JOINT PLANNING FROM A SERVICE VIEWPOINT

delivered by

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to the

AIR WAR COLLEGE

on

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INTRODUCTION:

SECRET

FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS YOUR CONSIDERATION OF 'FACTORS AFFECTING U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY' HAS BEEN LIKE A FRENCH CHEF PREPARING THE "SPECIALITÉ DE LA MAISON." YOU HAVE SHopped THE MARKETS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES; YOU HAVE CHOSEN THE REQUIRED INGREDIENTS WITH GREAT CARE AND JUDGMENT. YOU HAVE USED THE MIXING BOWL OF OSD AND THE JOINT STAFF, BEATEN LIGHTLY WITH THE BUDGET AND FLAVORED WITH SERVICE DOCTRINES, ROLES AND MISSIONS. AT THIS POINT I CAN'T ADVISE YOU WHETHER TO BROIL, BAKE, FRY, OR PERHAPS FREEZE YOUR CONCOCTION. I CAN, HOWEVER, TELL YOU A LITTLE ABOUT THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TEMPERATURE THAT YOUR SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO SURVIVE IN THE EVERY YEAR WORLD OF MILITARY PLANNING.

I WILL REVIEW BRIEFLY THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR PLANNING TO ESTABLISH A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A SOMEWHAT DETAILED AND ILLUSTRATIVE LOOK AT A JOINT PLANNING PROBLEM AND FINALLY I WILL CONCLUDE WITH SOME MORE OR LESS RANDOM AND PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS THAT SEEM PERTINENT.

THE JOINT PROGRAM

SECRET

SECRET
THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR PLANNING, IN THE ORDER OF DISCUSSION COMPRIS ES A

CHART 0 ON

JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (JLRS E), A JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (JSOP) AND A JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP) GENERALLY PRODUCED EACH YEAR FOR THE TIME PERIODS INDICATED.

FIRST THE JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE - THE JLRS E -

CHART 0 OFF

CHART 1 ON

THIS ESTIMATE COVERS A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING EIGHT YEARS IN THE FUTURE. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE MILITARY POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, AND FUTURE REVIEW OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES.

IT CONTAINS AN APPRAISAL OF THE WORLD SITUATION, AN EVALUATION OF TRENDS WHICH COULD INFLUENCE MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL COURSE OF ACTION; AND FORECASTS THE NATURE OF POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, INCLUDING THE WEAPONS AND TECHNIQUES LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED. BASED ON THESE APPRAISALS, THE ESTIMATE LISTS POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF MILITARY ACTION IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND MILITARY POSTURES REQUIRED FOR U. S. SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION. SINCE I AM NOT GOING TO DISCUSS THE JLRS E IN DETAIL TODAY, BEFORE WE LEAVE IT, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS AN ESTIMATE ONLY AND THE JCS USUALLY PUT IT TO BED QUIETLY WITH A "NOTED." I WANT TO STATE FRANKLY THAT THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT CONSIDER THE CURRENT EMPHASIS, THOUGHT, AND ATTENTION GIVEN THIS LONG RANGE EFFORT TO BE EITHER ADEQUATE OR MEANINGFUL. WE HAVE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A MORE CONSIDERED AND USEFUL LONG-RANGE PLANNING DOCUMENT. PARTICULARLY IS THIS IMPORTANT WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE URGENCY OF CONCEPTUAL AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR OUR LONG LEAD R&D PROGRAM. TOO OFTEN THE JSOP APPEARS TO RUBBER-STAMP (OR TO BE A MERE EXTENSION OF) THE INTERMEDIATE PLAN -- THE OBJECTIVES PLAN -- APPEARING ON THIS CHART.

CHART 1 OFF

CHART 2 ON

THE NEXT PLAN PRODUCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANNING PROGRAM IS THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN. WE CALL THIS PLAN "JSOP," AND IT IS IDENTIFIED BY THE MID-TIME PERIOD COVERED. THUS, THE JSOP JUST APPROVED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN NOVEMBER IS JSOP-66. THIS PLAN COVERS A 36-MONTH PERIOD BEGINNING FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE ANNUAL SERVICE BUDGETS, MOBILIZATION PLANNING, AND STRATEGIC STOCKHOLDING. THIS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BY A TRANSLATION OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLITICS INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY. THE CRITICAL INGREDIENT IS EMBODIED IN THE MILITARY FORCE OBJECTIVES -- OR "FORCE TABS" -- ESTABLISHED FOR AN ASSUMED D-DAY
FOR AN ASSUMED D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR BEGINNING FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE. THE FORCE OBJECTIVES AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SERVICE BUDGET REQUESTS. AS THE TITLE OF THE PLAN INDICATES, THIS IS AN OBJECTIVES PLAN, AND IT SETS A DEFINITE PATTERN FOR THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES FOR THE YEARS PRIOR TO THE ASSUMED D-DAY, AS WELL AS FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME THEREAFTER.

CHART 2 OFF

CHART 3 ON

THIS CHART DEPICTS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN AND SERVICE BUDGETS.

ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAM, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE ESSENTIALLY APPROVED A JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN WHICH ASSUMES A D-DAY OF 1 JULY 1985. THE FORCE OBJECTIVES WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS APPROVAL. THE SECRETARY WILL ESTABLISH PROGRAM GUIDANCE AND BUDGETARY GUIDELINES -- SUCH AS MANPOWER CEILINGS, FISCAL RESTRICTIONS OR MATERIAL PROGRAMMING LIMITATIONS -- AND FORWARD THEM TO THE SERVICES FOR USE DURING BUDGET PREPARATION.

BUDGET MESSAGE TO THE NEW CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TRANSPOSES THE BUDGET REQUEST INTO DOLLAR APPROPRIATIONS BY 1 JULY 1962. THESE FUNDS ARE THEN OBLIGATED AND SPENT SO AS TO ACHIEVE BY 1 JULY 1965 THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE PLAN.

CHART 3 OFF

CHART 4 ON

THIS IS THE LAST PLAN REQUIRED BY THE JOINT PROGRAM -- THE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN. IT IS THE JOINT PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRESENTLY AVAILABLE U. S. MILITARY FORCES DURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE COLD WAR, A LIMITED WAR, OR A GENERAL WAR.

IT IS PREPARED OR REVISED ANNUALLY, AND ASSUMES THAT A GENERAL WAR COULD BREAK OUT AT ANY TIME DURING THE PERIOD THE PLAN IS IN EFFECT. THE PLAN TRANSLATES OUR NATIONAL POLICIES INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND TASKS. IT SETS FORTH THE DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. MILITARY FORCES, BOTH THOSE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH CAN BE MOBILIZED BEFORE OR AFTER D-DAY. THIS IS THE JOINT FIGHTING PLAN. BASED UPON THIS PLAN, EACH MILITARY SERVICE, AS WELL AS EACH UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND, DRAWS UP CURRENT CAPABILITIES PLANS AND EMERGENCY WAR PLANS.

