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By **SW** NARA Date **10/12/08**

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACDA/D: **WMM** **W** Moser:jh
8/30/67

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in ACDA/D

DATE: August 23, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Edward E. Tomkins, Minister British Embassy
Mr. Ian M. Smart, First Secretary
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director, ACDA
Mr. Gottfried W. Moser, ACDA/D

1 SEP 1967

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Mr. Tomkins came to pay an introductory call on Mr. Fisher. After the opening pleasantries, Mr. Fisher said we have reached agreement with the Soviets to table the non-proliferation treaty tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. Geneva time. The timing will facilitate simultaneous announcement in both capitals. Mr. Fisher said this will not be a joint tabling, to which the Soviets objected; however, the texts will be identical. Mr. Fisher said the treaty as tabled might cause the FRG some pain. They object to the amendments clause which they say may bind them to amendments with which they do not agree. Mr. Fisher said we pointed out to them that with the veto being available to 24 (excluding France) members of the Board of Directors of the IAEA, which at all times will include one non-nuclear EURATOM member, it is difficult to conceive of an amendment passing which the Germans would oppose.

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Mr. Fisher said we anticipate much hard negotiation, especially on Article III. He said, however, that Article III, when singled out as a subject, because of general agreement on the rest of the treaty, will not be as difficult to negotiate as previously when it could be used as an argument against taking up the treaty at all. Mr. Tomkins asked why, in Mr. Fisher's opinion, the Soviets

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delayed until now to table - was it really because the Soviet leaders were on holiday? Mr. Fisher said this well may be the answer for there is no clear indication as to why they chose August 24.

Mr. Tomkins asked what will happen next? How long do we expect the next phase to last? Mr. Fisher said most probably the ENDC will continue through September - perhaps into October. He said we may have to return to NATO to discuss possible changes in our Article III if we are unable to persuade the Soviets with whom we are committed to make a hard sell on our current Article III. He said he felt the merits of our position were good for the EURATOM safeguard system does exist and EURATOM as an entity owns certain nuclear facilities and is responsible for materials accountability within the EURATOM area. He said it is not unreasonable to argue that the IAEA should utilize this organization which is in being. Mr. Fisher said he is aware of the UK's difficulties arising from its application for entry into EURATOM.

Mr. Tomkins asked if we expected that other nations will now come out with all their reservations and are we now in for a free-for-all. Mr. Fisher said we will probably have one round of this but noted that we have had it already with the Germans and the Italians. He said having a draft agreed to by the US and USSR puts a different tone on the negotiations. While the motivation may be greater for those who oppose the treaty to find objections to it as we come closer to a final agreement, at the same time the dangers of objecting to it are also greater.

Mr. Tomkins asked if we will take up the question of what steps in disarmament will follow the NPT and also the question of prohibiting non-nuclear-weapon states from developing peaceful explosive devices or can we leave these problems to one side. Mr. Fisher said actually the treaty does not leave these two issues aside, but addresses them in the preamble.

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In response to Mr. Tomkins' question concerning Kiesinger's expressed desire for a treaty of limited duration, Mr. Fisher said the Secretary raised this point with Gromyko and received a rather dour "no". He said, however, this may be something we will have to compromise on. If so he looked upon it as a possible "closer" and therefore did not think it should be discussed in the near future. Mr. Tomkins asked if the UK proposal for a withdrawal clause was a non-starter. Mr. Fisher said no, he would not be that categorical.

Mr. Tomkins said that while serving in Germany he was somewhat on the fringes of this issue, sometimes wishing that it would go away. However, he was happy that we had been able to carry it this far. Mr. Fisher said that in his discussions with German Parliamentarians who were here last March, he asked them a number of times if they thought West Germany's present non-nuclear policy would be sustainable with ten nuclear powers in the world. They thought it would not. He then pointed out to them the unsettling effect any change in this policy would have on the European scene. He said they made no response to this but it was obvious the point hit home.

Mr. Tomkins asked if we had had any word from the Soviets on our approaches to them on the handling of the strategic arms race. Mr. Fisher said we had not.

Mr. Smart asked what if any reply we had made to the Italians on the Fanfani proposal. Mr. Fisher said we had given them no formal answer, but had outlined a series of problems which the proposal raises. Mr. Fisher said the problem is that the Fanfani proposal takes on protean forms and we cannot make formal objections to something so nebulous. He said we have pointed out to the Italians that this would be a potential competitor to the non-proliferation treaty which is something we would like to avoid. Mr. Smart asked if we automatically excluded the proposal then. Mr. Fisher said we could not say that. Mr. Fisher said the Italians may simply wish to raise the proposal to have it be seen and be looking for a place or for a way in which to drop it. If this is the case, perhaps this could be handled in the Geneva context.

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