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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

EXERCISE
ERRANT FOE
ELLIPSE BRAVO 98
AFTER-ACTION REPORT(V)

PREPARED FOR DOE BY:

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(U) The purpose of this After-Action Report is to document DOE operational performance during participation in ERRANT FOE. In particular, this report presents the key issues DOE emergency response elements raised in the course of performing technical operations. This report provides the DOE Office of Emergency Response with information to help assess the readiness and capabilities of operational elements to respond to international weapons of mass destruction terrorist incidents and assign corrective actions as appropriate.

(U) The report also addresses DOE exercise planning and management issues to ensure the exercise program properly tests and evaluates the capabilities of DOE’s emergency response elements. Results of this exercise can be used in assessing the readiness of DOE’s emergency response elements over time and in adjusting the DOE emergency response training program to ensure that DOE emergency responders meet operational requirements.
(U) The After-Action Report is organized as follows:

- The BACKGROUND Section outlines the scope and broad objectives of the overall exercise and then focuses on the specific DOE exercise objectives. Also, it describes the DOE exercise participation, and exercise control structure and process.

- The FLOW OF THE EXERCISE Section presents the nature of the weapons of mass destruction terrorist situation that confronted U.S. authorities. It briefly traces the general response to this situation.

- The SUMMARY EVALUATION Section presents a judgment regarding the success of the exercise and assesses the overall performance of DOE emergency response elements in meeting their operational requirements. This section also highlights key findings during the exercise. It also outlines the emergency response elements' reactions to the alert, deployment, employment and redeployment phases of the exercise.

- The FINDINGS Section provides the basis for the overall evaluation of DOE operational element performance. It summarizes the issues that emerged during the course of the exercise. Exercise planning and management issues are discussed, followed by operational issues. It organizes the highlighted operational issues in the order the operations unfolded by alert, deployment, employment and redeployment phases.

(U) A Reference Book accompanying this report presents the supporting documents associated with the planning and execution of the exercise. The index of the Reference Book is at Tab D.
The interagency exercise objectives were as follows:

- Conduct crisis action planning
- Conduct crisis response
- Solicit Host Nation participation

DOE provided technical support to both crisis response and consequence management planning and operations. DOE specific objectives for ERRANT FOE are outlined below:

- Support the Foreign Emergency Support Team with Nuclear Radiological Advisory and Consequence Management Response Teams
- Support DoD with LINCOLN GOLD, Joint Technical Operations Team II, a Liaison Officer package and Consequence Management Planners
- Assist the Foreign Emergency Support Team and the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management in the development of a Consequence Management Plan

The DOE operational elements included 37 personnel as support to the interagency response. The response elements included the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team, LINCOLN GOLD Home Team, Joint Technical Operations Team II, and Consequence Management Planning Team. Additionally, DOE provided Liaison Officers to other agency locations. A description of DOE's emergency response capabilities is in TAB A. The DOE Exercise Force List is at Tab B.
served as the basis for an evaluation of the overall performance of the DOE emergency response elements.

(U) FLOW OF THE EXERCISE

All DOE elements successfully redeployed by 11 September 1998, thus completing DOE participation in Exercise ERRANT FOE.
(U) During the exercise Consequence Management Planners provided expert support to the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management.

(U) SUMMARY EVALUATION

(U) DOE emergency response elements accomplished their stated exercise objectives, and in so doing, several communication and operational shortcomings were identified. In ERRANT FOE, DOE demonstrated the operational soundness of the technical support it now provides to agencies in both domestic and international crisis response and consequence management areas.

(U) Particularly noteworthy are:

- The briefings given and data provided to a United States Ambassador and his staff by the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team were excellent and the experience gained was invaluable.
- The DOE Consequence Management Response Team planning was effective in operating along side the team’s counterparts in other U.S. government agencies and the host country.
- DOE consequence management planners provided significant data to the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management in the assembly of a consequence management plan.

(U) Key findings (discussed within the FINDINGS Section below) that require timely addressal are:

- The Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II did not have a straightforward means to resolve conflicts and issues between the DOE Phase II element leader and the DoD 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Phase II element leader. This raised the question of who is responsible for final arbitration and the process for escalating the conflict or issue to a higher authority.
- There is no standard operating procedure, Memorandum of Understanding, or Memorandum of Agreement, agreed upon by DOE and DoD, for sizing, tailoring, or coordinating the composition of the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. For example, is there a “minimum/core composition” that can be identified?

