Introduction to SIOP-63
(Vice Admiral Johnson)

General Lemnitzer, Gentlemen:

The Director of Strategic Target Planning and his staff have completed
the preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963. SIOP-63
has been developed using the guidance furnished by you last October.

Very briefly, I would like to review the most significant planning
actions which took place during the preparation of this plan.

(1) Immediately following the receipt of the new guidance, this
staff undertook the development of the force employment concept to satisfy
the requirements for increased flexibility and selectivity of response.
This has not been achieved without cost. As will be pointed out in the
following presentations; complexity of execution is the price that will be
paid. Your attention is now invited to the Task and Attack Option Chart
(location). The information on this chart has been fundamental to the
SIOP-63 development. This visual aid will be available for your reference
through the next day and a half.

The NSTL has been realigned in consonance with the three tasks.

Planning factors and definitions used in SIOP-62 were again reviewed,
updated and modified as necessary. New factors and definitions were added
as required. This and other basic planning was completed in January pre-
liminary to the actual force application. In our opinion there is no in-
stance where these planning factors or definitions limit or restrain SIOP
forces in any manner.

(2) Participating commanders identified their forces to be com-
mitted and coordinated in the plan at approximately the same time.
(3) The DGZs which commenced on 10 January 1962 and the last preplanned non-alert weapon was assigned on 19 April 1962 (a total period of more than three months); however, the new DGZs which were added to the NSTL after 3 May have necessitated a change in the force application completed earlier. This change was not completed until 25 May 1962.

(4) The written SIOP-63 plan was published in late May and is ready for distribution except for those portions which go out under separate cover.

(5) Distribution of appendices to Annex F (Force Timing and Strike Assignment Sheets) and Annex C (NSTL) is programmed for 13 July 1962. Annex F (Countermeasures Application) will follow about 23 July 1962.

The presentation of SIOP-63 today and tomorrow will cover all salient portions of the plan. This chart presents the sequence of topics to be presented, the briefing officers and the time scheduled for each portion of the briefing. (Brief run through of schedule if not previously covered.)

Gentlemen, may I present the first speaker, Colonel Philpott, who will discuss the National Strategic Target List.
SIOP-63 Force Structure
(Col McDonald)

(1) Force Disposition.

This presentation will review the SIOP-63 force structure. The
The black line represents the SAC ICBM bases in the U.S. This line is

The colored arrows represent the approximate routing of the SIOP forces to the target system. The color codes of the arrows are identical to the launch base coding for each command.

EUR forces in large part are within the "H" hour control line. A major portion of this effort is against those targets located

As previously mentioned the wide geographic dispersion of
(2) Committed Forces.

The SAC bomber force is shown on this page. As earlier shown on
The delivery vehicle summary of the committed forces is broken down on this chart by

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<th>August 62</th>
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<th>December 62</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert</td>
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The weapons delivered by the committed forces are shown here by command

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<td>Total</td>
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</table>
The shown here are included in the computation of cumulative damage expectancies in recognition of their inherent capability toward achievement of the common objective.

The planned force for August is shown here to portray the total remaining Free World nuclear capability. This force is not included for computation of SIOP damage expectancies but the coordination achieved by SAC does recognize the capability.

The Total Force Delivery Vehicle Summary includes

(DISCUS) DELIVERY VEHICLE SUMMARY

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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
(4) Planning Factors

This chart shows the planning factors that were applied to the weapons delivery systems during the force applications. These factors vary for each weapons delivery system.

The first, [redacted], are provided primarily by the guidance for SIOP-63. In a few instances, additional factors were developed by the Staff and CINCREPs. The factors shown here under the [redacted] column are applied to attack options 1 and 2, and those listed in the tactical column are applied to attack options 3, 4 and 5.

These are only a few typical examples which indicate the many variations as functions of location, posture and condition of warning. For instance, [redacted] are assigned a factor of 1.0 under a [redacted] but under a tactical warning condition these forces are assigned a factor of .5 in recognition of their vulnerability to enemy attack. This is an example of a factor not provided in the guidance.