THIS PLAN HAS 13 DETAILED ANNEXES, AND IS THE COMPLETE CURRENT WAR PLAN ON WHICH ALL OF THE CINC'S WAR PLANS ARE APPROVED. THE NEW PLAN FOR NEXT JULY -- JCSP-62 -- WAS FINALLY APPROVED LAST MONTH AND WILL GIVE THE CINC'S ABOUT 6 MONTHS LEAD TIME FOR DEVELOPING THEIR FY 62 WAR PLANS.
OF THE THREE BASIC JOINT PLANS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
AND THE ONE INVOLVING MOST SERVICE DISAGREEMENTS IS THE
JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN -- OR JSOP -- TODAY I WOULD
LIKE TO DISCUSS THAT PLAN FURTHER. THIS IS THE ONE WHICH
SHAPES THE STRUCTURE AND BUDGET OF THE MILITARY SERVICES.
ALL OF THE MILITARY SERVICES HAVE DEVELOPED (UNILATERAL)
REQUIREMENTS WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, ADD UP TO AN IMPRESSIVE
DEFENSE BUDGET. (BY IMPRESSIVE I MEAN UNATTAINABLE.) THERE
ARE MANY FACTORS WHICH RESULT IN THIS INITIAL UNREALISTICALLY
HIGH BUDGET. FIRST, WE ARE IN A TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN
CURRENT WEAPON SYSTEMS AND RADICALLY NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR
THE FUTURE. WE ARE FACED WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO MODERNIZE
CURRENT FORCES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR IN-BEING STRENGTH
WITH WHICH TO FIGHT ANY KIND OF WAR THAT MIGHT ARISE, AND
AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE FACED WITH THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND
BUY NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF EVER INCREASING COST IN ORDER
TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE COMPARABILITY
WITH OUR ENEMY. THESE MAY EVENTUALLY REPLACE, TO A LARGE
DEGREE, THOSE NOW IN USE BY THE SERVICES, BUT IN THE
MEANTIME -- WE ARE FORCED TO PROVIDE, TO SOME DEGREE, A
DUAL FORCE STRUCTURE -- ONE THAT IS PROVEN, AND ONE WHICH,
IN THE FUTURE, WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE BUT, AT THE PRESENT
DOES NOT GIVE US ADEQUATELY RELIABLE WEAPONS. THE MIX OR
BALANCE IS A CRITICAL QUESTION OF JUDGMENT IN THIS ERA OF
EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH
Another factor which greatly increases the requirements for military forces is the indefinite nature of the contingencies which we must be prepared to meet and the variety of concepts and strategic courses unilaterally developed and supported.

These factors result in extremely large initial military demands for the taxpayer's dollar. In such an environment, an arbitrary ceiling on the defense budget is inevitable, and many of the stated service requirements will not be met. Each service, therefore tends to emphasize those concepts, strategic courses and contingencies which enhance its chances for securing the greatest proportion of available resources. This difference in emphasis colors the viewpoint of each service on every element which enters into the plan, and it is in this unilateral frame of reference that the services approach the JSPF planning problem.

At this point, and before going further into the planning process itself, I think you should take a quick look at the background and the major changes that have occurred in the joint planning structure over the last ten years.

Prior to the Reorganization Act of 1958, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, made up of the planners from each service and chaired by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans of the Joint Staff, drafted joint plans. This committee was assisted in the job by the Joint Strategic Plans Group
STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP OF THE JOINT STAFF AND ORGANIZED IN MANY THREE-MAN PLANNING TEAMS. THE COMMITTEE NORMALLY MET TWICE WEEKLY AND CONSIDERED JOINT PLANS AND OTHER AGENDA ITEMS. MUCH OF THE GIVE AND TAKE, THE NEGOTIATION, IN JOINT PLANNING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THIS COMMITTEE.

THIS COMMITTEE AND OTHERS LIKE IT, HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED AS ONE RESULT OF THE REORGANIZATION ACT.

THE NEW ORGANIZATION REVEALS THE FOLLOWING PLANS STRUCTURE IN THE JCS.

CHART 5 ON

YOU SEE THAT THE JOINT STAFF IS NOW CONVENTIONAL IN NATURE WITH THE FORMER GROUPS AND TEAMS REPLACED BY THE J-SECTIONS.

SOME OF THE OLD PLANNING FUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE NEW J-3 SECTIONS, BUT MOST, AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, HAVE GONE TO THE J-5 SECTION.

CHART 5 OFF

THIS CHART INDICATES THE AIR FORCE -- JCS PLANNING RELATIONSHIP.

CHART 6 ON

AS YOU CAN SEE, THERE IS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AT ALL LEVELS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS. THE "ACTION OFFICER" ON BOTH SIDES IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SUCCESS OF THE SYSTEM. THESE OFFICERS, INCIDENTALLY, ARE COMPARABLE IN RANK, EXPERIENCE, AND BACKGROUND TO YOU HERE IN THE WAR COLLEGE - ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED, COLONELS AND SENIOR LT. COLONELS.

SERVICE COMMENTS, BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL, ARE DEVELOPED AT THE ACTION OFFICER LEVEL. THE SERVICE PLANNER, THROUGH HIS STATED CONCURRENCE.
THROUGH HIS STATED CONCURRENCE OR NONCONCURRENCE WITH PLANS
UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE JOINT STAFF, LARGELY DETERMINES
THE WORKLOAD FOR THE OPERATIONS DEPUTIES AND THE JCS, WITH
EACH LEVEL TRYING TO REACH AGREED VIEWS.

THE BASIC THEORY BEHIND JOINT PLANNING IS TO APPLY
THE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES
IN ORDER TO COME OUT WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE MILITARY ANSWER
IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. FROM A REALISTIC STANDPOINT I AM
SURE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU THAT THE RESULTS ACHIEVED ARE Seldom
THOSE CLEAR, SPARKLING GEMS OF MILITARY JUDGMENT AND WISDOM
WHICH IS THE GOAL OF THE PLANNING PROCESS.

CHART 6 OFF

CASE IN POINT -- YOU ARE WATCHING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FOR FY 66.

IT IS NOW FEBRUARY 1960.

DURING THE PAST YEAR EACH OF THE SERVICES, AS WELL AS
THE JOINT STAFF, HAS PREPARED A GREAT NUMBER OF STUDIES
PERTAINING TO A WAR SITUATION IN THE 1955-1968 TIME PERIOD.
THESE HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE JOINT STAFF; AND THE
JOINT STAFF OFFICERS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPOSED TO THEIR
OWN SERVICE VIEWPOINTS THROUGH MANY HOURS OF INFORMAL
DISCUSSION WITH ACTION OFFICERS AND OTHER PLANNERS.
A
CONTINUING LIAISON EXISTS BETWEEN SERVICE ACTION OFFICERS
AND THE BASIC WAR PLANS BRANCH OF J-5. AT LAST, THE BASIC
WAR PLANS BRANCH HAS DEVELOPED A FIRST DRAFT OR "FLIMSY"
AS IT IS NORMALY CALLED, OF THE JSOP FOR FY 66. THIS DRAFT,
LARGELY BASED UPON A
LARGELY BASED UPON A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR
THAT TIME PERIOD, INCLUDES STRATEGIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, AND A STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

THIS DRAFT IS THEN SENT TO OTHER JOINT STAFF AGENCIES
AND TO THE ACTION OFFICERS OF EACH SERVICE FOR INFORMAL
COMMENT. THE STRATEGIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE CHECKED TO
DETERMINE IF THEY REFLECT ADEQUATELY THE MILITARY ASPECTS
OF NATIONAL POLICY AS INTERPRETED BY THE SERVICE OF THE
ACTION OFFICER REVIEWING THE PAPER. IN CONSIDERING THE
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, IT IS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT WHICH
CONCEPT THE JOINT STAFF HAS ADOPTED. THE INFLUENCE OR
LACK THEREOF OF EACH SERVICE MEMBER OF THE BASIC WAR PLANS
BRANCH IS CLEARLY NOTICEABLE.

