MEMORANDUM FOR

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. John J. McCloy

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on SALT

The NSC meeting on preparation for the resumption of the SALT talks will take place on Wednesday, March 25 at 3:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The current version of the Evaluation Report prepared under the direction of the Verification Panel will serve as the basis for the discussion.

cc: The Attorney General
    The Under Secretary of State
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director of Central Intelligence

Henry A. Kissinger
Talking Paper for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSC Meeting of 25 March 1970)

SUBJECT: SALT Preparations for Vienna

ISSUE: To address the Evaluation Report and highlight the major issues to be addressed at the NSC meeting to permit the President to make decisions on the US approach to SALT for Vienna.

BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION:

-- Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of 30 December 1969 outlined preparations required for the Vienna phase of SALT (Tab B). On 21 January, the Verification Panel approved the tasks and schedule of work outlined by the Kissinger memorandum. The effort consists of reports on each subject and summaries thereof. End product is draft Evaluation Report (E.R.) (Tab A) developed from the summaries.

-- The Verification Panel met on 5, 12, 18, 19 and 20 March to discuss these issues.

-- The Evaluation Report contains the major issues and presents three categories of SALT options for consideration. The issues for decision are those addressed by the Task Y effort.

-- Although there is no firm agenda, it is expected that the E.R. will be basis for NSC consideration of SALT on 25 March.

-- The major SALT issues are essentially the same as they were before Helsinki.

-- It is not yet clear whether there will be another meeting of the NSC prior to issuance of guidance to the SALT Delegation.

-- General Comments on E.R.:

-- While changes have been made to update the E.R., basically the issues and questions remain the same.
Panel effort has clarified positions on some issues and has surfaced interagency differences on others.

-- The pre-Helsinki options (descriptions at Tab C) are grouped in Section V of the E.R. Tab A presents the three broad categories established by the President in his report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's -- limits on numbers alone, limits on numbers and capabilities, and reduction of offensive forces -- and relates the pre-Helsinki options to these categories. This facilitates consideration of matters for decision in the context of the general contours of an overall agreement.

a. Limited - I, II, IIA-III, and IIIA
b. Comprehensive - IV, V, VA
c. Reductions - VI, VII and Department of State token reductions.

-- Major Issue in Defining Approach for Vienna

-- There are three alternative approaches, conforming with the above three categories, which are endorsed by various elements in the Government. OSD and JCS are agreed that Category B is undesirable. JCS favors Category A. OSD is split between A and C.

-- The Helsinki talks indicated strongly that, if the Soviets are interested in an agreement, they will favor the Category A type.
-- Other Issues in Evaluation Report:

-- The major interrelated strategic issues to be addressed:

-- How ABM's are to be defined and controlled in an agreement;

-- The levels of US and of Soviet ABM's to be negotiated in an agreement;

-- How SAM upgrade is to be described and controlled;

-- Whether MIRV's should be banned or controlled, and by what means;

-- What measures for insuring survivability of our land-based missile forces should be included in an agreement; e.g., freedom to mix, relocation;

-- In the context of a decision to support a simple, understandable and verifiable primarily with national means type agreement similar to Option II, the major strategic issues for decision fall out if support for the Safeguard Phase II level, as stated by the President, is maintained.

-- Issues in E.R. that can be decided independently:

-- Approach on Soviet IR/MRBM's;

-- Maintain position that IR/MRBM's must be included in an agreement;
-- Limiting strategic bombers and air defenses -
agree to discuss, but stress
-- degree to which inclusion complicates problem;
-- Extreme difficulties in establishing definitions of bombers and air defense components and feasible,
verifiable limitations thereon.