The second of these factors, Weapon System Reliability, is the probability of a delivery vehicle delivering a weapon which detonates as planned, excluding effects of enemy action. Weapon System Reliability is the product of (Launch Reliability) x (Inflight Reliability) x (Weapon Reliability). Reliability data and CEPs for aircraft and missiles has been compiled and supplied by the CINCs committing the forces. A few examples of the aircraft reliability and CEP factors.
The JSTPS planning manual contains all of these factors, however, a few are shown here for your understanding. The asterisks show the highest and lowest factors for each of the areas.

The last factor to be considered in the development of the Weapon Delivery Probability is the Penetration Probability. This probability is obtained by applying the attrition value of the enemy's defensive system. This factor will be discussed in detail in the following briefing, Defense Analysis.

Recapping the 4 factors just discussed, we find that the product of (Pre-Launch Survivability) x (Weapon System Reliability) x (Weather/Darkness Factor) x (Penetration Probability) is Weapon Delivery Probability.

These factors and this total computation is completed for each weapon scheduled for delivery by SIOP forces.
Thus far, we have discussed target categories, tasks, and commitment of forces -- we will now consider the operational concepts and considerations under which SIOP-63 has been prepared.

Shortly after receipt of the National Targeting and Attack Policy, we found it necessary to expand and/or redefine some terms in the Joint Dictionary to permit specific applicability in SIOP-63. Some of these more important terms are on this chart.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

**KEY DEFINITIONS**

This is a new definition in which Unified and Specified Commanders determine and designate those of...

There is no change in this next definition other than the term...
Otherwise the definition remains the same.

In accordance with guidance received in the National Targeting and Attack Policy and subsequently the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, SIOP Forces were to be applied against the designated Tasks...
RELATIONSHIP OF ATTACK OPTIONS AND TASKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Option</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Execute</th>
<th>Withhold</th>
</tr>
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</table>

[*Remote - program as last priority]*

[(Resolve all conflicts in favor of AO-5)]

We will have this large chart available during subsequent presentations so that we can refer to it as we go on.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

GUIDANCE

Targets by Task

Protected Reserve
Broadened Withhold Capability

Constraints and Restraints
Damage Expectancy

We have listed on this chart some of the basic conceptual factors which were included in our guidance -- and represent the key and in some cases the limiting factors upon which the plan was prepared.
Damage expectancy is a new term in the SIOP. It is a composite of weapon delivery probability, which was discussed earlier, and damage criteria.

In addition to the concepts shown on this chart and included in the guidance.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

NEW CONCEPT

(TURN CHART PAGE)

ROLE OF FORCES
Another major item included in the guidance is the role of forces and weapon systems committed to the SIOP. (POINT TO CHART)

Under all circumstances, forces of the

As far as theater forces are concerned -- they are also committed to
the SIOP as first priority unless they are directed to other missions
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

That covers the major operational concepts contained in our guid-
ance. Now let's discuss the manner in which we applied SIOP Forces
against the various target systems.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

SEQUENCE OF FORCE APPLICATION

PHASE ONE

PHASE TWO
It must be realized that this was the basic sequence of force application during planning, but it does not mean that timewise, the weapons will be delivered on target in this order. The applied in Step 3 will be some of the

Next, we'll discuss the application of our delivery vehicles in more detail.

On this chart we have the
I want to explain here that

- since we must have the capability of executing this Task

---itself. Consequently, the weapons aboard multiple weapons carriers
sorties and weapons which must be shifted to optimize Task I targeting.

I believe a look at weapon system employment will provide the answer.

(TURN CHART PAGE)
WEAPON SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT

* MISSILES

* AIRCRAFT

First, we'll take a look at our __________ as directed by the guidance, Task I is primary.

But what about __________?

The Staff considers __________.
Additionally, if the USSR attacks only U.S. military strength and retains a reserve for city attacks.

The JSTPS staff believes that there are sufficient
For the above reasons it is valid to give the

Note also that this procedure reduces complications in the execution of
the plan. It makes for simplicity which is something to consider in a basically
complex plan.

