

1968 JAN 26 PM 4 58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPYFLO-PBR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACDA/IR:JAPresel:ems
1/19/68

38

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 18, 1968

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Adolph von Wagner, Third Secretary, German Embassy
Mr. Robert H. Kranich, Chief, Political Affairs
Division, ACDA/IR
Mr. Joseph A. Presel, ACDA/IR

COPIES TO:	ACDA (17)	White House - Mr. Keeny	US Mission GENEVA
	EUR/GER	DOD/ISA - Dr. Halperin	DISDEL (3)
	G/PM	AEC - Mr. Labowitz	USUN New York
	RPM		
	INR (10)	Amembassy BONN	
	IO/UNP		

39

DEF 18-6

Mr. von Wagner came in to ask about our interpretations on Article III of the draft NPT. He said that it was his understanding that Ambassador Roshchin had asked us to make an additional interpretative statement to the effect that the safeguards to be applied are those of the IAEA. Mr. Kranich read the relevant section of Mr. Fisher's tabling speech at Geneva. Mr. von Wagner said that he was satisfied.

Mr. von Wagner asked why we thought the Soviets had been prepared to buy the November 2 draft of Article III. Mr. Kranich explained we had told the Soviets that we could go no further. The Soviets appear to want the NPT and to want it quickly. They apparently understand the problems involved with the deadline of March 15 set by the General Assembly, as well as the impending non-nuclear conference. Moreover, they appear impressed by the increasing dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear countries as expressed during the last GA. The Soviets, previously envisaging the NPT as a strictly anti-FRG measure, now realize the importance of the speedy conclusion of this treaty because of the possibility of proliferation elsewhere in the world.

In responding to Mr. von Wagner's question, Mr. Kranich said that he did not feel that Soviet acquiescence in the speedy approval

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCED BY BS/R

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

of a NPT generally favorable to the West meant a fundamental change in the Soviet policy toward Western Europe.

After Mr. Kranich had explained the timetable which we envisaged for the remainder of the consideration of the NPT, Mr. von Wagner referred to the German paper of November 20 in which the Germans had said that they understood that the U.S. would not ratify the treaty until after an acceptable IAEA-EURATOM agreement had been worked out. In view of the State of the Union message, Mr. von Wagner wondered if the U.S. was not now changing its position. Mr. Kranich pointed out that the U.S. had never committed itself to any particular ratification procedure. The timing of our signature and ratification would depend on a number of factors, one of which was to gain maximum leverage on other key potential signatories.

Mr. von Wagner asked if we attached any special importance to the fact that the President did not mention ABM talks in the State of the Union message. Mr. Kranich replied that he did not, that it seems that the Soviets are not interested in ABM talks until after conclusion of the NPT, but they have never stated that they were opposed to having them as a matter of principle.

Mr. von Wagner asked what the ENDC was likely to discuss during the present session given the fact that the treaty draft had been tabled. Mr. Kranich replied that the treaty as tabled did not commit either of the governments; that we would talk about the review conference as well as other NPT-related matters, for example, the provision of security assurances or peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL