute controls are maintained by the U.S. custodians, namely: retention of the warhead arming plug, retention of the motor igniters and their closure plugs, and control of the firing console.

c. Other quick reaction systems, such as the THOR and JUPITER IRBMs and the [redacted] are not subject to the same procedures. The reason is that when weapon and vehicle are mated it is not practical to remove and retain in storage a vital element of the weapon without imposing time and technical factors which would unduly delay the reaction time and possibly introduce some degradation of the system safety. In the IRBM systems there are a number of events which must take place prior to launch which require the knowledge and participation of the U.S. custodial detachment. At the final moment of launch, however, U.S. control and possession rests upon two factors; namely, the basic governmental
agreement between the parties concerned and positive control of the launching by the U.S. custodian. We believe that these two factors constitute "possession" or "custody" of the warhead as intended by the law. We agree that the "two-key" feature referred to by Senator Anderson does constitute joint control of the IRBM system as intended by the basic governmental agreements. We maintain, however, that the overriding control of the launch by the U.S. custodian constitutes full possession of the weapon.

d. The Department of Defense had not prescribed minimum criteria to be observed by the Unified or Specified Commands and the military departments in recommending custodial arrangements for quick reaction applications. Those are arrangements which must be developed on the initiative of the Commands concerned in the light of their assigned responsibilities and the reaction times required for the effective use of Allied Forces. The arrangements considered to be consistent with the above principles are examined in minute detail by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to insure that they are consistent with the principles of military readiness and are adequate to insure that it would take an act of force as well as a breach of international agreement to obtain either weapons or information concerning them without proper authorization. In reviewing the proposed arrangements it was a fundamental requirement that whenever it can be done without gross violation of the principle of military readiness, at least one essential component of the weapon would be removed and retained by the U.S. custodian separately from the weapon until authorization for expenditure is received and authenticated.

Senator Anderson's definition of exclusive custody appeared to be at odds with several arrangements then in effect or proposed. Specific arrangements either in effect or proposed at that time were:

a. International agreements and corresponding technical arrangements concerning

b. The NATO Stockpile Plan and implemented by technical arrangements, the mating of HONEST JOHN and CORPORAL missiles when specifically authorized by SACEUR (USCINCEUR).

c. Covered by the NATO Stockpile Plan to become effective with completion of technical arrangements, the mating of NIKE HERCULES with US warhead made available to NATO allies under the Military Assistance Program.
d. Proposed by SACEUR and under consideration by the JCS, a strip alert for allied tactical aircraft (F-84 and F-100) with US weapons attached (no flights to be authorized until weapons are released for expenditure).

e. Proposed by JCS and under DoD consideration, the supply of US depth bombs for ASW aboard allied ships and/or aircraft.

(U) With the exception of a. and e. above, the arrangements had proceeded without the specific approval of the Secretary of Defense under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or SACEUR on the grounds that they were:

a. Fully consistent with the basic U.S. policy as pronounced at the NATO meeting of December 17, 1957; and

b. In consonance with the basic principles of custody as agreed by State, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

(U) In reply to the letter from the Chairman, JCAE, the State Department agreed with DoD in that "the proposed arrangements covering the armed aircraft on the ground satisfy the DoD requirements which would be maintained until an enemy attack was imminent and that the President has the constitutional authority to permit the weapons to become airborne at such time." The letter further went on to define the Department's responsibilities as regards arrangements for the deployment, positioning and readying abroad of nuclear weapons. "Essentially it consists of participation in the determination of policy, negotiation of necessary agreements and general supervision of the execution of such agreements."

(SEED) In the meantime, the Genie program, which had been held up at the request of the JCAE in late 1959, finally expired in the summer of 1960 due to a lack of funds. The Joint Committee took little notice of the program's demise and, in the fall of 1960, it authorized an Ad Hoc Subcommittee to go to Europe and conduct an extensive investigation of the NATO stockpile, the results of which we shall see shortly. At this point, however, it would be most appropriate to consider the origin and purpose of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the significant role it has played in the custody, control and dispersal of nuclear weapons.
CHAPTER 10
"WATCHDOG"

THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

"The importance of the field of atomic energy, coupled with the unique character of the problems raised by its development, makes it peculiarly desirable and necessary that the Congress be fully acquainted at all times with the work of the Commission. The bill in section 16 makes provision for reports which will contribute to this end.

"More important, however, is the provision for the establishment of a joint congressional committee, to be composed of nine Members of the Senate and nine Members of the House of Representatives, directed to make continuing studies of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems related to the development, use, and control of atomic energy.

"The joint committee is empowered to hold hearings, to act on legislation, and to equip itself with a staff of such experts and technicians as it deems necessary to carry out its functions.

"The usefulness of such a committee in focusing responsibility in the Congress and in keeping the legislature informed cannot be overemphasized. The joint committee will be in a position to give substantial aid to the Appropriations Committee; and to give consideration to supplementary and amending legislation as the need arises."

(U) This statement, in the original report of the Special Senate Committee which reported out the McMahon Act, indicated the "watchdog" role that the Joint Committee was to perform as one of the two primary institutions in the civilian control of atomic energy.

(U) Unique in its legislative functions and powers, the JCAE has indeed fulfilled its "watchdog" role for the Congress and public over both the military and AEC. In the early years of almost total civilian control it dealt primarily, and of necessity, with the activities of the AEC. However, by 1954 it was becoming increasingly concerned with the growth of military authority over the weaponry aspects of atomic energy.
(U) Under the 1954 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, the Defense Department was given authority to transmit atomic information constituting Restricted Data to foreign countries. It should be noted, however, that this information was necessary in connection with activities which normally would be handled directly by the military; i.e., planning, training, and defense against atomic weapons. Also AEC was to "assist" the Defense Department and participate in a joint determination as to the extent of weapons information to be transferred. On Restricted Data relative to research, development, and production of special nuclear material the Atomic Energy Commission was given responsibility for transmittal of information without Defense Department "assistance."

(SEC) Another somewhat obscure change or interpretation in the law apparently permitted the Defense Department to deal with nuclear components of weapons and nuclear warheads of missiles separately from the weapons system and the missile itself from the standpoint of secrecy classification and custody. This was later to be interpreted by the Defense Department to permit the transfer and to permit nuclear warheads on missiles to be treated separately from the missile vehicle itself in terms of development and manufacture, and transfer of ownership and classified information. This was accomplished primarily by the new definition of atomic weapons in section 11 d.

(U) In connection with the 1954 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, Congressmen Holifield and Price stated in part their dissenting views:

"Although we do not believe H. R. 9757 departs in any fundamental way from the accepted principle of civilian control and management of the atomic energy program, we wish to take this opportunity to alert the Congress and the public to the possibilities that lie ahead.

"It is generally acknowledged that atomic weapons are rapidly achieving a conventional status in military planning for national and allied defenses. Accordingly, we may expect that the military will steadily seek increasing control over the weapons phases of the atomic energy program. This is not said in criticism but only as a reminder that there are bounds which the military must not transgress if the principle of civilian control is to be maintained."
(U) To somewhat balance the additional grants of authority to the Defense Department, the Joint Committee added, and the Congress enacted, certain provisions intended to strengthen the Joint Committee's "watchdog" position in relation to the Military. First it added a provision to section 202 of the Act to make the Defense Department subject to the same requirement as the AEC in keeping the Joint Committee fully and currently informed as to all its activities relating to atomic energy. The Joint Committee report on this provision in 1954 stated that the obligation applied to pending matters as well as those where the Defense Department had taken final action or reached a position. Secondly it added provisions to sections 144 and 123 to require that all agreements of cooperation, including military agreements of cooperation, must lie before the Joint Committee for thirty days before becoming effective.

(U) Following the Soviet sputniks and the resultant NATO conference in the fall and winter of 1957, the Executive Branch proposed additional revisions to sections 144 and 91 of the Act to shore up U.S. alliances in the face of the increasing Soviet technological and missile threat.

(U) The proposed bill provided for the elimination of the proviso in section 144 b. preventing the communication by the Defense Department of "important information" on weapons design in connection with training activities. A new section 144 c. was proposed to be added which would permit complete exchange of design information on atomic weapons and submarines between the AEC and foreign countries. A new section 91 c. was proposed to permit the President to authorize the AEC or the Defense Department, as appropriate, to transfer to cooperating nations nonnuclear parts of weapons and weapons systems; nuclear reactors for submarines and other military applications; and source, by-product and special nuclear material (U235 and plutonium) for use in weapons or in nuclear reactors for military applications.

(U) None of these provisions changed the previous pattern as to responsibilities between the AEC and the Defense Department. However, the Defense Department did obtain greater authority in the trans-classification of information. The division of responsibilities, however, between the AEC and the Defense Department was left somewhat vague in section 91 c.

(U) As responsibility between the AEC and the Defense Department was not changed significantly, the extent of permissible transfer and exchange of atomic information, materials, and nonnuclear parts with foreign allies was substantially enlarged. This caused certain segments of the scientific
community, and certain groups with pacifist leanings, to view the proposals with alarm. The principal basis of their fears was not so much the military, as the stimulation of the nuclear arms race with the Soviet bloc, and the possible facilitation of the entry of a "fourth" nation and subsequently other countries into the atomic weapons picture. The Defense Department provided a substantial portion of the testimony in favor of the amendments. Among others, an assurance was given that custody of nuclear weapons components would be maintained and protected separate from the carrying vehicle: i.e., aircraft or missile. This assurance would become the subject of considerable subsequent discussion.

(U) The Joint Committee in reporting out the 1958 amendments, and Chairman Anderson on the Senate floor, added a number of restrictions and limitations. One of these had the effect of limiting detailed weapons cooperation with the British. Another gave the Congress veto power over future military agreements for cooperation by means of increasing the waiting period from thirty to sixty days and provided that no agreement could become effective if a concurrent resolution of disapproval should be adopted by the two Houses of the Congress during the sixty day waiting period.

(U) On February 3, 1960, Chairman Anderson felt it necessary to issue a statement concerning the President's answer at a press conference to a question whether the United States should transfer nuclear weapons to its allies.

"When the present law was adopted in 1958 (P. L. 85-479) the officials testifying to the Joint Committee time after time stated that it was not intended and that the law, if amended in accordance with their recommendations, would not permit completed nuclear weapons or the nuclear components of weapons to be transferred to a foreign country or to get beyond the custody of the United States forces. In turn, the Joint Committee in its report, and members of the Joint Committee on the Floor of the Congress, defended the amendments to the law and the agreements thereunder, stating that no transfer of weapons or nuclear components was intended or permitted and that the United States would maintain custody of such weapons....

"We therefore have a right to assume that any program the President may have to share our arms with our allies will not violate this provision, unless a change in the law is requested by the President and approved by the Congress."
(U) In a speech on the Floor of Congress on February 9, 1960, Congressman Holifield spoke of the problem of "erosion of civilian control" in relation to proposed arrangements for custody or transfer of atomic weapons to NATO countries. He stated:

"There has been a constant campaign to obtain acceptance of the fiction that 'after all a nuclear weapon is just another weapon.' 'The nuclear weapon is a conventional weapon now.' I regret to say that there has been an erosion of civilian control. Part of this erosion is due to a gradual step-by-step surrender to the steady pressure of our strong and entrenched military bloc. Part of it is due to the multiplication of nuclear weapon types and quantities in inventory."

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"These problems will not go away nor will they be solved by our refusal to recognize that technological change has made obsolete the old and cumbersome procedures.

"My plea is that we do not try to solve them through subterfuge or a calculated program of deceit. Let us lay the problem on the table and talk sense to the American people and our allies. Unless we can bear the burden of new challenges, through the exercise of our historic democratic processes of discussion, debate, and publicly arrived at decisions, then our way of life is doomed."

(SFRD) In December 1960 Mr. Holifield's Ad Hoc Subcommittee returned from its investigative tour of Europe and submitted a detailed report on its findings. The findings and recommendations covered the entire spectrum of nuclear weapons activities in Europe. Among these were:

- Protecting [redacted] from rifle fire.

- Stopping plans to place [redacted] and replacing them with Polaris.

- Protecting weapons against radiography.

- Improving the NATO communications system, training of allied delivery crews, and U.S. emergency evacuation capabilities.
Increasing the number of emergency ordnance dispersal personnel.

Reevaluation of US-NATO relationships, policies and commitments.

Installing a permissive action link (PAL) on all weapons in NATO Europe.

(SECRET) However, it was in the area of custody and cooperative military arrangements with NATO countries that the subcommittee expressed its greatest ire and concern. It broiled the Defense Department in a cold scathing indictment for failing to comply with both the letter and spirit of the law.

"It is the considered opinion of the Joint Committee that the State Department and the Defense Department have failed to comply with the intent of the Atomic Energy Act by the manner in which they have entered into International Arrangements for the possession, use and control of U.S. owned nuclear weapons and in the failure of the Defense Department to keep the Congress, through the Joint Committee, currently and fully informed.

"As discussed in previous actions, there is serious doubt whether the facts of the limited possession exercised by U.S. custodial forces of nuclear weapons in 'alert' positions of combat readiness (on planes on the pad and mated to missiles) are consistent with the requirements of section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This section prohibits any person, including a foreign government, to possess a U.S. atomic weapon.

"Certainly such 'alert' procedures are contrary to Congressional intent, and to representations made by the Defense Department to Congress at the time the law was amended in 1958. At that time it was represented that nuclear components of warheads and bombs would be kept separate from the aircraft or missile carrier.

"Moreover the means of placing such 'alert' procedures in effect were carried on outside of the framework prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1958.

"Although the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for a program of administration with international arrangements requiring approval by the Congress and Agreements for Cooperation subject to Congressional action as to the development, use and control of atomic energy (sections 3 f., 11 1., 123) the Executive Branch has entered into numerous international arrangements without
notification to and approval of the Congress. At the same time and through a number of secret executive international agreements and arrangements as to the use and control of atomic energy not provided for under the Atomic Energy Act, it has limited the purpose and effectiveness of the statutory Agreements for Cooperation.

"When one compares the various types of agreements and arrangements the United States now has with these various nations and the types and degree of our cooperation under them, one realizes the relative limited importance being attached to the legislatively authorized Agreements for Cooperation. In comparison it appears that our cooperation in the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment of atomic weapons and the development of atomic operational capability is being conducted principally under arrangements other than the Agreements for Cooperation.

"For example, as observed were approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense during 1960 without either an Agreement for Cooperation or Stockpile Agreement with that nation and without notice to the Joint Committee or concurrence of the AEC.

"In addition, understood that the warheads for these shorter range missiles, similar to those assigned to other nations, were not to be mated, but to remain in the custody and possession of U.S. custodial detachments until hostilities. However, there was some indication that new 'alert procedures' might authorize mating of warheads to missiles in periods of 'tension'.

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"In each of the countries visited, it was found that little or no Restricted Data was being given to the foreign operating personnel (as distinct from higher administrative authorities), even when there was in existence an Agreement for Cooperation and the information had been transmitted by the United States Government to that nation. Certain questions occur: Why have higher administrative authorities withheld or delayed transfer of Restricted Data to the operational personnel? -- Does such delay affect the operational capability? -- Were the legislative provisions of the 1958 amendments to Section 144b necessary?

"In only one type of weapons system observed under the NATO atomic strike plan has it been interpreted that an Agreement for Cooperation is required prior to the foreign user force achieving operational capability, and that is in the fighter bomber area, and then only in the final two weeks of training.

"As further indication of the relatively limited extent to which Agreements for Cooperation control in international cooperation in the uses of atomic weapons, the U.S. to date has signed Stockpile Agreements with [redacted] for atomic support of their forces without any Agreement for Cooperation with these nations. Also, prior to our Agreements for Cooperation with [redacted] in 1959, we already had Stockpile Agreements with both countries including the detailed technical service-to-service arrangements between their Army and Air Forces and ours. As was previously noted, Stockpile Agreements apply to nuclear weapons for use by the foreign force.

"Recommendation

"1. The Executive Branch and Congress should recognize that there are serious doubts as to whether the present NATO alert procedures are consistent with U.S. law and Congressional intent. If it is planned to continue such procedures, or institute procedures which permit in point of fact some measure of joint possession or control over U.S. weapons, then the problem should be faced directly and the law should be proposed for change under established procedures; i.e., legislative hearings and debate.
2. The basic policies under which custody, possession and control of United States nuclear warheads are to be maintained should be contained in the Stockpile Agreements or other Government-to-Government agreements rather than in military service-to-service arrangements. The Government-to-Government agreements, in turn, should come under the requirements of sections 91 c., 144 b., and 123 in the nature of Agreements for Cooperation subject to Congressional review, or else as international agreements approved by Congress or as treaties. To the extent they contain classified annexes or details, like Agreements for Cooperation, classified parts need not be made public, but can be reviewed in executive session by the legislative committee or committees having responsibility.

In compliance with sections 202 and 3 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Defense Department should keep the Joint Committee currently and fully informed 'with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization or application of atomic energy.' Major policy decisions, in particular, as for example the change in U.S. custody concept from separate U.S. maintenance and possession of warheads to the mating of the warhead to non-U.S. delivery vehicles in peacetime are matters of which the Legislative Branch through the Joint Committee should have been informed promptly at the time they were made. The January 1960 decision by SACEUR to place NATO atomic strike forces on Quick Reaction Alert with complete nuclear weapons aboard non-U.S. planes and missiles should have been brought to the Joint Committee's attention at the time or shortly before; not after the order had been implemented or as occurred, after the procedures had gone into effect in July 1960.

"In accordance with its legal responsibility to initiate notification to the Committee, the Defense Department must recognize that it does not comply with the law when it fails to furnish information until after the Committee requests it or when the Committee has to obtain its initial information through other sources."

(U) The report was submitted in early 1961, and a more opportune time could never have been found. The new regime of John Kennedy was engaged in a sweeping reappraisal of our national policies and entire defense posture. The findings of the report appears to have confirmed fears that the Defense
Department, with its multitudinous layers of semi-autonomous authority, had become unmanageable, and that the past administration had permitted the situation to deteriorate to the point where the "nuclear genie" was almost out of the bottle. While DoD had won its battle for custody, it was soon to lose the war for control of nuclear weapons and the JCAE report just might have provided the decisive blow.
CHAPTER 11
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The Eisenhower administration had adopted a military strategy of nuclear response for all but the most minor aggressions. The declared objective of this policy was to reduce costs and manpower requirements. This policy, strongly backed by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, had been approved in the fall of 1953 as NSC 162/2, and late in 1954 this policy was extended by a decision to make nuclear weapons available to NATO forces in compensation for the failure to achieve conventional force goals. In 1956, the NATO Strategic Concept, MC 14/2, was adopted which directed the Supreme Commander, in the defense of Europe, to defend as far forward as possible and to count on the use of tactical nuclear weapons from the onset. As a result, the ground forces were vigorously reorganizing to implement the atomic doctrine.

In July, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles disclosed that the United States was "studying" the idea of transferring custody of the nuclear stockpile in Western Europe to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself. The North Atlantic Council decided on December 19, 1957, to establish European based stockpiles to make possible the implementation of the previously adopted strategic concept MC 14/2. Henry Kissinger's book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, helped to present a case for limited nuclear war (published in 1957). Finally, in June 1958, the JCS after careful study, recommended a stockpile level of from 51,000 to 73,000 warheads by 1968.

In 1961 the new Kennedy Administration immediately began to revise the policy. The NATO Policy Review Group was established. One of the main objectives of the NATO Policy Review Group was President Kennedy's objective of getting "the nuclear genie back in the bottle" - at least in the European Theater. It took approximately one month for the review group to develop a position paper titled A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future (known as the Acheson Report). As a result of this study a policy directive was approved by the President on April 21, 1961 and transmitted to the National Security Council in a document called NATO and the Atlantic Nations.
The long-range policy proposed in the report was the development of conventional forces in NATO capable of meeting and holding any possible Soviet assault in the European Theater. The function of nuclear weapons in the European Theater was to be primarily diplomatic -- their use to be only as an additional and rather minor contribution to general nuclear war with the Soviet Union in conjunction with Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) forces.

The short range policy recommended the cessation of development of limited war nuclear systems designed for the European continent, particularly long-range systems such as MRBMs. The report recommended halting the deployment of already developed systems except where this was politically unfeasible, and the quick securing of deployed weapons against any possible unauthorized use. Finally, it was recommended that SACEUR's operations planning procedure in the theater be clarified and that, in particular, local commanders be directed not to use nuclear weapons even in self defense without the explicit authority of the President of the United States or those to whom his authority had been transmitted.

The proposed changes were not accepted readily by the JCS, who stated:

"It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that NATO strategy, together with SACEUR's interpretation, adequately contemplates a flexible response to the various forms of aggression which might take place in the NATO area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that all NATO forces must be built to and maintained at or near full strength, well trained and provided with adequate reserves. Modernization of these forces, both conventional and nuclear, must continue."

The NATO Policy Review Group had gathered a considerable amount of data and had also posed many searching questions to DoD. In response to a request from Mr. McGeorge Bundy of March 2, 1961, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatrick, forwarded information the next day showing the present location of nuclear weapons by geographic area and military commands. Mr. Gilpatrick also pointed out that:

"...based on present concepts and planning it has been forecast that our requirements for nuclear weapons will double by 1969. In order to effect any significant reduction in such requirements it will be necessary to revise the present stated concept regarding the use of nuclear weapons in support of tactical operations in other than general war situations. The present guidance on this point has been interpreted as supporting constantly increasing requirements for nuclear weapons designed for tactical purposes."
use. Obviously, no such change in concepts or guidance should be made other than in consonance with our national security policy which may be revised in connection with the review now being made of NSC 5906/1."

(U) At this point of time in our history the demise of the "massive retaliation" policy was imminent if not actual. The doctrine of "flexible response" had arrived even though it had yet to be implemented.

(S) The change in philosophy was not the only trauma which arose at that time. On the 7th of February 1961, the acting AEC Chairman notified the President that:

"The Commission plans to defer action to implement the directive of 16 January 1961 for a reasonable period in order to give you an opportunity to review it."

This was President Eisenhower's nuclear weapons dispersal authorization as of 30 June 1961. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested the unilateral AEC action of withholding implementation of approved dispersal of new and improved weapons and the large shortfall in weapon production.

(SR) The effect of the decision by the Acting AEC Chairman to defer action on the Presidential directive of 16 January 1961, although restrictive, was not really critical for the following reasons:

a. The slippage in production of weapons. (During the first 8 1/2 months of FY 1961, the AEC had produced only 49% of the weapons scheduled to be produced in FY 1961.)

b. The AEC concentrated on producing battle area and air defense weapons. (As of 15 March 1961, 52% of the weapons produced were of these types.) Many of these weapons were produced for and were to be used in overseas areas where the construction of suitable storage, surveillance, and security facilities had not been completed, or where political arrangements had not been completed for stockpiling. These weapons, being in AEC custody, permitted other types of weapons to be dispersed as long as FY 1960 dispersal credits were available. Also, since the AEC FY 1960 production of weapons also had slipped, a sizeable number of FY 1960 dispersal credits was carried over into FY 1961.

c. The return to AEC custody of approximately obsolete weapons in FY 1961 for the recovery of reactor material permitted the dispersal of new weapons.
The impact of this decision on operational plans—especially the SIOP which had already gone into effect—was, however, considered to be critical.

The Commission's decision was motivated by two considerations: (1) their concern as to the advisability of continuing the deployment of nuclear weapons to foreign areas, particularly to Western Europe; and (2) their concern that the contemplated additional transfers of weapons from National Stockpile Sites under Atomic Energy Commission custody to storage sites adjacent to military bases under Department of Defense custody was eroding the civilian control of atomic weapons originally contemplated by the Atomic Energy Act.

Mr. Gilpatrick expressed his concern in a letter to the President on April 11, 1961, in which he stated:

"As you know, the matter of U.S. nuclear weapons support for NATO is under intensive study as a result of which a decision as to the future course of action concerning allocation of nuclear weapons to support non-US NATO forces will be reached. I agree that until such a decision is reached no further dispersals to be allocated for the support of non-U.S. forces should be made.

"I am of the opinion, however, that the remainder of the dispersal program set forth in the directive referred to in the Commission's letter should proceed as rapidly as the status of weapons production permits. Included in the program, in addition to weapons for U.S. forces deployed to the United Kingdom and to Western Europe, are much larger numbers to fill out the complements of the strategic and air defense systems in the United States and the air defense and anti-submarine warfare systems employed by CINCPAC and CINCLANT. I am particularly concerned that weapons be made available for the ATLAS, TITAN and POLARIS missiles as rapidly as these missiles become operational and that our capability to implement the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) not be inhibited by withholding the most modern weapons from our strategic forces.

"Accordingly, I recommend that you authorize the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense to proceed with the dispersal plan of January 16, 1961, with the understanding that no further dispersals for allocation to non-U.S. forces will be made under that authority. In this connection, it is clear that due to production delays the dispersal program for Fiscal Year 1961 will not be actually implemented in full until well into Calendar Year 1962.
I consider it desirable, however, that with the exception indicated above the program be approved as an objective to be attained as early as practicable in the light of the availability of weapons and the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites.

"With respect to the second point on which the Commission has expressed concern, I cannot agree that transfer of weapons from the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense constitutes an erosion of civilian control."

(U) It became evident that the longstanding fears of the AEC regarding military control had not dissipated but merely had lain dormant, waiting for the right moment to voice concern to a receptive ear. The "new broom sweeping clean" might just provide that type of a favorable environment in which to air these views.

This was not to be the case, however, because, on May 20, 1961, President Kennedy approved the dispersal plan of January 16th provided that additional weapons were not dispersed in support of non-US forces and subject to "the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites." The President also requested that NATO strategy studies be made and the recommendations based thereon be communicated to him before dispersals for support of non-US forces were to be resumed.

Dr. Seaborg, then Chairman of the AEC, notified Mr. Bundy three weeks later that the Commission had released the first increment of weapons to the DoD for dispersal but would not release additional weapons until the President's letter of May 20 was clarified. The terms in question were "National Stockpile Sites" and "substantial reserve". The name of the game appeared to be another effort on the part of the AEC to resurface the issue of custody and control of nuclear weapons.

The dispersal plan provided for a total of weapons in the JCS reserve with of these weapons in the custody of the AEC and in DoD custody, subject to JCS control. DoD believed that these numbers which had been presented to the President in the dispersal program met "the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites." This interpretation was evidently discussed with representatives of the Division of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission who, it is said (in an OSD memorandum) agreed with their OSD counterparts. Mr. Gilpatrick so informed Mr. Bundy by letter on June 22, 1961 and recommended going ahead with the dispersal plan less weapons for support.
of non-US forces. Approval for these was given and AEC was directed to transfer the authorized weapons to the Defense Department for support of US forces in accordance with the plan of January 16th.

(SFRD) Meanwhile, the new administration was quite busy in a number of other areas involving nuclear weapons. Literally hundreds of questions were pouring out of the administration's study groups in the White House and Executive Office Building. Probing, searching, penetrating, groping, they covered the entire spectrum of nuclear weapon activities. Command, control, communications, release procedures, timely destruction of dispersed weapons (particularly two stage weapons) to prevent capture, disclosure of Restricted Data to NATO countries, protection of Restricted Data under conditions of either attack by internal elements of host nations or through capture by external enemy forces, installation of a permissive action link or launch enabling system in the Jupiter, control and transfer of weapons decentralization or predelegation of Presidential release authority for defensive weapons to lower echelons of command, and safety of nuclear weapons were just some of the areas being studied in the effort to find the ways and means of getting the "genie back in the bottle" and realigning our nuclear capabilities.

(U) A detailed analysis of each of these areas is not within the scope of this study. They will be referred to only in so far as they directly affect (and quite a few of them do) the control, custody and dispersal of nuclear weapons. One of the most important of these areas, particularly at this point in time, concerned US-NATO military nuclear arrangements.
CHAPTER 12
US-NATO MILITARY NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS

(U) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 extended the 1946 Act in authorizing cooperation with our allies in the military uses of atomic energy. Section 3 of the Act carried out the policy of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security by providing for a number of programs including:

"a program for Government control of the possession, use, and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material so directed as to make the maximum contribution to the common defense and security and the national welfare;

"a program of international cooperation to promote the common defense and security and to make available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security will permit; and

"a program of administration which will be consistent with the foregoing policies and programs, with international arrangements, and with agreements for cooperation, which will enable the Congress to be currently informed so as to take further legislative action as may be appropriate."

The amendments to the 1954 Act in the 1958 Public Law (85-479) greatly broadened the authority for cooperation with the allies in nuclear weapons matters. There were, however, limitations imposed by:

1. Section 91c pertaining to the transfer of atomic material and parts of weapons and weapons systems,

2. Sections 144b and 144c pertaining to the requirement to submit Agreements for Cooperation to Congressional review under Section 123, and,

3. Section 92 pertaining to possession by any foreign government or its agents of a US atomic weapon.

(U) While such words as control, use, possession and transfer appear in the Atomic Energy Act, the word custody was nowhere to be found. The first use of it appears to have been made by the Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, in offering US support to the NATO General Council in December 1957, when he stated:

"...would deploy nuclear warheads under U.S. custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO supreme allied commander for employment by nuclear capable forces."

SHAPE defined the word as the degree of US control of access to US nuclear weapons, to the extent that it would take an act of force to obtain either weapons or information concerning weapons without proper authorization. The degree of force needed was not spelled out. It was the substitution of the word "custody" for the word "possession" and the broader control procedures based thereon by DoD to which the JCAE objected.

(2) The US Government's nuclear weapons support of NATO and allied nations necessitated many different types of agreements and arrangements. The following is a general summary:

a. **Mutual Security Agreements**

These provide for supplying US equipment including weapon delivery systems to individual nations.

b. **Status of Forces Agreements**

These cover the stationing of US forces in individual countries and codify US and host country legal rights.

c. **Storage Agreements**

Agreements between the US and individual host countries for the introduction and storage of US nuclear weapons in support of US delivery forces (as distinct from the foreign nation's forces).

d. **Agreements for Cooperation**

Formal agreements between the United States and an individual member of NATO (can also be with NATO directly) involving the communication of information or the transfer of certain types of equipment involving Restricted Data. (This type of agreement is specifically provided for in the Atomic Energy Act.)
e. NATO Stockpile Agreements

NATO Stockpile Agreements between each user nation and the US covering the introduction, storage, and employment of US nuclear weapons for support of the allied nation's forces. Included in these agreements are policy matters such as:

(1) Cost sharing and construction criteria.

(2) Custody, security and release of weapons.

(3) Maintenance and positioning of weapons.

(4) Logistical support of US forces.

f. Service-to-Service Technical Arrangements

(1) These military service-level arrangements are supplementary to the NATO Stockpile Agreements above and are made between the U.S. Air Force, Army or Navy and the corresponding military service of the other nation.

(2) These arrangements cover such items as standing operating procedures, maintenance and logistics support responsibilities for barracks, dependent housing, feeding, access roads, transportation, communications and U.S. and supported force responsibilities in the stockpile-to-target sequence of operations involving nuclear weapons.

(6) The last three types of agreements were required to be concluded before the United States could deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in support of weapons systems manned by the non-U.S. forces of the cooperating countries. There was, however, one other authorization necessary and that was the necessity for obtaining Presidential approval to disperse nuclear weapons to areas outside the contiguous limits (48 states) of the United States.

(6) In retrospect, however, there was a decided lack of overall written policy guidance by the Executive Branch in this area. In the absence of this guidance, and in view of the necessity for strengthening our defenses in Western Europe, the Defense Department and the Services proceeded to go their sometimes separate ways. An insight into the degree of informality involved in the first of the storage agreements is afforded by a recount of some negotiations with the United Kingdom in 1947 during the Truman Administration.
The United Kingdom had accepted the introduction of complete atomic weapons by the United States into the United Kingdom. These arrangements were on a service-to-service basis. Construction of storage facilities was undertaken on the basis of oral arrangements in 1947 between the Chief of Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Introduction and storage of complete atomic weapons was arranged for in 1949 by the Commanding General, Third Air Force, with the Chief of Air Staff, Royal Air Force. No further Service level arrangements were found necessary. The Commanding General, Seventh Air Division, subsequently discussed these arrangements with Prime Minister Churchill who orally expressed his approval.

A number of formal bilateral and multilateral agreements had been coordinated with NATO countries subsequent to this "understanding" with the United Kingdom. Among the first was the agreement with NATO as a regional organization whereby the U.S. agreed to provide certain classified information pertaining to atomic weaponry (excluding design data) which was deemed necessary for the common defense and security of Europe. In addition, the U.S. would provide warheads under U.S. custody for NATO forces to include [redacted] units. It was under this agreement that the warheads were deployed and the "two key" procedures evolved when both the [redacted] warheads were mated to the missiles. Launch of the missiles could only be accomplished by inserting two keys in the launch control panel. One key was held by the U.S. warhead custodian, the other by an officer of the non-U.S. missile unit. U.S. custody then "hung by the thin thread" of one key. This was one of the procedures to which the JCAE objected.

The U.K. [redacted] under a bilateral non-NATO agreement with the U.S. on February 22, 1958. The warheads were dispersed to England in October 1958 and mated in 1959.

The "two key" arrangement was developed for the put into effect for. A bilateral NATO agreement was signed with

[redacted] with NATO for providing US warhead support for the countries for providing US warhead support to their indigenous forces.
(U) To bring order out of chaos, under the disclosures of the JCAE, NSAM 143 and NSAM 197 were formulated.

(U) The various programs of cooperation and agreements, however, were not the basic problems of U.S. support of NATO. The North Atlantic Council on May 1, 1958 noted (C-R(58)30), MC 70, the report of the Military Committee on the minimum essential force requirements for the period 1958-1963. It further approved for planning purposes the total force requirements defined by the document for the period up through 1963 and accepted the country breakdowns as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review. The United States agreed to the Council action and the Military Committee expressed no reservations with respect to the goals enumerated in the annexes.

(☐) A Presidential policy directive on April 24, 1961 indicated that we should not provide nuclear delivery systems additional to those which we were already specifically committed to provide to allied countries unless further studies indicated that such provision met certain specified and restrictive criteria. Based on this guidance, State and DoD jointly prepared and agreed, in May 1961, on a list of nuclear delivery systems which the US was committed to provide each of its allies. This list contained two categories: first, those undelivered nuclear capable weapons which could not be cancelled without serious adverse political effects; and, second, those weapons programs for NATO enumerated in MC 70 which it was judged at that time could be cancelled without such effects. The principal criteria for which programs were deemed cancellable were: (1) absence up to that time of country requests for the delivery systems; (2) the fact that the weapons had not been offered by the US previously to the country; (3) unwillingness of certain countries to accept nuclear components; and (4) the approaching obsolescence of certain weapons systems included in the MC 70 country breakdowns.

(☐) MC 26/4 superseded MC 70 and projected NATO force goals, including both conventional and nuclear weapons, through 1966. Although also based on the Political Directive of 1956 and on the relevant military documents (MC 14/2 and MC 48/2), these new force requirements purported to reflect a proper balance between nuclear and conventional forces. MC 26/4 established requirements for greater numbers of nuclear delivery systems as compared to MC 70. The Military Committee recommended that the conventional and nuclear forces enumerated in the document, except for MRBMs and nuclear submarines, should be noted by the North Atlantic Council as appropriate requirements for end-1966 and should be transmitted to the member countries and the NATO commanders as the basis for programming action. On January 5, 1962 the North Atlantic Council noted MC 26/4 and transmitted the document to the countries and the Major Commanders as
recommended by the Military Committee (C-R(62)1). This action paralleled that taken by the NAC three years earlier with respect to MC 70. Ambassador Finletter stated in the Council that the United States approved the recommendations in MC 26/4, but added that "His authorities reserved the right to make proposals from time to time to improve NATO's military position."

(U) By March of 1962, the Defense Department had concluded a number of studies which had been directed by the President's memorandum of May 20, 1961, and as a result of the National Security Council action of April 24, 1961, "NATO and the Atlantic Nations". In a March 16th memorandum for the President, Mr. Gilpatrick stated that it was at that time not necessary to "endorse requirements for nuclear delivery systems over and above those we are already committed to provide, notably MC 26/4 requirements for end-1966, in view of possible changes in our NATO strategy and the fact that we are not yet committed to providing the enlarged nuclear support indicated by such force requirements."

(6) The Administration's determination that it was not bound to provide nuclear support for the MC 26/4 goals could only have been based upon the conclusion that the Council action of January 5 was in itself not a sufficient basis and that the goals in MC 26/4 were not "accepted" or "approved" in the same sense as those in MC 70. On the other hand, by its participation in the Council action on the end-1966 force goals, the United States could not but have given its Allies the impression at that time that to the extent they established and trained nuclear forces in accordance with NATO MC 26/4 requirements, the US would, as in the case of MC 70, supply nuclear warheads for such forces except for MRBMs and SSBNs. There is no evidence that our Allies were ever explicitly informed of our reservation for meeting the MC 26/4 force goals. The problem of nuclear support of NATO will continue to plague us for many years until the role of tactical nuclear weapons and forces can be definitively predicted, projected, and quantified, and a national policy is established regarding the use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

[SERV] Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum of March 16 also stated that corrective action had been taken to remedy deficiencies in the areas of security, command and control, NATO communications, and US custodial procedures. DoD was developing a permissive action link on an urgent priority to be installed on nuclear weapons dispersed in support of non-US NATO forces. Again, regarding the whole question of NATO strategy and the role to be played by nuclear weapons, he thought it would be extremely disruptive to Alliance cohesion if we were now to withhold the
nuclear weapons necessary to make fully effective those weapons systems which we had committed ourselves to support. Accordingly, he recommended that the DoD be authorized to disperse, under US custody, [redacted] nuclear weapons for use by non-US forces in FY 62. This was an increase of [redacted] weapons from the [redacted] actually dispersed as of December 15, 1961. The total increase in Europe, including weapons for US forces, would be from [redacted] to [redacted]. It was further emphasized that the dispersal program would be coordinated in such a way so as not to prejudice the forthcoming results of the review of NATO strategy. Four high yield versions of weapons planned for non-US strike aircraft were witheld along with the necessary information concerning them to make non-US forces operational. The AEC had registered deep concern on the possibilities of compromising Restricted Data in these weapons and had not agreed to the dispersal or the transmission of information of high yield weapons (over [redacted] KT).

(SECRET) The President at a meeting on April 6, 1962 approved the dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-US forces as proposed in Mr. Gilpatrick's memorandum of March 16th. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 143, dated April 10, 1962, promulgated the dispersal authorization subject to the following:

a. Until further notice and effective immediately, [redacted] exclusive of the United Kingdom. It was not intended to preclude the use on Alert aircraft of [redacted] The effect of this limitation was to be reviewed by USCINCEUR/SACEUR.

b. Subject to the conditions in Paragraph a., authority was granted to disperse, under US custody, weapons in support of non-US forces as indicated in Annex A.

c. Further dispersal of nuclear bombs in support of non-US NATO air forces [redacted] would be delayed pending a State-Defense review of the situation.

d. The Atomic Energy Commission was directed to develop and produce at the earliest practicable date permissive action links to increase custodial control of nuclear weapons dispersed in support of non-US NATO forces.
The President also directed that "maximum effort as a matter of urgency will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to develop, improve and install permissive action links in nuclear weapons deployed abroad."

NSAM 143 required that "...authority for any additional dispersals may be sought, as necessary, on a case-by-case basis as the forces become operational, and in the light of continuing studies of NATO strategy."

Thus, the President reserved to himself the authority for all future dispersals for support of non-US forces.

As a result of differing philosophies regarding the interpretation of NSAM 143, the AEC and DoD requested clarification of NSAM 143 in a joint recommendation on September 22, 1962. On October 23, 1962, the President issued NSAM 197 which provided additional policy in relation to nuclear support of non-US forces.

"The communication of RESTRICTED DATA to another country for the purpose of training that country's forces in a nuclear delivery capability should be avoided when there is no intention of dispersing the weapons of that delivery system to the country. The impression should not be made that the US intends to provide forces of any country with a nuclear capability when such is not the case. It is necessary that consideration be given to all aspects of a proposed program of cooperation prior to a decision with respect to any single aspect of the cooperation, including the granting of RESTRICTED DATA. If all such factors are not considered prior to the initiation of the cooperative program, such a transfer of delivery vehicles, communication of RESTRICTED DATA for training or compatibility, or dispersal of related weapons, it is difficult to refrain from completing the balance of the mutual program once it has been started.

Therefore, the Department of Defense will hereafter submit to the President, for approval in principle, proposed programs of cooperation with other nations which will involve communication of RESTRICTED DATA, transfer of delivery vehicles utilizing atomic weapons, or dispersal of atomic weapons, together with the views of interested agencies, including the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, on those parts of the proposed programs which will affect their responsibilities. Presidential approval of such submittals will be restricted to approval in principal, reserving for future action Presidential authorization for dispersal of specific weapons. Presidential approval of such programs of cooperation will then provide the basis for future action by all responsible agencies."
NSAM 197 clarified the intent of NSAM 143. It required DoD to submit to the President for "approval in principle" proposed programs of cooperation with other nations which will involve the communication of Restricted Data, transfer of delivery vehicles utilizing atomic weapons together with the views of the Department of State and AEC. Presidential approval of such submittals was restricted to "approvals in principle", reserving for future action Presidential authorization for dispersal of specific weapons under NSAM 143. This "approval in principle" is known as a NSAM 197 action.

Two days later NSAM 199 rescinded a portion of NSAM 143 and permitted the loading of NATO QRA aircraft. NSAM 160 had also entered the act and established national policy for the development and installation of permissive action links on nuclear weapons deployed to Europe.

The issuance of NSAM 199 successfully and effectively completed (for the time being at least) the first phase of the new administration's efforts to establish executive control on the policies and procedures for providing nuclear support to non-US NATO forces.
CHAPTER 13

DISPERALS
1962 - 1964

(U) The FY 61 dispersal plan provided weapons for US forces but froze further dispersals for non-US forces. NSAM 143 authorized dispersals in 1962 for non-US forces but there was no authorization for increasing dispersals for US forces. The FY 61 plan was still in effect for US forces in FY 62. The normal nuclear weapons retirement cycle started with the approval by the President of the annual stockpile requirements. The Atomic Energy Commission evaluated the stockpile requirements in terms of their capabilities and provided the Department of Defense with their estimates of production for that stockpile year and the availability of materials for production in future years.

(U) Based on these estimates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated the weapons to the Commanders of Unified or Specified Commands and the Reserve, and requested the Commanders to submit their weapons dispersal requirements. The JCS then prepared the dispersal plan to provide the dispersal of the weapons to support operational needs for the Commanders. The weapons would be dispersed as they were produced by the AEC. These dispersals included both those for support of US forces and for support of non-US forces.

(SFRD) On June 6, 1962, Mr. Gilpatrick submitted for Presidential approval a program which provided for dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1962. The proposed plan called for increases only in dispersals in support of US forces. It provided for:

1. The dispersal of [redacted] nuclear components and complete weapons and [redacted] non-nuclear components under full US control in support of US forces.

2. The dispersal of [redacted] nuclear weapons/components and 1,422 non-nuclear components to foreign countries for US forces.

3. The JCS reserve to consist of [redacted] weapons, not less than [redacted] of which would be in NSS and OSS in custody of AEC.

4. A moderate number of weapons over and above those authorized
for dispersal for stockpile modernization, retirement, etc.

5. Replacement of lost weapons on a one-for-one basis.

(SRD) In August, the White House requested additional information on numbers and types of weapons to be dispersed, yield versions, and country. The dispersal plan as submitted contained only broad yield categories, i.e., high and low yields for each country, since the DoD believed that the detailed data was highly sensitive. After providing the information requested, the JCS were further queried on the FY 62 dispersal plan. Their answer provided an explanation of their philosophy for dispersal.

"As in previous years, the FY 1962 dispersal plan is in support of both normal peacetime dispersals and contingency dispersals. In the former case, dispersals are planned to be accomplished as soon as the operational capability is attained and the weapons are available. In the latter case, dispersals are to be undertaken only as required during periods of tension or actual wartime.

"As an example of a contingency situation, the FY 1961 plan provides for dispersal to etc. However, dispersal would not be accomplished except as specifically directed after satisfactory completion of appropriate agreements. A request for such dispersal authority again is contained in the FY 1962 dispersal plan.

"As another example, authority exists in the FY 1961 dispersal plan for dispersal of nuclear weapons to in support of CINCSAC. It is not the intention of CINCSAC to use this authority in support of peacetime operations.

"In the case of non-US NATO forces which are provided nuclear weapons support by the United States, a third situation arises. Repeated delays have been experienced in the attainment of a programmed operational capability
of certain of these forces. A number of nuclear weapons are now available and earmarked for support of these forces, however, no direct commitment has been made to provide the nuclear support. The fiscal year dispersal plan, therefore, consists of three categories of weapons: weapons in direct support of non-US forces, weapons in direct support of US forces and weapons earmarked for support of non-US forces. Weapons in this latter category are not identified as weapons for non-US forces and are not planned for actual dispersal in peacetime. In most cases, however, the units for which the weapons are earmarked are in the process of obtaining an operational capability. Thus, during periods of tension or wartime, dispersal of these earmarked weapons may be required.

"In the FY 1961 dispersal authorization, as well as that of previous years, the possibility of situations arising which would require the commanders of unified and specified commands to exceed authority in certain instances has been recognized. In the letter from the Secretary of Defense advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Presidential approval of the FY 1961 dispersal plan, authority was granted to proceed with dispersal in accordance with the representative dispersal plan with the proviso that 'any proposed departure from the representative plan of such a nature as to indicate a major shift in strategic emphasis' would be submitted for Presidential approval.

"Dispersal plans, therefore, have been representative plans rather than specific plans; they are not intended to be met in their entirety in each fiscal year, and they may be exceeded under special circumstances in accordance with the approval authority granted."

(SFRD) The Joint Chiefs were becoming increasingly concerned with the worldwide dispersal situation. Of the approximately [redacted] credits authorized for transfer from AEC to DoD and dispersal, less than [redacted] unused credits remained, although AEC had [redacted] weapons available. CINCONAD, CINCPAC and CINCSAC had exhausted their allocated dispersal credits while CINCLANT had only [redacted] unused credits. CINCEUR had sufficient credits but some of these were being used by CINCONAD. The JCS stated that the FY 63 allocation had already been provided to the CINCs.
and that immediate approval of the FY 62 dispersal plan was needed to alleviate the current situation and early approval of the FY 63 plan would be needed to avoid a similar situation arising in the near future.

McGeorge Bundy, however, was still very much concerned with avoiding major additional political commitments. He asked Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) to review the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan and provide him with recommendations. Mr. Nitze's reply agreed with the JCS position except for a few minor changes and recommended that the FY 62 plan should be acted on quickly.

The Christmas holidays, notwithstanding, it was acted on quickly but unfortunately for the DoD, not in the manner which they wished and undoubtedly expected. In a letter to Mr. McNamara dated December 26, 1962, President Kennedy wrote:

"I do not approve the proposed weapon dispersal program including the representative weapon dispersal plan, submitted by the memorandum to me dated June 6, 1962, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In view of the imminence of your submittal to me of your recommendations for a FY 1963 dispersal program, I believe it best not to make any changes in our dispersal program at this time. Accordingly, I hereby approve the continuation of the dispersals previously approved for FY 1961 to cover the FY 1962 needs.

"If this decision creates certain operating problems that affect the national security, I am willing to receive specific requests for exceptions in advance of my consideration of the FY 1963 dispersal program.

"I have directed the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to:

"1. Transfer to the Department of Defense, on call by the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, sufficient numbers of atomic weapons to provide in Department of Defense custody as of June 30, 1962, up to a total of [redacted] separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to a total of [redacted] non-nuclear components. For the purpose of this letter, complete atomic weapons are defined as complete thermonuclear weapons with separable nuclear capsules as required and complete sealed-pit weapons. The above directive
includes those weapons dispersed to the Department of Defense and stored at the National Stockpile Sites and Operational Storage Sites, those dispersed to Commanders and those in the reserve of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispersed in the custody of the Department of Defense.

"2. Replace on a one-for-one basis, to the extent practicable, any nuclear component, complete nuclear weapon or non-nuclear component in Department of Defense custody which becomes irretrievably lost or damaged beyond repair. I approve the use and transfer of those weapons in the undispersed reserve of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a one-for-one basis but not to exceed [blank] weapons to replace the weapons recalled by the Atomic Energy Commission to support modernization, quality assurance, and retirement programs. This provides for maintenance of stockpile quality without degrading the Commander's operational readiness."

(Scr) Additional guidance was given to the JCS by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on February 27, 1963, since the DoD had now received authority to receive more weapons from the AEC than it was authorized to disperse. Dispersals of nuclear weapons to areas under foreign sovereignty would continue to be accomplished in accordance with the previously approved FY 1961 nuclear weapons dispersal program as further amplified by NSAM No. 143. Dispersal to areas under US control would be accomplished in accordance with the proposed dispersal plan of June 6. Authority was given for contingency purposes to disperse to any single site location up to 10 percent more weapons than indicated for the 30 June 1962 level, provided that the total dispersal for all of the specified areas under full US control did not exceed [blank] complete weapons and [blank] non-nuclear components. In the event that a contingency increase of greater than 10 percent at any one location was required or if that total dispersal to areas under full US control needed to be increased, the JCS were directed to obtain prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. There was no restriction on the number of nuclear weapons dispersed in the Continental United States inclusive of Alaska and Hawaii, provided the total dispersals did not exceed the total authorization as cited in the paragraph above.
(SFRD) The chart below shows the FY 62 increases in relation to the FY 61 authorizations and the quantities on hand on January 14, 1963.

**TABLE VII**

**Areas Under Full US Control**

**Complete Weapons in Support of US Forces**

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(SFRD) Thus, the FY 61 dispersal plan and NSAM 143 authorizations were carried over through FY 62 into FY 63 except for an increase of weapons authorized for dispersal to areas under full US control.

(U) In August 1963, the JCS submitted a proposed dispersal plan for FY 63. It was a little late as it already was FY 64.

(U) In accordance with the President's desires for DoD to coordinate the dispersal plan with the responsible agencies in the areas of their concern, formal comments were requested from the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission (DMA) in September.

(SFRD) On November 13, 1963, U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote Mr. Gilpatrick that State concurred in the plan, provided that:

1. "Before actual dispersal is made to those forces of any foreign government of weapons which exceed levels approved for dispersal in NSAM 143 and in certain specific authorizations made pursuant to it, we will have an opportunity to review an intended dispersal on a case-by-case basis."
2. "We would ... reserve judgment on the proposed dispersal of Atomic Demolition Munitions."

The letter further stated that with the exception of the ADMs the remainder of the dispersal to non-US forces appeared to be in fulfillment of existing commitments to which State and Defense have previously agreed.

(SFR-D) The proposed FY 63 dispersal plan had to be updated in January of 1964 to reflect new requirements of the major commands since delays had resulted in its obsolescence. The new plan provided for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VIII</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPDATED FY 1963 DISPERASAL PLAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For US Forces Based in Foreign Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Support of Non-US Forces in Foreign Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For US Forces in Areas Under Full US Control Other Than the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number for US forces in foreign areas had decreased somewhat, whereas the number for non-US forces had almost tripled.

(SFR-D) The State Department concurred in the plan on March 5 subject to the same reservations made in their November 13, 1963, letter in reference to the FY 63 plan. Mr. Alexis Johnson, however, pointed out that the very significant build-up of artillery type weapons projected for the next few months emphasized the urgency of reaching agreed employment concepts, particularly in the NATO area.
TOP SECRET

(GPRD) By February 1964, there had been a 60% increase in the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe -- from _____ in 1961 to _____ as of December 22, 1963. The DoD proposed FY 64 dispersal authorization submitted to the President on March 26, 1964, requested a total of _____ out of a stockpile of _____ nuclear components/complete weapons, of which _____ and _____ would be authorized for dispersal to areas under full US control other than the US and to areas under foreign sovereignty, respectively.

(GPRD) The FY 64 dispersal plan, however, appears to have been jinxed. A discrepancy was discovered in certain of the numbers in the appendices of the plan in that they did not uniformly reflect the most recent JCS recommended planning base of _____ nuclear projectiles per non-US NATO 8-inch Howitzer battery. The necessary page changes were sent to McGeorge Bundy, the AEC, and the State Department. At long last the nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 64 emerged as NSAM 305 on June 16, 1964, much to the relief of all concerned.

(GPRD) In accordance with NSAM 305, the Department of Defense was authorized to:

1. Obtain custody of up to a total of _____ separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to a total of _____ non-nuclear components of capsule-type weapons;

2. Disperse nuclear weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and complete atomic weapons in the Department of Defense custody did not exceed that authorized in the paragraph above;

3. Disperse nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States in support of US forces in accordance with the area totals shown in the representative FY 1964 dispersal plan attached to the memorandum for the President dated March 26, 1964, with the provision that the total for each line may be exceeded by no more than 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies, and provided the grand total dispersed outside the US (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under full US control other than the US) did not exceed _____ Such dispersals, as applicable, would be subject to yield restrictions outlined in NSAM 143 and the policy with regard to Permissive Action Link (PAL) devices contained in NSAM 160;

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4. Disperse nuclear weapons and provide nuclear weapon support to non-US forces in accordance with the currently approved NSAM 143 and NSAM 197 actions. Authority for additional dispersals for the support of non-US forces, over and above those currently approved, would be requested on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the provisions of NSAM 143 and NSAM 197.

(U) In order to place the Dispersal Program in phase with corresponding approved stockpile compositions, the Secretary of Defense was requested to submit a FY 1965 Dispersal Plan in time for approval as soon as practicable. Subsequent dispersal plans would be submitted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year to which they pertained.

(U) The President had "noted with concern the large percentage and absolute growth in the quantity of nuclear weapons planned for dispersal to support non-US forces. He directed the Secretaries of State and Defense to review all additional requests for dispersal of such weapons to ensure that we do not build up excessive stockpiles of nuclear weapons abroad that would add to world tensions and increase the probability of nuclear accident and possible war."

(TS/RB) The following table is a summary of NSAM 305.
**TABLE IX**
SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DISPERSAL FOR FY 64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT AUTH (a)</th>
<th>FY 64 DISPERSAL PLAN</th>
<th>PERCENT CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN AREAS
   - SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES
     PAC
     EUR
     OTHER (b)
   - SUPPORT NON-US FORCES
     NON-US NATO (EUR)

2. FULL U.S. CONTROL (Other than U.S.)
   - OVERSEAS (c)
   - SHIPS
     LANT
     PAC

3. TOTAL OVERSEAS (Less Ships)
   TOTAL OVERSEAS

4. CONUS (Include HAW & AL)
   AEC CUSTODY
   DOD CUSTODY

TOTAL WEAPON TRANSFER
TOTAL STOCKPILE

25,914
30,162
+ 16.4

**LEGEND**
(a) Present authorization 26 December 1962 and NSAM 143
(b) Guam, Puerto Rico, Midway

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**TOP SECRET**
(SFRD) The quixotic problem of NATO nuclear policy again arose in 1963 when the Military Committee (MC) of the NATO Advisory Council (NAC) proposed replacing the NATO strategic doctrine, MC 14/2, with a much broader one which was based on the concept that the previous strategy was both militarily and politically infeasible. The Committee dropped the proposal when it became clear it was not going to be adopted. However, the JCS used it to prepare a position paper on Military Strategy for NATO which Secretary McNamara forwarded to Secretary of State Rusk on December 3, 1963, for his comments. Secretary Rusk responded on February 20, 1964, expressing his strong reservations on the paper and forwarding a State Department analysis, based on the NATO policy approved in April 1961, which attacked the forward nuclear strategy being advocated by the Germans. The State Department paper U. S. Policies for NATO Defense was concerned primarily with conventional defense of Europe. It considered the use of nuclear weapons only in the event that NATO forces were being overwhelmed or if they had been otherwise unable to regain a vital objective. The differences between the two papers were of such magnitude that Mr. McNamara directed the JCS to use MC 100/1 as the basis for their position. In May 1964 Mr. McNamara solicited comments from the State Department on the suitability for presentation to the President of a tabulation of plans for the provision of nuclear support to non-US NATO forces. Mr. Rusk replied on July 28 that State and Defense should conduct an intensive study of the military and political aspects of NATO tactical nuclear warfare in order to develop an agreed general concept to support a recommendation to the President for changes in national policy. In commenting on two areas in Mr. McNamara's letter, he recommended that the build-up in 8-inch Howitzer, Honest John, Nike Hercules and ADM levels be deferred until an overall study had been completed.

(U) By letter on June 19, the Secretary of Defense suggested to Mr. Rusk that MC 100/1 be used as guidance for our military representatives in NATO forums. The Secretary of State agreed that it might be possible for the time being to defer attempts to reach an agreement but questioned the use of MC 100/1 as a suitable guide.
(U) In October 1964, a Draft Presidential Memorandum, The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy was published which represented Mr. McNamara's personal views and was a compromise between the JCS and State's positions. It presented three nuclear options short of general war: demonstrative use of low yield weapons in a limited sector; a selective use theater wide west of the USSR for less than a few days; and a nuclear battle for less than a period of weeks to render ineffective the enemy's front line and immediate reserve forces. The rationale, among others presented, was that the number of weapons in Europe exceeded our capability to use them; and that future changes in SACEUR nuclear capability should be downward and cautious to avoid upsetting the status quo, increasing the risk or impairing the deterrence.

There were then three differing philosophies on NATO nuclear policy in late 1964. The official national nuclear policy for Europe was stated in NSAM 332 in December 1964 which provided the following guidelines to be used in discussions with NATO on nuclear defense:

1. We must adhere to our policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

2. The United Kingdom must be led out of the field of strategic deterrence.

3. Reduce the capability of the Germans for separate nuclear action.

4. Promote collective defense.

(U) It was during this time of exchanging of views that the FY 65 dispersal plan came up for coordination. In commenting on the proposed DoD dispersal plan for FY 65, Llewellyn Thompson, the Acting Under Secretary of State, made it clear that State did not concur in the planning figures for support of non-US forces for the same reasons enumerated in Mr. Rusk's letter of July 28, 1964. Mr. Thompson proposed that it would be useful if these areas could be discussed by a special committee composed of Mr. McNaughton from DoD/ISA, General Goodpaster from JCS and himself.

7 The Thompson Strategy Discussion Group, as it was referred to, met on March 23, 1965, at the State Department, with representatives from Defense, State and the JCS. As a result of the discussions, a tentative agreement was made by State that there was a de facto US commitment to support the non-US NATO nuclear forces which our allies had either acquired or taken positive steps to acquire in fulfillment of MC 26/4 force levels. In turn, Defense tentatively agreed that the FY 65 dispersal plan to be proposed would reflect the strictest possible interpretations.
of MC 26/4.

(DES) As a result of these agreements and because of changes in JCS requirements, the FY 65 dispersal plan was revised to cover dispersals through July 1, 1966. The plan proposed support only for those weapons systems currently programmed by the US and the Allies which would be operationally ready and for which storage would be available by June 30, 1966. ADM dispersals would be retained at the authorized FY 64 level until the ADM studies were completed and firm requirements established.

(SFRD) On May 17, 1965, the State Department concurred in the plan but recommended that no additional shipments of ADMs be made to Europe. One week later Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that as of that date (May 24), he had deferred shipment of any additional ADMs to Europe. He also noted that he expected the results of the ADM study and JCS recommendations by July 1, 1965. Regarding the ceiling on ADMs it appears that the shipments were not as easily stopped as Mr. McNamara obviously thought. The momentum of shipments already in progress was not halted until five weeks later when the number of ADMs in Europe was established at weapons. A modest increase of weapons over this ceiling was permitted in the FY 67/68 dispersal plan, thus arriving at the established figure of ADMs authorized for dispersal in NATO Europe. Meanwhile, the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1965/1966 was sent to the President on May 24 since both State and AEC had concurred in the proposed plan.

(TSFRD) The FY 65/66 dispersal plan was approved by NSAM 334 on June 1, 1965. It provided for a total of nuclear elements (out of a total stockpile of to be transferred from AEC to Defense by June 30, 1966. The JCS reserve would consist of weapons of which would be retained under AEC control and under DoD control. A total of weapons could be dispersed outside the US in numbers as follows:
### TABLE X

**AREAS UNDER FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY, FY 1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
<th>ATLANTIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Contingency for wartime operations only.

This was with the provisos that:

1. The total in each area may be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies.

2. Weapons for which dispersal in support of non-US NATO forces is authorized for planning purposes only will be dispersed in support of US forces in the areas pending additional and specific dispersal authorization on a case-by-case basis.

(SFRD) Authorizations for weapons in support of non-US NATO forces were:

### TABLE XI

**SUPPORT OF NON-US FORCES FOR FY 1965**

- Bombs
- Tactical Missiles
- Artillery
- Air Defense

Total
PAL devices were to be installed in all nuclear weapons dispersed or to be dispersed to NATO commands in Continental Europe for both non-US and US forces at the earliest practicable date with priority given to those weapons on QRA. Authority was also granted for exceeding the totals in each area by 10% for unforeseen contingencies, replacement of lost weapons on a one-for-one basis up to a total of 4,000. Weapons for support of non-US forces, which were not as yet operational, could be dispersed to US units.

NSAM 334 also stated:

"It is understood that the currently authorized area level of nuclear warheads to be stored in Europe is adequate in numbers and megatonnage to meet requirements now recognized for use by US or non-US NATO forces. There will necessarily be changes required in the stockpile due to such things as modernization, redistribution among users, and possible changes in force dispositions. It is expected that the next and succeeding dispersal plans focus principally on changes of this sort as far as Europe is concerned, and that any recommendation for significant net increases in the European stockpile beyond the level authorized by this NSAM will be made only on the basis of new circumstances.