IN COMMENTING INFORMALLY ON THE "FLIMSY" AND LATER ON
THE SECOND DRAFT OR BUFF, EACH SERVICE ATTEMPTS TO INJECT
INTO THE APPRAISAL THOSE FACTORS WHICH WILL HIGHLIGHT THE
NEED FOR ITS PARTICULAR FORCES TO MEET CONTINGENCIES OF
ITS OWN PRIMARY CONCERN.

EXAMPLE -- OVERSimplified but with some basis in fact --
WE'LL SAY THAT THE ARMY FAVORS AN APPRAISAL WHICH EMPHASIZES
THE POSSIBILITY THAT DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION,
A CONDITION OF MUTUAL NUCLEAR "STALEMATE" WILL PREVAIL.
THE ARMY BELIEVES THAT A GENERAL WAR IS MUCH LESS LIKELY
THAN LIMITED WAR, AND THAT THE SOVIET ARMY WILL CONTINUE TO
BE THE TRADITIONAL AND DECISIVE ELEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING A
CONTINENTAL STRATEGY.

THE NAVY FAVORS
THE NAVY FAVORS THAT PORTION OF THE APPRAISAL WHICH INDICATES THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE ITS NAVAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THAT CONTROL OF THE SEA IS VITAL TO SUCCESS IN WAR, AND THAT THE SOVIET NAVAL PROGRAM CAN CONSTITUTE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. IN PARTICULAR, THE NAVY ENDORSES THE ESTIMATE THAT LIMITED WAR WILL BECOME THE MORE PROBABLE FORM OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, BECAUSE IN LIMITED WAR ALL OF THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS HAVE A ROLE AND, THE NAVY AND THE MARINES MAY BE CALLED ON FIRST.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS AN APPRAISAL WHICH POINTS OUT THAT THE SOVIET MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT CONSTITUTE THE PRIMARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT BALLISTIC MISSILES WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE ABILITY OF THE USSR TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE IN THE INITIAL ATTACK. IT IS NOTED ALSO THAT THE USSR HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN SPACE.

THIS IS THE PRELIMINARY SKIRMISH — A TESTING OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND IDENTIFIES MANY OF THE SPLITS WHICH WILL DEVELOP.

MORE BINDING BECAUSE THE CONCEPT ADOPTED CAN SHAPE THE
FORCE OBJECTIVES.

THE AIR FORCE ADVOCATES A CONCEPT OF PREPARING FOR A
GENERAL WAR WHICH WILL OCCUR UNLESS, AT BEST, TACTICAL
WARNING. THIS WOULD REQUIRE READINESS TO EMPLOY SUBSTANTIAL
NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE OUTSET. THAT IS, AN
IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE OFFENSE, AND RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL
FORCES FOR AIR DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. THE AIR FORCE
BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY POSTURE SUPPORTING THIS CONCEPT
WOULD DO MOST TO DETER WAR, WHETHER GENERAL OR LIMITED;
WOULD PUT US IN A POSITION MOST LIKELY TO END IN VICTORY,
REGardless OF HOW A GENERAL WAR MIGHT START.

THE NAVY PROPOSES ADOPTION OF SEVERAL STRATEGIES WHICH
INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE
OUTSET OF A GENERAL WAR, DELAYED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AND RESTRICTED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY WOULD ALSO
EMPHASIZE THE PREPARATION FOR LIMITED WARS, WHICH MIGHT OR
MIGHT NOT INVOLVE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY ARE
EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE IN THE MATTER OF STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

THE ARMY SUPPORTS THE MULTIPLE CONCEPTS PROPOSED BY
THE NAVY, BUT WOULD INCLUDE THE THOUGHT THAT MAJOR PENETRATION
AND OCCUPATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY WILL BE THE ONLY MEANS FOR
ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. AND ALLIED GENERAL WAR
OBJECTIVES.

IN OBSERVING THESE DIVERSE VIEWS ON STRATEGY, YOU ARE
AWARE THAT THEY ARE TO BE EXPECTED BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE
THE BASIC DOCTRINE AND
THE BASIC DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS OF OUR LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES, THESE DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS ARE DEEP-ROOTED.
THERE IS LITTLE YIELDGING OR COMPROMISE OF BASIC PHILOSOPHY ON THE PART OF THE SERVICES BUT THE BASIC WAR PLANS BRANCH, WITH THE BENEFIT OF SERVICE COMMENTS, MUST PUSH FORWARD TO THE NEXT STAGE IN DEVELOPMENT. THE ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE WON'T WAIT. IT IS NOW LATE MARCH, 1960, AND NO AGREEMENT IS IN SIGHT.


AFTER SEVERAL STRENIOUS SESSIONS, THE JOINT CHIEFS THEMSELVES ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE SPLITS ON THE CONCEPT, BUT THE DISCUSSIONS ARE USEFUL FOR ELABORATING UPON VIEWS AND CONVictions. AT LAST, THE JOINT CHIEFS ARE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION. -- A CONCEPT GENERALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT WHICH WAS FINALLY AGREED TO IN THE LAST JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN. BRIEFLY, THIS ENVISAGES A GENERAL WAR INITIATED WITH A SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING, OR AS THE RESULT OF A LESSER CONFLICT BROADENING INTO GENERAL WAR. THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE INITIAL STRATEGIC OPERATION IS THAT THE U. S. AND ITS ALLIES MUST ENGAGE WITH THE
EMERGE WITH THE RESIDUAL OVER-ALL ADVANTAGE AND, CONCURRENTLY,
OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS MUST BE DESIGNED SO AS TO
MINIMIZE LOSS AND DAMAGE TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES.
DURING THESE OPERATIONS, OTHER ACTIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS,
BY ARMY, NAVAL, AND AIR FORCE FORCES, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE CONCEPT.

