A Special Operations Intelligence: Nuclear Terrorism
before they can attack again."

"The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass destruction, makes it imperative we act now to stop terrorists from threatening us with the world's most dangerous weapons."

"We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons."

"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorists before they are able to threaten us with mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."

Nuclear Terrorism: A National Priority
Debacle at Desert One
Communications Systems
- Incompatibilities between Operation Atlantic Command (U.S. Atlantic Command) and Ground Command
- Unfamiliarity of Supported Priorities
- Constantly shifting plans & Staff
- Over-involvement of joint operations
- Conduct joint operations
- Deficiencies in U.S. abilities to operate
- Major operation revealed major heavy involvement
- Potential hostages evacuate ~800 Amiri
- Restore democracy
- October 1983: U.S. invades island

Grenada: "FUBAR"
Congress Takes Action
Special Operations
Intelligence Support to
USD(1) on the ADEQUACY OF
ADVISER'S DECISION, THROUGH
USSOCOM BUDGET,
AND JUSTIFICATION OF
SUPERVISION/Preparation
DOD
OPERATIONS ACTIVITY WITHIN
OVERSIGHT OF ALL SPECIAL
PERFORMS POLICY
OSD
ALL SO/LIC MATTERS WITHIN
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT ON
MATTERS
INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS AND LAW
SECRETARY ON ALL SPECIAL
AND CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO
PRINCIPAL STAFF ASSISTANT

ASD SO/LIC Charter
US Special Operations Command

- Joint Special Operations Command
- Naval Special Warfare Command
- Air Force Special Operations Command
- Army Special Operations Command
- Civil Affairs Operations
- Psychological Operations
- 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
- Special Forces
- Special Tactics units
- Special Tactics units
- Special Tactics units
- Fixed Wing Special Operations Aviation
Information Operations
Psychological Operations
Civil Affairs Operations
Special Reconnaissance
Foreign Internal Defense
Conventional Warfare
Countering Propagation of WMD
Countering Terrorism
Direct Action

Special Operations Core Tasks
precise use of force
- degree of discriminate and
- operational techniques
- political risks
- level of physical and
- offensive actions in:
  - Different from conventional
damage designated targets
  - recover, exploit, destroy, or
  - taken to seize, capture,
  - environments
  - or politically sensitive
- conducted in hostile, denied,
- other small-scale actions
- Short-duration strikes and

Direct Action
Non-Kinetic Attacks
Infrastructure Attacks
Network and Intelligence Operations
Material Recovery
Hostage or Sensitive

Visibility means, including:
via clandestine or other low
Special Operations conducted
incidents
respond to terrorist acts and
prevent, deter, preempt, and
Offensive measures taken to

Countterterrorism
Counterproliferation of WMD

For Effective Use Only

Terrorists

For Effective Use Only

SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-05.

Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

- Render safe WMD
- Recover
- Capture
- Destroy
- Seize
- Locate

Taken to:
Visibility Special Operations
Clandestine or other low

[Diagram of military personnel and equipment]
Observations

- The problem is not an academic one.
- The U.S. is embroiled in global war.
- Intelligence requirements for SOF differ from those for policymakers & conventional forces in the level of detail and timeliness required.
- SOF CBW intelligence requirements will be similar to those for nuclear, except for those dealing with S&T issues.
- Better intelligence collection against targets of interest to SOF will benefit other OICOMs and government agencies, not just USOICOM.

You don't know what you don't know.

Nuclear intelligence ≠ terrorism intelligence.
Recommendation

We recommend that the Commission, in its report, highlight:

- the unique nature of SOF’s intelligence requirements;

- the gaps that currently exist in our knowledge; and

- stress the need for improved collection to fill these gaps and put badly needed intelligence in the hands of our Special Operators.
• Humans are more important than hardware
  • Quality is better than quantity
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
• Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur
- Special Operations are inherently intelligence-intensive

- Adequate intelligence to the degree of detail necessary to support Special Operations cannot be created after a crisis is underway
"Life is Tough. It's Tougher if You're Stupid."
Purpose

- Provide postulated nuclear counterterrorism-counterproliferation roles for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Global War on Terrorism to a non-SOF audience
- Examine the intelligence required to support these roles
- Highlight the importance of intelligence to SOF counterproliferation-counterterrorism core tasks
- Examine the adequacy of the current state of intelligence knowledge for support of SOF counterproliferation-counterterrorism core tasks
- Provide a recommendation to the Commission staff with regard to intelligence requirements and priorities