"Pending the completion of ADM studies now underway and the submission of further recommendations to the President, the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe is deferred. The replacement of ADMs on a one-for-one basis in connection with maintenance or modernization programs may continue."

These two paragraphs, with their Presidential imprimatur, established fixed ceilings for the first time on the total number of nuclear weapons and ADMs that could be deployed in Europe for support of NATO. Also, for the
first time, the rise of weapons for NATO Europe had been arrested. In fact, there was but a minute increase of weapons from the authorized in NSAM 305 to the in NSAM 334. The numbers would be carried forth and included in the subsequent dispersal plans until agreements on a NATO tactical nuclear policy could be reached within the US Government and with the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

(U) At a NATO Defense Ministers' meeting held in Paris, on May 31, 1965, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, sought to assuage the fears of our allies regarding our policy for the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe by saying:

"Since last December, the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Western Europe has increased about 10 percent. In absolute terms, as of the middle of May, over 5900 nuclear weapons were on hand in Western Europe: 1240 aerial bombs, 2400 tactical missiles, 975 nuclear projectiles, 990 air defense weapons, and 340 ADMs. Furthermore, the United States plans to deploy to Europe approximately 1800 additional nuclear warheads during the next 12 months. Implementation of these plans will increase the NATO nuclear stockpile, over the January 1961 level, by about 100 percent.

"I suggest to you, gentlemen, that there is nothing of 'demuclearization' or 'nuclear disengagement' in those figures. The real point, to my mind, is that at current levels of financial expenditure, we have already bought an extraordinary amount of tactical nuclear capability. Some of you may even think that we have over-insured ourselves in this area. We prefer it that way.

"In general with respect to our views on the use of nuclear weapons, one thing above all else should be understood: The United States is firmly committed to a forward strategy in Europe, and we propose to use whatever means may prove necessary, including nuclear weapons, to maintain those forward positions."

(U) This was followed some sixteen months later when, on Friday, September 23, 1966, Mr. McNamara made a public statement in Rome that the number of nuclear warheads in Europe was approaching 7000. The fact that Mr. McNamara felt compelled to make these statements is prima facie evidence that he recognized the degree of doubt
permeating the capitals of Western Europe. It was evident that there
was a decided need for greater participation by NATO in nuclear plan-
ing affairs if the situation was to be ameliorated.

(SFRD) An ill-fated attempt was made for greater NATO participation
in nuclear operations when an approved NSAM 197 action on April 23,
1964, provided for US support of a NATO multilateral force of
missiles and warheads per vessel. The participating countries were to be
This proposal by
the US never did get out of the discussion stages in the North Atlantic
Council.

(SFRD) One final action occurred late in 1965, concerning the FY 66
dispersal plan. NSAM 334 was amended on December 18, 1965, to
permit the dispersal of additional nuclear weapons (strategic bombs)
on Guam, and in case of weather evacuation from Guam.
The basis for this request was that the Vietnam war had necessitated
the deployment of B-52 bombers from CONUS bases to Guam from which
they could launch strikes with conventional bombs on Viet Cong territory
No problems were en-
countered by Defense in obtaining the concurrences of State and AEC.
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(U) It would be most appropriate at this point to capsule briefly the history of the custody of finished nuclear weapons to date. As we have seen, subsequent to the Manhattan Project, the AEC, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, maintained custody of all nuclear and non-nuclear atomic weapon components. This status of the stockpile continued until 1950, when President Truman exercised the authority granted the President in Section 6.a.(2) of the 1946 Act and directed that designated quantities of non-nuclear components be delivered to the DoD for dispersal to specific areas. In 1951, President Truman, under the same authority, directed the AEC, for the first time, to deliver to the DoD a small quantity of nuclear components to be positioned on Guam. In 1953, President Eisenhower directed the transfer to the DoD of additional nuclear components for atomic weapons. This transfer provided a nuclear capability for approximately 50% of the non-nuclear weapon components then in DoD custody.

(U) Under all of these directives, the DoD acquired custody of the transferred components. However, in 1955, when transfer of some thermonuclear weapons was authorized, President Eisenhower stated that weapons with yields of over 500 KT (even though dispersed to military units) would continue to remain in AEC custody. Therefore, this required the AEC to place custodians at many SAC bases and on ships at sea. Initially, civilian custodians were utilized, but the impracticality of this arrangement on ships was soon recognized and, as a result, in the fall of 1956, the Designated Atomic Energy Commission Military Representative (DAECMR) concept was developed. Under this arrangement, commanding officers of SAC bases and Naval combatant and ammunition ships were designated AEC Custodians (i.e., DAECMR) directly responsible to the AEC, thereby effecting AEC custody without the use of AEC civilian personnel at these locations. This concept covered all dispersal locations storing high yield weapons and continued until President Eisenhower, in 1959, directed the transfer of custody to the DoD of all weapons dispersed to the DoD including for the first time, those with yields in excess of 600 KT. The total number of weapons transferred to the DoD at that time constituted approximately 82% of the stockpile.

(U) Subsequent actions had authorized the transfer of continuously growing percentages of the total stockpile to the DoD. President Kennedy's consideration of the FY 1961 dispersal program included a requirement for retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites. Part of this reserve was to remain in AEC custody. The approval of the FY 1964 dispersal
plan, for the first time, gave priority to meeting the authorized transfer
to the DoD with the remainder to be retained in AEC custody. The FY 1965/
1966 dispersal program authorized transfer to the DoD of all but 1800 weapons
of the approved FY 1966 nuclear weapons stockpile. These 1800 weapons,
which could be reduced by up to 400 to provide replacements for weapons
withdrawn for stockpile sampling and modernization, only constituted about
6% of the FY 1966 nuclear weapons stockpile.

—(U) By this time, the AEC became convinced that no practical purpose was
being served in retaining custody of this small number of weapons. There
was a duplication in staffing because the AEC stored its portion of the stock-
pile at eight DoD storage sites within the continental United States. The
transfer of all finished weapons would eliminate the need for 36 personnel
positions in these sites and save the AEC $293,000 annually. Accordingly,
Dr. Seaborg proposed transferring all finished weapons to DoD in a letter
to Mr. Vance of July 11, 1966. He included drafts of a letter to the
President and a NSAM which directed the transfer. In reply, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense agreed in the desirability of the proposal but believed
it was advisable to conclude a revision of the existing stockpile agreement
prior to sending the proposal to the President.

(U) In a series of exchanges from November 1966 to January 1967, various
changes were worked out by the AEC and DoD. The most contentious issue
concerning the letter to the President and draft NSAM included summary
statements of AEC responsibilities in connection with atomic weapons as
derived from its interpretation of Executive Order 10841 and NSAMs 51,
197, and 272 and the Secretary of Defense letters of January 27, 1959 and
May 17, 1961. DoD believed that inclusion of these interpretations in the
letter and NSAM would serve to promulgate them as dogma. The AEC
indicated that omission of these summary statements implied a DoD lack
of a clear understanding of AEC's responsibilities.

(U) Meanwhile, the Field Command of DASA and the AEC's Albuquerque
Operations Office (ALOO) were revising agreements then in effect; the
Stockpile Operations Agreement of 1961, the AEC-DoD Atomic Weapons
Maneuver and Exercise Agreement of July 11, 1963, and the AEC-DoD
Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Weapons dated March 4,
1960. Some difficulties arose relative to storage of weapons and transfer
points since these areas had a direct bearing on AEC and DoD responsibilities
for transportation costs, carriers and guards associated with weapons ship-
ments.
(U) DoD and AEC finally agreed that the letter to the President and draft NSAM would only reference AEC's responsibilities and also that continuing AEC and DoD responsibilities and procedures would not be changed except incident to the removal of the AEC custodians at the stockpile sites (NSSs and OSSs). On January 30, 1967, Dr. Seaborg sent the agreed letter to the President with the draft NSAM. Eleven days later the President directed the AEC to deliver such weapons and components to the Department of Defense at locations, times and in accordance with such procedures that were mutually agreeable between AEC and DoD. After all that effort, the draft NSAM was never issued.

(U) Dr. Seaborg signed the new Stockpile Agreement on March 10, 1967, followed by Mr. Vance on March 20. The Stockpile Agreement provided inter alia for the transfer of all finished weapons from the custody of AEC to the DoD, and continuing AEC and DoD responsibilities in the areas of stockpile readiness, inspections, quality assurance, retrofit programs, replacement of stockpile limited life components, retirement, transportation, procurement, budgeting and records and reports. DoD, consistent with its operational requirements, agreed to provide AEC with facilities at the NSSs and OSSs for storage of material and for such other purposes as mutually agreed. AEC would expedite the completion of weapons and components requested by the DoD which are in process at AEC production facilities, during periods of increased tension, if feasible and not inconsistent with other Presidential directives.

(U) What had begun in bitter dispute some 21 years before had ended in amicable harmony. Many factors contributed to this evolution. It was finally accepted that AEC custody of the mated warheads on Titan and Minuteman missiles in silos, Polaris in submarines and Pershing on launchers, along with nuclear bombs loaded on QRA aircraft, with their attendant release procedures, would seriously degrade our deterrent and defensive capabilities. The time for operational decisions had been reduced from hours to minutes for meeting operational requirements. AEC's participation with DoD in safety, security, command and control, and dispersal procedures had immeasurably assisted in easing the transition of custody. Thus was completed the evolution of the custody of finished nuclear weapons.
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forces in West Germany. This was reflected in the JCS FY 1967 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Program submitted to the Secretary of Defense in September 1966. The program proposed that the warheads originally planned for \[\text{[redacted]}\] be dispersed to U.S. units in West Germany. It called for \[\text{[redacted]}\] weapons in DoD custody out of a projected stockpile of 31,864 nuclear elements. The JCS reserve would consist of \[\text{[redacted]}\] weapons of which \[\text{[redacted]}\] would be in the custody of AEC. The big issue again raised by the JCS was the established ceilings of \[\text{[redacted]}\] and \[\text{[redacted]}\] for NATO Europe in NSAM 334. The JCS objected to these ceilings on the grounds they were arbitrary and illogical. They proposed a total of \[\text{[redacted]}\] warheads for NATO Europe in FY 67 to include \[\text{[redacted]}\] ADMs. In answer to this proposal, DoD notified the JCS that the NSAM 334 ceilings would remain in effect for FY 67. These ceilings had been supported in the Final Draft Memorandum for the President on Theater Nuclear Forces dated August 31, 1966, which offered the official DoD position. Accordingly, the JCS were requested to provide assistance in drafting a new dispersal program for NATO Europe.

(SPAD) A revised plan was drafted which held to the NSAM 334 ceilings but which permitted a five percent increase of \[\text{[redacted]}\] weapons in the Pacific. Both ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA), in November 1966, nonconcurred in the proposed Pacific increase by quoting a statement in the Theater Nuclear Forces DPM which said:

"It is not clear that our current deployments are optimum for either military or political requirements in Asia. We do not yet have adequate studies to reach sound judgments of the question of the proper size and composition of our nuclear arsenal. Until such studies are completed I do not believe that any increase in our Pacific theater based nuclear forces is warranted." (underlining added)

Their primary concern was the last sentence in the above quote which, as it turned out, had not been included in the "For Comment" draft that had been circulated to the OSD staff, the JCS and the Services. ATSD(AE)
recommended to Mr. Vance that he approve the dispersal plan as written, stating inter alia that pending the outcome of the studies and in the absence of a persuasive argument to support the views of ISA and SA, OSD action to halt dispersals would seem precipitous and arbitrary. Mr. Vance did approve the plan which was sent to State and AEC in February 1967 for their concurrence.

(U) The State Department agreed on April 18th noting, however, that the plan did recall the past interest expressed by Secretary Rusk in the need for a thorough study of nuclear weapons policies in the Far East. Mr. Kohler also indicated that State was looking forward to reviewing the studies with the OSD staff.

(U) AEC suggested some changes to the plan in their May 10th concurrence. All of the changes except one were included in the plan. DoD preferred to base the dispersal plan on the approved FY 67 rather than the FY 68 stockpile. The plan also was revised to cover FY 68, as well as FY 67, and to reflect the revised agreement between DoD and AEC of March 10th relating to the transfer of all finished weapons to DoD. OSD so notified both AEC and State the same day the plan was sent to the President. All was not well, however, as some errors were noted in the plan on July 5, 1967 and all copies had to be corrected. At long last, the President approved the plan and issued NSAM 364 on August 14th.

A total of weapons were authorized for dispersal outside CONUS and Alaska. The provisions of NSAMs 143 and 160 were continued in effect. The President did note, however, that the Pacific Theater requirements would be given further review during consideration of the next dispersal authorization request. In connection with future dispersal authorizations, the President directed that:

1. The deployment plan would be submitted annually in mid-November concurrent with the stockpile approval request.

2. The plan would establish levels in terms of total overseas, total by area, and total by type of weapons (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, ASW) within each region. The Secretary of Defense was granted authority to exceed the latter two control levels by 10% to meet unforeseen contingencies.

3. The Secretary of Defense was also given reasonable flexibility to alter the quantities of weapons (authorized for the end of the fiscal year) during the course of the fiscal year to cover unavoidable peaks in deployments due to logistical factors.

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4. Contingency plans would be shown separately together with adequate explanations.

5. The plan would highlight the rationale for and major changes over the previous deployment plan.

6. The DoD should obtain the concurrence of the AEC and the State Department.

The DoD plan for FY 67-68 had been approved by the President but the White House staff had added all of the additional controls on ceilings for future plans.

[SECRD] NSAM 364 established weapons ceilings for FY 67-68 on each country for the end of the fiscal year which could be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies. A total of weapons was authorized for dispersal to areas under foreign sovereignty with weapons earmarked for support of non-U.S. forces. An additional weapons could be dispersed to areas under U.S. control outside the continental United States. The JCS were notified by Mr. Nitze that in the execution of the plan, the dispersal of nuclear weapons should be consistent with the memorandum for the President of May 26, 1967, as well as NSAM 364. By this he meant that the ceilings of and would remain in effect even though not specifically cited in NSAM 364.

[SECRD] Nothing much transpired during the latter part of 1967. It was not until January 1968 that any event of significance occurred. As a result of policy statements in the DPM on Theater Nuclear Forces and the recommendations of ASD(SA) and ASD(ISA), Mr. Nitze notified the JCS on January 26 that relative to the development of a new Nuclear Weapons Development Ceiling Plan (NWDCP) by the JCS, no additional dispersals would be made to NATO Europe and that he desired the JCS to plan an orderly reduction in the number of weapons in NATO Europe to (the level as of December 31, 1967) by June 30, 1968. The actual number of weapons in NATO Europe on January 26 was . This was to be a temporary suspension until he had received and reviewed an assessment of the weapons to be deployed to NATO Europe from the JCS and ASD(SA). He also imposed ceilings on weapons and afloat in the Atlantic and Pacific at the numbers actually deployed on December 31. Any dispersals over these limits had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense. He did allow a 10% overage for weapons afloat to cover ships on and off-loadings and a 60-day compensating reduction.
(TOP SECRET) The Korean crisis in January and February 1968

(SPRD) On the 29th of March the JCS requested that the ceiling of weapons afloat in the Atlantic be increased from Mr. Nitze's ceiling of [redacted] plus 10% to [redacted] plus 10%). They stated that the December 31 level was below normal. For example, the [redacted] was out of the fleet and was due to be loaded with [redacted] weapons. The OSD staff, i.e., ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE) recommended increasing the ceiling to [redacted] plus ten percent or a total of [redacted] weapons. Mr. Nitze agreed and notified the JCS on April 6 of the new ceiling.

(SPRD) By the middle of March, meanwhile, both the JCS and Systems Analysis had forwarded to Mr. Nitze their assessments of requirements for deployments to NATO Europe. Dr. Enthoven forwarded the Systems Analysis paper early in April to the JCS for comment. Mr. Nitze followed this a few days later on April 9 with another request to the JCS for an appraisal of the requirements for NATO Europe to establish priorities with the objective of reducing the total number of weapons there to [redacted] The JCS review of the Systems Analysis paper highlighted the fact that their respective positions and philosophies were poles apart.

(U) The Systems Analysis position assumed that:

1. A theater nuclear war necessarily would be of limited duration and largely restricted to the engaged land battle.

2. The U.S. should employ external strategic forces as a substitute for theater nuclear forces in a war limited to NATO Europe.

3. The role of theater nuclear forces would be very limited in a general nuclear war.

This rationale, except for assumption 2, was not too far divergent from former Secretary McNamara's position in the October 1964 draft DPM, "The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy". SA believed that even a level of 7,161 weapons in Europe was in excess of NATO's needs and proposed a revision of the nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe.
TOP SECRET

The JCS strongly disagreed with SA's assumptions by pointing out that the SA recommendations did not support the approved strategy for NATO Europe which was stated in MC 14/3 adopted on January 16, 1968, and in which the U.S. had concurred. The JCS reaffirmed their support of the planned level of deployments (by end FY 68) to support the defense concept for NATO Europe.

Strategy, tactics and dispersals were now being reviewed, assessed, massaged, and analyzed in both Theaters. An OSD staff recommendation generated a request by Mr. Clifford to the JCS to comment on a proposed redistribution of weapons on Guam. It was felt that some weapons should be and placed on Guam to achieve a better balance of weapons (approximately equal numbers in each area), reduce the vulnerability of weapons and constitute a better balanced reserve of weapons on Guam, e.g., there were only tactical bombs out of a total of some weapons stored there. Other steps were already in progress to reduce the vulnerability of weapons were closed down by PACOM and PALs were directed to be placed on weapons in the other sites as well as for all weapons due to be

In answer to Mr. Clifford's memorandum, the JCS on June 25 submitted a reply which stated that the proposed redistribution would adversely affect the capability of CINCPAC to react to emergencies in the Pacific and recommended there be no change in the current tactical distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific.

By this time, however, other events had occurred and decisions made relative to the FY 69 NWDCP that need be explored in order to understand the final results of the amazing number of complex and interrelated actions which took place in a relatively short span of time.
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CHAPTER 17

DISPERAL AUTHORIZATIONS
FY 1969 and FY 1970

(SRCD) In developing the NWDCP for FY 1969, several issues surfaced in October 1967 between the Joint Staff and OSD which were the subject of discussions between General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Nitze. The JCS objected to the ceiling of NSAM 364 which directed controls on ceilings on weapons by category and by region. They believed that the former restriction was not consistent with NATO commitments and that the requirements for approximately weapons had been stated and justified. They reiterated that the latter control was overly restrictive and thus degraded much of the flexibility needed to properly manage the dispersed stockpile. However, in a meeting on December 28, 1967, in Mr. Nitze’s office, the OSD FY 1969 NWDCP was agreed to by General Wheeler, ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA). The NATO ceiling and controls remained in the plan which was sent to State and AEC for concurrence the next day.

AEC concurred in the proposed plan on February 26, 1968, subject to the inclusion of some minor revisions. State also concurred in the plan and proposed AEC revisions. Mr. Bohlen wrote further that State continued to believe that it was important to develop a better overall concept for nuclear weapons deployments in the Pacific and suggested that an approach similar to that taken on deployments in NATO Europe in the DPM on Theater Nuclear Forces might be a good model. OSD sent the plan to the President on March 9, 1968.

(SRCD) In late May the plan was hung up due to some differences between the White House Staff and OSD. The White House Staff wanted to add a statement to the effect that the ceilings were higher than the contemplated deployments. Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler believed that this would prejudice the results of the studies being conducted by JCS and Systems Analysis. The White House Staff finally agreed to delete this and OSD concurred in the insertion of statements on PAL and the retention of dispersal authority by the President for support of NATO 155mm units. All these actions to establish Presidential ceilings were going on at the same time as the intra-DoD exchanges on Mr. Nitze’s ceilings.

(SRCD) The President approved the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1969 and FY 1970. NSAM 370, dated June 11, 1968, incorporated the following major changes to the DoD draft submitted with the plan.
1. The Secretary of Defense would control actual deployments and notify the President of significant changes in contemplated actual deployments within the Presidential ceilings. (Note: by letter, month later State requested to be able to comment on any significant changes.)

2. The President expressed a continued interest in the Pacific theater requirements and reasons therefor.

3. The President noted the decision in regard to the installation of PAL on certain weapons.

4. Authority was withheld for dispersal of 155mm nuclear rounds in support of non-US NATO units pending results of ongoing studies. (Note: Secretary Clifford had referred to these studies in his presentation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting on the Defense Planning Committee on May 10, 1968 and added "any judgment as to the need for or nature of additional nuclear artillery should be withheld until the studies I have mentioned are completed".

(SR+D) NSAM 370 authorized DoD to deploy up to [redacted] weapons outside the U.S. and exceed the country and category ceilings by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies except that the total of [redacted] weapons in NATO Europe would not be exceeded. The procedure for case-by-case dispersals under NSAM 143 would be submitted only to meet requirements which were not identified in the annual deployment plans. Henceforth the annual NWDCP would contain the bulk of the requests for changes in support of non-US forces. The yield restrictions of NSAM 199 were amended to exempt the Mk 61 in support of U.S. forces from the [redacted] limitation on land based alert strike aircraft on station in NATO.

(U) The issuance of NSAM 370 returns us to the point where we stopped in discussing Mr. Nitze's ceilings.

(SR+D) In response to a JCS request for an increase in his ceilings on weapons aloft, Mr. Nitze raised the ceiling to an overall total for all fleets of [redacted] tactical bombs, artillery rounds, ASW warheads, ADMs and AAW warheads to accommodate projected weapon deployments and avoid future problems related to force changes. The OSD staff, ISA, SA and AE recommended the increase and consolidation to accommodate movement of ships between fleets and avoid offloadings which had already been necessary to avoid exceeding Mr. Nitze's ceilings.
On June 26, 1968, the JCS replied to Mr. Nitze's memorandum of April 9. They opposed any reduction in NATO Europe, stating that realistic priorities could not be established, and recommended that the deployment ceilings be maintained as authorized by the President, essentially restating the rationale expressed in their April 25 critique of the Systems Analysis assessment. The Joint Staff followed this up on July 5th with a request for reconsideration of Mr. Nitze's decision of April 1 not to permit an increase in his ceiling on weapons. They requested an increase in their ceiling on weapons to permit the introduction of the Genie rockets for support of the F-106 squadron authorized for

The NSAM 370 deployment ceilings for the end of FY 1969 were lower in some cases than the Deputy Secretary of Defense's ceilings. Furthermore, Mr. Nitze's ceilings were contained in some four memoranda.

It was now time to rectify any incompatibilities and issues, if necessary, in a single paper containing the additional instructions and ceilings which Mr. Nitze felt were necessary to control deployments.

On August 6, 1968, Mr. Nitze provided this guidance in a memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, part of which is quoted below.

"a. NATO Europe... My decision is that, pending new developments, deployments to NATO Europe will continue to be limited to a total of weapons, which was the actual weapons level as of 26 January 1968. The provision of a 60 day grace period for compensatory reductions will not apply after 31 December 1968; instead, a 30 day grace period will apply.

"b. The approval of the Secretary of Defense is required prior to actual deployment, and is deferred pending completion of detailed arrangements with the U.K. and review of the requirement at that time.

"c. Other Land Areas Outside the U.S. NSAM 370 levels apply without modification, pending further review of our deployments in the western Pacific. Wherever actual present deployments exceed the NSAM 370 levels, reduced levels should be achieved through orderly reductions by end FY 1969. The comments in JCSM-392-68 of 25 June 1968, concerning distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific, did not reflect any consideration which the JCS may have given to the vulnerability of tactical
nuclear weapons as currently distributed in the Pacific. I am concerned both with the large number of weapons which are stored and also with the small number of storage areas in which these weapons and those Guam are stored. In formulating the proposed FY 1970 Presidential Deployment Ceilings, we shall consider shifts of weapons the Marianas, Hawaii and/or CONUS.

"I have noted JCSM-426-68 of 5 July concerning deployment of Mk 25 (GENIE) warheads In view of the downward trend of nuclear weapons deployments in these locations, I do not consider an increase over the NSAM 370 ceilings to be advisable. I would, however, have no objection to a compensatory recution of nuclear weapons and of tactical defensive weapons elsewhere in the Pacific which would allow the desired GENIE deployment within the President's ceilings.

"d. Afloat. An overall total for all fleets of tactical bombs, artillery rounds, ADMs, ASW warheads, and AAW warheads is authorized for deployment afloat. This figure has been chosen to allow for the load out of the early in 1969.

"e. Unforeseen Contingencies. NSAM 370 allows the Presidential ceilings in each separate country/command area or the total by category of weapons within each region to be exceeded by 10 percent in the event of unforeseen contingencies; however, it prohibits exceeding the Presidential ceiling of weapons in NATO Europe. Where I have established ceilings within the Presidential ceilings, deployments above my ceilings require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Otherwise, I wish to be informed whenever the Presidential provision for unforeseen contingencies is used. Notification should include a description of the contingency along with an estimate of the duration of the excess deployment."

(FOB) The President was informed of these ceilings by Mr. Nitze in a memorandum dated August 6, 1968. And thus were drawn the DoD guidelines for the dispersal of nuclear weapons in FY 69. The only other action affecting NSAM 370 ceilings was a JCS request for an increase of strategic bombs on Guam. B-52 bombers had been deployed to Guam to conduct conventional strikes in Viet Nam.

When NSAM 370 was submitted it was thought that the Viet Nam conflict would be terminated before the ceilings went into effect. Consequently only the bombs needed for the B-52s which were to remain on Guam were
requested. The initial deployment of these weapons had been requested in a similar action in late 1965. The request sailed through OSD, State and AEC and was sent to the President on December 5, 1968.

(SECRET) Meanwhile, regarding the FY 70 deployment plan, Mr. Nitze, on September 6, 1968, sent a memorandum to General Wheeler, ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE) requesting them to develop by October 1 a list of any unresolved issues in the forthcoming stockpile and deployment plans. This was followed up by a memorandum to the JCS Chairman giving guidance for the development of the deployment plan. The ceiling of ___ for NATO Europe would continue. No major changes were contemplated for weapons afloat, or in other areas except the Pacific, where it appeared that there could be a reduction in forward weapon deployments.

(TS/RF) General Wheeler replied on October 1st that the proposed reductions and Mr. Nitze's ceilings for NATO Europe total and ___ ADMs) and weapons afloat were the two issues associated with the deployment plan. Unlike the FY 69 NWDCP which was jointly drafted by the ATSD(AE) and JCS staffs, the JCS submitted their FY 70 plan to OSD on October 24th. The plan called for a reduction of ___ but with an increase of ___. It also proposed increasing the ADMs in Germany ___ respectively and additional initial deployments of ___ were intended for US teams in support of non-US forces and planned for use in the defensive barriers of those countries. The other provisions of the plan were in accord with the previous NSAMs and the OSD guidance. The OSD staff recommended to Mr. Nitze that the NATO and afloat ceilings be maintained and there be a reduction of weapons with a corresponding buildup on Guam.

(TS/RF) General Wheeler and Mr. Nitze met on November 4 and three days later the Chairman notified the Deputy Secretary that he objected only to the projected FY 71 figures for the Pacific which were lower than the FY 70 levels. A compromise was reached whereby the reductions in the Pacific were lessened in FY 70 but continued in the projection for FY 71. The total number of weapons reduced ___ on Guam ___ was ___ which would then be stored in Hawaii as that location was considered to be a part of the U.S.

(U) The final plan was drafted and succeeded in weathering some resistance from International Security Affairs and Systems Analysis. AEC and State concurred and it was sent to the President on December 20, 1968.
TOP SECRET

(TOP SECRET) Two days before the Johnson administration left office NSAM 372 was issued which authorized the Department of Defense to:

1. Deploy weapons in the U.S. without limit.
2. Deploy no more than [redacted] weapons outside the U.S.
3. Exceed the country and category ceilings by no more than 10%.
4. Support non-U.S. forces as indicated in the plan.
5. Implement contingencies under the noted conditions. (Contingencies were treated separately.)

NSAM 372 restated the other provisions of NSAM 364 regarding PAL, as well as NSAMs 143, 197, 199, and 155mm Howitzer support of non-U.S. units. On January 25, 1969 the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin Laird, forwarded NSAM 372 to the CJCS with the statement that he planned to review it in the future. Mr. Nitze's ceilings would also remain in effect until an overall appraisal had been made of our nuclear weapons posture. The new administration was not going to make any precipitate moves but rather review, analyze, and redirect if necessary our national objectives, security policy, and strategy. Only after the decisions had been made on these objectives would the necessary changes be made on our force structure, military posture, and associated nuclear weapons stockpile and deployments.
CHAPTER 18

CUSTODY ACTIONS AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
1969 - 1971

The question of custody of nuclear weapons arose again in 1969, this time not between DoD and AEC, but within Army Nike Hercules units in the United States. In 1961, operational requirements for the air defense of CONUS and Hawaii, as well as monetary and manpower advantages led to the assignment of missions to Army National Guard air defense units. As of January 1969 there were 44 Army National Guard (ARNG) Nike Hercules batteries in CONUS. Six more constituted all the SAM units in Hawaii. These people were and are members of the state National Guard and manned the air defense sites on the same level as their counterparts in the active Army on some 52 other sites.

Because the ARNG was not considered a part of the DoD at the time that the DoD was given custody of nuclear weapons deployed with ARNG Nike Hercules units in 1961, procedures were established for the maintenance of DoD custody of these weapons by the assignment of approximately six active members of the US Army to each ARNG Nike Hercules site to control transfer, movement and access to the warhead. Accountability of the warhead was maintained by Active Army Accountable Officers of Army area commands in the same manner as they were maintained for Active Army units. A Federal chain of command was established for the control of nuclear weapons by placing the ARNG Nike Hercules units under continuous operational control of appropriate Active Army air defense commanders. Nuclear weapons could be released from Federal custody to ARNG units by designated Active Army air defense commanders, prior to their actual call to Federal active duty, in surprise attack situations, or upon declaration of Defense Condition I of Air Defense Emergency providing the National Guard crews and units were under the operational control of a Federal active duty air defense commander. Release could be accomplished by issuing properly authenticated orders to the ARNG unit commander and the Active Army custodians.

On January 1, 1969, Public Law 90-486 changed the status of a National Guard technician so that a National Guard technician employed under provisions of the act "is an employee of the Department of the Army or Department of the Air Forces, as the case may be, and an employee of the United States." Based on a JCS request on February 24, 1969, the DoD drafted a memorandum for the President which requested
approval to transfer custody of Nike Hercules warheads from the Active Army custodians to the National Guard technicians on duty at the sites.

(COD) On July 16, 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard requested that the JCS develop additional information on the proposed transfer of custody for Army National Guard Nike Hercules batteries. He specifically desired information on the annual monetary savings; improvements in operational procedures; arguments which could be used to substantiate that there would be no degradation in safety, security or control, and the possible impact on military operations and custody by the unionization of ARNG technicians.

(COD) The JCS provided this information on October 23, 1969. Manpower and monetary savings would be approximately $2.2 million, streamlining of operational procedures by standardization for all Air Defense units would result, standardized procedures would provide increased control by utilizing a single chain of command to authorize release of the arm plugs, and unionization would not really be a problem since Section 7311, Title 5, U.S. Code prohibits federal employees from striking.

