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Ordering
information for this book is available at the
W.W. Norton & Co. website. Or by phone:
800-233-4830 (U.S.)
717-346-2029 (Outside U.S.)
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Press releases, selected documents, photographs,
audio clips and other material from the historic conference
in Havana. |
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Documents, naval charts and other declassified
records on the U.S. hunt for Soviet submarines during the
most dangerous days of the crisis. |
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Read the analysis of contemporary historians
as they sift through the historiography and more recent evidence
to learn the lessons of history. |
The Declassified History.
At midday, and again in the early evening
of October 16, 1962, John F. Kennedy called together a
group of his closest advisers at the White House. Late
the night before, the CIA had produced detailed photo
intelligence identifying Soviet nuclear missile installations
under construction on the island of Cuba, some ninety
miles off the Florida coast; now the president and his
men confronted the dangerous decision of how the United
States should respond . . . [More]
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The Most Dangerous Moment.
If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most
dangerous passage of the Cold War, the most dangerous
moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the evening of
Saturday, 27 October 1962, when the resolution of the
crisis—war or peace— appeared to hang in the balance .
. . [More]
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Annals of Blinksmanship.
Now that the Cold War is over, its history
has become a growth industry, though in truth there was
no great shortage of historical analysis even while the
war was going on. Today, however, one finds a certain
generational divide as perhaps the salient characteristic
of the enterprise . . . [More]
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Turning History on Its
Head.
For nearly forty years most American accounts
of the Cuban Missile Crisis of have left Cuba out of the
story. With the blockbuster film "Thirteen Days" the story
now ignores the Soviet Union as well. The film turns history
on its head and drums into our heads exactly the wrong lessons
of the crisis. . . [More]
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