IN ADDITION, INCREASED EMPHASIS IS GIVEN TO CONFLICTS
SHORT OF GENERAL WAR. THE ARMY AND NAVY POSITION REPEATEDLY
POINTED OUT THAT THESE LESSER CONFLICTS WILL BE "MORE LIKELY,"
IN THE JSOP PERIOD, THE AIR FORCE POSITION WAS AIMED AT
COMPLETE THIS COMPARISON. IN OTHER WORDS, CONFLICTS SHORT
OF GENERAL WAR WILL BE MORE LIKELY THAN WHAT? THAN GENERAL
WAR? CERTAINLY, THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE AND WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE SO. MORE LIKELY IN 1965 THAN
1960? THE AIR FORCE THINKS NOT. RATHER, THE RISKS INVOLVED
PROBABLY WILL CAUSE AN INCREASED RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN
LOCAL AGGRESSION, ESPECIALLY WHERE MAJOR ISSUES ARE KNOWN
TO BE INVOLVED, AND WHERE THE DANGER OF THE CONFLICT EXPANDING
TO GENERAL WAR IS GREATER.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1965 NOW CONTAINS MUCH
DISCUSSION ON LIMITED WAR, AND FIRMLY RECOGNIZES THAT THE
CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY AND SWIFTLY
WITH THESE CONFLICTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CRUCIAL TO OUR
NATIONAL INTERESTS.

WITH THE JCS SOLUTION, THE BASIC WAR PLANS BRANCH GOES
BACK TO WORK. THE ENSUING DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN BASED UPON
THE APPROVED CONCEPT
THE APPROVED CONCEPT OFFERS NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM, SINCE CONCEPT IS SO BROADLY STATED AS TO ALLOW COMPLETE LATITUDE FOR UNILATERAL SERVICE INTERPRETATION. ALL OF THE SERVICES CONCUR IN THE PROPOSAL AND IT IS APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF, THUS, WITH NO POINTS AT ISSUE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO PASS IT TO THE CHIEFS OR THE OPERATIONS DEPUTIES. THE SERVICES ARE NOW REQUIRED TO SUBMIT "FORCE TABS" BASED UPON THEIR UNILATERAL ASSESSMENT OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES.

THIS IS THE REAL HEART OF THE PROBLEM, SINCE FORCES EQUATE TO RESOURCES AND BUDGET.

THE FORCE OBJECTIVES PROPOSED BY THE ARMY INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL D-DAY FORCE OF 14 DIVISIONS. OF THESE, SIX WOULD BE LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THE REMAINDER DEPLOYED TO EUROPE, KOREA AND HAWAII. THE U.S. BASED DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE STRAC COMPOSED OF 3 DIVISIONS AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN LOCAL AGGRESSIONS. A LARGE MOBILIZATION BASE WOULD BE PROVIDED TO PERMIT A TREMENDOUS EXPANSION IN GROUNDED FORCES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT STRATEGIC WARNING OR LIMITED WAR WOULD PERMIT MOBILIZATION PRIOR TO D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY PROPOSES TO INCREASE GREATLY THE NUMBERS OF SEPARATE MISSILE BATTALIONS AND ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS. THESE WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND GUIDED MISSILES WITH FROM 20 TO 1000 MILES RANGE. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY PROPOSES TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF AAA BATTALIONS WHICH WOULD BE EQUIPPED
WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE NIKE-
HERCULES WHILE PREPARING THE WAY FOR MAJOR PROCUREMENT
OF NIKE-ZEUS.

THE NAVY FORCE OBJECTIVES CONTINUE CONTINUED
MODIFICATION OF THE ATTACK CARRIER FORCE, TO INCLUDE
CONVERSION TO SUPER CARRIERS, ALONG WITH SUPPORTING
VESSELS. THEY ALSO STATE A REQUIREMENT FOR A CRUISER AND
SUBMARINE FORCE, NUCLEAR POWERED, TO LAUNCH SURFACE-TO-AIR
AS WELL AS SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND SURROUND THE
CARRIER FORCES WITH A MORE EXTENSIVE AND COSTLY AIR DEFENSE
STRUCTURE THAN IS DEVOTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ENTIRE
NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT. IN ADDITION, THEY WANT 21 NUCLEAR
POWERED SUBMARINES EQUIPPED WITH THE POLARIS MISSILE AND
LONG LEAD TIME PROCUREMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER LEADING
TO A FORCE OF 45 POLARIS SUBMARINES. THREE MARINE DIVISIONS
WITH THEIR OWN WINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT ARE INCLUDED. AS WITH
THE ARMY OBJECTIVES, THERE IS EMPHASIS ON LONG TERM
MOBILIZATION.

AIR FORCE OBJECTIVES REFLECT 47 MAJOR COMBAT
WINGS AND 84 SUPPORT SQUADRONS -- TANKERS AND AIRLIFT --
WITH INCREASED NUMBERS OF MISSILE UNITS.

A REVIEW OF THE THREE SERVICES' FORCE OBJECTIVES
INDICATES CLEARLY THAT THERE ARE DIVERSE INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE ROLES AND MISSIONS. ALL THREE SERVICES HAVE
INDICATED A REQUIREMENT FOR THE TRM. THE ARMY AND THE
AIR FORCE HAVE COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FOR SURFACE-TO
SURFACE MISSILES IN
SURFACE MISSILES IN THE 300 TO 1500 MILE RANGE, AND BOTH
THE ARMY AND THE NAVY ARE COMPETING WITH THE AIR FORCE FOR
STRATEGIC AIR ROLES; THE ARMY AND MARINES CONTINUE THEIR
PRIVATE COMPETITION IN THE ROLE OF LAND WARFARE. NEW WEAPONS
HAVE COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM OF RESOLVING DIVERGENT SERVICE
PHILOSOPHIES AS EACH STRIVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE
NEW WEAPONS AND INCREASE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL
SECURITY. ESTABLISHED ROLES AND MISSIONS HAVE LITTLE
RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE GRAB FOR MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS.
BEHIND THE SCENES IS A DEFINITE OVERTONE OF SUSPICION, AND
DESIRE TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT ROLE IN SPACE, OR FAILING
THAT, TO DENY THAT ROLE TO ANOTHER SERVICE. EACH IS MAKING
A STRONG, COMPETITIVE BID FOR THE DEFENSE DOLLAR; RECOGNITION
AS THE DECISIVE FORCE AND, FAILING THAT, SERVICE "SURVIVAL"
IN THE NAME OF BEING A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO NATIONAL
DEFENSE.

THESE ELEMENTS OF STRUGGLE, IF YOU WILL, ARE PRESENT
AT EACH LEVEL OF JOINT PLANNING. ONE FUNDAMENTAL LESSON
OUT Universal FOR SUCCESSFUL JOINT PLANNING IS TO KEEP PERSONALITIES OUT
OF THE BUSINESS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON AN IMPERSONAL, NOT AN EMOTIONAL
BASIS. IN JOINT PLANNING YOU WILL SEE CASES OF DECEPTION
AND COLLUSION -- JUST AS YOU WOULD SEE IN ANY POKER GAME.
THE SIMPLE RESULT IS THAT IF SOMEBODY WINS SOMEBODY MUST
LOSE, SO THE EFFORT IS TO CUT THE LOSSES AND MAXIMIZE THE
GAINS, AND SO EVERYBODY GETS SOMETHING. WITHIN THIS

FRAMEWORK, CONVICTIONS IN
FRAMEWORK, CONVICTIONS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST MUST BE
HELD STRONGLY AND EXPLAINED CLEARLY — PREFERABLY WHILE
FURTHERING CONSENSUAL PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE
OTHER PLANNERS.