(COD) Other major actions in 1969 concerned programs of cooperation for support of non-US NATO nations with ADMs, 155mm Howitzer warheads, and the Lance missile system, and the FY 71 NWDCP iteration. These issues and some historical background are discussed below.

ADM Program of Cooperation

(COD) The issue of ADM dispersals first arose in November 1963 when the FY 63-64 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization (NSAM 305) was under consideration. Commenting on the plan, U. Alexis Johnson, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote the Deputy Defense Secretary, Mr. Roswell Gilpatrick, that State "would reserve judgment on the proposed dispersal of Atomic Demolition Munitions." State at that time, however, was more concerned about the large increase in nuclear weapons dispersals for support of non-US Allied forces and did not pursue the matter further. The number of ADMs authorized for deployment to Europe had risen from _ to _

(COD) In May 1969, State concurred on the proposed FY 65-66 dispersal plan but recommended that no additional shipments of ADMs be made to Europe pending the outcome of a forthcoming study. One week later, Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that as of that date (May 24) he had deferred the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe.
He also noted that he expected the results of the ADM study and JCS recommendations by July of that year. The momentum of shipments of ADMs to NATO Europe, already in progress, could not be halted, however, until some five weeks later when the number of ADMs in Europe was stabilized at [redacted] weapons.

(SECDET) The FY 65-66 dispersal plan (NSAM 334) was signed by the President on June 1, 1965. In the forwarding memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, Mr. Vance included the following statement regarding ADMs: "Pending the completion of the ADM studies now underway and the submission of further recommendations to the President, the shipment of additional ADMs to Europe is deferred. The replacement of ADMs on a one-for-one basis in connection with maintenance or modernization programs may continue." This statement fixed a DoD ceiling of [redacted] ADMs which could be deployed to NATO Europe. In the NSAM, the President noted that currently authorized area level of nuclear weapons to be stored in NATO Europe was adequate in numbers and that any recommendation for significant increases would be made only on the basis of new circumstances.

(SECDET) In coordinating on the proposed FY 67-68 dispersal plan, State and DoD agreed on an ADM ceiling for NATO Europe of [redacted] weapons. This in effect raised the intermediate DoD ceiling to [redacted] weapons. Although this ceiling was not specifically cited in the text of the FY 67-68 plan (NSAM 364), the memorandum from Mr. Nitze, which forwarded the plan to the President on May 26, 1967, did state that there would be no change in the level of ADM dispersals in NATO Europe pending the outcome of current studies. Mr. Nitze also stated that there was no change in the number of weapons currently authorized for dispersal to NATO Europe [redacted] in NSAM 334.

(SECDET) In his memorandum for the President of March 9, 1968, forwarding the dispersal plan for FY 69, Mr. Nitze reiterated his statement of May 26, 1967, regarding ADMs. Nine months later, on December 20, 1968, the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1970-1971 was sent to the White House. Mr. Nitze informed the President that "the proposed plan reflects no change in the number of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) on hand in Europe pending outcome of studies on the matter. The subject of ADM employment is under review, with consideration being given to development of a new, improved munition with better command and control features."
On May 4, 1969, SACEUR submitted a request for an ADM Program of Cooperation to the Secretary of Defense. This was followed on July 31 by a JCS request to the Secretary of Defense to obtain approval for an ADM Program of Cooperation. On September 4, 1969, the Deputy Secretary of Defense replied to the JCS request that it would be necessary to defer a decision on this matter until NSSMs 64 and 65 and the Theater Nuclear Forces DPM were completed. Two months later, Mr. Packard made the decision that DoD should go ahead and coordinate the program with State and AEC, after which he would review the matter before sending it to the President.

The proposed program was time-phrased with Phase I deployments expected to begin in FY 71. Phase I consisted of the deployment of the full number of weapons in support of non-US NATO forces in West Germany. Phase II would commence after the completion of Phase I, at which time it would be possible to consider the deployment of additional weapons. While the time to complete Phase I was somewhat indefinite, it was estimated at approximately three years from the date of approval in principle.

The projected deployment of ADMs as then conceived is shown below:

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<th>Country Supported/Country of Storage</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
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155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation

(SREP) A Program of Cooperation for support of non-US NATO nations with 155mm Howitzer nuclear weapons was first approved in principle by the President on August 30, 1966. The Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-1968 (NSAM 364) authorized the deployment of 155 Howitzer warheads to US units in West Germany, which were planned for support of non-US NATO forces upon approval of a projected NSAM 143 request.

(SREP) The DoD proposed deployment authorization for FY 69 pre-delegated the dispersal authority for 155mm warheads to the Secretary of Defense subject to the specified requirements for command, control and custody. This pre-delegation was suggested by the White House staff in order to reduce the volume of separate dispersal authorizations required on a case-by-case basis by NSAM 143. The FY 69 deployment authorization (NSAM 370), issued on June 11, 1968, while authorizing the deployment of the 155mm warheads to NATO Europe, stated that prior to making firm commitments to the NATO Allies for specific support of 155mm Howitzer units, the DoD should submit the proposed action for Presidential approval together with an evaluation of the utility of such support.

(SREP) The basis for the change by the White House was a statement made by Mr. Clifford at the NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee on May 10, 1968, wherein he cited pertinent ongoing studies and states: "...any judgment as to the need for the nature of additional nuclear artillery should be withheld until the studies I have mentioned have been completed." (NOTE: Mr. Clifford's remarks were strongly influenced by his assistants for Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs who opposed any further increase of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe and used the "study routine" as a means of further delay.) In view of that statement, the White House staff felt that pre-delegation of the dispersal authority was not appropriate. The dispersal authority for FY 70 (NSAM 372) contained the same restriction as NSAM 370 since the 155mm Howitzer program of cooperation was not yet firm.

(SREP) The JCS NWDCP for FY 71 contained projected deployments for both ADMs and 155mm warheads in support of these programs of cooperation. As a result of meetings in November 1969 between the Joint Staff and the staffs of ATSD(AE), ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA), an OSD ceiling plan was developed which included the projected deployments of ADMs and 155mm warheads. The deployment of 155mm
warheads in support of the allies would be time-phased similar to the ADM plan with a smaller ratio of weapons going to [redacted] in the initial phase. The draft memorandum for the President which would forward the plan, requested reauthorization of the 155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation and deployments, and authority for ADM deployments; contingent on Presidential approval of the projected ADM Program of Cooperation.

1971 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan

The OSD draft FY 1971 plan was essentially the same as the approved FY 1970 plan (NSAM 372) with the exception of the aforementioned 155mm Howitzer and ADM deployments and some other changes which were minor. The plan proposed a ceiling of [redacted] weapons outside the US and continued the ceiling of [redacted] weapons in NATO Europe. There was a reduction of [redacted] weapons authorized for deployment [redacted] and an increase of [redacted] weapons on Guam in anticipation of the demilitarization [redacted] The withdrawal of all nuclear weapons [redacted] and their redeployment remained to be addressed in a separate action after decisions were made on force structure in the Pacific. Coordination with State and AEC had yet to be accomplished by the end of 1969. Preliminary indications were, however, that it would sail through relatively unscathed. State's concern with the politico-military situation [redacted] had been anticipated.

Lance Program of Cooperation

The last major proposal in 1969 concerned the new Lance missile system. Three years prior, on July 8, 1966, the President had approved a program of cooperation for support of our NATO allies with the Lance weapons system. The program, at that time, envisioned replacement of the allied Honest John Launchers on no more than a one-for-one basis. Warhead support would also consist of no more than a one-for-one replacement of the Honest John warheads with Lance warheads.

The development of the original Lance missile with a range of 75 kilometers and a nuclear and non-nuclear capability was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense on December 15, 1967. That decision was made in order to reorient the Lance development and go forward with an extended range Lance (XRL) missile system which was also under study. The XRL offered greater promise with a programmed range of
140 kilometers than did the original Lance with the 75 kilometer range. At this time the US informed its NATO Allies that development of the Lance missile system had been halted due to technological difficulties, that a reappraisal of the system was being made, and that they would be notified when firm decisions had been made relative to the future system. The Lance missile and development then proceeded to the point that six US Lance battalions were programmed to replace four divisional and five corps Honest John battalions and four Sergeant battalions in Europe during CY 72-73. A total of [redacted] Lance warheads would replace [redacted] Honest John and [redacted] Sergeant warheads in NATO Europe when all US Lance units were fielded.

In response to a memorandum from Mr. Nitze in January 1969, the JCS submitted a revised Lance Program of Cooperation to OSD in October of the same year. The proposed program would permit replacement of the allied Honest John and Sergeant systems and the retired UK Corporal units. Estimates of the number of Lance battalions which the allies would purchase ranged from 15 to 33. The number of Lance warheads for support of these units also varied in estimates between [redacted] and [redacted].

By the close of 1969, the draft NWDCP for FY 71, the proposed 155mm Program of Cooperation, and the ADM and Lance Programs of Cooperation had all been coordinated within DoD and were due to go to State and AEC for coordination and concurrences. Still outstanding also were the major decisions to be made on the national security studies which would affect our entire nuclear as well as conventional posture.

On January 20, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the President, requested approval of the JCS proposal to transfer custody of the Nike Hercules warheads from Active Army custodians to Army National Guard technicians. It was noted that approximately 280 Active Army personnel would be released for assignment to other duties which would realize a monetary savings of $2.3 million annually and would also improve operational procedures.

On February 6, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the President, requested approval of the NWDCP for FY 71. The main changes in this plan included a reduction of weapons [redacted] an increase in total weapons [redacted] and an increase of weapons on Guam by [redacted]. The initial deployment of 155mm
Howitzer weapons to Europe under the program of cooperation, although included in the plan, would not occur until country agreements were reached, custodial arrangements were concluded, and units and facilities were operational. The inclusion of additional ADMs into Europe reflected the first phase of the ADM program of cooperation, but actual deployment would be withheld pending Presidential approval of the program and fulfillment of all the requirements for support of non-US NATO forces. These increases would then be accomplished within the established NATO Europe ceiling of weapons. If approved, this plan would authorize a ceiling of weapons to be deployed outside CONUS in FY 71 as compared to at end FY 70 and at end FY 69. The requested afloat ceiling would be compared to the end FY 70 total of and end FY 60 total of.

Dr. Kissinger notified the Secretary on February 20, 1970, that the President had approved the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons at National Guard Nike Hercules sites from Army active duty custodians to National Guard custodians who were employed by the Federal Government. He desired that implementation policy and instructions assure that standards of control then applying to Army active duty custodians were continued when custody was transferred to the National Guard technicians.

On March 2, 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense notified the JCS that Presidential approval had been obtained for transferring the custody of nuclear weapons at National Guard Nike Hercules sites from active duty Army custodians to Army National Guard technicians. The transfer was subject to maintaining the same standards of control as were then applied to the active duty Army custodians. Implementation policy and guidance statements given the JCS are enumerated at Appendix F.

On April 2, 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird requested Presidential approval in principle for the Lance program of cooperation which formally proposed the modernization of non-US NATO forces by replacing the Honest John and Sergeant systems with the Lance and was a revision of the previously approved program of July 8, 1966. Due to substantial changes in the system such as a new warhead and a greater range capability, it was deemed appropriate to submit the revised program for approval in principle.

On April 11, 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard requested Presidential approval in principle for a program of cooperation for Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM). The proposed program anticipated more effective use of manpower and resources available to Allied Command Europe (ACE) by
the formation of non-US NATO ADM teams with attached US custodians. All weapons would be equipped with external combination lock-type PAL devices prior to dispersal, be stored in approved storage sites and be under US custody and control procedures. It was realized, and so stated to the President, that ADMs could pose particular command and control problems stemming from the need to avoid pressures for premature transition from non-nuclear to nuclear conflict while providing for timely use of the munitions once the decision to employ them was made. To forestall undue pressures for early release the additional ADMs to be deployed would, like those already in the NATO area, be subject to the following US guidelines which had been provided to the NATO Military Committee, SHAPE and EUCOM:

"a. Military plans will be so predicated that they do not depend on assured release of ADMs.

"b. The physical positioning of ADMs, within deployment authorizations, may be planned as a military decision. However, when ADMs are positioned forward of the main battle position, provisions will be made for rapid evacuation in the event a political decision to use ADMs is not made in time to prevent potential military overrun.

"c. Plans for the emplacement and/or firing of ADMs should take into account the requirement to obtain first the approval of the national command authority. Such approval may be given for emplacement and firing together; or for emplacement only, followed by separate approval later for firing.

"d. Custodial requirements will cease only after approval for firing has been given by the national command authority."

Deputy Secretary Packard forwarded additional information to Dr. Kissinger on April 16, 1970, answering some questions he had on the 155mm Howitzer Program of Cooperation.

The President approved the NWDCF for FY 71 (NSDM 60) on May 9, 1970. He desired that the NATO ceiling be resubmitted with revised tables; total deployments outside the US would not exceed --- plus the currently planned NATO ceiling rather than the requested --- approval of the ADMs to Europe was withheld pending Presidential decision on the ADM program of cooperation; ceilings --- were approved; provisions of NSAMs 143, 197 and 370 would continue to apply; and that all weapons --- were to be PAL-equipped by June 30, 1970. Yield restrictions of NSAMs 143, 197 and 370 were also continued.
On June 12, 1970, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that authorization be given to Air National Guard technicians in nuclear-equipped F-101 units to control the transfer and movement of, and access to, nuclear weapons and to maintain accountability for them. The JCS also recommended that the same authorization apply to the Air National Guard operation of the F-106 aircraft if and when assigned. JCS stated that approval would result in a net savings of three personnel per squadron, elimination of an active duty Air Force custodial detachment at each base, and the attendant administrative support. This action was a natural follow-on to the Army Nike Hercules custody transfer of the previous year. Additional rationale to support their request was presented as follows:

(SEC) As a result of Program/Budget Project 703, three Aerospace Defense Command active squadrons, equipped with F-101 aircraft and the AIR-2A (GENIE), were inactivated and their aircraft transferred to ANG units located at Bangor, Fargo and Spokane. Each squadron had 18 aircraft. These ANG units were then in training. It was estimated that the first unit, Bangor, would be operationally ready by late summer or early fall. Weapons were located at Bangor for a collocated active ADC F-106 squadron. When the ANG unit was operationally ready, weapons would be made available, but would remain in the custody of active Air Force personnel until the change in policy was approved. The active Air Force would have a 13-man custodial team located at each of the three ANG bases. These personnel (11 security police and 2 maintenance technicians) would maintain custody of the nuclear weapons by manning the entry control points and controlling access to the storage, alert and mass load areas, in addition to functioning as convoy commander when weapons were moved to and from the above areas.

ADC maintained custody of the AIR-2A rocket at ANG organizations by:

a. Assuring continuity and retention of federal control during storage, maintenance, delivery and ground alert.

b. Maintaining control of the location of the rockets within the ANG complex.
The proposed change in policy would result in the improvement of operational procedures since the commander having the mission responsibility would then have control of the total resources required to perform the assigned mission, thus, streamlining the command channel of responsibility.

On November 20, 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority given to the Secretary of Defense by the President, to increase approved deployment levels in NATO Europe when specified conditional deployments were made and to increase specified deployments in any theater up to 10 percent when necessary to meet contingencies. He also desired that he be informed of such actions, the reasons for these actions, and, in the case of contingencies, the expected date of restoration of the authorized level.

Secretary Laird notified the JCS on December 22, 1970, that the apparent savings on the Air National Guard transfer of custody proposal did not appear sufficiently strong to warrant submission to the President and suggested a resubmission at a later time when it appeared that manpower and monetary savings would be more extensive.

On January 16, 1971, Under Secretary of State Johnson, in a letter to Deputy Secretary Packard, requested consideration of some points that State had in regard to deployments. Mr. Johnson said he would be reluctant to accept increases of deployments on foreign territory resulting from their removal would agree to additional tactical bombs if a commensurate reduction in tactical ground support weapons were made, would encourage removal of all nuclear weapons and would discourage any increase of deployments due to political reasons.

Mr. Packard replied to Mr. Johnson on February 9th by stating that Defense did not see any need for additional construction or deployments discussed the increase of tactical bombs as necessary to maintain the status quo due to loss of visibility and reserve stocks redistribution would partially compensate for the lost.

On March 3, 1971, Air Force Secretary Seamans requested Secretary of Defense approval of consolidation of facilities. Specifically, the Air Force desired to combine all nuclear weapons and to remove all activities except WRM storage from
Mr. Packard approved this request on March 30th and concurred in the plan to construct a nuclear weapon storage facility.

On May 24, 1971, Mr. Packard forwarded the proposed deployment plan for FY 72 to the President. The plan contained the following principal changes from the previous year:

a. Reflecting nuclear weapon re-basing required by deploying additional tactical nuclear bombs and simultaneously reducing Army deployments by new weapons, deploying additional tactical nuclear bombs deploying additional tactical nuclear bombs and additional ASW weapons providing balanced reserve on Guam for support of forward areas and returning weapons then stored to Hawaii or CONUS.

b. Increased authorizations in NATO Europe from to allow introduction of WALLEYE air-to-surface missiles and ADMs.

c. Decreased deployments in the Atlantic region by weapons by removing ASW weapons from and increasing by strategic bombs to Puerto Rico.

d. Increased afloat totals from to to take into consideration the scheduled deployments of POSEIDON missiles.

The President approved the NWDCP for FY 72 (NSDM 121) on July 21, 1971, with the exception of planned deployments. He forbade additional tactical nuclear weapons deployments and desired that these weapons be deployed instead to US territory, possessions, or afloat in the Pacific theater or returned to CONUS. In addition, he requested that more information be included in the FY 73 plan such as deployments required in support of specified US and NATO contingency war plans and SIOP; regional threats in terms of numbers and types of targets, weapons, delivery forces available and objectives to be achieved by use of the weapons against the identified threat target systems; the US (CONUS and overseas) and allied nuclear delivery units in approved force plans be identified by unit types and numbers of delivery vehicles and delivery vehicle loading factors; and the rationale for significant changes in overseas
deployments requested for FY 73 or projected for FY 74.

(TS//FOR) On August 17, 1971, Air Force Secretary Seamans requested Secretary of Defense approval for construction of storage facilities for only weapons maintained since the President did not approve the deployment of the additional weapons.

(TS//FOR) In replying, Secretary Seamans, on September 3, 1971, Mr. Packard stated that he deemed it prudent to postpone construction of nuclear storage facilities.

(U) Effective November 3, 1971, the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) was redesignated the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) by DoD Directive 5105.31.

(☐) The JCS resubmitted the Air National Guard proposal on December 7, 1971, to the Secretary of Defense since, with the recently approved safety rules for ANG operation of the F-101B/AIR-2A weapon system, inclusion of monitoring as well as custodial functions would result in an increase in the strength of active Air Force custodial detachments to an average of 17 personnel - four over the previously planned strength for each of the F-101 units. The JCS stated that the annual support cost for the 100 active Air Force personnel would be $823,000. The ANG assumption of custodial functions would require 50 technicians to augment the current authorization at an additional cost of $420,000. Replacing 100 active Air Force personnel by 50 ANG technicians would result in a savings of approximately $403,000. The JCS further stated that an additional annual savings of $300,000 and 40 manpower spaces could be realized when the ANG received four squadrons of F-106 aircraft by the end of FY 73.
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TOP SECRET

CHAPTER 19

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS

1972

Immediately upon the completion of President Nixon's [redacted] Secretary Laird sent for the purpose of providing him a current first-hand report on the circumstances surrounding the security of our nuclear weapons. His findings indicated that [redacted] had conducted themselves well in their relations with US personnel. Nuclear weapon storage was not discussed. [Redacted] had cooperated fully with US security personnel by providing base security outside US storage and aircraft areas unobtrusively. did not react overtly in any way to nuclear weapons movements. In summary, close and friendly relations [redacted] continued and this relationship was not likely to change in the near future in the opinion of the Embassy staff as well as US military officials there. The personnel at the storage site were well trained and led and the storage facilities, while modest, were considered adequate from a security point of view.

On January 31, 1972, the JCS submitted their final proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan for FY 1973. The principal change to this plan was for increased POSEIDON missile deployments.

The ATSD(AE) presented the deployment issues to Secretary Laird on the same day. These issues and the ATSD(AE)'s recommended solutions were:

a. Retain some nuclear weapons in Europe as MBFR "bargaining chips."

b. Approve the JCS request for [redacted] tactical nuclear bombs

c. Continue deployment of [redacted] ADMs to West Germany instead of the requested by the JCS primarily due to political and military undesirability.
d. Hold tactical nuclear bombs for US forces at present levels on the grounds that the JCS rationale did not adequately justify the slight increase.

e. Propose maintaining current authorization of strategic nuclear bombs at JCS requested an increase to but the Secretary of Defense decision of October 16, 1970, deferred this request.

(U) Secretary Laird approved the ATSD(AE) recommendations on February 1, 1972.

(SFERD) On March 27, 1972, the President was notified by Deputy Secretary Rush that all nuclear weapons had been removed as of March 21, 1972, and also informed the President that there had been no public reaction to the shipments. This action was necessary directing that:

a. Nuclear weapon deployments be reduced gradually to no more than by the end of CY 1972. If necessary, this number would be reduced further (as required by the weapons mix) so that the number deployed would be no more than could be removed by under emergency evacuation conditions. This reduction would streamline nuclear operations so as to facilitate all emergency actions should any be required in the future.

b. Plan to continue nuclear weapon storage although at a reduced level. It would be understood that future events may lead to total withdrawal of nuclear weapons

c. Plans for construction of a nuclear storage facility would be held in abeyance.

d. The improvements to the physical security of the nuclear storage area including sensor installations, which had been postponed pending a would now be completed expeditiously.

(SFERD) On March 31, 1972, Secretary Laird reported to the President that his review of had been completed. Mr. Laird
informed the President that he had directed the following actions: (1) gradual reduction in nuclear weapons deployments to about half the authorized limit; (2) holding in abeyance plans for the construction of a nuclear storage facility and (3) the expeditious completion of modest improvements in the physical security of the nuclear storage area. Secretary Laird also informed the President that the reduction in the number of weapons deployed to while facilitating such emergency actions as might become necessary of weapons deployed forward the SIOP strike plans, would be fully covered. It was also specifically stated that the removal of weapons should not be obvious to.

(SEED) On 9 May 1972, in response to requests for rationale of deployments and stockpile plans outlined in NSDMs 121 and 128, the Deputy Secretary forwarded a study on war plans information to the President. The study explained that to support the National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, the DoD based nuclear weapons stockpile requirements on a real war-fighting capability; and deployed nuclear weapons to provide a credible perception of resolve to use the weapons if necessary. General and contingency war plans provided a range of conventional and nuclear options within the limits of current force capabilities. The level and mix of nuclear warheads in the current stockpile was based upon the capability to engage and defeat a comprehensive target system while meeting material and budgeting constraints. The capabilities of our strategic offensive forces were integrated in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to provide for their most effective employment against preplanned targets. The US stockpile of strategic warheads did not provide the capability to defeat the complete enemy target system, however, through the ability to respond after absorbing a first strike, it provided, in conjunction with other force elements, a high confidence of deterring an all-out surprise attack. Plans for employment of nuclear weapons for tasks not incorporated into the SIOP were based on the assumption that early nuclear weapons employment would not be authorized except in response to an enemy nuclear attack or other most compelling circumstances. However, plans did include provisions for use of nuclear weapons at any stage of a conflict during which their employment could be justified from a military standpoint. As a result, the stockpile provided a range of capabilities that permits nuclear responses appropriate to a wide variety of situations. Projection of future stockpile needs in view of an expanding and increasingly complex target system was recommended.

(TSRED) The study then developed in more detail five specific categories of discussion. These categories and main comments were:

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a. Strategic Offensive Weapons -- which discussed targeting, weapons application and expected damage related to the SIOP. It also included discussion on recovery and reconstitution of the strategic bomber force, other contingencies involving these forces, a summary of the characteristics of the strategic weapons stockpile and indications of current force loading.

b. Strategic Defensive Weapons -- summarized current capabilities in terms of types and yields of warheads, numbers of delivery vehicles and vehicle load factors.

c. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Europe -- described the current relationships of the SIOP to NATO's theater nuclear strike forces, summarized key elements of SACEUR's General Strike Plan relative to the attack of fixed targets and described the targeting concept in SACEUR's Regional Defense Plan for application against non-fixed targets. It further identified the principal shortcomings in the quality of the current tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. The quantity of weapons allocated to CINCEUR in FY 1972 was compared with SACEUR's estimates of weapons requirements and included a summary of changes in nuclear weapon deployments proposed in FY 1973 for NATO Europe.

d. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Atlantic -- summarized nuclear weapons requirements for the region related to the SIOP, support for SACEUR and support for the execution of other contingencies. It described general purpose naval force nuclear weapon requirements for conflict-at-sea in both the Atlantic and Pacific and indicated overall stockpile composition and force loading for nuclear antisubmarine and naval surface-to-air warheads.

e. Theater Nuclear Weapons--Pacific -- dealt with weapons requirements for SIOP and other strategic commitments in the Pacific region and with the single contingency in Asia requiring the largest probable expenditure of nuclear weapons. It also summarized principal changes proposed for nuclear deployments in the Pacific in FY 1973.

Deputy Secretary Rush forwarded the FY 1973 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the President for approval on May 11, 1972. Significant changes from the previous year were listed as follows:

a. Review of other requirements, Westpac deployments would decrease from XXX in FY 72 to XXX for FY 73.

b. A decrease in NATO Europe of XXX in FY 72 to XXX in FY 73 resulting from withdrawal of XXX tactical bombs from US forces in Germany.
introduction of aircraft previously supported by US bombs, and withdrawal of Honest John and Sergeant missiles in conjunction with the planned introduction of the Lance for US forces.

c. Atlantic deployments would be reduced by weapons due to termination of SAC operations at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico, (bombs) and deactivation of the Bomarc system (warheads).

d. Increase of weapons afloat from to which reflected additional Poseidon missile deployments.

(TS/RE) The President approved the NWDCP for FY 1973 (NSDM 178) on July 18, 1972. He stipulated that deployment of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense determine at the appropriate time whether deployments in support of the ADM program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; that PAL's be installed on all the remaining nuclear weapons not included under NSDM 60; and that all nuclear weapons be PAL equipped. He also requested that, for the FY 74 plan, a rationale be provided for any significant changes in overseas or afloat deployments including a discussion of military objectives and capabilities affected by such changes in the deployments and that a total deployment program and schedule be shown for the weapon systems requested to be deployed in support of US or allied forces during this period.

(¢) On September 13, 1972, Secretary Laird requested Presidential approval of the proposal to transfer custody to the Air National Guard.

(©) Dr. Kissinger notified the Secretary of Defense on October 24, 1972, that the President approved the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to Air National Guard units equipped with F-101B or F-106 aircraft and AIR-2A/W25 GENIE nuclear weapons. The President also expressed the desire that implementing instructions and policy statements assure that standards of control required of Air Force active duty custodians were equally applicable to ANG technicians having custody of nuclear weapons.

(©) One week later, Deputy Secretary Rush notified the JCS that Presidential approval had been obtained for the transfer of custody to the Air National Guard and attached the policy and guidance statements for implementing the transfer. These statements are enumerated in Appendix C.
(TSP) In late November, after joint preparation by the Defense and State Department staffs, a joint memorandum to the President was forwarded summarizing the political and military impact of removal of nuclear weapons. This memorandum was based on the premise that the US commitment may at some time make it necessary to consider withdrawal of our nuclear weapons. It was noted that neither State nor Defense advocated the removal of our weapons at that time. The paper examined the military and political factors associated with such a decision in the context of programmed force deployments and existing policy guidance. Contents of the paper follow:

"Authority has existed for the deployment of nuclear weapons since mid-1957. Actual deployment of nuclear weapons first occurred in January 1958 (for the nuclear-armed Matador cruise missile). The first nuclear bombs were deployed early in 1960. Today only tactical nuclear bombs are stored.

"The authorized level is bombs; however, in March of this year the Secretary of Defense directed that these be reduced gradually to by the end of this calendar year in order to improve our ability to control these weapons if required; for instance, we would be able to remove all of our weapons or we would be prepared for more rapid emergency disablement (or destruction) of our weapons. On February 19, 1972, the Secretary of Defense directed that PAL's (electromechanical locking devices) be installed by the end of this calendar year on all nuclear weapons stored as a means of providing additional protection. Other steps are being taken to increase the physical security of our nuclear storage area.

"For some years the US had maintained a continuous 24 hour nuclear alert recently with two and sometimes with four . On February 18, 1972, these aircraft were withdrawn to augment our was notified before these aircraft were redeployed and was informed that they will be returned The aircraft have not yet resumed OCA status but are expected to do so in the near future at no higher level than previously. You recently approved deployment plan for end FY 73 which includes continued deployment of four SIOP alert
"Warfighting Considerations

"Four SIOP sorties are planned to be launched with ___. These forces form a very small portion of the US nuclear forces currently targeted in the SIOP against ____ and thus it can be said that they play only a relatively minor role in attacking the ____ threat. If these ____ our weapons were removed, we might redeploy them during periods of crisis, assuming this right is maintained, or we might assign these four sorties to aircraft carriers, Polaris submarines, or B-52's ___. Therefore, decisions concerning nuclear weapons ___ should be based primarily on considerations other than the function of these weapons in the SIOP.

"Beyond the SIOP, contingency plans relating to the defense ____ as well as the overall theater general war plan, ____ In fact, there are 159 contingency targets (e.g., port facilities, airfields, POL and other military targets) ____ which land-based ___ can reach only from bases ___

"Of course, the precise number of these targets that would be struck depends upon the situation at the time and the particular planning option selected. Also, as in the SIOP, if aircraft and weapons were removed they could be redeployed in time of crisis, or other weapons systems might be substituted.

"Forward Basing

"With ____ our nuclear storage rights along ____ (We also have weapons stored on Guam, but only the longer range B-52's can reach the ___) Redeployment of the relatively small number of weapons poses no great logistic problem. In terms of military capabilities, however, a significant consideration is the contraction of forward storage options. Our forward base structure ____ permits nuclear armed aircraft launched from these areas, together with carrier aircraft and strategic bombers from ____ and with strategic bombers from CONUS or sea-based missiles which might appear ambiguous ____
"If we were denied storage (and our storage rights there have been subjected to increased uncertainty in the last few months), we would be left with as forward nuclear weapon sites. The potential importance of areas would then increase. The removal of nuclear weapons under these circumstances would leave for forward storage and would degrade our capability for tactical nuclear response in areas other than. However, if reentry rights were negotiated and if these were honored in a crisis, we could redeploy our weapons if a situation developed requiring such redeployments.

"Credibility"

"To the extent they are known or are assumed to be present, our nuclear deployments enhance the credibility, both to Allies and adversaries, of our capability and will to stand by our commitments. The visibility of these weapons and their associated quick reaction aircraft, are likely to have more specific meaning to longer range B-52's on Guam or missile submarines in the Pacific. In addition, these weapons and aircraft contribute to our total posture of deterrence elsewhere in Asia. It should be recognized, however, that these weapons Nevertheless, their deterrent effect may not be diminished greatly inasmuch as when other available US nuclear capabilities are considered.

