

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-14 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 RSC-01 SCI-06 SCEM-02 AEC-11 DODE-00

PA-04 PRS-01 USIA-15 SPC-03 PM-07 DRC-01 /122 W

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R 230920Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0296

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USLO PEKING

AMCONGEN HONG KONG

S E C R E T TAIPEI 7051

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, PFOR, MCAP, OTRA, TECH, TW

SUBJECT: FONMIN REAFFIRMS ROC DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM ACQUIRING  
NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: A. TAIPEI 7052; B. STATE 223316

TOKYO FOR HELFRICH, AEC

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AEC STUDY TEAM MEMBERS AND AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED TO FONMIN SHEN USG'S POLICY DECISION THAT ROC SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER IN ACQUIRING CHEMICAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY BECAUSE WE COULD NOT OTHERWISE ENSURE KIND OF COOPERATION NECESSARY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. THEY ALSO NOTED WAYS WE COULD HELP ROC WITH POWER REACTORS AND SENSIBLE PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH. FONMIN COMMENTED HE UNDERSTOOD US VIEWS PRECISELY, REAFFIRMED THAT ROC HAD DROPPED PLAN FOR PURCHASING REPROCESSING PLANT, AND STATED ROC HAD NO INTENTION OF PROCEEDING IN FACE OF US OPPOSITION SINCE ROC COULD NOT JEOPARDIZE NUCLEAR COOPERATION FROM US. HE INDIRECTLY ASSOCIATED PREMIER WITH HIS REMARKS. END SUMMARY.

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2. FOLLOWING MEETING WHICH COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND WITH AEC SEC GEN CHENG, AMBASSADOR, DR. FRIEDMAN, DR. SIEVERING AND GLEYSTEN CALLED ON FONMIN SHEN NOVEMBER 20 TO REVIEW CONCLUSIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY STUDY TEAM VISIT TO TAIWAN. FRIEDMAN COMMENTED THAT ROC HAS AN AMBITIOUS AND RATHER SOPHISTICATED PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT INCLUDING AN AVOWED INTEREST IN AN ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE. WHILE THIS LATTER INTEREST WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN MANY RESPECTS, IT ALSO RAISED PROBLEMS FOR US, I.E. THOUGH PERHAPS JUSTIFIABLE IN TERMS OF A LARGE POWER REACTOR PROGRAM, IT COULD ALSO BE STAGE FOR A WEAPONS PROGRAM.

3. FRIEDMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL PEOPLE ON ROC SIDE WITH WHOM GROUP HAD TALKED HAD STRESSED ROC'S EXCLUSIVE INTEREST IN PEACEFUL USES PROGRAM. YET WE HAD IMPRESSION THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS AND SEGMENTS OF GOVERNMENT VIEWED FULL FUEL CYCLE AND CHEMICAL REPROCESSING PLANT AS WAY TO KEEP OPEN MILITARY OPTION. FRIEDMAN NOTED THAT US/ROC NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WAS BEING WATCHED VERY CAREFULLY BY REST OF WORLD AND THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY DEVELOPMENT OF REPROCESSING CAPABILITY IN TAIWAN. HENCE, HE FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT IT WAS NOT IN ROC'S BEST INTEREST TO GO ANY FURTHER IN THIS DIRECTION. ALTHOUGH STUDY GROUP WISHED ROC HAD NOT PROCEEDED WITH FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY AND LABORATORY-SCALE REPROCESSING CELL, MEMBERS DID NOT FEEL PARTICULARLY CONCERNED SO LONG AS THESE WERE NOT VIEWED AS STEPPING STONES TO FULL-SCALE REPROCESSING FACILITY.

4. AMBASSADOR ENDORSED FRIEDMAN'S PRESENTATION, REMINDING FONMIN OF OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS ABOUT REPROCESSING PLANT AND STATING THAT US RELIES ON ROC ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT PROCEED WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE AND CONSULTATION. NOTING THAT ROC WAS DEVELOPING A CRITICAL DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS, THAT BENEFITS OF REPROCESSING PLANT WERE AT BEST MARGINAL, AND THAT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS HAD LEFT ROC WITH ONLY US AS SOURCE OF NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE. GLEYSTEN STRESSED THAT ROC AND US HAD TO OBSERVE GREATEST CARE SO AS TO MINIMIZE INTERNATIONAL SUSPICION THAT THERE

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MIGHT BE ROC INTEREST IN WEAPONS PROGRAM. WE WISHED ROC TO OBSERVE EVEN STRICTER STANDARDS THAN OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO GO OUT OF ITS WAY TO REMOVE ANY AMBIGUITY BECAUSE WE COULD NOT OTHERWISE WNSURE THE KIND OF COOPERATION NECESSARY FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. WE WERE ASKING NOT ONLY THAT ROC DESIST FROM SEEKING REPROCESSING CAPABILITY BUT ALSO THAT IT CEASE MINOR ACTIVITIES WHICH IMPLIED CONTINUING

INTEREST IN THIS DIRECTION.

5. ON POSITIVE SIDE FRIEDMAN NOTED THERE WERE VARIOUS WAYS WE COULD HELP THE ROC; US WOULD ASSURE ROC A SUPPLY OF FUEL FOR ITS POWER REACTORS AND DO ITS BEST TO HELP WITH REPROCESSING PROBLEM WHICH IN ANY EVENT WAS SOLVED THROUGH 1985. WE COULD ALSO COOPERATE IN SPECIALIST VISITS AND CONDUCT OF SENSIBLE PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH. FINALLY FRIEDMAN AGREED TO EXPEDITE APPROVAL OF AMENDED US/ROC BILATERAL AGREEMENT SO THAT TAIPOWER COULD PROCEED WITH CONTRACTS FOR ADDITIONAL REACTOR PURCHASES.

6. FONMIN RESPONDED THAT US EXPOSITION WAS VERY CLEAR AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD PRECISELY POINTS WE HAD MADE. AS HE HAD INFORMED AMBASSADOR EARLIER THIS YEAR AND REAFFIRMED TO CHARGE IN AUGUST, ROC INTENDED TO LIMIT ITS PROGRAM TO PEACEFUL USES AND HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS. EARLIER PLAN FOR PURCHASING REPROCESSING PLANT HAD BEEN DEFINITELY DROPPED AND ROC HAD NO INTENTION OF PROCEEDING IN FACE OF US OPPOSITION. ROC KNEW ITS LIMITS AND WOULD NOT BE SO FOOLISH AS TO JEOPARDIZE US NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITHOUT WHICH THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED. THIS WAS VIEW SHARED BY ALL IN THE CABINET "WHO HAVE ANY COMMON SENSE." WITHOUT EXPLICITLY STATING PREMIER'S POSITION HE ASSOCIATED CCK WITH HIS VIEWS BY SAYING HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE AND AFTER OUR VARIOUS REPRESENTATIONS.  
MCCONAUGHY

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