TO THIS END, AN OCCASIONAL LIGHT TOUCH CAN HELP. AS
AN EXAMPLE, RECENTLY THE ARMY PLANNER AND THE AIR FORCE
PLANNER EXCHANGED SOME DOCUMENTS. THE ISSUE AT HAND WAS
THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THE VIEWS WERE
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED. THE AIR FORCE PLANNER PRESENTED
THE ARMY PLANNER WITH A SUGGESTION:

'CHART 7 ON
CHART 7 OFF.'

NOT LONG AFTERWARD, THE ARMY SENT ANOTHER PLANNING
FACTOR TO THE AIR FORCE.

'CHART 8 ON
CHART 8 OFF.'

BUT IT IS NOW APRIL OF 1960, AND THE OBJECTIVE FORCE
PLAN MUST PROCEED.

'... I HAVE TOLD YOU, GENERALLY, HOW THE SERVICES DEVELOP
JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR OVER-ALL FORCES; NOW THE SERVICE
PLANNERS ARE CALLED UPON TO TAKE A DETAILED LOOK AT THE
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY EACH OF THE OTHER SERVICES; 'THIS IS A
RELIABLY NEW PROCEDURE — BUT A SIGNIFICANT ONE. IN MANY
RESPECTS, THIS IS LIKE TELLING A NEIGHBOR WHY YOU DON'T LIKE
HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN — A REAL CONTROVERSIAL EXERCISE, AS
YOU WILL APPRECIATE.'

NATURALLY, THE FIRST

BUT THE AIR FORCE HAS DONE ITS HOMEWORK, ALSO, AND IT POINTS OUT THAT THE PROGRAM SUBMITTED BY THE ARMY FOR THE NIEKE-ZEUS -- THROUGH THE PERIOD OF THE JSOP -- WILL COST $13 BILLION, FOR ONLY 27 NIEKE-ZEUS SITES. ALL PLANNERS ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR URGENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANTI-ICBM AREA, BUT THE NAVY JOINS THE AIR FORCE IN RESISTING THIS VASTLY EXPENSIVE PROGRAM FOR PRODUCTION OF A WEAPON WITH LIMITED DEFENSE PROSPECTS.

THEM CONSIDER SUCH A PROGRAM PREMATURE AND TECHNICALLY QUESTIONABLE.

THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE JOIN IN QUESTIONING THE NAVY'S INSISTENCE ON RETAINING THE LARGE ATTACK CARRIER FLEETS. THROUGHOUT THIS TIME PERIOD, AND SUGGEST THAT THE NAVY DIVORCE THESE EXPENSIVE CARRIERS FROM THE STRATEGIC ROLE, REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE ANTI-SUBMARINE DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES.

WHILE THEY ARE INVOLVED IN THIS ATTACK, THE AIR FORCE PLANNER DISCOVERS THAT THE NAVY'S PROGRAM FOR THE DEFENSE OF THESE CARRIER ATTACK FORCES AGAINST THE AIR-BREATHEING THREAT HAS A PRICE
THREAT HAS A PRICE TAG OF SOME $12.4 BILLION THROUGH 1966, WHICH IS ONE-HALF A BILLION MORE THAN THE TOTAL PROGRAMMED COST BY ALL SERVICES FOR AIR DEFENSE FOR THE WHOLE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT FOR THE SAME PERIOD. THIS DISCOVERY REALLY CAUSES A FUROR.

PROGRESS, HOWEVER, IS BEING MADE IN THE AREA OF MOBILIZATION PLANNING -- ALL THE SERVICE PLANNERS AGREE THAT, AFTER D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR, LARGE MOBILIZATION FORCES AND DECREASED PRODUCTION -- ON THE STYLE OF WORLD WAR II, WILL NOT BE PROBABLE! PROGRESS -- BUT ONLY FIFTEEN YEARS LATE...

SO, THEY TACKLE THE PLANNING PROBLEM OF HOW LARGE TO MAKE THE MOBILIZATION SUPPORT BASE. THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS ONLY THAT REQUIRED FOR THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD UNITS BROUGHT INTO ACTIVITY ON D-DAY -- THOSE WITH AN INITIAL GENERAL WAR MISSION. TO SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL, THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT THE HARDWARE IN STORAGE FOR USE BY LATER FORCE MOBILIZATION MAY BE DESTROYED, OR DENIED THROUGH DISRUPTION OF TRANSPORTATION. ALSO, IF STOCKS AND FACILITIES ARE DESTROYED AND CHAOS EXIST, THEN THESE FORCES SHOULD BE USED PRIMARILY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AND RECONSTITUTION -- AND WE CAN'T AFFORD CONCERN FOR CONVENTIONAL TROOP-TYPE EQUIPMENT IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT.

AND SO IT GOES -- UNTIL BIRM ISSUES ARE DRAWN UP BY THE SERVICES AND THE JOINT PLANNERS -- TEN ALL DAY SESSIONS WITH SERVICE PLANNERS. THE J-5 STRIKES A COMPROMISE POSITION,

AS HE IS EMPOWERED
AS HE IS EMPOWERED TO DO, FORWARDS IT TO THE JOINT CHIEFS;
SHOWING BY A BREAKOUT, THE AREAS OF SERVICE DISAGREEMENT.

THE JOINT OBJECTIVES PLAN IS THEN PUT ON THE AGENDA OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR A MEETING IN MAY -- AND TO
STAY ON THE AGENDA UNTIL RESOLVED. (ON JCS AGENDA 24 TIMES
FROM 20 MAY TO 14 SEPTEMBER -- CONSIDERED 13 TIMES,
DEFERRED 11 TIMES.)

WHEN THEY GET INTO THE PROBLEM, THE CHIEFS RECOGNIZE
THROUGH EXPERIENCE THAT THEY CAN'T RESOLVE THE MAJOR
DIFFERENCES -- THEY ARE TOO FUNDAMENTAL, AND THEY ARE VITAL
TO EACH OF THE SERVICE POSITIONS, SO -- THEY EFFECT AGREEMENTS
IN THE LESS SENSITIVE AREAS, AND FORWARD THE MAJOR ISSUES
AS SPLIT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS DECISION.

LATE IN MAY, THEY GET THE SECRETARY'S DECISION --
GENERALLY ALONG THESE LINES:

**CHART 10 ON**

-- THIS COSTS TOO MUCH --

**CHART 10 OFF**

AS GENERAL BROWN PROBABLY TOLD YOU A COUPLE OF WEEKS
AGO -- THE FORCE TABS PRICED OUT AT ABOUT $55 BILLION.

WELL, IF YOU SENSE THAT WE ARE MORE OR LESS BACK WHERE
WE STARTED -- YOU'RE RIGHT. I DON'T SAY THAT THIS IS GOOD --
BUT IT IS A FACT OF LIFE -- IN JOINT PLANNING, AT LEAST.