"Possibility of Seizure"

"Another consideration is the possible seizure of our weapons. The US recently has taken steps to increase the physical security in our nuclear storage area and recent evaluations have concluded that the is of a high order and tightly controlled and that an attempt at seizure of our weapons is remote except in the unlikely event that such a move was directed by the. Moreover, all things considered, probably are every bit as secure from seizure as are our weapons in other foreign countries."
government. It is clear, therefore, that the focus of our planning should be on the timing, conditions and order of withdrawal although we should not foreclose the possibility of a continued presence for an extended period of time if tensions in the area fail to diminish.

"Impact of Removal -

[Redacted] our nuclear capability provides visible evidence of our support. Regardless of the rationale used, would view the removal of US nuclear weapons (and they would surely become quickly aware of it) as a severe blow, and as a significant manifestation of a weakening US commitment. This decision would be more upsetting to them, for example, than would the removal support forces for the as the latter are not related directly to the defense. Nevertheless, eventual removal of the weapons is a step may now foresee.

"There was no reaction to several changes during the past year in the number of weapons in storage as opposed to their active interest in the redeployment of the. In the latter instance, a reaction was not unexpected, since we notified prior to the redeployment of these aircraft. No notice, of course, is given of the nuclear weapon movements and we do not know how detailed their knowledge is of our weapon storage levels.

"It is likely that interest in the aircraft stems from the relationship of although it is most certainly understood that two aircraft on nuclear alert would not, by themselves, be decisive in preventing. Nevertheless, it is probable that sees the aircraft as representative of the full range of US support should problem.'
"A further critical factor in terms of impact on would be the advance notice provided before the weapons were removed. has been, and probably will continue to be, very resilient in its ability to adapt to changes in the international environment. Given 12 to 18 months notice of an impending withdrawal, it would very probably be able to adapt both its domestic and foreign positions to such an eventuality.

Removal on short notice would, on the other hand, severely shake We should nevertheless consider that advance notice could increase the danger action to prevent removal of the weapons.

"Over the years, nuclear weapons has not been emphasized pronouncements. Thus, although has made it clear that US military presence of relations with the US, it is not clear from past history that the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes a particularly odious component of the US military presence. Rather, it is largely the physical presence of US forces and installations has frequently denounced the specifically demanded that the US abandon that seems to have assumed that the

"The political impact of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons depends to some extent on other moves we may make in our force deployments as a whole. were apparently satisfied with US statements concerning US force reductions because they established a trend toward an outcome preferred by will probably react to future US action or inaction in terms of whether these reinforce or reverse movement toward that ultimate objective. We can probably anticipate a degree of flexibility on timing; e.g., are not pressing us to reduce forces at a time when our would rule out any significant reductions. When permit, however, and particularly
If a ... some significant reductions in forces not directly related to the defense...

...expect removal of such units as the C-130 squadrons as a consequence of a period as evidence of US intentions.

In this respect the nuclear weapons could play an important role. Their removal is likely to recognize withdrawals to meet minimum expectation that reductions be both public enough (C-130's) and substantial enough (nuclear weapons) to confirm that the trend is continuing.

However, one might consider using the withdrawal of nuclear weapons as either an explicit or implicit action. In fulfilling our the pros and cons of withdrawing nuclear weapons also will have to be weighed against those of withdrawing of other units with substantial theater-support functions, i.e., communications and intelligence.

"Other Nations"

"To the extent that removal of nuclear weapons became known to other nations in the area, the political impact would probably be somewhat mixed. The assessment of our move would probably be less severe if it were obvious had not been shocked by it. While welcome as a manifestation of further the move would to some extent lessen the credibility of US commitments. For example, might be more difficult to deal with on the issue of nuclear storage in their country. Although contributing uneasiness, there would probably be no significant impact relationships or military arrangements. while uneasy concerning the future military status would probably not find it difficult to accept the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons as long as it were not coupled to a wholesale US withdrawal area."
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The President approved, on 7 February 1973, the proposal that the SIOP-tasked [redacted] when aircraft availabilities permitted and desired to be informed of the contemplated timing for the return of these aircraft.

During a March 1973 security visit to some NATO installations, Senators Pastore and Baker questioned the storage of nuclear depth bombs [redacted]. Specifically, their question dealt with possible usefulness versus apparent vulnerability. The Senators had been told that the U.S. Navy aircraft which would use these weapons were based at Jacksonville, Florida, and they questioned whether it might be more practical for these aircraft to fly with their own weapons rather than having them stored [redacted]. They also questioned, in a broader sense, their difficulty in conceiving a wartime scenario whereby the Russians would allow slow propeller driven aircraft to search out their submarines in the water [redacted].

On 16 May 73, Deputy Secretary Clements informed Dr. Kissinger that worldwide [redacted] assets continued to be fully committed in Southeast Asia and he therefore could not present a definite date for resumption of the SIOP alert. He also stated that the requirement for SIOP alert [redacted] remained valid and that Dr. Kissinger would be advised when firm dates became available.

On 8 June 1973, Deputy Secretary Clements forwarded the request for approval of the FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment plan. Specifically addressed in this memorandum were differences from the previous plan which were:

a. The authorization for NATO Europe would be decreased from [redacted] in FY 1973 to [redacted] in FY 1974. Detailed information included a net decrease in missiles deployed in West Germany on the Honest John/Sergeant swap for Lance and the reduction of tactical bombs [redacted] because of an uncertainty concerning the date that the unit would become operational and assume a nuclear role.

c. Atlantic deployments would be reduced by [redacted] pending completion of detailed arrangements with the [redacted] storage.

d. Authorization of weapons afloat would increase from [redacted] in FY 1973 to [redacted] in FY 1974. This reflected the continued deployment of additional warheads in the new Poseidon missiles.

e. The proposed plan would authorize a total deployment of [redacted] weapons outside the United States at the end of FY 1974 as opposed to [redacted] at the end of FY 1973 and [redacted] for end FY 1972. The plan would also authorize the conditional deployment of up to [redacted] additional weapons outside the U.S. for various contingencies—an increase of [redacted] from FY 1973.

f. Secretary Laird's intention to extend PAL controls to all nuclear weapons on foreign soil [redacted]

(SRAD) The President approved the NWDCP for FY 1974 on 18 July 1973 (NSDM 226). He stipulated that deployments of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense would recommend whether ADM deployments in support of the program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; that PAL devices would continue to be installed in all weapons deployed to NATO Europe that PALs would continue to be placed on all weapons deployed in that PALs would be placed on all ASW weapons deployed by the end of FY 74; and that replacement of tactical bombs deployed with PAL-equipped bombs by the end of CY 1974 or as soon thereafter as procurement of such bombs permitted.

(TOP) On 24 August 1973, the JCS requested a change in the deployment authority due to a security problem at storage site. It was determined that, the site was considered
vulnerable to intruders and dissidents. The JCS requested authority to deploy **ASW warheads** from **interim basis** while retaining deployment authority for the warheads **when the worldwide security review was completed.**

**TOP SECRET**

On 27 September 1973, Secretary Schlesinger approved the JCS request and also requested that he be informed of recommendations concerning **when the worldwide security review was completed.**

**TOP SECRET**

On 3 November 1973, Secretary Schlesinger replied to Senator Pastore concerning the **questions. He stated that the two basic reasons for forward-basing ASW weapons **were that the weapons must be prepositioned near the waters in which their use was anticipated and that they were for support of allied forces with whom we have appropriate programs of cooperation. Additional rationale to support these reasons follow. **and forward deployed US aircraft could make immediate use of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons **Patrol aircraft would deploy from the US with conventional loads and then onload nuclear ASW weapons at **if the situation escalated to nuclear operations. The site is the only peacetime storage site close to **The US/NATO forces fully expect to have air superiority and control of air spaces over this **fighter/interceptor squadrons based **and USAF fighter/interceptor squadrons based **would provide air control and ASW unit protection.

**TOP SECRET**

On 20 June 1974, the President, by NSDM 258, approved the request of the Secretary of Defense to change the nuclear weapon yield constraint imposed by NSAM 143 and modified by NSAM 199. The yield provisions were amended to accommodate B61-2 and B61-3 tactical nuclear bomb support of non-US NATO forces. The yield of bombs provided to non-US NATO forces shall not exceed **KT.

**TOP SECRET**

On the same day, the President approved in principle the programs of cooperation **the Federal Republic of Germany to develop and support B43, B57 and B61-2/B61-3 nuclear bomb delivery capabilities with the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). The President also approved in principle programs of cooperation which would add B61-2/B61-3 nuclear bomb support to those existing programs **the Federal Republic of Germany, already supported with the B28, B43 and B57 nuclear bombs.

**TOP SECRET**

All weapons were removed **on 18 July 1974.**
(SEPD) The JCS notified the Secretary of Defense on 7 October 1974 that their examination of the deployment posture at [redacted] reaffirmed the military justification for forward-deployed nuclear ASW weapons [redacted] and recommended that all such weapons be consolidated.

The JCS rationale was presented as follows:

a. [redacted] had been noncontroversial from a political and security standpoint and was located in proximity to the area of operations. Ample storage space was available for the additional weapons.

b. [redacted] of the weapons were earmarked for [redacted] use and the consolidation would only involve an intracountry move.

c. If [redacted] was maintained in a contingency status, B57s could be airlifted from [redacted] and returned to the site by the time delivery aircraft arrived. It could also be utilized as a divert field.

d. [redacted] could absorb the increased inventory without increasing the number of support and security personnel. All of the US security forces at [redacted] could be reassigned. Some weapons technicians would still be required at [redacted] to maintain security and support equipment.

(TOPSECRET) The next day, the President approved the NWDCP for FY 1975 (NSDM 274). He stipulated that actual deployments against the authorizations would be controlled by the Secretary of Defense and be in accordance with Public Law 93-365 (the Nunn Amendment); deployments of 155mm projectiles for support of non-US NATO units would be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons with US forces in West Germany; that the Secretary of Defense recommend at an appropriate time whether ADM deployments in support of the program of cooperation be accompanied by corresponding increases in the total number of these weapons in NATO Europe; and that deployment of [redacted] tactical bombs [redacted] and [redacted] ASW warheads to [redacted] Guam under conditions of advanced readiness be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the authorization for these weapons in Guam. He also approved retaining excess Honest John and Sergeant warheads in-theater but directed that they be identified as special deployments rather than included under the authority for unforeseen crises. He stated that except as necessary to comply with the provisions of Public Law 93-365, these warheads would remain in-theater unless their redeployment was approved by the President. The President further directed that his approval be obtained before removing weapons from
that yield restrictions of NSAM 143 as modified by NSAMs 197 and 370 and NSDM 258 continue to apply; that PAL devices continue to be maintained on all weapons deployed to NATO Europe, and on all PAL-equipped weapons that those weapons without PAL devices be replaced with PAL-equipped weapons by the end of FY 1976; that deployment of weapons to be held in abeyance pending further review; and that any plan to deploy weapons to be submitted to him for approval. The President additionally desired that future annual deployment authorization requests include plans for two fiscal years.

(U) The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished on January 19, 1975, and reestablished as the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The AEC’s Division of Regulation became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the same date.

(TSFRD) On 20 January 1975, the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the FY76-77 Deployment Authorization Plan. The Secretary decided upon the removal of all nuclear weapons from by early FY 76 but authorized conditional deployments as follows:

a. Up to tactical nuclear bombs for advanced readiness.

b. Up to tactical nuclear bombs for temporary offload of ships when required for emergency reasons.

c. Up to AAW/ASW for temporary offload of ships when required for emergency reasons and for advanced readiness of ASW operations (warheads).

(SFRD) At the same time, the Secretary of Defense deferred a decision on the issue until Navy studies addressing the rationale and inventory needs for AAW and ASW weapons had been completed.

(TSFRD) On 16 April 1975, the Secretary of Defense submitted the FY 1976 and FY 1977 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the President. It was noted that the plan incorporated many changes resulting from a rigorous internal reexamination of deployments in the context of revised military planning, the restructuring and modernization of military forces, the Nunn Amendment (PL 93-365) and ongoing MBFR negotiations. Therefore, the
FY 76-77 authorization request for Europe was set at the ceiling established by PL 93-365 of [redacted] weapons. Identification of possible weapons reduction of [redacted] for FY 76 in Europe, which included [redacted] for Option III in MBFR and an additional [redacted] in FY 77 to account for reduced military requirements, were addressed with the objective of reaching levels in Europe of [redacted] in FY 76 and [redacted] in FY 77. The proposed reductions were based on:

a. Replacement of Honest John and Sergeant with the more survivable and flexible Lance SSM on a less than one-for-one basis.

b. Replacement of some fixed yield bombs with selectable yield bombs which were more suitable to the European environment.

c. Readjustment of load factors of nuclear air defense weapons to have more nonnuclear missiles on alert.

d. Withdrawal to CONUS of those weapons intended for dual-based forces and some of the less critical weapons held in reserve by the theater commander for battlefield use.

e. Overall deployments in Westpac would decrease from [redacted] in FY 75 to [redacted] in FY 76 and [redacted] in FY 77.

f. Atlantic deployments would be reduced from [redacted] in FY 75 to [redacted] in FY 76 and FY 77.

g. Authorizations of weapons afloat would decrease from [redacted] in FY 75 to [redacted] in FY 76 but increase slightly in FY 77 to [redacted]

h. The proposed plan would authorize a total deployment of [redacted] in FY 76 and [redacted] in FY 77.

On April 30, 1975, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in a memorandum to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense stated that the President had directed that, until further notice, there will be no withdrawal of United States forces or nuclear weapons from overseas areas without his expressed approval.

In accordance with General Wickham's request for a list of the Force Actions and Nuclear Actions that were immediately affected by General Scowcroft's April 30 memorandum, the ATSD(AE) on May 9, submitted the following information to the ASD(ISA) for incorporation into an information memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.
a. Guam

-Action. In accordance with the Presidential approval FY 75 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization and FY 75-77 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. HONEST JOHN warheads and MADAM are to be returned to CONUS by end FY 75 for retirement.

-Impact. No operational impact. Retention in Guam post FY 75 would require an administrative change to the FY 75-77 stockpile. ERDA's retirement schedule could be affected.

-Recommendation. We should continue with this move or seek Presidential approval to extend these deployments.

b. [Redacted]

-Action. It had been planned to withdraw all remaining tactical nuclear bombs from [Redacted] by early FY 76, upon Presidential approval of FY 76-77 Deployment Plan. Significant cost savings would accrue.

-Impact. Short-term delay would have negligible effect. Long-term delay or a Presidential requirement to retain nuclear weapons at [Redacted] would require major security improvements (approximately $1 million construction costs) and continued O&M. CINCPAC has no operational requirement for these weapons past FY 75.

-Recommendation. Short-term delay has a negligible financial effect and no movement is planned pending Presidential approval of the FY 76-77 Deployment Plan. We recommend withdrawal in FY 76 upon Presidential approval.

c. FRG

-Action. [Redacted] PERSHING warheads are currently scheduled for return to CONUS by end FY 75 for retirement.

-Impact. No operational impact. Stockpile authorization change required.

-Recommendation. We should place these warheads in the Special Deployment authorization for possible use in MBFR negotiations.
"d. high-yield tactical bombs, excess to USCINCEUR's needs, were to be returned to CONUS. Action currently on a hold due to political sensitivities.

- **Impact.** None.

- **Recommendation.** No movement until Presidential approval of FY 76-77 Deployment Plan and consultation with USCINCEUR.

e. **Alaska**

- **Action.** Tactical bombs, 155mm AFAPs, and NIKE HERCULES warheads are to be returned to CONUS for storage by end FY 75.

- **Impact.** Removal of these weapons from Alaska would achieve cost and manpower savings and eliminate certain security problems.

- **Recommendation.** These weapons are not listed in the Deployment Plan as an overseas deployment. This should therefore be accomplished and treated as a CONUS move."

On May 23, 1975, General Scowcroft notified General Wickham that his verbal request to remove older theater nuclear weapons from Guam for retirement had been approved.

General Scowcroft notified the Secretary of Defense on 30 June 1975 that the President had authorized continuation of the FY 75 deployments pending his decision on the FY 76 plan.
DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
1975-1977

(TS/FRD) On 16 July 1975, NSDM 300 was issued which gave Presidential approval to the FY 76 and FY 77 deployment plan. Approved ceilings were: ___ for Western Europe; ___ for the Atlantic; ___ for the Pacific; ___ afloat for FY 76 and ___ afloat for FY 77. Authorizations for ___ would remain at the current levels. Approval of the SACEUR Reserve concept was withheld pending receipt and review of an analysis of its political and military implications. MBEF excess in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) would be retained. The President also requested rationale for the proposed reductions and revised deployment tables reflecting this NSDM decision.

(U) The Secretary of Defense forwarded the rationale and revised deployment tables to the President on 1 August 1975.

(S/FRD) In a message to USCINCEUR dated 15 August 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conditional deployment of ___ Lance warheads ___

(S/FRD) On 16 August 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a message, directed that planning be initiated to consolidate ASW nuclear weapons from ___

(TS/FRD) By memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated 10 September 1975, the ATSD(AE) outlined the rationale for reductions in the numbers of forward deployed nuclear weapons that were identified based on military requirements, peacetime security of these weapons and economic considerations. The general rationale presented was as follows:

--- Pacific.

--- Remove the remaining ___ nuclear weapons from ___ but retain the storage facilities for contingency redeployments. There is no longer a requirement for these tactical bombs in a SIOP role. Strategic assets have assumed the role previously held by these land-based tactical bombs. Carrier nuclear forces are available to provide a backup capability.
SECRET

(S-PDR) Reduce the authorization of nuclear weapons from the current ___ to ___.

- Air delivered nuclear bomb requirements have been reduced from ___ to ___ as CINCPAC no longer maintained a SIOP commitment.

- Reduce Army weapons from ___ to ___ by deleting all atomic demolition munitions (ADM), reducing tactical missile warheads (___ Honest John to ___ and ___ Sergeant to ___), reducing ___ Nike Hercules nuclear warheads to ___ and reducing artillery nuclear rounds from ___ to ___.

-- NATO.

(S-PDR) Reduce a limited number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe outside the NATO Guidelines Area (no MBFR implications) as follows:

- Eventually remove all nuclear air defense weapons from ___ Nuclear warheads ___ were demated and replaced with conventional rounds during ___ They continue to be held in storage thus requiring US custodial and ___ security forces.

- The nuclear storage sites in ___ are believed by many in Congress to be vulnerable to overrun in a war or takeover in a coup. Aside from this political pressure, it was recognized that their military utility, in the current deployment posture was questionable.

- Remove from ___ B43 bombs that are no longer in SACEUR's Strike Plans plus ___ other bombs that were designated for restrict or replacement of losses. These weapons were solely in support of US forces and had no Program of Cooperation implications. This action would reduce bombs for US forces from ___ to ___ bombs would remain Air Force requirements under SACEUR's strike plans.

--

(S-PDR) Remove ___ nuclear depth bombs stored ashore ___ The Chairman JCS supported a Secretary of Defense decision
that these could be redeployed to CONUS. They were retained in

country for possible use as bargaining chips in
country for possible use as bargaining chips in

rights negotiations and their removal would be part of the final
package upon completion of these negotiations.

-- United Kingdom. (S FRD) The British had been informed of
the Secretary of Defense direction to consolidate

with other weapons at

This
consolidation was not affected by the NSDM 300 freeze.

(S FRD) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, by a 13 November 1975
message, execution of consolidation plans to relocate the ASW
weapons from

(TS FRD) By JCSM-422-75, dated 4 December 1975, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff forwarded their proposed FY 1977 and FY 1978 Nuclear Weapon
Deployment Plan to the Secretary of Defense. The proposed deploy-
ment levels were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized</th>
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<th>Proposed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
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<td>Pacific</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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</table>

Note: Proposed levels resulted from a JCS reevaluation of
deployments based on the posture necessary to support
operational requirements in the context of "today's environ-
ment." MBFR Option III, reconsideration of Nike Hercules
reductions

and significant reductions
within NATO were also addressed.
The US CINC EUR, by JCS message, was requested to complete a study on a proposed reduction of nuclear warheads for Nike Hercules Options of this study were to encompass the following:

a. No reduction in Nike Hercules warhead deployments.

b. Twenty-five, 50, and 75 percent reductions in nuclear capable batteries per battalion equivalent with the batteries affected retaining conventional posture.

c. Twenty, 50, and 80 percent reductions in nuclear loading factor per nuclear capable Nike Hercules battery.

In a 16 December 1975 memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, the ATSD(AE) authorized removal of remaining Honest John warheads. This action was authorized since the NSC staff had determined that modernization programs having no effect on MBFR negotiations were not subject to the "freeze" indicated by NSDM 300 and could therefore be completed.

US CINC EUR replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1975 regarding the Nike Hercules review. The reply referred to a SACEUR assessment which presented no information indicating military justification for introducing gaps by completely withdrawing the Nike Hercules system, eliminating the nuclear component, or thinning out the system. The SACEUR study indicates that a reduction to a standard load of ten warheads per US battery might be acceptable although the adjustment could create some element of risk. The main concern was that political reaction to US unilateral reduction could be counterproductive in the current modernization dialogue and would be viewed as a clear sign of weakening US resolve in the face of economic pressures.

In January 1976, it was decided that the FY 1977/78 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan would be forwarded to the Defense Review Panel (DRP) Working Group for discussion.

By JCSM 20-76 dated 19 January 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their site-by-site review of nuclear weapons storage sites, identified candidate sites for consolidation and closure and provided related information on personnel requirements relating to the storage sites in NATO Europe. The proposed reductions are...
summarized as follows:

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<th>1 Jan 75</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 48 Nike Hercules sites in central Europe.*

**S** On 27 January 1976, Presidential Advisor Scowcroft informed the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved an additional [redacted] Poseidon reentry vehicles for [redacted].

(U) A proposed deployment plan package was forwarded to OASD(ISA) on 4 February 1976 with the request that it be furnished to the DRP working group. The ATSD(AE) also requested discussions at the
working group level after February 18 with a meeting of the principals in either late February or early March 1976.

(U) On March 22, 1976, the FY 1977/1978 Plan was transmitted by the NSC staff to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting final agency concurrence.

(U) Department of Defense concurrence was forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 5 April 1976 by the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

(SFIR) By JCSSM-127-76, dated 5 April 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that Presidential approval be sought to remove the ASW weapons stored. The rationale for this request was that there were indications that a would be ratified prior to completion of US/UK negotiations on increasing storage at If these weapons were not removed prior to ratification, would have legitimate cause for complaint.

(SFIR) The Deputy ATSD(AE) provided an interim reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 April 1976 concerning site consolidation. He reaffirmed that NATO site closures were dependent upon consultation, which he noted had been slow; that OSD M&RA and PA&E, as well as ATSD(AE) and JCS, had been working since November 1975 on the problem. He informed the JCS that site consolidation issues had previously been addressed in the April 1975 "Nunn Report" and the 19 December 1975 study, "Improving the Effectiveness of NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces." He further stated that it was being recommended that the Secretary of Defense address this issue at the 19th Nuclear Planning Group meeting in June 1976.

(SFIR) In a memorandum to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense dated 3 May 1976, the Deputy ATSD(AE) provided a point paper on proposed reductions. The points made were:

-- The FY 1977-1978 Deployment Plan proposed that, from a total of nuclear weapons then authorized weapons be incrementally withdrawn, leaving warheads at the end of FY 1977. Types to be withdrawn would include nuclear artillery, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, atomic demolition munitions, and tactical bombs.

-- The rationale presented for this withdrawal was:
From a military viewpoint, an approximate balance existed between opposing forces was not anticipated; that aircraft were no longer SIOP committed; that greater operational emphasis should be made on integrating strategic, tactical, land and sea based systems similar to that occurring in NATO; that withdrawal of some of the older, more obsolete systems, e.g., Sergeant and Honest John, would be permitted; Nike Hercules (conventional only) was being transferred to and that the capability existed for a rapid insertion of additional nuclear weapons, e.g., airlift from Guam, if necessary.

Political considerations were congressional concern over the large number of forward deployed nuclear weapons worldwide and the threat of international terrorism or host-country takeover; weapons were for employment by US forces only; did not know the quantity of nuclear weapons; that the nuclear weapons being reduced were not the more visible delivery systems; and that movement of weapons can occur on an incremental basis without knowledge of the extent of transfer.

(TS-FRP) By National Security Decision Memorandum 128 dated 4 May 1976, National Security Advisor Scowcroft notified the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved modifications of the US The modifications would provide improved survivability of the forces committed to the General Strike Plan and allow for some reduction in tactical aircraft requirements for targeting against fixed targets in the GSP, thus making such aircraft fully available for other theater operations. Specifically, the United States:
TOP SECRET

-- Would carry the below, as appropriate, whether located in CINCENT's or USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

(S-PRD) On May 25, 1976, the President's National Security Advisor forwarded the FY 1977/1978 Deployment Plan to the NSC Defense Review Panel with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the President without an NSC meeting; and that there had been general agreement that it would be inadvisable to withdraw weapons from that time.

(S-PRD) In a 7 June 1976 memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, the Deputy ATSD(AE) authorized the JCS to store afloat or at a temporary location in CONUS the ASW weapons then stored. The Joint Staff was also informed that the actual relocation date would not exceed beyond a reasonable time (2 to 4 weeks) after entered into force and that the United Kingdom would restrict movements during the tourist season thereby precluding consolidation at until after September 1976.

(S-PRD) In a message on 21 June 1976, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the removal of the depth bombs from temporary storage afloat. The message also stated that SAS site would be maintained as a contingency site to support ASW operations under advanced readiness conditions.

(TS-PRD) The President approved the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Plan for FY 1977 and FY 1978 by National Security Decision Memorandum 332, dated 7 July 1976, which also extended the FY 1976 deployment authority of NSDM 300 through the FY 1976 transition quarter. Authorized deployment levels by region and afloat were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the following restrictions were enumerated:

-- All nuclear weapons deployed would be removed.

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--- All nuclear weapons deployed to NATO Europe, would have Permissive Action Link (PAL) devices installed.

--- Reductions in would be accomplished in coordination with the Department of State.

--- Prior to the initial weapons withdrawal the Department of State would be informed.

--- The special deployment category for MEFR would be retained.

(SRD) On 19 July 1976, all weapons stored at were removed without incident.

(TS-PRD) In a guidance memorandum dated 21 July 1976 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to the FY 1977/FY 1978 deployment plan, the Secretary of Defense directed an early coordinated effort to withdraw an initial nuclear weapons from

(TS-PRD) The ATSD(AE) was advised by the Vice Director, Joint Staff, on 28 September 1976, that the CINCPAC plan for re-deployment was then under development, that a 1 December 1976 sealift movement would be cost effective, and requested that coordination be obtained from the State Department.

(TS-PRD) On 1 October 1976, Department of State concurrence was requested for the removal of weapons by sealift from in a letter to the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from the Deputy ATSD(AE).

(TS-PRD) The Secretary of Defense concurred in the closing of 23 storage sites in his memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 November 1976. Additional guidance from the Secretary is briefly stated herewith. Further reductions in NATO sites might be possible following NATO discussions on possible thinning of nuclear capable Nike Hercules. MBFR Option III and CINCEUR/SACEUR Deployable Reserve would be held in abeyance pending outcome of ongoing negotiations and future decisions. Action should be initiated, however, to effect closure of the sites at Concord and Seal Beach, California; Barbers Point and Lualalie, Hawaii; and in the time frame specified by JCSM-20-76. would be retained to support deployment levels specified in
NSDM 332. The site at [REDACTED] would not be closed until ongoing negotiations with [REDACTED] were completed.

(SECRET) At the same time, the Secretary of Defense transmitted a message to SACEUR requesting his personal views of the NATO site consolidations in JCSM-20-76 as well as the one at [REDACTED] FRG, supporting US forces in Europe. He also requested SACEUR's views on the feasibility of further consolidation/closures in [REDACTED].

(SECRET) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a 7 December 1976 message, notified concerned commands of the Secretary's 10 November 1976 site closure decisions. Closure of the [REDACTED] site would be dependent upon a reduction of tactical bomb deployment authorizations allowing proper storage of all tactical bombs at [REDACTED].

(SECRET) On 18 December 1976, the Secretary of Defense was informed by a memorandum from National Security Advisor Scowcroft that the President had decided to delay the planned withdrawal of the Sergeant Missile Battalion, including its warheads, equipment, and troops until further notice.

(SECRET) On 3 January 1977, the ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff, of the President's decision to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant missile battalion. Therefore, the Sergeant warheads scheduled for withdrawal at that time would be retained for the present.

(SECRET) In a letter to General Haig, dated 17 January 1977, the Secretary of Defense suggested delaying the closure of seven Central Region SAS sites originally identified by the JCS. He also suggested that it might be timely to examine the entire site consolidation issue in light of the current maldeployments in the Central Region and in consideration of the survivability and security of nuclear weapons currently deployed as well as those to be deployed as part of the theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization program. The Secretary also agreed that weapons redeployment proposals, due to site security vulnerabilities, be delayed due to political sensitivities.

(SECRET) On 17 February 1977, the Deputy ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff that the State Department had agreed to the withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons from [REDACTED].
on or about 1 March 1977.

(SR) General Haig, by a 25 February 1977 letter to Secretary Brown, acknowledged former Secretary Rumsfeld's 17 January letter and informed the new Secretary that development of the terms of reference as well as the US position for a storage site assessment to determine optimum storage locations in the Central Region were underway. He also stated that, upon completion of this effort and if politically opportune, separate requests would be made to the governments of to discuss possible site restructuring within those countries.

(SR) On 1 March 1977, the Deputy ATSD(AE) forwarded a proposed FY 1977-1978 Deployment Plan change to the State Department requesting their concurrence. The change was being made partly due to delays in ERDA's delivery of B61 bombs due to past funding problems and partly due to SACEUR's desire to retain a yield spectrum including the currently provided by the B57. The result of this action would change the overall deployment authorizations in Europe to for FY 1977 and remain at the figure for FY 78.

(ISR) Also on 1 March 1977, the Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) that CINCPAC had scheduled a 7 March airlift to withdraw the remaining weapons from and requested that the State Department be informed of the schedule withdrawal date.

(U) The State Department was informed of the Joint Staff request by ATSD(AE) letter of 2 March 1977.

(ISR) The United States Ambassador to objected to the 7 March withdrawal date due to political considerations. Therefore, as a result of a 4 March ATSD(AE) request, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the 7 March mission should be cancelled and that it would be rescheduled at a later date.

(U) The State Department concurred in the proposed European deployment changes in a 4 March 1977 letter to the ATSD(AE).