With regard to aircraft --

While we recognize that missiles provide
Once again, we cross-target between missiles and manned aircraft to the maximum extent possible to cover the strengths and weaknesses of both systems.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

ATTACK OPTION RECAP

Having discussed the sequential steps of force application and weapon systems employment, let's recap the manner in which our forces are laid.

targets -- at the same time retaining sufficient forces to attack Task III targets.

In , we have optimized

We believe that this concept provides a great deal of flexibility in SIOP-63.
While we are discussing the manner in which our forces are programmed
under the pre-emptive options -- Attack Options One and Two do not require

We have previously discussed the relationship of -- the next significant operational consideration is Force Generation Levels. While this term is new to the SIOP, it actually fulfills the same purposes as which were used in SIOP-62 and with which you are familiar. We adopted this new designation to preclude any mix-up between

The purposes of Force Generation Levels are:

(READ CHART)

PURPOSES OF FORCE GENERATION LEVELS

1. 

2. 

Here is the way these force generation levels are broken down:

(TURN PAGE OF CHART)
Thus far I have described the procedures employed by our force application teams in laying SIOP-63 forces against the various target
As each sortie is considered by the Force Application Team at least one of the team members is cognizant of the characteristics and capabilities of the delivery vehicle under consideration.

Another critical operational factor is the
Considerable consideration is given

In targeting the force, it is essential that we [blacked out] for the reasons shown on the chart. Naturally, every effort is made to destroy the [blacked out] with our fast reacting weapon systems and those systems launching from bases closest to the DGZs.

It is also necessary to provide for mass in order to insure successful penetration of enemy defenses with the least losses to our own forces. In timing the force, weapon separation must be used to provide safe operating margins for weapon systems.

(TURN CHART PAGE)
In addition to the foregoing the force application teams must consider tactics. In the penetration phase considerable emphasis is given to

Every effort is made to avoid defenses where possible and finally we have corridor development, roll back, mutual and ECM support.

I will present a graphic display of several of these points with emphasis on the last two.

First, in regard to corridor development and roll back.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT

- Roll Back

GRAPHIC DISPLAY
This chart graphically depicts several friendly aircraft which have been massed so as to provide mutual support in penetrating a fighter control area. In SIOP-62 we have had more than -- An objective of SIOP-63 (bring down overlay)
The overlay shows how the effectiveness is further reduced by the
In summary, gentlemen--our tactics are designed to

(TURN CHART PAGE)

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

TACTICS

- Delivery

The diversified techniques developed
by the individual commands

Finally, we have delivery tactics. I won't go into any detail
concerning the individual techniques utilized to deliver the weapons.

However, there are

This completes the briefing on Concepts and Operational Considerations -- are there any questions?
Flexibility has been covered in the detailed briefings that you have heard earlier. I would like to recap this flexibility.

(Chart #1) SIOP-63

(Chart #2)

(Chart #3)

(Chart #4) In planning for SIOP-63 the

The asterisks on indicate across which "Corridor F" is laid. The attack of
(Chart #6) We recognize our limitations in the area of

In the future when the survivability of hardened and mobile weapons permits complete coverage of the immediate threat.

(Chart #7)

(Chart #8) Now I would like to discuss
clarify these misconceptions.

(UUNCOVER THE FIRST CHART)

On this chart you see the interaction of all forces affected by

(describe each line). This line represents the

Now let's look at the signifi-

cant items on this chart. This first point represents the
Now let's look at the effective sortie data on another chart.

(PUT UP BAR CHART - SORTIES)

This chart more clearly portrays the composition of each level of forces at significant periods of time.

Now let's look at a chart which converts this data to weapons

(COVER FIRST CHART WITH LAST CHART, LEAVE SECOND BAR CHART VISIBLE).