THE JOINT CHIEFS KNOW THAT THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF
THOSE FINAL PROBLEMS ARE SUCH THAT THE PLANNERS CAN'T DO
MUCH MORE WITH THEM -- SO, THEY AND THEIR OPERATIONS DEPUTIES
(Ours, of course, is
(Ours, of course, is Lt. General Gerhart, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs) Tackle the big problems, themselves -- with a lot of midnight work for the action officers to provide positions, facts, arguments, support, and the like, for their chief.

As we go into this major JCS exercise, at the highest military level, I think it would be appropriate to give you a first hand impression of the Army chief on this process -- General Decker had this poignant remark, which he made to a Washington reporter last month:

Chart 11 on

...If you don't fight, you're dead.... (Pause)

Chart 11 off

So now the Chiefs personally review their own service submissions in great detail. They check these against the forces, the requests, and the statements of the Unified and specified commands -- the CINCs.

Since the CINCs have the operational responsibility to make any of these plans work -- and must implement the strategy given, their comments are given great weight. This is particularly true now, since the Joint Chiefs realize that, to get agreements, they are going to have to adjust the relative priorities within commands, and between commands. They are going to have to set the ground rules for a "give and take" process.

In this final, personal review -- the Chiefs start out by a fundamental review of the service positions on basic military objectives. A good starting point for us, today,
IS TO REVIEW -- AS THEY WOULD -- THE KEY STATEMENT ON NATIONAL STRATEGY AS IT IS SET OUT IN BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:

CHART 12 ON

(EXTRACT OF BNSP)

...THIS IS AN EXTRACT FROM OUR BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.... WHILE WE STUDY IT FOR A FEW MOMENTS -- LET ME POINT OUT THAT THE AIR FORCE VIEWS THIS "DETERRENCE OF WAR" AS THE OVER-ALL NATIONAL OBJECTIVE WITH THE SUPPORTING MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING THE CAPABILITY TO PREVAIL IN WAR IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL. SO, THE AIR FORCE WOULD TRANSLATE THIS INTO A MILITARY STRATEGY AND TASKS WHICH LEAD TO CREATION OF A WAR WINNING MILITARY FORCE, NOT THE PYRRHIC VICTORY KIND, BUT WINNING SUCCESSFULLY -- WHICH ENSURES THE SURVIVAL OF THE U. S. AS THE DOMINANT NATIONAL POWER.

CHART 12 OFF

NOW, THE CHIEFS TAKE UP THE INDIVIDUAL ITEMS OF EXPENSIVE HARDWARE WHICH IS GEARED, PRIMARILY, TO THE GENERAL WAR THREAT --

CHART 13 ON

(GENERAL WAR CONCEPTS OF THE SERVICES)

WHEN FUTURE FORCE OBJECTIVES ARE CONSIDERED, THEY MUST BE VIEWED FROM THE CONCEPTUAL BELIEFS OF THE SERVICES PROPOSING THEM. THAT IS WHY I WANT TO PUT THIS RATHER FUNDAMENTAL TYPE OF CHART IN FRONT OF YOU, AS WE CONSIDER THE "SPLIT" VIEWS OF THE CHIEFS.

THE AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT IN ORDER FOR A CONDITION OF
COMPLETE DEFEAT TO EXIST, THE SOVIETS -- OUR "GENERAL
WAR" ENEMY -- MUST BE CONVINCED THAT OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
CAPABILITY, PLUS THE SUM TOTAL OF OTHER U.S. AND ALLIED
FORCES, MUST BE ABLE TO INFLECT AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF
DESTRUCTION ON THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC -- NO MATTER HOW WAR
STARTS, WHILE PRESERVING THE DOMINANT POSITION OF THE U.S.

THUS, IN THE PLANNING FOR THAT WAR, GENERAL WHITE HOLDS
TO THE POSITION THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR CAPABILITY OF
DESTROYING OR DISARMING HIS MILITARY FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTE
A THREAT TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES -- THE AIR FORCE
CONSIDERS AN ENEMY'S MILITARY FORCE AS THE ONE THING THAT
IS ALWAYS "UNACCEPTABLE" FOR HIM TO LOSE. NO MATTER WHAT
ELSE HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO SACRIFICING -- HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO ENGAGE US IN WAR IF HE STANDS TO LOSE THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF HIS MILITARY FORCE. THIS IS "COUNTERFORCE."

IN THE SHORT TIME SINCE THE EARLY '50s, YOU AND I HAVE
SEEN THE UNITED STATES CHANGE FROM A RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE
SANCTUARY TO A PRIME TARGET ONLY 30 MINUTES AT MOST AWAY
FROM A SOVIET DECISION TO STRIKE!

THE AIR FORCE VIEWS A GENERAL WAR AS ONE IN WHICH WE
MUST FIGHT AN ENEMY WHO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE MODERN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES. TODAY THE USSR IS OUR ONLY ENEMY IN THIS
DEFINITION, BECAUSE HE IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN APPLY THAT
KIND OF FORCE AGAINST US. IN THE FUTURE, IT MAY WELL
INCLUDE RED CHINA.

THE AIR FORCE

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THE AIR FORCE BELIEVES THAT THE PRIMARY THREAT REQUIRES PRIMARY ATTENTION IN OUR FORCE PLANNING AND PRIORITY IN FORCE BUDGETING. THE AIR FORCE, CERTAINLY WOULD NOT DENY THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR CAPABLE FORCES WITH THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES TO FIGHT LOCALIZED CONFLICT, OR LIMITED WARS, WITH LIMITED ENEMIES -- BUT, THE EQUIPPING AND MAINTAINING OF IN-BEING FORCES FOR SMALL WARS MUST NOT DILUTE AND REDUCE OUR STRENGTH TO OPPOSE THE PRIMARY THREAT.

BUT THE ARMY ARGUES, WITH HONEST CONVICTION, THAT WE DON'T NEED ALL THIS...THEY SAY "WE AGREE WITH A DETERRENT FORCE FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR" ... NOT, THEY SAY GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR ... "BUT, THE ARMY SAYS IT NEED NOT BE A WAR-WINNING FORCE, SINCE A SMALLER AND LESS EXPENSIVE DETERRENT FORCE CAN PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM CONSIDERING THIS EXTREME ALTERNATIVE." THIS, SAYS THE ARMY, WE CAN HAVE "MUTUAL DETERRENCE" TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR, AND CAN EXPECT TO HAVE TO FIGHT ONLY A GENERAL CONVENTIONAL... OR NEARLY NON-NUCLEAR WAR ... THEREFORE, THE AIR FORCES' LARGE STRATEGIC FORCE IS NOT NECESSARY; REDUCE IT AND MAKE THE MONEY AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR A LARGER CONVENTIONAL-TYPE GROUND FORCE, AND MORE MOBILITY FOR SUCH FORCE.