-- Other Relevant Matters:
-- Verification
-- Positive - assured verification, including on-site inspections if required.
-- Deviation from narrow interpretation of this principle only if exception is in best interest of US; e.g.,
land mobile ban.
-- Maximum feasible reliance on national means but on-site-supplementary means where necessary, e.g., to assure
monitoring and verification of compliance with specific elements.
-- Requirements beyond national means can only be
determined in context of total agreement.
TOP SECRET

APPROVED by [Signature]

APPROVED by [Signature]

Attachments:
Tab A - Evaluation Report (E.R.)
Tab B - Dr. Kissinger's Memo of 30 Dec 69
Tab C - Pre-Helsinki Options
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL

SUBJECT: Preparations for Next Round of SALT

On the basis of the current status of the SALT negotiations and the recommendations of the Working Group the Verification Panel will undertake the following tasks in preparation for the next round of SALT beginning April 16:

1. Aim for an NSC meeting no later than the first week of March. The purpose will be to place before the President the major SALT issues based on an updating and expansion of our previous analyses, to take account of developments in Helsinki and of any additional pertinent factors. Presidential guidance following the NSC meeting will determine the further preparatory work to be undertaken by the SALT Backstopping Committee and the Verification Panel.

2. To prepare for the NSC meeting, the Verification Panel will produce updated evaluation and verification reports on the basis of the attached work program, which has been developed in the Working Group of the Verification Panel. The Working Group should proceed with its work unless there are major reservations with the Work Program which can be raised at the next meeting of the full Verification Panel. The full Panel should meet in the second week of January to review the progress of the Working Group and to provide it with additional guidance as needed.

The Verification Panel will review the existing options in the light of the updated analysis and indicate recommendations as to any modifications and additions or elimination of previously examined options.

Attachment
VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP
TASK Y OUTLINE

ABM/MIRV Options

Among the issues requiring further analysis are:

-- possible ABM/MIRV combinations, the specific strategic capabilities they provide, and their verifiability;

-- more specifically:

-- what levels of ABMs are required for protection against accidental and third country attacks, for protection of the U.S. bomber force, for defense of Minuteman and for defense of the National Command Authority;

-- verification and strategic implications of possible upgrading of Soviet air defense missiles to give them ABM capabilities and of their ABM systems to give them more extensive capabilities.

MR/IRBMs and Overseas Based and Deployed Forces

We need to examine:

-- What would be the consequences for U.S. and allied security of an agreement which does not place limits on IR/IRBM?

-- What are the strategic and verification implications of various possible controls on U.S. overseas based nuclear forces, e.g., carrier-based aircraft?

-- What are the strategic and verification implications of restricting ballistic missile submarine patrols and the overseas flights of strategic aircraft?

Land Mobile Systems
Our assessment of the value to the U.S. of land mobile offensive systems has been changing. We should re-examine carefully both the strategic and verification implications of both permitting and limiting or banning land mobile systems.

**Bombers and Air Defenses**

The Soviets have expressed interest in including strategic bombers in an agreement. We have responded that if bombers are included, air defense systems should be included as well. We need further study of such issues as:

--- how to define strategic bombers and air defense systems for purposes of an agreement;

--- the strategic and verification implications of various measures of limitation on these systems.

**Cruise Missile Submarines**

Options which control ballistic missiles launched from submarines have routinely included controls on SLCMs as well. We must examine the strategic and verification consequences of both including and excluding SLCMs.

**Qualitative Limits**

We need more analysis of the technical, strategic and verification issues presented by agreements which control such factors as accuracy and throw weight.

**Strategic Force Reductions**

Agreements involving force reductions present special verification problems and also raise issues with respect to their strategic consequences.
What different measures of reductions should we consider?
What are their strategic and verification implications?

Transfer of Strategic Systems and Technology to Third Countries

This subject, in which the Soviets have expressed interest, has not been examined in detail in the SALT context.

Protecting Against Accidents and Provocative Attacks

The specific issue of ABM protection against relatively low level attacks will be addressed in the context of AEM/MIRV relationships. However, the problem goes beyond ABM, including such possibilities as exchange of information about safety procedures and provisions for emergency communications.

"Freedom to Mix"

Several U.S. options incorporate the concept of "freedom to mix," that is, to trade one system for another within an agreed numerical limit.

A related question is that of fixing the numerical limit, e.g., when does a missile silo become "operational" and therefore permissible under an agreement limiting silos to those "operational" on a certain date? What should the overall limit be? How should "moth balled" systems be treated?
Polaris Vulnerability

The potential long-term vulnerability of our SSBN force is a crucial theme in much SALT analysis. Explicit analysis of SSBN vulnerability and the principal risks that reliance on them involves is required.