We have constructed this chart based on actual weapon count, or where their was not feasible, on an average weapon load by type aircraft.
(Chart #9) I mentioned earlier under protected reserve, the capability of the airborne alert indoctrination force of

(Chart #10) Medium Force Dispersal. An additional factor in the flexibility of SIOP-63 is the capability of the ______ under a period of tension,
This concept and plan for dispersal is concerned primarily with

(Chart #12) You will also recall that

(Chart #13) I wish to emphasize very strongly that
(Charts #13 and 14) Recap the force, DGZs and average DEs achieved by the alert force for attack options 1, 3, 5 against Tasks I, II and III.

Repeat for the total SIOP force.

Gentlemen, this concludes the resume of the flexibility contained in SIOP-63.
DIFFERENCES RESOLVED

DSTP - SIOP'63

WORKING PAPERS
DIFFERENCES

Definitions

Alert Forces
Reserve Forces
Warhead Reliability
Bomb Reliability
CEP's For Certain A/W ACF
Unknown Defenses
Clobber

Planning Factors

Application of DBL
Application of WX/D
DEFINITIONS

TOPIC

ALERT

FORCE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>DEEP POLITICS</th>
<th>OTHER VIEW</th>
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</table>
PLANNING FACTORS

TOPIC
VAR HEAD REL

BOMB REL

LOBBER

UNKNOWN DEF
PLANNING FACTORS

TOPIC | DSTP

SEP's for certain all WX ACFT

*(PAC LANT, N, A, MC)
SEQUENCE
LAYDOWN
OF FORCE
TARGET SAC/POL FIRST
IN ORDER OF ARRIVAL
(RATHER THAN BY COMAN)
INTEGRATE OTHER
FORCES (INCLUDING
47TH POL DIV)
Para VII
APPROVED
(HTAP)
(WINCOPAC MSG)
(METHODOLOGY)

WORKING PAPERS
DIFFERENCES RESOLVED BY DSTP

THE NATIONAL TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY IN PARAGRAPH 9, TITLED RESPONSIBILITIES, REQUIRES THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AS THEY OCCUR, AND TO HIGHLIGHT THOSE DIFFERENCES WHEN PRESENTING THE NSTL/SIOP-63 TO THE JCS. DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIOP-63, TEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WERE HIGHLIGHTED EITHER AT POLICY COMMITTEE MEETINGS BY THE MEMBERS INVOLVED OR BY TWXs FROM COMMANDERS WHO HAD COMMITTED FORCES.

CHART #1

ON THIS CHART WE HAVE CATEGORIZED THE TEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION INTO THREE MAJOR AREAS, NAMELY:

DEFINITIONS
PLANNING FACTORS
METHODOLOGY

AS SHOWN ON THE CHART, THE TWO DIFFERENCES UNDER THE CATEGORY OF DEFINITIONS WERE THAT OF ALERT FORCE AND RESERVE FORCE.

FIVE DIFFERENCES ARE SHOWN UNDER THE HEADING OF PLANNING FACTORS. THESE CONSIST OF: WARHEAD RELIABILITY, BOMB RELIABILITY, CEPS FOR CERTAIN ALL WEATHER, UNKNOWN DEFENSES, Clobber Factor.

SECRET
THE NEXT THREE ARE CATEGORIZED UNDER THE TITLE OF METHODOLOGY. THESE ARE: APPLICATION OF DBL, APPLICATION WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR, AND THE SEQUENCE OF FORCE LAYDOWN. YOU WILL NOTE THE TWO ASTERISKS APPEARING ON THIS CHART. ONE IS OPPOSITE OF RESERVE FORCE AND THE OTHER OPPOSITE OF SEQUENCE OF FORCE LAYDOWN. IN THESE TWO CASES, THE POLICY COMMITTEE HAD AGREED; HOWEVER, THE JCPAC MADE KNOWN HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THESE ITEMS IN A MESSAGE IN EARLY JANUARY OF THIS YEAR.

CHART #2

BEFORE GETTING INTO THE DETAILS OF THIS PARTICULAR CHART, I WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FORMAT WHICH WILL BE THE SAME FOR THE NEXT SIX CHARTS. ON THE LEFT HAND COLUMN WE HAVE INDICATED TOPICAL HEADINGS OF THE DIFFERENCES CONCERNED. THE CENTER COLUMN SHOWS THE TP DECISION, WHILE THE RIGHT COLUMN REFLECTS THE OTHER VIEW OR VIEWS, AS THE CASE MAY BE.

