



EXCISE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SATO VISIT

MEMORANDUM

October 28, 1969

TO: J - Under Secretary for Political Affairs
THROUGH: EA - Mr. Green mg
S/S
FROM: EA - Winthrop G. Brown WTB
SUBJECT: Okinawa - Preparations for Sato Visit
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

As you know we are in substantial agreement with the Japanese on the Communique and proposed unilateral statements by Sato covering conventional use. We have also made good progress through Jurich's financial discussions and should have something satisfactory on that subject fairly soon.

There are, however, a number of other items which need to be dealt with in preparation for the meeting.

1. Nuclear Weapons

In NSDM 13, the President decided that he was "prepared to consider, at the final stages of the negotiations, the withdrawal of the weapons while maintaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the agreement were satisfactory."

Only the President can make this decision and he will undoubtedly not wish to make it finally until he has talked to Sato and satisfied himself that withdrawal is a sine qua non for an otherwise satisfactory agreement. However, in making this decision the President should be aware of the form which it would take and how it would be presented to the public. We are, therefore, preparing for your consideration, prior to inter-Departmental study, draft language which would be inserted in the Communique about nuclear weapons, and the text of an agreement, presumably secret, which we would try to get from the Japanese on emergency re-introduction.

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It is, of course, possible that Sato may refuse to agree, even secretly, to re-introduction of weapons in an emergency and will insist upon prior consultation in all cases.

We will shortly submit this language on nuclear aspects to you. If this language proves satisfactory, we would clear it in the IG, ask for Tokyo's comments, and check it out with the White House.

Transit rights are mentioned in the President's NSDM 13 but both sides have proceeded on the tacit assumption that transit was permissible. We will have to decide whether to let this sleeping dog lie as is or to try to cover transit rights specifically.

It has been suggested that Sato will not come in November unless he is reasonably confident that an agreement, particularly on the nuclear issue, will be possible. Paragraph 3 of the telegram proposed in my companion memorandum gives a clear clue as to what the President's position on this issue may be. We may have to consider if anything further would be necessary or desirable.

2. Economic Issues

We will have to decide and agree with the Japanese as to how our agreement on financial aspects of reversion is to be recorded and what mention, if any, should be made of it in the Communique. I believe you have discussed these points with Jurich. We will obviously have to be able to assure Congress and explain to the public that satisfactory agreement on these important matters has been reached.

3. Congressional Consultations

We are working with H to lay out a schedule of Congressional consultations, the bulk of which we would expect to be accomplished by Ambassador Meyer and Snider during the week before the Sato visit. Defense Department support will be important, especially with the Armed Services leaders.

4. Explanation of Agreements for Press and Public

We are preparing a careful explanation of why the agreement which we are anticipating is in the best interests of the United States for use with the Congress, public and the press. On this we hope to get IG approval.

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We will be in touch with P and, through them, with DOD as to how the Communique and the Agreement should be handled with the press, e.g., backgrounders, etc.

Some of the language in the Communique and also in Sato's proposed statements is necessarily imprecise. It would be important to reduce the risk that our two governments might make contradictory statements about the meaning of the agreement as they explain it to their respective publics and legislatures. We are looking at possible points of ambiguity and considering whether and to what extent we should try to get agreement with the Japanese as to what should be said publicly about them.

5. Binding Effect of Proposed Arrangements

Questions will doubtless be asked as to the extent to which we can properly rely on a joint Communique plus unilateral statements of policy by Sato, neither of which have been approved by the Diet, as binding his government and future governments of Japan. We are in touch with L in developing answers to these questions.

6. Propriety of Action by Executive Agreement

We are checking out again with L on our capacity to handle this major international agreement by executive action rather than with Congressional approval.

8. Advising Interested Governments

We plan, at the time the Nixon-Sato Communique is issued, to send an information telegram to Embassies Seoul, Taipei, Bangkok, Canberra, Wellington and London, and perhaps others, advising them of the main points in the Communique.

If you have any thoughts as to further matters on which we should be getting ready, please let me know.

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