(U) The following outlines the activities of the DOE emergency response elements during the various phases of operations in ERRANT FOE:
(U) A DOE conference addressed and reviewed the Exercise ERRANT FOE after action comments of all participating DOE activities. Based on the discussion of these after action comments, the following paragraphs address both the important exercise planning and management issues as well as operational issues that warrant follow-up actions. The operational issues are presented and organized under the headings of alert, deployment, employment and redeployment activities of the DOE emergency response elements.

(U) Exercise Planning and Management Issues:

(U) Need for a Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) to Manage a Single Coherent Interagency Exercise. Exercise ERRANT FOE follows Exercise GAUGED STRENGTH in June 98 as the second interagency counter-terrorist exercise of FY 98. A contracting firm responsible to a single DoD agency operated and managed the Joint Exercise Control Group for both exercises. Consequently, this contractor managed the exercise more as a “single-agency” exercise than as an “interagency” exercise. This resulted in the perception that DoD exercise objectives are of greater importance than those of the Interagency.

(U) DOE Administrative Process does not Support Realistic Exercise Execution. Deployable DOE personnel and contractor support require blanket travel orders that allow for immediate deployment within established timelines. These orders should address travel and communication security, and eliminate the lengthy process of seeking foreign travel clearance prior to departure. DOE emergency response element personnel require quick procedures (now in place) for security plan approval for classified communications material when deploying during an exercise or real-world contingency.

(U) Alert Issues:
(U) **Effects Modeling.** Several agencies were conducting effects modeling. This could lead to confusion in the interagency concerning the effects of a release of radiological/nuclear material. There was no apparent effort to coordinate the results of the various modeling efforts in order to provide a single answer to the customer (e.g., Chief of Mission, Foreign Emergency Support Team Leader).
(U) Redeployment Issues: There were no redeployment issues.
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TAB A - DOE Emergency Response Capabilities

(U) **Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)**

(U) Team Size: 8-12 personnel per shift.

(U) **Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT)**

(U) Team Size: 5-8 personnel.
(U) **Team Size**: 5 (1 Federal Official and 4 Scientists) personnel.

(U) **Joint Technical Operations Team (Phase II) (JTOT II)**

(U) **Team Size**: 21 DOE personnel, augmented by 10-12 DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians.
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(U) Joint Technical Operations Team (Phase III) (JTOT III)

(U) Team Size: 1 Federal official, 21 DOE scientific personnel, and additional DOE support personnel as needed.

(U) Consequence Management Planning Team

(U) Team Size: 2 Federal officials, 10 scientists.
(U) **Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT)**

(U) **Team Size:** 2 Federal officials.

(U) **Search Response Team (SRT)** This team was not employed in this event.

(U) **Search Augmentation Team (SAT)** This team was not employed in this event.

(U) **Team Size:** The Search Response Team: 7 personnel. The Search Augmentation Team: 20 personnel.
(U) DOE Operational Structure
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TAB B - DOE Exercise ELLIPSE BRAVO Force List

(U) NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM

(U) NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM

(U) LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM

(U) LINCOLN GOLD HOME TEAM

(U) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM II

(U) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM III

(U) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM

(U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S LIAISON OFFICER

(U) Total number of DOE Participants deployed to Exercise ERRANT FOE was 37.
TAB C - Exercise Major Events
The detailed events are presented on the following pages as follows:
(U) The Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team released the Consequence Management Planning Team and the Commander-in-Chief's Liaison Officer. These teams all immediately returned to their home stations.
A. QUICKLOOK REPORT
B. LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
C. CONTROLLER GUIDANCE
D. PRE-EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST
E. EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST
F. NUCLEAR RADILOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM SITUATION REPORTS
G. NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM POWER POINT BRIEFINGS
H. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TEAM SITUATION REPORT
I. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT BRIEFING
J. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM SITUATION REPORT
K. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP TELEPHONE LOG
L. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP HARD COPY MESSAGES
M. JTOT II / JTOT III RECEIPT TRANSFER CHECK FORM
N. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP DAILY EVENT LOG
O. AFTER ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM (AATS) INPUTS
P. DOE PARTICIPANT AFTER-ACTION COMMENTS

Appendix 1 Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team
Appendix 2 LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM
Appendix 3 Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II
Appendix 4 Consequence Management Planning Support Team