THE NEXT TWO CHARTS WILL DEAL WITH DEFINITIONS. CHARTS 3 AND 4 WILL COVER THOSE DIFFERENCES CATEGORIZED UNDER PLANNING FACTORS AND THE NEXT TWO CHARTS SUMMARIZE THE WORKING PAPERS.
Differences categorized under the title methodology.

On all charts we have reflected the opinions of the policy committee members as shown in parenthesis.

Now let us take a look at the first difference, titled, "alert force.

The other view proposed by CINCSAC, CINCAL and the Air Force representatives is shown on the right. This view would have

Chart #3

On this chart the definition of

as shown on this chart.

The rest of this chart is self-explanatory.
CHART #4

NOW FOR UNKNOWN DEFENSES.

THIS RECOMMENDATION IS REFLECTED UNDER THE COLUMN TITLED DSTP'S DECISION. OTHER PROPOSED THAT NO FACTOR BE USED AS SHOWN ON THE CHART.

CHART #5

LET US NOW CONSIDER THE NEXT CHART PERTAINING TO PLANNING FACTORS. IT CONCERNS ITSELF WITH CEPs FOR CERTAIN ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT.

IN THIS CASE THE DSTP

SECRET WORKING PAPERS
ED WITH THE CEP'S PROPOSED BY THE COMMITTEE. YOU
NOTE IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN THAT THE OTHER VIEW

N BY

CHART #6

THE NEXT TWO CHARTS CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH QUESTIONS

ETHODOLOGY IN THE LAYDOWN OF SIOP-63. THE FIRST ITEM
OWN ON THE LEFT IS THE SEQUENCE OF FORCE LAYDOWN.

STP DECISION WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE 47TH POLICY
MITTEE MEETING IS AS SHOWN.

HE OTHER VIEW IS AS REFLECTED IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN
REFLECTS THE CINCPAC POSITION.

CHART #7

THE LAST CHART OF THIS PRESENTATION COVERS THE APPLICATION
THE DBL FACTOR (PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY) AND APPLICATION
THE WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR.

FIRST, DBL, THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC COULD HAVE BEEN TITLED
APPLICATION OF VARIABLE FACTORS IN SIOP-63, BECAUSE IT
UDES A PACKAGE RECOMMENDATION AS BRIEVED TO THE POLICY
MITTEE BY THE CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE. YOU WILL NOTE
AT THE DIRECTOR, IN VIEW OF THE GUIDANCE, SUPPORTED THE
TION TAKEN BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES
THAT HE ELECTED TO USE ALL FACTORS IN THE LAYDOWN OF

SECRET
THE PLAN.

THE OTHER VIEWS ARE AS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT.

AND THE APPLICATION OF A WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR.

MESSAGE TO JSTP, AND STATED HIS BELIEF THAT DBL SHOULD BE APPLIED IN ASSESSMENT ONLY.

NOW FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR FOR NON ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT.

THE DIRECTOR SUPPORTED THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SAC, AL, AND AF REPRESENTATIVES WHICH WAS TO APPLY AS IN SIOP-62 FOR ALL ALERT AND NON ALERT NON ALL WEATHER SORTIES. THE PROONENTS OF TWO OTHER VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THIS QUESTION ARE SHOWN IN THE RIGHT COLUMN.
THROUGH A MATHEMATICAL CALCULATION HE BELIEVED A DETERMINATION COULD BE MADE
OMBINING BOTH FACTORS WHICH WOULD MORE REALISTICALLY PROVIDE US WITH THE ANSWER WE SOUGHT.

HIS CONCLUDES THE PRESENTATION ON THE DIFFERENCES OF
PINION AND THE DECISIONS MADE BY THE DIRECTOR IN CONSIDERATION
OF THESE DIFFERENCES FOR SIOP-63.