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PAGE 02 OF 06 STATE 143946 022133Z
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, US, AG

SUBJECT: SINO-ALGERIAN COOPERATION: NEW DEVELOPMENTS

A. BEIJING 12377

B. ALGIERS 0716

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING AT PARA FIVE IS THE BACKGROUND PAPER YOU
REQUESTED ON CHINA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.

3. REFEELS REFLECT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISSUE OF
SINO-ALGERIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION, INCLUDING A PUBLIC


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PAGE 03 OF 06 STATE 143946 022133Z C07/12 011698 NOD060


STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE 4/30 AND ALGIERS' REPORT OF AMBASSADOR ROSS' CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GHOZALI. THE ALGERIANS SAID THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; THAT ALGERIA INTENDS TO APPLY IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO THE REACTOR AT AIN OUSSERA; AND THAT THE CHINESE HAD ASKED--AND ALGIERS HAD GRANTED--PERMISSION TO COMMUNICATE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE REACTOR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO THE U.S.

4. SINCE 1984, CHINA'S PUBLIC POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS HAS BEEN FOUNDED ON THREE PRINCIPLES: (1) GUARANTEE FOR PEACEFUL USE, (2) SUBMISSION TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL ITS EXPORTS (WHICH MEANS PROVISION OF TECHNICAL DATA TO THE IAEA AND AGREEMENT TO IAEA INSPECTION OF FACILITIES), AND (3) NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE REITERATED THESE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR APRIL 30 STATEMENT AND SAID THAT THE ALGERIANS WOULD "BRIEF THE IAEA ON THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND ALGERIA AND DISCUSS WITH IT THE ISSUE OF SUBMITTING THE REACTOR TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND SUPERVISION." APART FROM SINO-ALGERIAN COOPERATION, CHINA'S CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HAS BEEN THE SOLE BREACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.



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CHINA HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT IT IS WILLING TO PARTICIP IN GLOBAL DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. BEIJING HAS STATED THAT PRC WOULD AT NO TIME AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE BE THE FIRST USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; IT SUPPORTS A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCL TESTING; AND IT SUPPORTS THE THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA CONTINUES TO CONDUCT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING. CHINA HAS PLEDGED PUBLICLY THAT IT DOES NOT ENGAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NOR DOES IT HELP OTHER COUNTRIES DEVEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA JOINED THE IAEA IN 1984; SUCH MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT IN ITSELF ENTAIL AN OBLIGATION TO APPLY IAEA SAFEGUARDS, EITHER TO A COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS OR TO ITS OWN NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

THE NPT: WHAT MEMBERSHIP WOULD MEAN FOR CHINA

NPT MEMBERS THAT ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PLEDGE NOT T TRANSFER TO ANY RECIPIENT WHATSOEVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCL EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. ALL COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE NPT UNDERTAKE REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR EXPORTS THEY ALSO AGREE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO CEASE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. CHINA'S DECISION TO JOIN T NPT WOULD BE A HIGH PROFILE COMMITMENT TO BECOME PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND WOULD

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PAGE 06 OF 06 STATE 143946 022133Z C07/12 011698 NOD060
 NUCLEAR PROGRAMS NOT OPEN TO (AEA INSPECTION). IN 1990 GERM
 AND IN 1989 JAPAN ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD REQUIRE FULL SCO
 SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY. CANADA, SWEDEN
 THE NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, BULGARI
 AND POLAND IMPLEMENT SIMILAR POLICIES. HOWEVER, OTHER MAJOR
 SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING THE USSR, THE UK, AND FRANCE HAVE NOT Y
 AGREED TO CONDITION THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS ON A POTENTIAL
 RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S ACCEPTANCE OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IT
 U. S. POLICY TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE ALL OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIE
 THAT FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE MADE A CONDITION OF
 SIGNIFICANT NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLY.

END TEXT BACKGROUND PAPER ON CHINA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERAT
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