(SRAPD) The FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization reflected a reduction of [redacted] bombs in support of US forces in [redacted] had been removed in 1975 and the remaining [redacted] were scheduled for removal during FY 1977. The State Department disagreed with the proposed withdrawal stating that such a decision should be deferred until Congress considered the proposed Defense Cooperation Agreement and its status on Capitol Hill became clearer. As a result, the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense informed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 26 March 1977 that the withdrawal of the [redacted] bombs would be held in abeyance.

(SRAPD) Approval was given on 31 March 1977 to change the FY 1977 and FY 1978 deployment authorization reflecting the delayed B61 delivery in support of non-US NATO squadrons. The Director, Joint Staff was notified of this approval by a Deputy ATSD(AE) memorandum dated 20 April 1977.

(ISRPD) On 14 April 1977, State concurrence was again received to withdraw the remaining weapons from [redacted] The Deputy ATSD(AE) informed the Director, Joint Staff of this concurrence on the same day.

(ISRPD) The Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) on 26 April 1977 that all nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from [redacted] by airlift on 23 April 1977 as scheduled. The Deputy ATSD(AE) provided confirmation of this to the State Department on 27 April 1977.

(ISRPD) As a result of the decision to reduce forces and nuclear weapons the Chairman, JCS requested Secretary of Defense approval, on 14 July 1977, to initiate withdrawal of weapons by removing [redacted] tactical bombs by 31 October 1977. This action would permit consolidation of the remaining air-delivered weapons and closure of the site. The Chairman also stated that the remaining [redacted] bombs would be withdrawn during the January-June 1980 time period.

(ISRPD) The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS request to withdraw the initial [redacted] tactical bombs from [redacted] provided such drawdown commenced after 26 July 1977 which was the established date of the security consultative meeting.

(ISRPD) In an 11 August 1977 message, the JCS approved the withdrawal of [redacted] bombs from [redacted] and their subsequent relocation to United Kingdom. This action was a previously approved conditional weapons deployment to support deployment of to the United Kingdom.
The Chairman, JCS informed the Secretary of Defense on 22 August 1977, that, based on FY 1977 deployment authorizations, ground force weapons were being withdrawn prior to 1 October 1977. The Chairman also requested approval to withdraw the remaining 114 ground force weapons during October-December 1977. The Secretary of Defense approved this proposal on 23 August 1977.

The ATSD(AE) forwarded the proposed FY 1978-1979 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan to the Secretary of Defense on 9 September 1977. Major features addressed in this plan called for:

-- Maintaining the current warhead levels in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) to protect the warhead offer under Option III of MBFR.

-- Requesting approval in principle to initiate a supplemental plan to replace excess Honest John warheads in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) (expected to be in excess of warheads by end FY "8"), for which delivery systems were not available, by more operationally useful weapons to the extent such warheads were available. This would not only improve the current NATO military posture, but could also enhance the negotiating value of the warhead offer in MBFR Option III. Prior notification of the NATO allies to inform them of this approach would be desirable.

-- Loading of all eight US Lance units with warheads pending future main missile purchase by the FRG. The plan contained conditional deployments for the FRG should additional main missile purchases be made and would be drawn in equal amounts from warheads for conditional deployments in support of US units. The deployment of an enhanced radiation warhead for Lance would not be required to meet the deployment levels in this plan. Assuming approval by the President for production of this warhead, however, their subsequent deployment to NATO was envisioned.

-- Retaining Nike Hercules warheads in the FRG pending settlement of details regarding thinning out of nuclear Nike Hercules. Adjustments for Nike Hercules could be integrated into the supplemental plan for dealing with the excess Honest John if appropriate.


-- Withdrawal of all Army warheads from Guam. The limited benefit of retaining these weapons forward deployed while the delivery forces were being withdrawn to CONUS would not be offset by the cost of improving and maintaining storage facilities in Guam.
TOP SECRET

Marine weapons would be left which could cover Army contingencies and SAC weapons would remain at Anderson AFB.

(SECDEF) The Director, Joint Staff informed the ATSD(AE) on 9 September 1977 that, due to the collocation of the [REDACTED] support weapons were also consolidated reducing the number of storage sites [REDACTED] from 11 to 10.

(U) The Secretary approved the FY 1978-1979 plan on 10 September except for some conditional deployment authorization requests.

(SECDEF) Following this approval, the ATSD(AE) forwarded the revised plan to State on 14 September 1977 requesting departmental concurrence.

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SUMMATION

(SFRD) Over the years, the custody of nuclear weapons has shifted from [percent AEC (ERDA) control in 1950 to [percent control by the Defense Department. The table below shows deployments and stockpile totals for the initial year, peak year and end fiscal year 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Illustration</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>Total stockpile from 1947 through 30 September 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>NATO Europe deployments from 1954 through 30 September 1977 showing total, non-US support and US support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVa</td>
<td>Central Region NATO Europe total from 1961 through 30 September 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVb</td>
<td>NATO Europe total from 1961 through 30 September 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Pacific ashore deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and country totals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>Atlantic ashore deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and country totals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII</td>
<td>Afloat deployments from 1961 through 30 September 1977 showing total and area totals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XIV

TOTAL STOCKPILE (BY FISCAL YEAR)

[Graph showing the total stockpile by fiscal year from 1947 to 1977.]
NATO EUROPE DEPLOYMENTS
CENTRAL REGION

FRG, UNITED KINGDOM

NUMBER OF WEAPONS

1951  63  65  67  69  71  73  75  77

TOTAL
BOMBS/ARTY
ADM/NIKE HERCULES
ASW
PACIFIC ASHORE DEPLOYMENTS
END FISCAL YEAR TOTALS
TABLE XVII

ATLANTIC ASHORE DEPLOYMENTS
END FISCAL YEAR TOTAL

1961 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77

—SECRET—
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
TABLE XVIII

AFLOAT DEPLOYMENTS
END FISCAL YEARS

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FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to prosecution. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946
   Assigned all organizations and properties of the Manhattan Project
to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

2. Executive Order 9816 31 Dec 1946
   Implemented the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It stated that all
fissionable material and all atomic weapons and parts remaining from
the Manhattan Project would be transferred to the AEC. It further
provided that AEC could deliver fissionable material or weapons to
the Armed Forces in the interests of National Defense at the direction
of the President.

3. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Established 1 Jan 1947
   AFSWP ordered to assume responsibility for all military service
functions of the Manhattan Project "as are retained under control
of the Armed Forces." Included was the mission to participate in
weapons development in coordination with the AEC.

4. Letter from Secretary of War to Chairman, AEC 30 Dec 1946
   In connection with discussion concerning storage bases the letter
states in part "I anticipate that when the matter has been reviewed
by the President, he will direct that a certain number of bombs and
bomb parts will be wholly within the custody of the armed services
which are charged with the national defense."

5. Joint AEC-MLC Meetings Dec 1946; Aug 1947
   At both meetings the MLC informally indicated the desirability of
transferring custody of stockpile weapons to the Department of
Defense. No decisions reached.

6. Memorandum for Secretaries of War and Navy 4 Sep 1947
   "Delivery of Atomic Weapons to the Armed Forces"
   Military Liaison Committee recommends that all atomic weapons
when ready for stockpile be delivered to the Armed Forces; that
the AFSWP assume custody of weapons so delivered and assume
responsibility for storage and surveillance with technical assistance
from the AEC.

BIB-1

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative sanctions. "No unauthorized disclosure to foreign dissemination.

Section 104B, Atomic Energy Act, 1946.
7. **Memoranda for Chairman, MLC**

    from Secretary of Navy  
    from Chief of Staff, U. S. Army  
    from Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force  

    18 Sep 1947  
    16 Oct 1947  
    31 Oct 1947

All indicate general concurrence with MLC proposals of 4 September 1947 and request formal views of AEC.

8. **Letter to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC**  

    12 Nov 1947

Transmits views, as expressed in memoranda listed above, on desirability of transfer of custody. Requests formal views of AEC. No formal reply received.

9. **Memorandum to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC**  

    16 Dec 1947

Transmits copies of correspondence between MLC and the three Departments regarding delivery of atomic weapons to the Armed Forces. Incloses also a presentation of the views of the MLC.

10. **Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from Chairman, MLC**  

    11 Mar 1948

Incloses AEC staff study on technical considerations together with a summary of MLC views. MLC recommends that "the Secretary of Defense recommend to the President that the responsibility for stockpile and surveillance of atomic weapons, with necessary assistance from the AEC, be assigned to the Armed Forces without delay."

11. **Joint AEC-MLC Meeting at Sandia Base**  

    26-27 May 1948

A statement of points of understanding was prepared in preliminary fashion for further consideration at a subsequent meeting.

12. **Memorandum to Chairman, AEC, from Chairman, MLC**  

    14 Jun 1948

Proposes transfer of custody, urging that AEC join the Secretary of Defense in recommending to the President the transfer of custody and submitting a draft of a proposed letter to the President.

13. **Meetings in Office of Secretary of Defense**  

    (Present were Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Army; Chairman, MLC; Chairman, RDB; Chief, AFSWP; 5 AEC Commissioners)  

    30 Jun 1948

It was generally understood that the President should decide the issue and that the AEC would present a parallel paper to the President when the Secretary of Defense requests a decision.
14. **Letter to the President from Secretary of Defense**

Letter urges the President to "advise the Atomic Energy Commission that delivery to the Armed Forces of stockpile atomic weapons will be directed, effective approximately four months hence." Includes letter to Secretary of Defense of 13 March 1948 from Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force and letter from JCS of 20 March 1948, both of which recommend transfer of custody as a matter of urgency.

15. **Presidential Refusal**

The President refused to transfer custody of atomic weapons to the Armed Forces despite unanimous recommendations for approval from the three Service Secretaries, the Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Military Liaison Committee.

16. **Memorandum to the President from Chairman, AEC**

Advices against transfer of custody.

17. **Presidential Release to the Press**

"As President of the United States, I regard the continued control of all aspects of the atomic energy program, including research, development and the custody of atomic weapons, as the proper functions of the civil authorities."

18. **Letter from the President to Secretary of Defense**

States "On balance, I do not feel justified in exercising my authority under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to order the transfer of the stockpiles to the Armed Services."

19. **AEC-AFSWP Agreement on Operation and Maintenance of Storage Sites Able, Baker and Charlie**

Signed by DoD on 20 April 1949 and by AEC on 11 May 1949. This agreement provided for joint occupancy by the AEC and AFSWP. It stated that AFSWP was primarily concerned with support of operations in the event of national emergency and with support of training exercises and maneuvers. AEC would be responsible for custody of all stockpile items in storage or undergoing inspection. AFSWP would be responsible for custody of AEC weapons released for AFSWP training and maneuvers.
20. "Report on Future Storage Requirements for Atomic Weapons"

This report, prepared by a working group of a subcommittee of the MLC and approved by the MLC, which was submitted to the JCS for approval recommends that "the Department of Defense should have operational control of the recommended sites, as at the present sites, with present authority extended to include operational control of the nonnuclear components including war reserve kits and spares at the operational sites."

21. Letter from MLC Chairman LeBaron, to Mr. Early

"Surveillance and Custody of Atomic Weapons"

Advises that the AEC is considering a staff study which recommends that the AEC obtain the concurrence of the President to "transfer of custody of stockpile of nonnuclear components of atomic bombs to the Department of Defense" and "delegation of responsibility for routine maintenance of nuclear components of stockpile atomic weapons to the Department of Defense." Such transfer and delegation would, in the opinion of the AEC, be contrary to the intent of the President's earlier decision that custody of atomic weapons should remain with the AEC.

22. Memorandum to Secretary of Defense from Chairman, JCS "Surveillance and Custody of Atomic Weapons"

Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the AEC proposal should be supported by the Department of Defense "provided the terms of the proposal are mutually agreed to by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission."

23. Beginning of Korean Conflict

early summer 1950

It was decided that bombs, minus nuclear components, would be delivered to the custody of the Air Force and Navy at Operational Storage Sites abroad and aboard carriers. The nuclear components would remain in custody of the AEC in the United States pending further decision in the future.

24. Presidential Letter to the Chairman, AEC

24 Aug 1950

Approved delivery of nonnuclear components from AEC to the Armed Forces for strategic deployment. Delivery was made to the United Kingdom, Guam, [redacted], and the carrier [redacted]
25. AEC-MLC Meeting 9 Mar 1951

It was brought out at this meeting that the military had been performing functional surveillance on the entire stockpile, including nuclear components, for some time. AEC expressed surprise at this information. Mr. Dean, AEC, stated that AEC custody was "an empty concept" and that the "real problem" was in establishing the proper division of responsibility for stockpile operations.

26. Joint MLC-AEC Memo to JCS 26 Apr 1951

The MLC approved a jointly agreed upon AEC Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which proposed that nuclear components be transferred to the custody of the DoD in numbers to match the nonnuclear components already deployed. The JCS disapproved this proposal with the statement that it was "untimely." No further explanation was advanced by JCS.

27. AEC-DoD Agreement on "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations" 3 Aug 1951

28. AEC-AFSWP Agreement Covering the Operation of National Stockpile Sites Under the Command of AFSWP 23 Jun 1952

Implemented terms of the AEC-DoD Agreement on "Responsibilities for Stockpile Operations" of 3 August 1951.

29. Presidential Approval of an NSC Study 10 Sep 1952

The President approved a study compiled by the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the National Security Council. The study was entitled: "Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons." It provided:

(1) The Department of Defense should have custody of stocks of atomic weapons outside the continental limits of the U.S. and any such numbers within the continental limits as might be required to assure operational flexibility and military readiness.

(2) The AEC should maintain custody of the remainder of the stockpile.

(3) Other provisions relating to Provisions of Storage Facilities, Physical Security (DoD provided for all storage sites); Access to Weapons, etc.

BIS.9
30. Assistant Secretary of Defense Memoranda to the Army, Navy, Air Force and AFSWP 16 Oct 1953

Delineated Service custody responsibilities, and responsibilities for operation of "operational sites" overseas and in the United States. The memo to AFSWP charged the Chief, AFSWP with operating a reporting system to insure that he knew the status and location of the stockpile at all times.

31. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, AEC — Subject: Transfer and Deployment of Atomic Weapons 22 Jun 1953

On recommendation of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, the President, on 20 June 1953, approved the request of the Secretary of Defense to effect the deployment of nuclear components "in numbers equal to the nonnuclear deployments now approved to those storages afloat and ashore wherein the decision to so deploy rests solely with the United States."

32. Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1955 1 Dec 1954

The President authorized dispersal of nuclear weapons to include thermonuclear, however he retained approval authority for separate dispersal actions under the plan.

33. AEC-DoD Storage Operations Agreement 3 Aug 1955

Superseded the Joint AEC-DoD Agreement of August 3, 1951.

34. Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1956 29 Aug 1955

The President authorized transfer of a certain number of nuclear components to DoD custody. Included were a number of high yield weapons which the DoD was permitted to disperse but for which the AEC would maintain custody.

35. Presidential Letter to AEC 29 Aug 1955

In this letter the President levied the responsibility on AEC to maintain on the spot custody of the high yield weapons at dispersed locations. As a result of this letter, AEC assigned civilian AEC custodians to dispersed locations at home, aboard and aboard ships at sea. The assignment of civilians aboard Naval ships proved impractical and almost immediately, following an AEC briefing of the President, was replaced by use of Naval officers as "Designated Atomic Energy Commission Military Representatives."
36. **Joint AEC-DoD Agreement on Interim Principles and Procedures for the Carrying Out of Responsibilities as directed by the President in Connection with the Early Dispersal of High Yield Weapons**  
6 Sep 1955

This agreement provided for the maneuver of high yield weapons and specified that such weapons would remain in AEC controlled storage except when being used in readiness exercises of "in other specified instances."

37. **AEC Letter to MLC**  
19 Mar 1956

The letter was in answer to a letter from MLC to AEC. By their letter, AEC agreed to provide space at AEC storage sites for certain DoD weapons. Specifically, the AEC agreed to provide space as listed below:

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SITE    IGLOOS
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38. **AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons**  
4 May 1956

This memorandum provides for the transfer of weapons in AEC custody to DoD custody upon declaration of a Defense Emergency or similar emergency condition.

39. **AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons**  
3 Feb 1960

Superseded the AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding of May 4, 1956.

40. **AEC-DoD Agreement as to Principles and Procedures for the Carrying Out of Responsibilities as Directed by the President in Connection with the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons**  
4 Jun 1956

The agreement implemented the May 4, 1956 AEC-DoD Memorandum of Understanding.
41. **Presidential Letter to AEC**

24 Nov 1956

In his letter, the President directed AEC to maintain custody at DoD locations in the same manner that they were accomplishing the task aboard Naval vessels. This meant that AEC civilian personnel would be withdrawn and military officers would assume the responsibility as DAECHR's. (The DAECHR system was an arrangement whereby the officer acted for both the AEC and DoD in custody matters. Transfer in emergency was effected in the following manner.

1. The DAECHR held a series of special code words provided to him by joint AEC-AFSWP action.

2. Commanders authorized to declare a Defense Emergency also held the code words.

3. When an authorized commander declared a Defense Emergency, his message contained the current code word.

4. If the code word in the commander's message matched the current word in possession of the DAECHR, he accomplished transfer of custody from AEC to DoD.

Peacetime transfers of weapons required that the DAECHR receive separate authorization to effect transfer of custody from both the DoD and the AEC.)

42. **AEC-DoD Agreement for the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons**

2 Feb 1957

This agreement implemented the President's direction of 24 November 1956 to the AEC and put the DAECHR system fully in effect for maintenance of dispersed high yield weapons.

43. **Amendment to Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1956**

8 Mar 1956

The President increased the number of low yield weapons authorized for dispersal under DoD custody and established a ceiling on the total number of low and high yields authorized for dispersal.

44. **Presidential Dispersal Authorization to July 1, 1957**

24 Nov 1956

The President authorized dispersal of nuclear weapons to include thermonuclear. He continued his previous restriction in effect that weapons in excess of 600 KT would remain in the custody of the AEC even when dispersed.
45. **Presidential Atomic Weapons Dispersal Authorization as of July 1, 1958**

The President authorized the dispersal of certain number of nuclear weapons. He established ceilings on the total number of low yield nuclear components under DoD custody and high yield complete weapons under AEC custody authorized for dispersal in the U.S. and overseas.

6 Aug 1957

46. **Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, JCS -- Subject: Dispersal Requirements for Atomic Weapons**

Memorandum requests approval of dispersal requirements and DoD custody of all dispersed atomic weapons through 30 June 1959.

22 Sep 1958

47. **Letter to the Chairman, AEC from the Acting Secretary of Defense**

In addition to requesting coordination on dispersal requirements through 30 June 1959, it pointed out that a feature of the requested authority would provide for the transfer of all dispersed weapons to the DoD.

13 Oct 1958

48. **Letter to the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman, AEC**

The AEC presented specific comments on the proposed letter to the President concerning the subject of DoD custody of all dispersed weapons.

21 Oct 1958

49. **Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense**

In addition to requesting dispersals plan as of 1 July 1959, the letter requests authority for the DoD to assume custodial responsibilities for all dispersed weapons including those over 800 KT.

20 Nov 1958

50. **Annex One to the AEC-DoD Agreement for the Dispersal of High Yield Weapons**

This agreement provided for positioning of U.S. weapons in England for delivery by English vehicles. It provided that the warheads/weapons:

1. would remain in U.S. custody;

2. would be provided foreign external security.

This arrangement served as the basis for future similar dispersals of weapons to other NATO countries.

26 Nov 1958
51. Presidential Atomic Weapon Dispersal Authorization to July 1959 and Approval of Transfer of Dispersed High Yield Weapons from AEC to DoD 3 Jan 1959

The President authorized the dispersal of nuclear and nonnuclear components under DoD custody. DoD custody for dispersed high yield weapons was approved based on DoD concluding the necessary arrangements with AEC and notifying the President. This removed the requirement for DAECMR's and they were subsequently withdrawn. Upon implementation, the requirement for AEC custody dwindled to only the NSSs, the OSSs having JCS Reserve weapons, and the AEC facilities.

52. Letter to the President from the Secretary of Defense 12 Feb 1959

Informs the President that arrangements had been completed for transfer of custody of dispersed weapons to the DoD as requested in the President's letter of 3 January 1959.

53. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan to July 1, 1959 26 Feb 1959

This directive replaced in entirety the President's directive of January 3, 1959. The total numbers of weapons authorized for dispersal as of July 1, 1959 were not changed by the President directed that AEC turn over custody of numbers of atomic weapons and nonnuclear components without regard to high or low yield.

54. Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1959

Requested approval of a program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1960.

55. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan as of June 30, 1960 5 Nov 1959

The President approved the DoD program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1960.

56. Letter to the President from the Secretary of Defense 21 Dec 1960

Requested approval of a program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1961.

57. Presidential Approval of DoD Dispersal Plan as of June 30, 1961 16 Jan 1961

The President approved the DoD program for the dispersal of weapons as of June 30, 1961.
Memoranda prepared by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

They provide OSD studies on custodial measures and arrangements in relation to the questions raised by the JCAE.

Letter from the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State to the Chairman, JCAE

The State Department agreed with DoD regarding arming of allied aircraft with nuclear weapons and permitting weapons to become airborne when an enemy attack was imminent.


Much of the background material on the JCAE was taken from a paper by James T. Ramey, then Executive Director, JCAE, which was prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8-10, 1960.

"Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price on HR 9759": House Report 2181 - 83rd Congress, Second Session, Rg 137.


Section 144c and 91c(4) restricted cooperation to nations which have "made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons."


70. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Mr. McGeorge Bundy 3 Mar 1961

It forwarded dispersal information and presented the opinion that there would not be any significant reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile projections without a review of national security policy for use of these weapons.

71. Letter to the President from the Acting Chairman, AEC (Graham) 7 Feb 1961

Presents to the President, the AEC views on custody and control of weapons and long-range requirements for special nuclear materials. Pointed out that at that time, the AEC had custodial responsibility for only about 10% of the stockpile. Stated that the Commission planned to defer action on the dispersal directive of 16 January 1961 until the President had had an opportunity to review the cited issues.

72. Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense 6 Apr 1961

The Chairman, General Lemnitzer, protested the unilateral AEC action.

73. Meeting, AEC-MLC of March 23, 1961

The Commission indicated that it did not feel that it could separate its concern as to the possible overstocking of weapons for NATO from its overall concern as to the loss of civilian control.

74. Letter to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 11 Apr 1961

Presents the Department of Defense views on the issues raised in the 7 February 1961 letter from the AEC to the President. Recommended that the President authorize the AEC and the DoD proceed with the dispersal plan of 16 January 1961 with the understanding that no further dispersals for allocations to non-U.S. would be made under that authority.
75. Letter to the Chairman, AEC from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Pointed out the need to implement the dispersal of weapons and stated that he considered it necessary that the question of nuclear support of non-U.S. NATO forces and the remainder of the dispersal program be treated separately.

11 Apr 1961

76. Letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from the President

Authorized "The AEC and the Secretary of Defense to proceed with the dispersal plan of 16 January 1961 as far as U.S. forces were concerned, subject to the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites and subject to effective arrangements for modernization of weapons not so retained."

20 May 1961

77. Letter to Mr. Owen from the Chairman, AEC

Cites possible ambiguity and requests clarification of the terms "National Stockpile Sites" and "substantial reserve" as used in the President's letter of 20 May 1961.

29 May 1961

78. Letter to Mr. Bundy from the Chairman, AEC

Provided data concerning the number of weapons actually in the custody of the AEC and the DoD at that time. In addition, it stated that no additional credits would be authorized pending the requested clarification of terms contained in his 16 June letter to Mr. Bundy.

16 Jun 1961

79. Letter to Mr. Bundy from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Presented thoughts concerning possible ambiguities in the President's letter of 20 May 1961 which were raised in Dr. Seaborg's letter to Mr. Owen of 29 May 1961. Stated the belief that the matter of reserve weapons was a basic concept upon which the dispersal program was developed and that the program as approved meets "the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites."

22 Jun 1961

80. Letter to the Chairman, AEC from Mr. Bundy

Stated that any ambiguities which may have existed in the President's letter of 20 May 1961 with respect to the dispersal of nuclear weapons had been clarified by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's letter to Mr. Bundy of 22 June 1961.

2 Aug 1961

JIB-13

82. Memorandum for the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 16 Mar 1962

Mr. Gilpatrick recommended that DoD be authorized to disperse nuclear weapons under U.S. custody for support of non-U.S. forces. He would withhold aircraft (except the U.K.) and make clear that NATO strategy is being subject to a complete review.

83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 143 10 Apr 1962

Established procedures for approval of programs of cooperation for nuclear support of non-U.S. forces. Approved support for certain non-U.S. forces.

84. Deputy Chief of Staff Memorandum (DCSM) 1295-62 18 Oct 1962


Amended NSAM 143. Programs of cooperation were to be approved under NSAM 197. Specific dispersals were to be approved under NSAM 143.


Amended portions of NSAM 197 to permit the loading of up to 15 or less on NATO QRA aircraft.

87. Deputy Joint Staff Memorandum DJSM-1395-62 5 Nov 1962

The JCS expressed concern that immediate approval of the FY62 dispersal plan was needed to alleviate a shortage of dispersal credits.


Requested ISA to review the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan.

89. Letter to Mr. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense from the President 26 Dec 1962

Disapproved the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan. Dispersals were to be made under the FY 61 and FY 62 authorizations.
90. Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: FY 1962 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan

The JCS could disperse additional weapons to areas under full U.S. control.

27 Feb 1963

91. Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

State concurred in the proposed FY 63 dispersal plan subject to State review of dispersals above those authorized in NSAM 143.

13 Nov 1963

92. Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

State concurred in the proposed FY 64 dispersal plan subject to the same reservations expressed in their letter of 13 November 1963.

5 Mar 1964

93. Memorandum to the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, subject: Request for Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 64

DoD submitted the proposed FY 64 dispersal plan to the President.

26 Mar 1964

94. National Security Action Memorandum No. 305

The President approved the DoD proposed Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 64.

16 Jun 1964

95. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State

DoD forwarded to State for comment the JCS paper subject: Military Strategy for NATO, December 1963.

3 Dec 1963

96. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense

State Department paper, U.S. Policies for NATO Defense sent to DoD.

20 Feb 1964

97. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State

Mr. McNamara solicited comments from State on a proposed plan for support of non-U.S. forces.

May 1964
98. **Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense**
   28 Jul 1964

   Mr. Rusk stated that State and DoD should conduct a joint study of NATO tactical nuclear warfare.

99. **Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State**
   19 Jun 1964

   Mr. McNamara suggested using MC 100/1 as guidance for our NATO representatives.

100. **Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense**
    13 Aug 1964

    Mr. Rusk suggested deferring attempts to reach an agreement on MC 100/1.

101. **Draft Presidential Memorandum (PDM)**
    **The Role of Tactical Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy**
    Oct 1964

    Expressed Mr. McNamara's personal views on NATO Tactical Nuclear Strategy.

102. **National Security Action Memorandum No. 332**
    Dec 1964

    Stated the official national nuclear policy for Europe.

103. **Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM 694-64) for the Secretary of Defense**
    17 Aug 1964

    Forwarded the proposed JCS dispersal plan for FY 65.

104. **Letter from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State, Llewellyn E. Thompson to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Mr. William J. Howard**
    20 Nov 1964

    State did not concur in the dispersals for non-U.S. NATO forces.

105. **Letter from the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cyrus Vance**
    17 May 1965

    State concurred in the revised FY 65 dispersal plan.

106. **Letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State**
    24 May 1965

    Mr. McNamara notified Mr. Rusk that no additional ADMs would be shipped to Europe.

24 May 1965

Forwarded the proposed FY 65 dispersal plan to the President.

108. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense

20 May 1965

AEC concurred in the FY 65 dispersal plan.

109. National Security Action Memorandum No. 334

1 Jun 1965

The President approved the FY 65 nuclear weapons dispersal plan.

110. White House Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Change in the Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1966

18 Dec 1966

The President approved the increase of strategic nuclear bombs in Guam.

111. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

18 Nov 1965

State concurred in the increase on Guam.

112. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense

22 Nov 1965

AEC concurred in the increase on Guam.

113. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Secretary of Defense

11 Jul 1966

Dr. Seaborg proposed to recommend to the President that AEC transfer custody of all finished weapons to DoD.

114. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC

3 Aug 1966

Mr. Vance concurred in Dr. Seaborg's proposal but believed it advisable to withhold the letter to the President pending completion of a joint revision of existing applicable stockpile agreements.
115. **Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC** 8 Nov 1966

Mr. Vance sent a redraft of Dr. Seaborg's letter to the President and proposed NSAM to Dr. Seaborg which indicated Mr. Vance's readiness to proceed with the transfer if AEC would concur in the terms of the proposed Stockpile Agreement.

116. **Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense** 23 Dec 1966

Dr. Seaborg forwarded a redraft of the Stockpile Agreement to Mr. Vance.

117. **Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC** 10 Jan 1967

Mr. Vance agreed to the drafts of the letter to the President and the NSAM.

118. **Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the President** 30 Jan 1967

Dr. Seaborg sent the jointly agreed DoD-AEC letter to the President and draft NSAM proposing the transfer of all finished weapons to DoD custody.

119. **Letter from the President to the Chairman, AEC** 10 Feb 1967

The President, pursuant to Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, directed the AEC to deliver such weapons and components to the Department of Defense at locations, times and in accordance with such procedures that may mutually be agreed to between the AEC and DoD.

120. **Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense** 10 Mar 1967

Dr. Seaborg signed the Stockpile Agreement for AEC and forwarded it to Mr. Vance for signature.

121. **Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC** 20 Mar 1967

Mr. Vance signed the Stockpile Agreement and sent one copy back to Dr. Seaborg. He also agreed to inform the President annually of weapon transfers in the annual stockpile plan as requested by the President in his letter to Dr. Seaborg of February 10, 1967.

122. **Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense** 10 Sep 1966

The Chairman forwarded the proposed FY 67 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Program.
123. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Replied to the proposed FY 67 Dispersal Program and stated that the ceiling of [redacted] for NATO Europe in NSAM 334 remains in effect.

27 Sep 1966

124. JCSM-52-66, subject: Programs of Cooperation (Nuclear Weapons)

24 Jan 1966


5 May 1966

126. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

27 Sep 1966

The decision on the dispersal of nuclear weapons to NATO Europe remains as stated in NSAM 334.

127. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to Mr. Vance, subject: Consideration of Nonconcurrence in the Proposed FY 67 Dispersal Plan by ASD(ISA) and ASD(SA)

10 Nov 1966

Dr. Wakske recommended Mr. Vance approve the plan as written.

128. Letter from Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State to Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense

18 Apr 1967

State concurred in the proposed FY 67 dispersal plan.

129. Letter from the Acting Chairman, AEC to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

10 May 1967

AEC concurred in the FY 67 dispersal plan but recommended a few changes.

130. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC

26 May 1967

Forwarded the FY 67 plan modified to include FY 68 which included all the changes except one recommended by AEC.

131. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Deputy Under Secretary of State

26 May 1967

Forwarded the FY 67 plan modified to include FY 68.


134. Memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) to All Holders of the Proposed FY 67-68 Dispersal Plan

Requested holders to correct the proposed FY 67-68 Dispersal Plan.

135. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Nitze forwarded NSAM 364 to the JCS and notified them that the ceilings of [redacted] for NATO Europe would not be exceeded.

136. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Nitze imposed a temporary ceiling of [redacted] weapons in NATO Europe and intended to hold the number of weapons in [redacted] and afloat in the Atlantic and Pacific at the level actually dispersed as of December 31, 1967.

137. JCSM-160-68, subject: Deployment of Mk 25 (GENIE)

The JCS requested increases in the weapons ceilings for [redacted] in order to disperse GENIE rockets to those areas.

138. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Nitze refused to increase his ceilings on weapons in [redacted]

139. Memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

The JCS requested an increase in Mr. Nitze's ceiling on weapons afloat in the Atlantic from [redacted] to [redacted]
140. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
6 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze increased his ceiling on weapons afloat in the [Atlantic from [to ]

141. JCSM-142-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
8 Mar 1968

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of nuclear weapon deployments to Europe for the period 1 January-30 June 1968.

142. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SA) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
14 Mar 1968

Systems Analysis forwarded their analysis of requirements for deploying nuclear weapons to Europe in FY 68-70.

143. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
5 Apr 1968

Mr. Nitze requested JCS comments on the Systems Analysis assessment.

144. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
9 Apr '68

Mr. Nitze requested a reappraisal of nuclear weapons ceiling for NATO Europe with the objective of assessing the relative priorities of dispersals toward reducing them to a level of [ ]

145. JCSM-260-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
25 Apr 1968

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the Systems Analysis paper and provided their comments.

146. Memorandum from ASD(ISA) and ATSD(AE) to the Secretary of Defense
24 Apr 1968

Proposed querying JCS on the desirability of realigning distribution of nuclear weapons [ ] and on Guam and [ ] in approximately equal numbers.

147. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
4 May 1968

Mr. Clifford requested the view of the JCS on a proposed redistribution of weapons in approximately equal numbers on [Guam ]

BIB-21
148. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Directed the JCS to install PAL devices on all weapons now deployed or planned for deployment at advance.

149. JCSM-392-68 to the Secretary of Defense

The JCS recommended no change in the current distribution of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific.

150. Covering Brief from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

29 Dec 1967

151. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

29 Dec 1967

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for concurrence.

152. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, AEC

29 Dec 1967

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for concurrence.

153. Letter from the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of Defense

26 Feb 1968

AEC concurred in the proposed NWDCP for FY 1969 subject to recommended minor changes.

154. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

6 Mar 1968

State concurred in the proposed FY 1969 NWDCP.

155. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President

9 Mar 1969

Forwarded the proposed FY 69 NWDCP for approval.

156. Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

23 May 1968

Gave the background on OSD/White House discussions on the proposed FY 69 NWDCP.
11 Jun 1968

158. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
22 Jul 1968

159. Joint Chiefs of Staff Request for Increased Afloat Deployment Authorization for PACOM
14 Jun 1968
Joint Chiefs of Staff requested an increase in CINCPAC nuclear weapons afloat from [redacted] to [redacted].

160. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
25 Jun 1968
Mr. Nitze notified General Wheeler of the new ceiling for weapons afloat.

161. Covering Brief from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
21 Jun 1968
Dr. Walske recommended, with concurrence from Drs. Halperin (ISA) and Selin (SA), a new ceiling for weapons afloat of [redacted] weapons.

162. JCSM-395-68 to the Secretary of Defense
26 Jun 1968
The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to Mr. Nitze's memorandum of April 9. They opposed any reduction in NATO Europe and recommended that the nuclear weapon deployment ceiling be maintained at the level of [redacted] as authorized by the President in NSAMs 334 and 384.

163. JCSM-426-68 to the Secretary of Defense
5 Jul 1968
The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested reconsideration of Mr. Nitze's decision of April 1 not to permit an increase in his ceiling on weapons. They requested an increase of [redacted] weapons to permit the introduction of GENIE rockets for the [redacted].

164. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
6 Aug 1968
Mr. Nitze gave guidance to the JCS for implementation of NSAM 370 and established revised OSD ceilings on dispersals.

165. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to CJCS, ASD(ISA), ASD(SA) and ATSD(AE)
6 Sep 1968
Requested a list of unresolved issues for the forthcoming stockpile and deployment plans.

BIB-23
166. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 Sep 1968
Gave the JCS additional guidance for the forthcoming deployment plan.

167. CM-3688-68 to the Secretary of Defense 1 Oct 1969
General Wheeler listed the unresolved issues.

168. JCSM-630-68 to the Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1968
Forwarded the JCS proposed NWDCP for FY 70.

169. Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1968
Summarized the FY 70 deployment issues and made recommendations to Mr. Nitze that his ceilings and guidelines be maintained.

170. CM-3757-68 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 7 Nov 1968
General Wheeler agreed to the stockpile and deployment levels with certain exceptions.

171. Letter from the Chairman, AEC to the ATSD(AE) 16 Dec 1968
Dr. Seaborg concurred in the plan.

172. Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to ATSD(AE) 10 Dec 1968
State concurred in the plan.

173. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 20 Dec 1968
Forwarded the FY 1970 NWDCP for approval.


175. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 Jan 1969
Mr. Laird forwarded NSAM 372 to the CJCS with a statement that he intended to review it in the future.
176. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the ATSD(AE) 25 Jan 1969

Mr. Laird kept Mr. Nitze's ceilings in effect.

177. Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 Dec 1961

Mr. Gilpatrick approved the deployment of Nike Hercules warheads to ARNG SAM sites, provided custody will be with members of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty.

178. Letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense 12 Mar 1965

The President approved the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of July 18, 1964, which requested approval for release of nuclear weapons to National Guard Air Defense Units in emergencies. The JCS had requested this in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of March 5, 1964.

179. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 22 Mar 1965

Mr. Vance gave the JCS approval for the deployment authorized by the President.


National Guard technicians employed under the act are employees of the United States.

181. JCSM 105-69 to the Secretary of Defense 24 Feb 1969

The JCS recommended approval of the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to ARNG Technicians at ARNG Nike Hercules sites.

182. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 9 Jun 1965

Mr. Vance deferred shipment of additional ADMs to Europe.

183. JCSM-470-69 to the Secretary of Defense 31 Jul 1969

The JCS requested approval of an ADM Program of Cooperation.

BIB-25
184. Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 4 Sep 1969
Mr. Packard deferred a decision on the ADM Program of Cooperation.

185. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ATSD(AE) 5 Nov 1969
Mr. Packard authorized going to State and AEC with the ADM Program of Cooperation.

186. Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from F. M. Bator, Special Assistant to the President 30 Aug 1966
The President approved a 155mm warhead Program of Cooperation.

187. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 16 Jul 1969
Requested additional information on the Army National Guard proposal to transfer custody of Nike Hercules units.

188. JCSM-676-69 to the Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1969
Forwarded the JCS NWDCP-FY 71.

189. Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from W. W. Rostow 8 Jul 1966
The President approved a Lance Program of Cooperation.

190. Memorandum to the Secretary of the Army from the Secretary of Defense 15 Dec 1967
Mr. McNamara directed Mr. Resor to reorient the Lance development.

191. Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Deputy Secretary of Defense 11 Jan 1969
Mr. Nitze asked General Wheeler to determine if we should go ahead with a new Lance Program of Cooperation.

192. JCSM-677-69 to the Secretary of Defense 29 Oct 1969
The JCS requested approval of a Lance Program of Cooperation.
193. **MICS-500-69 to the Secretary of Defense**

23 Oct 1969

Responded to and provided the additional data to support the ARNG transfer proposal.

194. **Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President**

20 Jan 1970

Requested approval of the ARNG transfer proposal.

195. **Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense**

20 Feb 1970

Notified SecDef of Presidential approval of the ARNG transfer proposal.

196. **Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS**

2 Mar 1970

Notified JCS of the Presidential approval of the ARNG custody transfer and gave authority and guidance on implementation.

197. **JCSM-287-70 to the Secretary of Defense**

12 Jun 1970

JCS requested transfer of control of nuclear weapons in F-101 units to Air National Guard technicians.

198. **NSDM 59 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission**

9 May 1970

Approved the FY 1971-1972 nuclear weapons stockpile.

199. **NSDM 60 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission**

9 May 1970

Approved the FY71 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Plan.

200. **Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS**

20 Nov 1970

Delegated authority to the JCS to increase approved deployment levels in NATO Europe and other deployment increases in any theater up to 10%.

201. **Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS**

22 Dec 1970

Disapproved the ANG proposed transfer program indicating manpower and monetary savings were not substantial enough to warrant Presidential approval.
202. NSDM 121 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 21 Jul 1971

Approved the FY 1972 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.

203. NSDM 128 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 16 Aug 1971

Approved the FY 1972–1974 nuclear weapons stockpile.

204. JCSM-535-71 to the Secretary of Defense 7 Dec 1971

Resubmitted the ANG transfer proposal with additional information and justification.

205. Memorandum from Secretary Laird to Sec AF and Chairman, JCS 27 Mar 1972

Issuance of guidance concerning future actions regarding nuclear operations

206. Memorandum from Secretary Laird to the President 31 Mar 1972

Notification of completion of nuclear posture review of and directions he had given to alleviate some potential problem areas.

207. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 9 May 1972

Transmitted the Presidential request for war plans study in accordance with the parameters of NSDMs 121 and 128.

208. NSDM 174 Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 7 Jul 1972

Approved the FY 1973–1975 nuclear weapons stockpile.

209. NSDM 178, Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 18 Jul 1972

Approved the FY 1973 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.

210. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President 13 Sep 1972

Recommend Presidential approval to transfer custody of F-101/F-106 weapons units to the Air National Guard.
211. Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense 24 Oct 1972

Notified SecDef of Presidential approval of the transfer of custody to the Air National Guard.

212. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS 1 Nov 1972

Notified JCS of Presidential approval of the ANG proposal and gave authority and guidance on implementation.

213. Joint State/Defense Memorandum to the President late Nov 1972

Forwarding a study summarizing the political and military impact of removal of nuclear weapons.

214. JCSM-43-73 to the Secretary of Defense 2 Feb 1973

Submission of the proposed FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment plan.

215. Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense 7 Feb 1973

Approval of FY aircraft and request for contemplated timing of the return.

216. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Dr. Kissinger 16 May 1973

Informed that F-4s were still committed to SEA, that SIOP alert remained valid and would be advised when aircraft become available to resume SIOP.

217. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 8 Jun 1973

Requesting approval of the FY74 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.

218. NSDM 226 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 18 Jul 1973

Approved the FY 1974 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.
219. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS

Notifying of Presidential approval of the FY 1974 deployment plan.

220. NSDM 228 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Approved the FY 1974–1976 nuclear weapons stockpile.

221. JCSM-377-73 to the Secretary of Defense

Requested authority to deploy ASW weapons due to site security problems.

222. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, JCS

Approved the deployment of ASW weapons.

223. Letter from Secretary Schlesinger to Senator Pastore, Vice Chairman, JCAE

Answers questions concerning storage at

224. NSDM 258 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Approved yield change for non-US NATO forces to for the B61-2/B61-3 weapon.

225. NSDM 259 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Approved a program of cooperation for nuclear bomb support of non-US NATO nations for the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and added the B61-2/B61-3 bombs to previously approved programs of cooperation.

226. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President

Requesting approval of the FY 1975 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.

BIS-30
227. JCSM-404-74 to the Secretary of Defense 7 Oct 1974

Reporting on their reexamination of the storage problem.

228. NSDM 274 from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 8 Oct 1974

Approved the FY75 nuclear weapons deployment authorization.

229. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President 16 Apr 1975

Requesting approval of the FY 1976 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.

230. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to General Wickham 30 Apr 1975

Informing Defense that the President directed that there would be no withdrawal of US forces or nuclear weapons overseas areas without his expressed approval.

231. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to General Wickham 23 May 1975

The President approved verbal request to remove older theater nuclear weapons from Guam for retirement.


234. Memorandum from General Scowcroft to the Secretary of Defense 30 Jun 1975

Informed SecDef that the President had authorized continuation of the FY 75 deployments pending his decision on the FY 76 plan.
235. **NSDM 300 from the President to the Secretaries of State and Defense** 16 Jul 1975

Approved the FY 1976-1977 nuclear weapons deployment plan; withheld approval of the SACEUR Reserve concept; requested rationale for proposed reductions and requested revised deployment tables reflecting decisions in this NSDM.

236. **Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President** 1 Aug 1975

Forwarded rationale and revised deployment tables that were requested in NSDM 300.

237. **JCSM-422-75 to the Secretary of Defense** 4 Dec 1975


238. **Report, "Improving the Effectiveness of NATO's Theater Nuclear Forces (T)"** 19 Dec 1975

239. **Memorandum from ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff** 16 Dec 1975

Authorized removal of remaining Honest John warheads.

240. **JCSM-20-76 to the Secretary of Defense** 19 Jan 1976

Submitted site-by-site review study and recommendations for site consolidations and closures.

241. **Memorandum from General Scowcroft to the Secretary of Defense** 27 Jan 1976

Transmitted Presidential approval of an additional Poseidon reentry vehicles for ASW weapons.

242. **JCSM-127-76 to the Secretary of Defense** 5 Apr 1976

Requested Presidential approval be sought to remove all ASW weapons from SSBN commitments to NATO.

243. **NSDM 328 from General Scowcroft to the Secretaries of State and Defense** 4 May 1976

Provided notification that the President had approved a modification of SSBN commitments to NATO.
244. Memorandum from the President's National Security Advisor to the National Security Council Defense Review Panel

Recommended the FY 1977-1978 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan be forwarded to the President without an NSC meeting.

245. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff

Authorized the removal of all ASW weapons.

246. NSDM 332 from the President's National Security Advisor to the Secretaries of State and Defense


247. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Directed an early effort to withdraw weapons.

248. Letter from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department

Requested concurrence in removing weapons.

249. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Concurred in closing 23 storage sites and recommended in JCSM-20-76 and provided additional guidance.

250. Memorandum from the President's National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Defense

Advised that the President had decided to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant Missile Battalion until further notice.

251. ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff

Provided notification of Presidential decision to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant warheads.

252. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to General Haig

Suggested delay in closing seven Central Region sites, requested examination of the entire site consolidation issue and agreed to delay site discussions with...
253. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, 17 Feb 1977
Joint Staff
Forwarded State Department concurrence in withdrawing remaining nuclear weapons from ___

254. Letter from General Haig to the Secretary of Defense 25 Feb 1977
Acknowledged the 17 Jan SecDef letter, informed the SecDef that terms of reference and development of US position on site assessment was underway and, as a follow-on, if opportune, open discussions separately with ___

255. DJSM-409-77 to the ATSD(AE) 1 Mar 1977
Provided notification that a MAC airlift mission had been scheduled for 7 March and requested that State be so informed.

256. Deputy ATSD(AE) Letter to the Director, Bureau of 1 Mar 1977
Politico-Military Affairs, State
Requesting State concurrence to change the FY 1977 deployment authorization for B61 bombs in support of allied squadrons in Europe.

257. Deputy ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff 4 Mar 1977
Requested cancellation of 7 March schedule of weapons removal from ___ due to political concerns expressed by State Department.

258. Letter from Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to the ATSD(AE) 4 Mar 1977
Provided State concurrence in change to the FY 1977 deployment authorization.

259. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 18 Mar 1977
Requesting approval of a change to the FY 1977 Deployment Authorization delaying removal of B61 bombs from ___

260. Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 26 Mar 1977
Providing notification that removal of ___ bombs from ___ would be delayed due to State desiring a deferment pending Congressional debate on the ___
261. Memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense

Approved the FY 1977–1978 deployment plan change concerning B61 bombs in Europe.

31 Mar 1977

262. Memorandum from the Deputy ATSD(AE) to the Director, Joint Staff

Provided notification that State concurred again with removal from requested initiation to remove the weapons, and that OATSD(AE) be informed when withdrawal was complete.

14 Apr 1977

263. Deputy ATSD(AE) Memorandum to Director, Joint Staff


20 Apr 1977

264. DJSM-769-77 to the ATSD(AE)

Provided notification that all nuclear weapons were removed from (b)(1) by airlift on 23 April 1977.

26 Apr 1977

265. Deputy ATSD(AE) Letter to Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Department

Confirmed removal of all nuclear weapons from (b)(1) on 23 April 1977.

27 Apr 1977

266. CM-1524-77 to the Secretary of Defense

Requested Secretary of Defense approval to withdraw (b)(1) tactical bombs.

14 Jul 1977

267. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Approved withdrawal of (b)(1) tactical bombs after July 26, 1977.

27 Jul 1977

268. CM-1583-77 to the Secretary of Defense

Requested Secretary of Defense approval to withdraw (b)(1) ground force nuclear weapons during October–December 1977. (Approved 23 August 1977)

22 Aug 77

269. ATSD(AE) Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense


9 Sep 1977

BIB-35
270. **DJSM-1550-77 to the ATSD(AE)**

Provided notification of collocation, complimentary weapons movement, and reduction of sites from 11 to 10.

271. **ATSD(AE) Letter to Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department**

14 Sep 1977

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY
TRANSFER AND DISPERsal
OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CY 1950 - CY 1977
CHRONOLOGY
TRANSFER AND DISPERSAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jun 14, 1950  Transfer of nonnuclear components of the Mk 4 bombs from AEC to DoD for training.

Aug 1950  Transfer of nonnuclear components from AEC to the USAF for storage at overseas bases and to the Navy for storage on the weapons.

Late 1950  Nonnuclear components moved to UK and to Guam.

Dec 6, 1951  Nonnuclear components authorized on

May 1951  Nonnuclear components authorized on

Apr 6, 1951  President authorized the transfer of nuclear bombs from AEC to General Vandenburg. This was the only dispersal and transfer authorization in fiscal years 1951 and 1952.

Jun 1951  The bombs transferred to General Vandenburg's custody were moved to Guam.

Jul 22, 1952  Nonnuclear components authorized for storage in UK, Guam, and on carriers.

Jun 20, 1953  President authorized dispersal of weapons under AEC control to carriers, ammo ships, Guam, and the UK. Nonnuclear components could be stored at the above locations and Alaska, Hawaii. This constituted the dispersal authorization for fiscal years 1953 and 1954.

Jul 1953  Arrangements were made with the AEC for storage of nuclear weapons on carriers and Guam.

Apr 1954  The President authorized the dispersal of nuclear weapons under AEC control to ammunition ships, cruisers and submarines.
Dec 1, 1954  
For FY 1955 the President authorized the transfer of [redacted] nuclear weapons from AEC to DoD. Dispersals were authorized to CONUS, the UK, West Germany, Hawaii, Guam, [redacted] naval vessels]

Jan 1955  
Nuclear weapons were dispersed to UK, Guam, Hawaii, [redacted] naval vessels. Dispersal to Alaska, [redacted] and West Germany had also been authorized by the President on December 1, 1954.

Aug 29, 1955  
The President authorized [redacted] low yield (under DoD custody) and [redacted] high yield (under AEC custody) to be dispersed in CONUS, UK, West Germany, on Guam, Hawaii and naval vessels in FY 1956.

Mar 8, 1956  
The President amended the August 29, 1955 authorization and established a ceiling of [redacted] weapons to be transferred from AEC to DoD, exclusive of high yield.

Nov 24, 1956  
The FY 1957 dispersal plan was approved. Totals of [redacted] low yield under DoD and [redacted] high yield under AEC could be dispersed.

Aug 6, 1957  
A total of [redacted] low yield and [redacted] high yield weapons and a combined total of [redacted] were authorized for dispersal during FY 1958.

Jan 3, 1959  
The President ordered the transfer of [redacted] low yield and [redacted] high yield weapons (for the first time) to DoD for FY 1959. The high yield weapons were to be transferred when AEC and DoD had worked out the arrangements.

Feb 26, 1959  
The President authorized the transfer of [redacted] nuclear weapons to DoD for FY 1959. This authorization replaced the FY 1959 January 3, 1959 approval. DoD now was authorized custody of both low and high yield weapons.

Nov 5, 1959  
The President approved the FY 1960 dispersal plan and authorized DoD custody of [redacted] weapons. Dispersal was authorized for the first time to [redacted]

Jan 16, 1961  
The FY 1960 dispersal plan was approved by President Eisenhower. DoD was given custody of [redacted] weapons.
President Kennedy approved the FY 61 NWDCP of January 16, 1961. It provided that additional weapons were not dispersed in support of non-US forces and subject to the desirability of retaining a substantial reserve in the National Stockpile Sites. This was the basic dispersal authorization for US forces for FY 61, 62 and 63, and for non-US forces in FY 61.

Apr 10, 1962
NSAM 143 authorized the dispersal of nuclear weapons for support of designated non-US NATO forces. However, it also precluded the loading of exclusive of forces in the United Kingdom. This was the basic dispersal authorization for non-US forces for FY 62 and FY 63.

Oct 23, 1962
NSAM 197 required "approvals in principle" by the President for support of non-US forces. Dispersal approval for weapons for these forces would continue under NSAM 143.

Dec 26, 1962
President Kennedy disapproved the proposed FY 62 dispersal plan but did permit DoD custody of nuclear weapons and components.

Feb 27, 1963
The Deputy Secretary of Defense clarified the President's authorization/denial of December 26, 1962. He permitted the additional dispersal of weapons over the January 16, 1961 (FY 61) authorization to areas under full US control.

Jun 16, 1964
NSAM 305 approved the FY 64 NWDCP. It authorized DoD to obtain custody of nuclear weapons and components. It continued the requirements of NSAMs 143, 160 and 197.

May 17, 1965
The Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, imposed a ceiling of ADMs which could be dispersed to Europe.

Jun 1, 1965
NSAM 334 approved the NWDCP for FY 65 and FY 66. DoD was authorized custody of nuclear weapons. No additional ADMs could be dispersed to Europe. A ceiling of 200 weapons was imposed on NATO Europe. NSAM 143 and NSAM 197 actions were continued.

Feb 10, 1967
The President authorized the transfer to DoD of all finished nuclear weapons in the stockpile.
Aug 4, 1967
NSAM 364 authorized DoD to disperse weapons for FY 67 and FY 68. The ceilings of weapons for NATO Europe and ADMs for Europe was continued.

Jan 26, 1968
The Deputy Secretary of Defense notified the JCS that no additional dispersals would be made to NATO Europe and that he intended to hold the number of weapons in NATO Europe/Atlantic and Pacific, at the numbers actually deployed as of December 31, 1967. He allowed a 10% overage for weapons afloat. Any dispersals over these limits had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Jan 26, 1968
The actual number of weapons in NATO Europe was

Apr 6, 1968
The Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized an increase of weapons to his ceiling of weapons for the Atlantic Fleet.

Jun 11, 1968
NSAM 370 approved the NWDCP for FY 69. The ceilings of weapons for NATO Europe and ADMs in Europe were continued in effect. NSAM 143 was modified to permit "case by case" dispersals to be authorized by the annual NWDCP. A ceiling of weapons was set for dispersals outside of CONUS.

Jun 25, 1968
The Deputy Secretary of Defense established a new ceiling of weapons afloat less Polaris warheads.

Aug 6, 1968
The Deputy Secretary of Defense established a ceiling of weapons for NATO Europe and a total of weapons afloat excluding strategic offensive missiles.

Jan 18, 1969
NSAM 372 authorized the FY 70 NWDCP. The ceilings of weapons in NATO Europe and ADMs in Europe was continued. The maximum number of weapons outside CONUS was set at

May 9, 1970
NSDM 60 authorized the FY70 NWDCP. The President desired revised NATO and ADM tables. Revised tables as approved established NATO Europe/ADM ceiling at the ADM ceiling for Europe at
The maximum number of weapons outside CONUS was set at
Nov 20, 1970

The Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated authority to the JCS to increase approved deployment levels in NATO Europe when specified conditional deployments were made and to increase specified deployments in any theater up to 10% when necessary to meet contingencies.

Jul 20, 1971

NSDM 121 authorized the FY72 NWDCP. The President approved ceilings [redacted] to NATO Europe and [redacted] for ADMs in Europe. He denied an increase of [redacted] weapons. A ceiling of [redacted] was set for dispersals outside of CONUS.

Jul 18, 1972

NSDM 178 authorized the FY73 NWDCP. The President approved ceilings of [redacted] to NATO Europe and a European ADM ceiling of [redacted]. A ceiling of [redacted] was set for weapons dispersed outside of CONUS.

Jul 18, 1973

NSDM 226 authorized the FY74 NWDCP. The President established ceilings of [redacted] for NATO Europe and [redacted] for ADMs in Europe. The total authorized for dispersal outside CONUS was [redacted].

Jun 20, 1974

The President, by NSDM 258, approved a change to the nuclear weapon yield constraint imposed by NSAMs 143 and 199. The yield shall now not exceed [redacted] kt (accommodating B61-2 and B61-3 nuclear bomb support of non-US NATO forces).

Oct 8, 1974

NSDM 274 authorized the FY75 NWDCP. The President established ceilings of [redacted] for NATO Europe and [redacted] for ADMs in Europe. A ceiling of [redacted] was set for dispersals outside CONUS.

Apr 30, 1975

General Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, notified General Wickham, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, that the President had directed there would be no withdrawal of US forces or nuclear weapons from overseas areas without his expressed approval.
May 23, 1975
General Scowcroft notified General Wickham that the President had approved a request to remove cold weapons from Guam to retirement.

Jun 30, 1975
General Scowcroft notified the Secretary of Defense that the President authorized a continuation of FY 75 deployments pending decision on the FY 76 plan.

Jul 16, 1975
NSDM 300 authorized the FY 76-77 NWDP. The President approved a ceiling of [redacted] for NATO Europe. The total authorized for dispersal outside CONUS was [redacted]. It also requested the rationale used in developing the plan and that revised tables reflecting Presidential changes be submitted.

Aug 1, 1975
Secretary of Defense forwarded the rationale and revised deployment tables to the President.

Jan 27, 1976
General Scowcroft informed the Secretary of Defense that the President approved an assignment of an additional

May 4, 1976
NSDM 328 provided Presidential approval of modification to SSBN commitments to NATO.

Jul 7, 1976
NSDM 332 authorized the FY 77-78 NWDP. The President approved a ceiling of [redacted] for NATO Europe. The total authorized for dispersal outside CONUS was [redacted].

Jul 19, 1976
All nuclear weapons were removed from [redacted].

Dec 18, 1976
General Scowcroft informed the Secretary of Defense that the President had decided to delay withdrawal of the Sergeant missile battalion [redacted].

Mar 18, 1977
Secretary of Defense requested approval from the President to delay withdrawal of [redacted] B61 bombs from [redacted].

Mar 31, 1977
General Scowcroft informed the Secretary of Defense of Presidential approval in delaying B61 bomb withdrawal [redacted].

Apr 23, 1977
All nuclear weapons were removed by air [redacted].
APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY

DEPLOYMENTS BY COUNTRY

CY 1951 - 1977
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<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>INITIAL ENTRY</th>
<th>WITHDRAWN</th>
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<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Nonnuclear Bomb</td>
<td>Nov 55</td>
<td>Jun 67</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Jan 56</td>
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<td>Genie</td>
<td>Sep 57</td>
<td>Sep 60</td>
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<td>Depth Bomb</td>
<td>Jul 58</td>
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<td>ADM</td>
<td>Jan-Mar 61</td>
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|              | 280mm gun         | Jan 58        | Jun 62    |
|              | 8-inch Howitzer    | Jan 58        | Jun 62    |
|              | ADM               | Jan 58        | Jun 62    |
|              | Bomb              | Mar 58        | Jun 62    |
|              | Lacrosse          | Jul-Sep 60    | Dec 63    |
|              | Nike Hercules     | Jan-Mar 61    | Jun 68    |
|              | Davy Crockett     | Jul-Sep 62    | Jun 68    |
|              | Sergeant          | Jul-Sep 63    | Jun 68    |
|              | 155mm Howitzer    | Oct-Dec 64    |           |</p>
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APPENDIX C

NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

BY

COUNTRY, REGION, AND AFOAT

(FY 1961 through FY 1977)

NOTE: Pertinent footnotes are indicated as necessary.

C-1

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions, penalty as restricted data in foreign dissemination.

Section 1442, Atomic Energy Act 1954.
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE (b)
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Valley)
Tactical Missiles
Hercules
 Honest John
Little John
Vengeance
Sage
Large
Davy Crockett
Other (c)

TAC Artillery
6-inch Howitzer
105mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ASM
Tactical Air Defense (b)
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLIGHT ASW/AW
ASM
AAM

TOTAL DOD WARHEADS
(a) COMSEC and Overseas
(b) Air-to-Air Missiles and Surface-to-Air Missiles in CONUS and Alaska are included in the strategic defensive category. At all other locations they are carried as tactical defensive except for Thor when on Johnston Island.
(c) Honest John and rear missiles are classed as tactical offensive weapons.
(d) Nuclear weapon deployments prior to 1961 are not shown as existing records indicate warheads only by Mark number and/or capsule. Appendix B shows the systems in each country from 1951 or initial entry through current date or withdrawal date.
### NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

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**STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE**
- Missiles
  - Bombs and ASMs

**STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE**
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- BMDs

**TACTICAL OFFENSIVE**
- Bombs
- ASM (Hail)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Hace
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other (b)

- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

**TACTICAL DEFENSIVE**
- AHS
  - Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

**FLEET AHS/AAM**
- AHS
- AAM

**TOTAL WARHEADS**

(a) - Includes Alaska and Hawaii.
(b) - See specific countries for individual systems.

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*Formerly Restricted Data*

*Unauthorized disclosure of this document may be punishable under the Espionage and National Security Act of 1917, and/or the Federal Electronic Communications Security Act of 1984.*

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*Top Secret*
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

HAWAII

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles (a)
- Bombs and AGMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
- Bombs
- AGM (Walleye)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Nuke
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other

- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
- SAMs
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAM
- ASW
- AAM

TOTAL WARHEADS
(a) - Regulus.

C-6
### Strategic Offensive
- Missiles (a)
- Bombs and ASMs

### Strategic Defensive
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- SAMs

### Tactical Offensive
- Bombs
- ASMs
- Tactical Missiles
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Perring
  - Sprat
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other (b)
- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other (c)

### Tactical Defensive
- ASMs
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Mike
  - Hercules

### Fleet ASMs
- ASMs
- AAMs

### Total Warheads
- (a) - Thor, Jupiter.
- (b) - Corporal, Redstone, Lacrosse, Nautilus.
- (c) - 200mm Gun.
## Nuclear Warhead Deployments

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**Strategic Defensive**

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**Tactical Offensive**

| Bombs               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| ASM (Harpoons)      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Tactical Missiles   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Honest John         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Little John         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Fenning             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Sergeant            |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Lance               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Dary Crockett       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Other               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

| Tube Artillery      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 8-inch Howitzer     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 155mm Howitzer      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Other               |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

**Tactical Defensive**

| ASMs                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Tactical Air Defense|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Falcon              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Mike Hercules       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

**Fleet ASM/AAM**

| ASM                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| AAM                |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

**Total Warheads**

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**FORMERLY RESTRICTED**
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

WEST GERMANY

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and AAMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMS

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Valley)
Tactical Missiles
Napalm
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Spartan
Lance
Dave Crockett
Other (a)

Tube Artillery
8-inch Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other (b)

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
AIR
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASM/AAM
ASM
AAM

TOTAL WARHEADS
(a) - Corporal, Redstone, Lacrosse, Matador.
(b) - 20mm Gun.
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| 8-inch Howitzer     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 155mm Howitzer      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
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| TOTAL WARHEADS      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

(a) - See next page.

