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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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**Memorandum of Conversation**

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DATE: December 16, 1967

SUBJECT: NPT (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor,  
Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Lawrence Weiler, ACDA/D

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At a reception at Mr. Garthoff's home, Vorontsov asked how the Article III NPT impasse could be resolved. I said we hoped the Soviets would respond favorably to what Mr. Foster had told them in Geneva that the road to agreement lay through the November 2 formulation. I recalled that we had told them what we would say publicly about the meaning of the language -- that the IAEA-EURATOM agreement should enable all parties to have confidence in the effectiveness of the safeguards and that the IAEA would have to be able to satisfy itself that no diversion of materials was taking place. Vorontsov said that this was merely what the U.S. would say, but what was important was what was in the treaty itself, and that some EURATOM countries did not look at the November 2 formulation the same way as the U.S. Vorontsov said some EURATOM countries do not wish to have any IAEA inspectors in EURATOM territory and the Soviet Union could not agree to a treaty which required Soviet allies to accept IAEA inspectors but gave special treatment to EURATOM countries that would allow them to say they were not required

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to accept IAEA inspection. I said the U.S. had made it clear to all that we did not envisage merely paper verification.

Vorontsov commented that the U.S. action in insisting that the negotiations must be upon the November 2 version, after the Soviets had informed the U.S. this version was unacceptable, would create a very bad impression with "certain people" in Moscow since it looked as though the U.S. was delivering an ultimatum. He added: "We are trying to soften that impression in Moscow." He then asked "what about the November 2 version." I stressed that the November 2 version was what we should focus on; when I added that Moscow itself had rejected the November 9 version, Vorontsov said, "Oh, that, nevertheless what about November 9?". I said his government should take seriously our view that the road to agreement was through the November 2 draft. Vorontsov said if EURATOM wanted to maintain its own inspection system that was its business but the Soviets had to think of their allies and how they, the Soviets, would look if they agreed to special treatment for allies of the U.S.

Vorontsov expressed considerable concern about the prospects for the NPT. He said the Soviets wanted the treaty very much and that it would help with "other matters" but that the tactics of those who sought defeat of the treaty -- endless negotiations until there were more opponents than supporters of the treaty -- seem to be winning; he pointed to the "gang-up" of the non-nuclears against the U.S. and the USSR during the General Assembly. He thought we had about one month, possibly two, to reach agreement and after that it might be too late.

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