THE AIR FORCE LOOKS AT THE ENEMY THAT THE ARMY WOULD HAVE US FIGHT IN THIS LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL-TYPE WAR, WHICH INCLUDES THE SOVIETS ... AND SEES NO END TO THE DRAIN ON U.S. RESOURCES INVOLVED. ALSO, THE AIR FORCE ARGUES ... IF WE BEGIN TO EQUIP FOR THIS TYPE OF ENGAGEMENT, WE WILL TELEGRAPH OUR INTENTIONS.
TELEGRAPH OUR INTENTIONS TO THE ENEMY THAT WE WILL RESPOND
"IN KIND" TO HIS ARMED AGGRESSION; THUS, WILL BE INVITING
HIM TO FIGHT --- ON HIS TERMS --- AND WILL BE PASSING THE
CONTROL OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ENEMY DECISION-MAKERS.
RATHER THAN DETERRING HIS USE OF FORCE, WE WOULD BE
ENCOURAGING HIM TO "NIEVLE" US TO DEATH IN A CONVENTIONAL
WAR OF ATTENTION. OR --- SHOULD HE CHOOSE TO EXERCISE HIS
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, WE WOULD BE IRREVOCABLY DEFEATED.

THE NAVY WOULD COMPLETELY FOREGO ANY ATTEMPT AT
"COUNTERFORCE". IN GENERAL WAR, WEAPONS FOR A STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE, AND POSTULATES THAT THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR
STRIKES AGAINST A SMALL NUMBER OF SOVIET CITIES --- SOFT-
TARGETS WITH BIG PAY-OFF IN DETERRENT VALUE, THROUGH
POPULATION AND URBAN DESTRUCTION --- WILL BE ENOUGH. THEIR
FINITE DETERRENCE IN THIS AREA INDICATES DISAGREEMENT WITH
A WAR-WINNING OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR. NOTE THAT
THEY, TOO, MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TYPES OF GENERAL WARS.

NAVY PLANNERS CONSIDER "FINITE DETERRENCE" AS ADEQUATE
TO DETER, AND THEY COUNT THE TARGETS NECESSARY TO DO THE
JOB --- SURPRISINGLY, IT COMES TO EXACTLY 45 POLARIS
SUBMARINES --- GIVE OR TAKE A FEW --- PLUS, THE 5 THEY WOULD
ADD ON TO PROVIDE NATO WITH ITS SEPARATE DETERRENT FORCE.

THEIR ARE NOT TOO CLEAR ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL
CONVENTIONAL WAR AS ESPoused BY THE ARMY, BUT THEY REALLY
DON'T RULE OUT ANYTHING, CLAIMING THE FLEXIBILITY THAT I
MENTIONED BEFORE --- TO PERMIT THEM TO ADJUST FORCES EITHER
WAY.
The Air Force answers the Army's argument on "Mutual Deterrence" by claiming it is misleading — it implies that the USSR must also deter the United States, and the Air Force is not going to subscribe to a U.S. strategy that has as one of its postulates our own deterrence. Who's national policy are we serving? Thus, the Air Force says that mutual deterrence is not a strategy for General War — it is an indication that we don't have a strategy in this area.

As for the Navy's "finite deterrence" — the Air Force sees this as an open strategic invitation to act of Soviet military aggression against our allies or in peripheral areas — against which we can do nothing because of strategic inadequacy — we could never honor a treaty commitment with such a force since it has neither a credible, first or second strike capability, and once committed, the Soviets would retain a decisive residual force. "Also, the pure retaliatory nature of such a force prevents the President from making a decision against alternative courses of strategic action — committing him only to the "retaliatory" response. There is a definite need and a place for a "retaliatory" force in our over-all counterforce concept...but, standing alone... a retaliatory force is not enough... it is a part of a strategy...not a whole strategy..."

Next, the Joint Chiefs turn to a discussion of the forces and mobilization concepts for conflicts short of General War. First,
GENERAL WAR. FIRST, WHAT IS MEANT BY "LIMITED WAR" IN OUR U. S. MILITARY PLANNING.

ACADEMICALLY, OF COURSE, IT MEANS A CONFLICT IN WHICH THE OBJECTIVE, THE FORCE, THE TERRITORY, AND THE LIKE, ARE LIMITED.

PHILOSOPHICALLY, IT MEANS A WAR IN WHICH THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE -- OR SOMETHING IN A LIKE VEIN.

BUT FOR COLD HARD MILITARY PLANNING -- THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT YOU CAN'T BE SURE OF ANY OF THESE "LIMITATIONS" UNLESS YOUR ENEMY IS INCAPABLE OF EXCEEDING ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS -- THIS, WE SAY THAT ANY LIMITED WAR IN THE TIME FRAME OF OUR CONSIDERATION MUST BE ONE IN WHICH WE ARE OVERTLY ENGAGED WITH SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION.

THOUGH THE SERVICES DO NOT AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THIS POSITION, ALL ARE GENERALLY AGREED THAT WE MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO ENGAGE IN LIMITED WARS -- BUT AGAIN THEY DISAGREE ON HOW, AND WITH WHAT FORCES, SUCH WARS SHOULD BE PLANNED.

CHART 14 ON (LIMITED WAR CONCEPTS)

THE AIR FORCE VISUALIZES THIS TYPE OF WAR AS A CONFLICT OF VARIABLE INTENSITY WITH AN ENEMY THAT DOES NOT POSSESS IN BEING, THE CAPABILITY OF MATCHING OUR WEAPONS! -- AND OVER WHICH WE CAN, BY MILITARY SUPERIORITY WHICH WE POSSESS, IMPose OUR WILL SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE TO EMPLOY THAT SUPERIORITY. TODAY
THAT SUPERIORITY. TODAY SUCH ENEMIES INCLUDE ALL POWERS EXCEPT THE SOVIETS...TOMORROW MAY BE DIFFERENT.

THE ARMY SEES THIS TYPE OF WAR AS A SITUATION IN WHICH THE LOCAL FORCES -- THE INDIGENOUS GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF OUR ALLIES -- ARE INSIGNIFICANT OR NON-EXISTENT. THEY VISUALIZE THAT AIRLIFT OF MANY AMERICAN SOLDIERS, TANKS, AND OTHER MOBILE BATTLEFIELD EQUIPMENT IS IMPERATIVE -- AND IMMEDIATE. THEY WOULD EXTEND LIMITED WAR CONCEPTS TO ANY ENEMY, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD HAVE US USE THE THEORY OF MILITARY MASS, PLUS MOBILITY, TO CONTAIN THIS WAR. THE ARMY SAYS THAT, WHATEVER THE ENEMY HAS IN THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTS AND FORCES FOR LIMITED WAR, WE MUST MEET HIM. THIS IS THE RATIONALE OF THEIR "GRADUATED DETERRENCE" -- AS I HAVE SAID EARLIER, IT IS AN "OPEN-END" SORT OF THING.

THE NAVY'S VIEW OF LIMITED WAR IS PRIMARILY ONE WHERE THERE ARE LIMITED FORWARD ALLIED AIR BASES -- AND TOWARD THIS END THEY ARE CONSTANTLY ATTACKING THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR GLOBAL NETWORK OF BASES. SO, WITH LIMITED BASES NO CONSEQUENTIAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITY -- THE NAVY SUPPLIES THE ANSWER THROUGH THEIR RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE TASK FORCES, OPERATING IN SANCTUARIES OF FRIENDLY WATER, IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE COMBAT AREA. NAVAL POWER, SPEARHEADED BY NAVAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS, FROM NAVAL ATTACK CARRIERS AND THEIR MARINE AERIAL ENVELOPMENT TACTICS -- CAN PROVIDE THE ANSWER TO LIMITED WARS.

