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By JWT NARA Date 7/16/87

*Mr. Carzo*

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December 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL

SUBJECT: Preparations for Next Round of SALT

On the basis of the current status of the SALT negotiations and the recommendations of the Working Group the Verification Panel will undertake the following tasks in preparation for the next round of SALT beginning April 16:

1. Aim for an NSC meeting no later than the first week of March. The purpose will be to place before the President the major SALT issues based on an updating and expansion of our previous analyses, to take account of developments in Helsinki and of any additional pertinent factors. Presidential guidance following the NSC meeting will determine the further preparatory work to be undertaken by the SALT Backstopping Committee and the Verification Panel.
2. To prepare for the NSC meeting, the Verification Panel will produce updated evaluation and verification reports on the basis of the attached work program, which has been developed in the Working Group of the Verification Panel. The Working Group should proceed with its work unless there are major reservations with the Work Program which can be raised at the next meeting of the full Verification Panel. The full Panel should meet in the second week of January to review the progress of the Working Group and to provide it with additional guidance as needed.
3. The question of whether we should enter the next round of SALT with a single position or with several options will be resolved following the NSC meeting. The Verification Panel will review the existing options in the light of the updated analysis and indicate recommendations as to any modifications and additions or elimination of previously examined options.

Attachment

*Henry A. Kissinger*

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VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP  
TASK Y OUTLINE

ABM/MIRV Options

Among the issues requiring further analysis are:

-- possible ABM/MIRV combinations, the specific strategic capabilities they provide, and their verifiability;

-- more specifically:

-- what levels of ABMs are required for protection against accidental and third country attacks, for protection of the U. S. bomber force, for defense of Minuteman and for defense of the National Command Authority;

-- verification and strategic implications of possible upgrading of Soviet air defense missiles to give them ABM capabilities and of their ABM systems to give them more extensive capabilities.

MR/IRBMs and Overseas Based and Deployed Forces

We need to examine:

-- What would be the consequences for U. S. and allied security of an agreement which does not place limits on IR/MRBMs?

-- What are the strategic and verification implications of various possible controls on U. S. overseas based nuclear forces, e. g., carrier-based aircraft?

-- What are the strategic and verification implications of restricting ballistic missile submarine patrols and the overseas flights of strategic aircraft?

Land Mobile Systems

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*What are minimum  
Sov. needs against  
China & UK/France  
NSC Staff*

*State -  
(Include  
SLBM)*

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Our assessment of the value to the U.S. of land mobile offensive systems has been changing. We should re-examine carefully both the strategic and verification implications of both permitting and limiting or banning land mobile systems.

### Bombers and Air Defenses

The Soviets have expressed interest in including strategic bombers in an agreement. We have responded that if bombers are included, air defense systems should be included as well. We need further study of such issues as:

-- how to define strategic bombers and air defense systems for purposes of an agreement;

-- the strategic and verification implications of various measures of limitation on these systems.

### Cruise Missile Submarines

Options which control ballistic missiles launched from submarines have routinely included controls on SLCMs as well. We must examine the strategic and verification consequences of both including and excluding SLCMs.

### Qualitative Limits

We need more analysis of the technical, strategic and verification issues presented by agreements which control such factors as accuracy and throw weight.

### Strategic Force Reductions

Agreements involving force reductions present special verification problems and also raise issues with respect to their strategic consequences:

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- What different measures of reductions should we consider?
- What are their strategic and verification implications?

### Transfer of Strategic Systems and Technology to Third Countries

This subject, in which the Soviets have expressed interest, has not been examined in detail in the SALT context. We should look at the strategic, verification, and political problems presented by such transfers and by possible restrictions upon them. We should also examine the problems created by the possibility that under any agreement systems, components, or development activities might be assigned to non-signatories.

### Protecting Against Accidents and Provocative Attacks

The specific issue of ABM protection against relatively low level attacks will be addressed in the context of ABM/MIRV relationships. However, the problem goes beyond ABM, including such possibilities as exchange of information about safety procedures and provisions for emergency communications.

### "Freedom to Mix"

Several U.S. options incorporate the concept of "freedom to mix," that is, to trade one system for another within an agreed numerical limit. We need a clear understanding of the operational, verification, and strategic problems connected with exercise of such freedom, for example:

- How would the transition period be handled?
- How would the two sides communicate their "mix" intentions?

A related question is that of fixing the numerical limit, e.g., when does a missile silo become "operational" and therefore permissible under an agreement limiting silos to those "operational" on a certain date? What should the overall limit be? How should "moth balled" systems be treated?

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Verification Policy Options

The broad issue of our general approach to verification includes such problems as:

- making operational the concept of non-interference with national means of verification;
- potential forms of "cooperation" involving national means;
- the overall desirability of supplementary verification measures such as missile flight test and telemetry restrictions.

Polaris Vulnerability

The potential long-term vulnerability of our SSBN force is a crucial theme in much SALT analysis. Many options imply that submarines will remain sufficiently invulnerable so that the U.S. could safely increase reliance on submarine (or otherwise mobile) systems. Explicit analysis of SSBN vulnerability and the principal risks that reliance on them involves is required.

*Outline 15 Jan*  
*1st drafts 25 Jan*  
*Board Gyp 4 Feb*  
*Link G 6 Feb*  
*Carroll 11 Feb*  
*For W 19:6 13 Feb*  
*Verif. P. Mtg 18 Feb*  
*Final Ver*      *Verif. P. - Atkinson*  
*NSC*              *- 18 March*

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