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NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles (a)
- Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- EM60

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
- Bombs
- ASM (Guppy)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Hase
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other

- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
- ASMs
  - Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAM
- ASM
- AAM

TOTAL WARHEADS
(a) - Polaris
### Nuclear Warhead Deployments

#### Pacific (a)

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**Strategic Offensive**
- Missiles (b)
  - Bombs and ABMs
- Bombs
  - GBM
  - Tactical Missiles
- Honest John
- Little John
- Pershing
- Sergeant
- Lance
- Savvy Crockett
- Other (e)

**Tactical Offensive**
- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other (f)
- Grenades
- Other Artillery

**Tactical Defensive**
- Nike
- Tactical Air Defense
- Falcon
- Nike Hercules

**Fleets ASW/AW**
- ASW
- AAW

**Total Warheads**
(a) Does not include Alaska, Hawaii and Afloat.
(b) Regulus.
(c) Thor.
(d) Four Nike Zeus not included in FY 64 and FY 65 totals.
(e) Matador, Lancer, .
(f) 25mm Gun.

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**Top Secret**

Formerly Restricted Data

Unauthorized disclosure contrary to Executive Order 12065, 18 F.R. 6923, and amendment thereto, and to the Act of Congress, April 30, 1946.
### Nuclear Warhead Deployments

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**Strategic Offensive**
- Missiles (a)
  - Bombs and ASMs

**Strategic Defensive**
- Air-to-Air Missiles (b)

**Tactical Offensive**
- Bombs
  - ASM (walleye)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Javelin
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other (b)

- Tube Artillery
  - 8-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

**Tactical Defensive**
- AN/ASQ
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

**FLEET ASW/AAM**
- ASW
- AAM

**Total Warheads**
- (a) - Regulus
- (b) - Leacock

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*C-21*
### Nuclear Warhead Deployments

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### Midway Island

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### Nuclear Warhead Deployments

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</table>

#### Strategic Offensive
- Missiles
- Bombs

#### Strategic Defensive
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- SAMs

#### Tactical Offensive
- Bombs
- ASM (Valkyrie)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Maxie
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other (a)
- Tube Artillery
  - 3-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other (b)

#### Tactical Defensive
- SAM
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

#### Fleet ASM/AAM
- ASM
- AAM

#### Total Warheads
- (a) - Metador, Lacrosse.
- (b) - 260mm Gun.
## Nuclear Warhead Deployments

**Strategic Offensive**
- Missiles
  - Bombs and ASMs

**Strategic Defensive**
- Air-to-Air Missiles

**Tactical Offensive**
- Bombs
- ASM (Valley)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Nuke
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other

- Tube Artillery
  - 6-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

**Tactical Defensive**
- AHS
  - Tactical Air Defense
    - Falcon
    - Mike
    - Hercules

**Fleet ASW/AAM**
- ASW
- AAM

**Total Warheads**

- (a) - Metador,

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*Formerly Restricted Data*

- Unauthorized disclosure is a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-Launched Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Waluie)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tape Artillery
8-inch Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ASMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAM
ASW
AAM

TOTAL WARHEADS

TOP SECRET

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

[Redacted]

TOP SECRET
### NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

**Afloat - Atlantic**

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**Strategic Offensive**

- Missiles (s)
  - Shanks and ASM

**Strategic Defensive**

- Air-to-Air Missiles
  - SAMs

**Tactical Offensive**

- Bombs
  - ASM (Walleye)
  - Tactical Missiles
    - Mace
    - Honest John
    - Little John
    - Pershing
    - Sergeant
    - Dave Crockett
    - Other
  - Tube Artillery
    - 8-inch Howitzer
    - 120mm Howitzer
    - Other

**Tactical Defensive**

- AAMs
  - Tactical Air Defense
    - Falcon
    - Mike
    - Hercules

**Fleet ASM/AAM**

- ASM
- AAM

**Total Warheads**

- (s) - Polaris, Poseidon.

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*FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA*

Unauthorized disclosure of this information is contrary to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder.
# Nuclear Warhead Deployments

## Afloat - Pacific

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<th>FY72</th>
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### Strategic Offensive
- Missiles (a)
  - Bombs and ASMs

### Strategic Defensive
- Air-to-Air Missiles
  - SAMs

### Tactical Offensive
- Bombs
- ASM (Halo)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Nuke
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Navy Crockett
  - Other (b)

- Tube Artillery
  - 6-inch Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

### Tactical Defensive
- ADS
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

### Fleet ASW/AW
- ASW
- AAW

### Total Warheads
(a) - Regulus, Polaris
(b) - Navaho

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Formerly Restricted Data

*Unrestricted when released in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.*
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**NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS**

**AFLOAT - MEDITERRANEAN**

**TACTICAL OFFENSIVE**
- Dumb
- ALC (Allied)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Javelin
  - Little John
  - Firefly
  - Harpoon
  - Navy Crockett
  - Other
- 2-inch Mortar
- 15mm Mortar
- Other

**TACTICAL DEFENSIVE**
- AAMS
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Nike Hercules

**FLEET ASW/AAM**
- ASW
- AAM

**TOTAL WARHEADS**
(a) - Polaris
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

TOTAL-DoD

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NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

CONUS-DoD

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| STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE |      |      |      |
| Air-to-Air Missiles |      |      |      |
| SAMs                |      |      |      |

| TACTICAL OFFENSIVE  |      |      |      |
| Bombs               |      |      |      |
| ASM (Walleye)       |      |      |      |
| Tactical Missiles   |      |      |      |
| Hace                |      |      |      |
| Honest John         |      |      |      |
| Little John         |      |      |      |
| Pershing            |      |      |      |
| Sergeant            |      |      |      |
| Lance               |      |      |      |
| Davy Crockett       |      |      |      |
| Other               |      |      |      |

| Tube Artillery      |      |      |      |
| 8" Howitzer         |      |      |      |
| 155mm Howitzer       |      |      |      |
| Other               |      |      |      |

| TACTICAL DEFENSIVE  |      |      |      |
| ADMS                |      |      |      |
| Tactical Air Defense|      |      |      |
| Falcon              |      |      |      |
| Nike Hercules       |      |      |      |

| FLEET ASW/AAW       |      |      |      |
| ASW                 |      |      |      |
| AAW                 |      |      |      |

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

OUTSIDE CONUS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
  Mace
  Honest John
  Little John
  Pershing
  Sergeant
  Lance
  Davy Crockett
  Other

Tube Artillery
  8" Howitzer
  155mm Howitzer
  Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
  Falcon
  Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
  ASW
  AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

FY76  FY77  FY78
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

ALASKA

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

HAWAII

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASMs (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Hace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Mike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS
NATO EUROPE

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Nace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAM
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
### NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

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NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

UNITED KINGDOM

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
- Missiles
- Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
- Air-to-Air Missiles
- SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
- Bombs
- ASM (Valleye)
- Tactical Missiles
  - Mace
  - Honest John
  - Little John
  - Pershing
  - Sergeant
  - Lance
  - Davy Crockett
  - Other
- Tube Artillery
  - 8" Howitzer
  - 155mm Howitzer
  - Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
- ADMs
- Tactical Air Defense
  - Falcon
  - Mike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
- ASW
- AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

FY76 FY77 FY78
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS
WEST GERMANY

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMS

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

FY76 FY77 FY78
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

ATLANTIC

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
   Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
   SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
   Bombs
   ASM (Walleye)
   Tactical Missiles
      Mace
      Honest John
      Little John
      Pershing
      Sergeant
      Lance
      Davy Crockett
      Other
   Tube Artillery
      8" Howitzer
      155mm Howitzer
      Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
   ADMs
   Tactical Air Defense
      Falcon
      Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
   ASW
   AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleys)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

C-46

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure is subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination.

Section 1443, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASH (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASH/AAW
ASH
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

FY76  FY77  FY78
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

GUAM

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
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| TOTAL WARHEADS      |      |      |      |
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS

AFOAT SUMMARY

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
Tactical Missiles
Mace
Honest John
Little John
Pershing
Sergeant
Lance
Davy Crockett
Other

Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
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Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

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ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS
AFLOAT-PACIFIC

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE
Air-to-Air Missiles
SAMs

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE
Bombs
ASM (Walleye)
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Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASW/AAW
ASW
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS

FY76 FY77 FY78
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEPLOYMENTS
AFLOAT-MEDITERRANEAN

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Missiles
Bombs and ASMs

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SAMs

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ASH (Walleye)
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Sergeant
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Tube Artillery
8" Howitzer
155mm Howitzer
Other

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE
ADMs
Tactical Air Defense
Falcon
Nike Hercules

FLEET ASH/AAW
ASH
AAW

TOTAL WARHEADS
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APPENDIX D

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AUTHORIZATION AND DISPERALS

BY LOCATION

(FY 1947 through FY 1977)
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**Total US Stockpile:**
- 31350
- 31678
- 31674
- 31723
- 30040
- 30067
### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

**AUTHORIZED AND DISPERSALS**

**BY LOCATION**

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<td><strong>TOTAL US STOCKPILE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>warheads in excess to European requirements being retained in-theater for MBFR purposes.</td>
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<td>(g)</td>
<td>additional warheads were deployed to Government request and US Presidential approval.</td>
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_Finally RESTRICTED DATA_
APPENDIX E

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

(End FY 1947 through End FY 1977)

NOTES:

1. The warhead totals include those for maintenance, retrofit, stockpile sampling, destructive testing, operational spares and retirement.

2. The differences between the individual totals in these stockpile tables and other tables involve unassociated warheads and certain weapons held by the DoE (formerly AEC) in CONUS.

3. The MACE and MATADOR missiles were classed as strategic offensive weapons during the period 1955 through 1960. Subsequently, they were classed as tactical offensive missiles.

E-1
### STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

**Land Based Missiles**
- 3 2000t H-IAGORN
- 20 13 HACE
- 16 109 HACE
- 12 27 H-3 ATLAS/EORH
- 8 27 H-2 ATLAS D
- 4 8 H-2 JUPITER

**sea Based Missiles**
- 3 150/170 Cpl RECULUS 1
- 2 7 RECULUS 1

**TOTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILES**

### INITIAL OFFENSIVE

**WART**
- **ATM**
  - Little Boy
  - Big Boy
- **H-B**
  - 16 110/130/150 Cpl
  - 5 150/170 Cpl
  - 3 110/130/150 Cpl
  - 4 150/210 Cpl
  - 4 150 Cpl
  - 4 110/130/150 Cpl
  - 6 150/170 Cpl
  - 9 170/190 Cpl
  - 6 150/170 Cpl
  - 7 130/190 Cps
  - 7 110/120/130/140/150 Cps
  - 6 110/130/150 Cpl
  - 6 110/130/170 Cpl
  - 14 150 Cpl
  - 15 150 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
  - 8 150/210 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
  - 2 150 Cpl
### Tactical Offensive

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<thead>
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<tr>
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<td>300mm Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 19</td>
<td>991/992</td>
<td>200mm Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 19</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>200mm Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 23</td>
<td>16-inch Shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 33</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>8-inch Howitzer</td>
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### Nuclear Weapons Stockpile (Continued)

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<td>Y3</td>
</tr>
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<td>MK 48</td>
<td>T14</td>
<td>Y4</td>
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<td>T11/7</td>
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<td>T15</td>
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### Tactical Missiles

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<td>Caps CORONAL</td>
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### Total Tactical Missiles/Artillery

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<td>110/170/210/260</td>
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### Tactical Defensive (Continued)

**Air Defense**
- **Genie**
- **Hercules**
- **ROMARC**

**Total Tactical Defensive Warheads**

**Fleet ASW/AAM**
- **ASM**
  - 1 x 110/240 CAPS BETTY
  - 7 x 110/170/260 CAPS BETTY
  - 14 x HLU (Total 101)
- **AAW**
- **ASX**
- **Total ASW/AAM Warheads**

**Ground Total - Nuclear Warheads**

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**Top Secret**

**Restricted Data**

This document contains Restricted Data and is not to be disclosed to any unauthorized person in any manner.
## Tactical Offensive (Continued)

**Tactical Missiles**
- 1210 Cap HATADOR
- 7 170/260 Cap CORPORAL
- 7 210 Cap CORPORAL
- 7 240 Cap CORPORAL
- 7 170/260 Cap HONEST JOHN
- 7 210 Cap HONEST JOHN
- 7 240 Cap HONEST JOHN
- 20 T1 MACE
- 20 T2 MACE
- 20 T3 MACE
- 31 T1 HONEST JOHN
- 31 T2 HONEST JOHN
- 31 T3 HONEST JOHN
- 30 T1 REDSTONE
- 30 T2 LACROSSE
- 30 T3 LACROSSE
- 45 T2 LITTLE JOHN
- 45 T3 LITTLE JOHN
- 50 T1 FERSHING
- 50 T2 FERSHING
- 50 T3 FERSHING
- 52-1/2 T1 SERGEANT
- 52-1/2 T2 SERGEANT
- 54-2 DAVY CROCKETT
- 70 LANCE

**Nuclear Artillery**
- 19-0 20mm Gun
- 19-0 20mm Gun
- 31-0 6-inch Howitzer
- 31-0 6-inch Howitzer
- 48 155mm Howitzer

**Total Tactical Missiles/Artillery**

---

**Restricted Data**
### Top Secret

**Appendix E**

**Nuclear Weapons Stockpile**

#### Strategic Offensive

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<td>MK 62 MINUTEMAN</td>
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<td>MK 68 POSEIDON C3</td>
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**Total Strategic Offensive Missiles**

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<td>MK 53-OY2</td>
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<td>MK 61-1</td>
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<td>MK 69-0 SRAH</td>
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**Total Laydown Strategic Bombs, A-S MSLS**

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**Total Other Strategic Bombs**

**Total Strategic Offensive Warheads**

#### Strategic Defensive

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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Surface-to-Air Missiles</th>
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<td>MK 66 Y1 SPRINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK 71 Y1 SPARTAN</td>
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**Total Strategic Defensive Missiles**

**Total Strategic Warheads**

---

*Formerly Restricted Data*
TACTICAL OFFENSIVE

Tactical Bombs
MK 28-1/2Y2
MK 28-1/2Y3
MK 43 Y1
MK 43 Y2
MK 43 Y3
MK 43 Y4
MK 43 Y5
MK 57-1/2
MK 61-0
MK 61-2
MK 72 Y1 WALLEYE

TOTAL TACTICAL BOMBS

Tactical Missiles
MK 31 Y1 HONEST JOHN
MK 31 Y2 HONEST JOHN
MK 31 Y3 HONEST JOHN
MK 50 Y1 PERSHING
MK 50 Y2 PERSHING
MK 50 Y3 PERSHING
MK 52-1/2Y1 SERGEANT
MK 52-1/2Y2 SERGEANT
MK 70 LANCE

Nuclear Artillery
MK 33-0 8-inch Howitzer
MK 33-1 8-inch Howitzer
MK 48 155mm Howitzer

TOTAL TACTICAL MISSILES/ARTILLERY

TOTAL TACTICAL OFFENSIVE WARHEADS

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE

ADMs
MK 45-1 Y2 MADM
MK 45-1 Y3 MADM
MK 45-1 Y4 MADM
MK 54-0 Y1 SADM
MK 54-0 Y2 SADM

Tactical Air Defense
MK 31-0 Y1 NIKE HERCULES
MK 31-0 Y4 NIKE HERCULES

TOTAL TACTICAL DEFENSIVE WARHEADS

TOTAL TACTICAL WARHEADS
FLEET ASW/AAW

ASW Depth Charges, Missiles, Torpedoes
- MK 57-0
- MK 34-2 ASTOR
- MK 44-0 ASROC
- MK 55 SUBROC

AAW
- MK 30-2 TALOS
- MK 45-0 Y1 TERRIER

TOTAL ASW/AAW WARHEADS

GRAND TOTAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS
APPENDIX F

POLICY AND GUIDANCE STATEMENTS

FOR

CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NIKE-HERCULES (U)
APPENDIX F

POLICY STATEMENT FOR

CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NIKE-HERCULES (U)

1. (S) The custody of nuclear weapons deployed with the Army National Guard units, at all times until released for use, will be with members of the Army National Guard who are employed by the Federal Government as National Guard technicians. Release of these weapons for tactical employment will be authorized only by officers of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty through a Federal chain of command.

2. (S) Active Army Commanders will exercise their command responsibility for the custody and control of deployed nuclear warheads for Army National Guard NIKE-HERCULES units through a Federal chain of command to include responsibility for: the transfer, movement, and access to nuclear weapons and the maintenance of accountability of nuclear weapons. Accountability of nuclear warheads will be maintained by Active Army Accountable Officers of Army Area commands. The Active Army Commander's other responsibilities for safety, security, storage, and maintenance of nuclear weapons at the sites may be discharged for him by the participating States through their National Guard chain of command as mutually agreed with each Governor concerned.

GUIDANCE FOR CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF WARHEADS FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NIKE-HERCULES (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To establish the policy of responsibilities for custody and control of nuclear warheads for the NIKE-HERCULES/MK 31 System when issued to the Army National Guard.

2. (U) Employment of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons will be provided for tactical employment by Army National Guard air defense units in accordance with:

   a. The appropriate (1) rules of engagement or (2) interception and engagement instructions and procedures.

   b. The authority and conditions specified by the commander of the unified command.
3. (S) Policy. The custody of nuclear weapons dispersed at National Guard areas (on site) at all times until released for use, will be with members of the Army National Guard who are employed by the Federal Government as National Guard technicians. Release of these weapons for tactical employment will be authorized only by officers of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty through a Federal chain of command.

4. (S) Custody of Nuclear Warheads for Army National Guard NIKE-HERCULES

   a. Custody of Nuclear Warheads. Custody is the responsibility for:
      (1) the control of transfer, movement, and access to atomic weapons and (2) the
      maintenance of accountability of atomic weapons including nuclear and non-
      nuclear components. (AEC-DoD Stockpile Operations Agreement, March 1967)

   b. Custodial Requirements. The custodial requirements for National Guard technicians are:

      (1) The transfer and movement of nuclear weapons within National Guard areas (sites) will be controlled for the responsible Active Army Command by custodians who are members of the Army National Guard employed by the Federal Government as National Guard technicians. An Active Army Command will be directly responsible for transfer and movement of nuclear weapons to and from such areas.

      (2) The senior National Guard technician on duty at each site will control access to nuclear weapons for the responsible Active Army Commander. Access should be controlled to the extent that it would take an act of force against an individual in a National Guard technician status and, therefore, against the Federal Government to gain unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon.

      (3) Army Accountability Requirements. An Active Army Accountable Officer under an appropriate command will maintain accountability of nuclear weapons.

5. (S) Release of Nuclear Warheads Dispersed to Army National Guard NIKE-HERCULES Sites.

   a. Control procedures will be established to prevent the launching of a nuclear-armed missile prior to authorized release for operational employment

   b. NIKE-HERCULES arm plugs will be inserted in missiles only when authorized by appropriate Active Army authority. At all other times, arm plugs will be removed and safeguarded as a positive means of preventing unauthorized arming.
6. (G) Command Responsibilities. In addition to responsibility for custody of nuclear weapons as described above, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC) and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Command (CGARADCOM), retain command responsibility for safety, security, storage, and maintenance of these weapons. By mutual agreement with the Governors of the States concerned, CINCUSARPAC and CGARADCOM are authorized to discharge these four latter responsibilities through the appropriate National Guard chain of command. This authorization is effective for so long as the National Guard conforms to pertinent directives. In exercising these responsibilities for safety, security, storage, and maintenance, appropriate Active Army Commanders will inspect Army National Guard air defense units and will provide such directives as may be required. The National Guard technicians will observe the proper implementation of these responsibilities.

7. (U) Safety. The safety rules for the NIKE-HERCULES nuclear weapon system must be understood and complied with by National Guard personnel concerned.

8. (G) Security.

a. Installation Security. Installation security of on-site nuclear weapons and all associated equipment is the responsibility of the State National Guard concerned. National Guard commanders will provide adequate guards to protect nuclear weapons and associated equipment located on-site. They will ensure the coordination and implementation of prescribed security measures. Detailed nuclear weapons security plans will be submitted to CINCUSARPAC or CGARADCOM for review and approval.

b. Security Clearances. The appropriate security clearance will be obtained for each National Guard member before he may carry out his specific duty in support of this plan.

c. Security Devices. As an aid to maintaining effective custody and security, intrusion alarm devices and sentry dogs will be used when practicable.

9. (U) Storage and Maintenance. The State National Guard concerned is responsible for proper storage and organizational maintenance of on-site nuclear warheads, utilizing as appropriate the authorized storage, maintenance, and assembly facilities made available by the Active Army. Appropriately trained and cleared National Guard personnel will accomplish organizational maintenance of nuclear warheads.
10. (U) **Custodial Personnel.** All National Guard technicians given custody of weapons will be officers, warrant officers, or enlisted personnel employed by the Federal Government as National Guard technicians responsive to the Secretary of Defense through a Federal chain of command. They will be qualified by training and/or experience and will have appropriate security clearances. Personnel and medical records will be screened, and behavior of individuals will be observed continually in order to detect promptly and/or prevent aberrant actions.

11. (U) **Inspections.** Army National Guard NIKE-HERCULES units equipped with a nuclear weapon system will be subject to inspection by representatives of agencies such as the appropriate unified or Army command, Department of the Army; or DASA.

12. (U) **Agreement.** A mutual agreement between the Governor of a participating State and CINCUSARPAC or CGARADCOM, or their designated representatives, consistent with this policy, will be negotiated, prior to the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to National Guard technicians. The agreement will state explicitly that the National Guard technicians granted custody of nuclear weapons are under the sole final authority of a Federal chain of command in relation to their custodial responsibilities. Such agreement will be subject to approval by the commander of the appropriate unified command.
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12. (U) **Human Reliability Program.** The provisions of the US Air Force Human Reliability Program apply for each member of the ANG assigned responsibilities in support of this policy.

13. (U) **Inspections.** ANG units equipped with a nuclear weapon system will be subject to inspection by representatives of the appropriate unified or Air Force command, the Department of the Air Force, and the Defense Nuclear Agency.

14. (U) **Agreement.** An agreement between the governor of a participating state and the ADC or its designated representative, consistent with this policy, will be in effect prior to the transfer of custody of nuclear weapons to ANG technicians. The agreement will state explicitly that the ANG technicians granted custody of nuclear weapons are under the sole final authority of a Federal chain of command with respect to their custodial responsibilities. Such agreement will be subject to approval by the Commander, ADC.
with governors of states concerned for the discharge of these four latter responsibilities through the appropriate ANG chain of command. Appropriate active Air Force commanders will inspect ANG air defense units and will provide such directives as may be required.

7. (U) **Safety.** Safety rules and Air Force directives for Air Force fighter-interceptor nuclear weapon systems used by active Air Force units will be applicable to ANG units.

8. (U) **Security.**

a. **Installation Security.** The security provided for nuclear weapons with ANG units will be comparable to that required for similar resources in the custody of active Air Force units. ANG commanders will provide sufficient security personnel to protect nuclear weapons and associated equipment wherever active Air Force security personnel are not provided. They also will insure the coordination and implementation of prescribed security measures. The commander responsible for security will submit detailed nuclear weapons security plans to the ADC for review and approval.

b. **Security Clearances.** The appropriate security clearances for each member of the ANG will be obtained in accordance with DoD and Service directives before he may be assigned responsibilities in support of this policy.

9. (U) **Storage and Maintenance.** Properly trained and cleared ANG personnel will accomplish storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons. In cases where nontechnician ANG personnel accomplish storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons, they will always be under the direct supervision of technician personnel. For ANG units collocated with similar active Air Force units, storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons may be accomplished by active Air Force personnel.

10. (U) **Convoy and Loading.** Properly trained and cleared nontechnician ANG personnel are authorized to perform those operations relating to on-base convoy and loading of nuclear weapons. These operations will always be monitored by an ANG technician.

11. (U) **Custodial Personnel.** All ANG technicians given custody of nuclear weapons will be officers, warrant officers, or enlisted personnel employed by the Federal Government as ANG technicians responsive to the Secretary of Defense through a Federal chain of command. They will be qualified and will have appropriate security clearances.
duty US Air Force personnel or with members of the ANG who are employed by the Federal Government as Air National Guard technicians. Release of these weapons for employment will be authorized only by officers of the US Armed Forces on active duty, through a Federal chain of command.

4. (a) **Custody of Nuclear Weapons for ANG Units.**

   a. **Custody of Nuclear Weapons.** Custody is the control of transfer and movement of, access to, and accountability for nuclear weapons and components.

   b. **Custodial Requirements.**

      (1) The transfer and movement of nuclear weapons by ANG units will be controlled for the responsible active Air Force commander by custodians who are active Air Force personnel or who are members of the ANG, employed by the Federal Government as Air National Guard technicians. An active Air Force commander will be directly responsible for transfer and movement of nuclear weapons to and from such units.

      (2) The senior ANG technician on duty in a unit, not collocated with a similar active Air Force unit, will control access to nuclear weapons for the responsible active Air Force commander. Access will be controlled to the extent that it would take an act of force against an individual in a National Guard technician status and, therefore, against the Federal Government to gain unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon. For ANG units collocated with similar active Air Force units, access to nuclear weapons may be controlled by active duty US Air Force personnel or by ANG technicians.

      (3) Accountability for nuclear weapons will be in accordance with established Air Force procedures.

5. (b) **Release and Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons Deployed to ANG Units.** Control procedures will be established to insure that nuclear weapons are not expended until receipt and authentication of an order conveying US Presidential authorization for the release of nuclear weapons.

6. (c) **Command Responsibilities.** In addition to responsibility for custody of nuclear weapons as described above, the Commander, US Air Force Aerospace Defense Command (ADC), retains command responsibility for safety, security, storage, and maintenance of these weapons. CINCONAD or the Commander, ADC, is authorized to enter into appropriate agreement.
APPENDIX G

POLICY AND GUIDANCE STATEMENTS

FOR

CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT (U)
APPENDIX G

POLICY STATEMENT FOR CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR AIR NATIONAL GUARD (U)

1. The custody of nuclear weapons deployed with Air National Guard units will, at all times until nuclear weapons are released for use, be with active duty US Air Force personnel or with members of the Air National Guard who are employed by the Federal Government as Air National Guard technicians. Release of these weapons for employment will be authorized only by officers of the US Armed Forces on active duty, through a Federal chain of command.

2. Active Air Force commanders will exercise their command responsibilities for the custody of deployed nuclear weapons for Air National Guard units through a Federal chain of command. These responsibilities include the transfer and movement of, access to, and accountability for nuclear weapons and components. The active Air Force commander's other responsibilities for safety, security, storage, and maintenance of nuclear weapons may be discharged for him by the participating states, through their Air National Guard chain of command, as mutually agreed with the governor of each state concerned.

GUIDANCE FOR CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To establish policy and responsibilities for custody of nuclear weapons when assigned to the Air National Guard (ANG) for employment in conjunction with fighter-interceptor aircraft.

2. (U) Employment of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons will be provided for employment by ANG air defense units in accordance with:

   a. The appropriate rules of engagement, or interception and engagement instructions and procedures.

   b. The authority and conditions specified by the commander of the appropriate unified command.

3. (S) Policy. The custody of nuclear weapons deployed with ANG units will, at all times until nuclear weapons are released for use, be with active
APPENDIX H

NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS / ARRANGEMENTS

through 30 June 1975
## TYPES OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS

| Atomic Stockpile Agreement (Umbrella Agreement) | A. Gov't Bilateral Agreement between United States and a user Nation  
B. Provides for introduction and storage within a Country  
C. Provides Policy Guidance for  
   (1) Custody, Security, Safety and Release of weapon  
   (2) Cost sharing arrangements and construction criteria |
| Atomic Cooperation Agreement (Section 144B Atomic Energy Act) | A. Gov't level Bilateral Agreement between United States and user Nation  
B. Exchange of Atomic information useful for mutual Defense Purposes  
   (Atomic Energy Act 1959 PL 85-479) |
| Service-Level Agreements | A. Bilateral technical agreement between Military Services of the United States and the user nation  
B. Implement government-level stockpile agreement  
C. Provisions of stockpile agreement expanded and amplified in detail  
D. Defines and assigns responsibilities  
   (1) Command relationship, security, safety custody, etc. |
| "Third party" stockpile agreements | A. Governmental-level agreement between United States - Third nation and user nation  
B. Stockpiling within territorial limits third nation for use by NATO committed forces of signatory user nation  
C. Service-level agreements required to implement this agreement |
### STATUS OF AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES

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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>COOPERATION AGREEMENTS (Sec. 149a, A.E. Act)</th>
<th>ATOMIC STOCKPILE AGREEMENTS IN COUNTRY</th>
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<th>SERVICE-TO-SERVICE TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS USAFE</th>
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**NOTES:**
- Asterisk (*) indicates dates of currently in-force agreements/arrangements.
- (a) - U.S. agreement covering U.S. weapons in Germany only; currently considered inactive but not abrogated.
- (b) - SHAKE advises that these arrangements are not required.
- (c) - Agreement with NATO as a regional defense organization permits exchange of atomic information only.
- (d) - Multinational technical arrangement for storage in West Germany between the U.S., West Germany and other nations considered inactive but not abrogated.
- (e) - JUPITER forces per NATO agreement of 22 Jun 1956; considered inactive but not abrogated.
- (f) - U.S. agreement considered inactive due to phase-out of Thor; considered inactive but not abrogated.
- (g) - Corporal warhead support plan considered inactive due to phase-out of Corporal system; not abrogated.
- (h) - U.S. weapons; considered inactive but not abrogated.
- (i) - U.S. missiles.

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Unrestricted distribution subject to normal security safeguards.

**SECRET**

AGREEMENTS/ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED INACTIVE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT OF NON-US NATO FORCES

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NOTE: Agreements/arrangements listed above are considered inactive due to phase out of a specific system or withdrawal of a country from NATO. None of the above agreements/arrangements have been abrogated.
**SECRET**

AGREEMENTS/ARRANGEMENTS CONSIDERED

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT FOR NON-US NATO FORCES

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**NOTE:** (a) - Multinational technical arrangement for storage in West Germany between the U.S., West Germany and the United Kingdom.

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**H-5**

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Unauthorized disclosure subject to punishment under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the National Security Act of 1947.
APPENDIX I

STORAGE LOCATION MAPS

as of 30 September 1977

NOTE: Maps are assembled in the same order as the deployment tables in Appendix C