IN SIMPLE WORDS -- ALL THE SERVICES HAVE THEIR FAVORITE SOLUTIONS TO THE
SOLUTIONS TO THE LIMITED WAR PROBLEM — EACH TENDS TO TALK ABOUT AND PLAN FOR THE LIMITED WAR FORCES THAT MAKES THE BEST SELLING POINTS FOR THE BUDGET.

CHART 14 OFF.

WELL, IT IS LATE IN THE SUMMER OF 1960. -- 100% AGREEMENT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE OBJECTIVE FORCES IS STILL LACKING.

THE PLAN, WITH AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS IS POSSIBLE, IS FORWARDED AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. CUTS HAVE BEEN MADE, PRIORITIES ADJUSTED — BUT, TO PREVENT PIECENAIL DECISIONS FROM DISRUPTING PROGRAMS BEYOND REPAIR, THE SERVICES NOW SUBMIT GRADUATED FORCE “PACKAGES.” THESE FOLLOW FOUR PATTERNS — OR FORCE INCREMENTS — YOU COULD CALL THEM A HIGH BUDGET FORCE, A MIDDLE BUDGET FORCE, A LOW, AND A PRACTICALLY LOW BUDGET FORCE.

USING THIS APPROACH, THE PLAN GOES FORWARD. IN SEPTEMBER, THE DECISIONS BEGIN TO COME DOWN FROM THE SECRETARY — DECISIONS IN THE FORM OF BUDGETARY CEILINGS, PERSONNEL CEILINGS, AND FORCE LEVELS FOR THE THREE SERVICES, WITHIN WHICH PLANNING AND HARD GOODS BUYING IS AUTHORIZED.


UP TO NOW,
UP TO NOW, YOU HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A POSITION OF
OBSERVING A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM OF JOINT PLANNING -- A
RATHER DISMAL PICTURE. AT THIS POINT, LET'S RETURN TO
JANUARY 1961. I MUST EXPLAIN THAT I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING
ONLY THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. THERE IS A GREAT
DEAL TO BE SAID ON THE CREDIT SIDE OF THE JOINT PLANNING
LEDGER. THE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS UPON WHICH RESOLUTION IS NOT
ACHIEVED IS SMALL BY COMPARISON WITH THOSE WHICH ARE
RESOLVED SUCCESSFULLY AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
NATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE "SPLIT" ISSUES ARE, INVARIABLY,
SIGNIFICANT ONES -- DIRECTLY TOUCHING ON VITAL NATIONAL
INTERESTS. ON THESE RIDE THE KEY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND
DECISIVE TALKS IN OUR MILITARY ENDEAVOR.

THE DAY-TO-DAY LABORS OF THE JOINT PLANNERS ARE
EXHAUSTIVE, DETAILED, AND GENERALLY SUBSTANTIVE -- AND IT
IS MY BELIEF THAT A REAL SERVICE IS PERFORMED IN THE
PRESENTATION OF PAPERS WHICH THE JOINT CHIEFS ARE ABLE, IN
THE MAIN, TO ACCEPT WITH A MINIMUM OF TIME AND LABOR. THE
JOINT CHIEFS, THEMSELVES, RESOLVE MOST OF THE "SPLITS";
INDICATING THAT RESOLUTION IS USUALLY POSSIBLE AT THAT LEVEL,
WHERE THE WIDER VIEW PREVAILS. THIS RESULT IS, OF COURSE,
A DESIRABLE ONE -- BUT IT STILL HAS FAR TO GO TO SERVE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION IN THESE VITAL DIVERGENCIES
WHERE TRUE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED DUE TO SERVICE-
CENTERED CONVictions.

IN MY HYPOTHETICAL
In my hypothetical example of the development of JSOP-66, at least the issues were developed and discussed, even though complete resolution was not accomplished at any level. This has some advantages — but it is clearly a laborious and relatively ineffective way to get a job done. Probably the most significant thing to be learned here is that we still haven’t found the answer to the problem of making the best use, and the best decision, concerning the national resources which the military establishment represents. General Richardson’s presentation which follows mine is certainly pertinent in this regard.

Almost every one of us here will be participants in, or will be affected by, the reorganization studies and proposals fostered by the incoming administration. As you know, the Air Force has publicly stated support for a reorganization of our decision, and military policy making machinery. "At the top" in order to serve, more faithfully and directly, the national interest. We look forward to the day when "overriding service-orientated loyalty will disappear." I'm afraid my view is that in this regard we cannot afford evolution — we must legislate so as to evolve on a time table.

This opportunity of yours is one of the best vehicles to provide the background, the problems, the alternatives, and the tasks that face the military today and in the future.

Only judgment, clear
ONLY JUDGMENT, CLEAR AND UNBIASED, CAN PRODUCE THE BEST SOLUTIONS ... AND ONLY MILITARY JUDGMENT CAN PRODUCE MILITARY SOLUTIONS. WE SEE TODAY A PROLIFERATION OF EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY CONCEPT AND STRATEGY, INCLUDING SCIENTISTS, PROFESSORS, ECONOMISTS AND COLUMNISTS. THEIR VIEWS ARE WIDELY READ, DISCUSSED AND, TO VARYING DEGREES, HAILED AS AUTHORITY. WHERE IS THE CLEAR STATEMENT OF MILITARY VIEWS BY MILITARY LEADERSHIP WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT FROM A COUNTRY PREEMINENT IN THESE MATTERS? THE VOICE OF MILITARY AUTHORITY IS CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT, UNLESS HEARD IN CONTENTION AND CONTROVERSY.

LET'S TAKE ONE FINAL LOOK AT THE EFFECT OF JOINT PLANNING AS IT APPEARS TO THE MAN WHO, MORE THAN ANY OTHER, WILL CONTROL OUR NATION'S DESTINY DURING THESE NEXT FOUR YEARS.

CHART 15 ON
(KENNEDY'S - "MERELY TO CRITICIZE IS NOT ENOUGH:" STATEMENT)

WE WON'T SATISFY THIS CRITICISM WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL AND FAR REACHING CHANGES. THE SAME ILLUSTRATION HE GIVES ALSO BRINGS TO MIND THE LESSON OF HISTORY THAT, WHEN SOME FORGOT TO PREPARE FOR WAR, THE GLORY OF HER LAW, HER TECHNICAL SKILL - HER HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING - NONE OF THESE PROTECTED HER FROM THE VANDALS AND VISIGOTHS -- MEN WITH CLUBS -- AND A LOW STANDARD OF DYING.

CHART 15 OFF

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE NATION HAVE A RIGHT TO
LOOK TO THE MILITARY FOR REAL "DEFENSE" AND NOT FOR
ARTICULATE HAGGLING. THE CHALLENGES TO US ARE NATIONAL
INTEREST REQUIREMENTS IN THE FULLEST SENSE OF THAT PHRASE --
THE COMPETITION AGAINST A WAR-WINNING STRATEGY SHOULD BE
BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN -- NOT IN THE PENTAGON!