

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5835  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, MPOL  
SUBJECT: NOV 20 NAC ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

REF: STATE 292218

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1. AT NOVEMBER 20 "OPEN-ENDED PERMREP MEETING" (USNATO 10740) AMBASSADOR DELIVERED STATEMENT ON TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND DISTRIBUTED CHARTS PER REFTEL. (WE WILL COMMENT SEPTTEL ON THE MEETING WHICH WE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY USEFUL.) PATRICK MOBERLY, FCO ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, OPENED THE DISCUSSION: TEXT OF HIS COMMENTS FOLLOW IN PARA 2 BELOW.

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2.

BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTE USED BY MR. MOBERLY ON 20 NOV 1978  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z

GREY AREA SYSTEMS

NOTE THIS IS FREE EXCHANGE, NOT COMMITTING GOVERNMENTS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X9  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 JUN 2019  
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUL 2009 200902419

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BUT CONFIDENT MY GOVERNMENT BESIDES WELCOMING THIS DISCUSSION TODAY WOULD ENDORSE ONE FEATURE OF THE US PRESENTATION, NAMELY THAT WE ARE DEALING NOT WITH ONE PROBLEM BUT TWO: I MEAN ARMS CONTROL AND TNF MODERNIZATION. IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE CLOSELY INTER-RELATED AND EACH HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OTHER. AMBASSADOR BENNETT'S PRESENTATION HAS COVERED MUCH GROUND AND RAISED MANY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO WHICH THERE ARE NO EASY ANSWERS. LIKE TO COMMENT ON JUST A FEW OF THEM.

#### THE STRATEGIC SETTING

(A) NATO STRATEGY REQUIRES A CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF GRADUATED RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION. HENCE NEED FOR LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND TNF. BELIEVE THIS IS COMMON GROUND. WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF GAPS IN THIS LINKAGE BEGAN TO APPEAR.

(B) WE KNOW SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ALREADY MORE THAN ENOUGH TO DESTROY WESTERN EUROPE. THIS NOW BEING MODERNIZED AND IMPROVED - PARTICULARLY SS20, BACKFIRE. INTRODUCTION OF THESE SYSTEMS DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE OVERALL BALANCE IN OUR VIEW. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY SS20 MORE ACCURATE THAN PREVIOUS SYSTEMS AS WELL AS BEING MOBILE AND HAVING LONGER RANGE AND THEREFORE POSING A POTENTIALLY GREATER THREAT TO OUR OWN TNF.

(C) WE DO NOT NEED TO TRY AND MATCH THE RUSSIANS IN EVERY RESPECT, NOR TO ESTABLISH ANY KIND OF EURO-STRATEGIC

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z

BALANCE. INDEED TO DO SO COULD LEAD TO DOUBTS ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN IN-THEATRE FORCES AND US CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ON WHICH WE IN EUROPE GREATLY DEPEND.

#### TNF MODERNIZATION

WORK OF HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) SET UP UNDER LTDP CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ABOVE. QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE IS A CASE FOR CONSIDERING SOME UP-DATING OF NATO'S IN-THEATRE LONGER-RANGE TNF CAPABILITY AS OUR EXISTING SYSTEMS BECOME OLDER AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSES IMPROVE. OTHERWISE COULD BE DANGER OF GAPS IN OUR CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF DETERRENCE AND GRADUATED RESPONSE. I THEREFORE WELCOME REFERENCES TO HLG AND ITS PROGRAMME IN TODAY'S DISCUSSION AS BEING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE

TOTAL PICTURE.

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ARMS CONTROL

SO FAR AS OBJECTIVES GO, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETED AT EUROPE, THIS WOULD CLEARLY RESPOND TO CERTAIN EUROPEAN CONCERNS.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY RESTRAINTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED WHICH MADE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, GIVEN THE DEGREE OF EXISTING SOVIET OVERKILL; AND MORE PARTICULARLY WHETHER THE ALLIANCE COULD AFFORD RESTRAINTS ON NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE IN RETURN.

OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION AT THIS STAGE (ALREADY MENTIONED IN EARLIER DISCUSSION) IS TO DOUBT WHETHER ON BALANCE IT

SECRET

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PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 02 OF 06 242028Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5836  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE FOR GREY AREA SYSTEMS TO BE BROUGHT INTO SALT III: AT LEAST WE HAVE YET TO BE CONVINCED.

ANOTHER CONCLUSION I WOULD DRAW IS THAT IF ANY NATO GREY

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AREA SYSTEMS WERE TO BE BROUGHT INTO SALT III (AND CRUISE MISSILES HAVE A PARTICULAR STATUS IN THIS REGARD AS AMBASSADOR BENNETT HAS MENTIONED) THEN WE SHOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO BE SURE THAT APPROPRIATE SOVIET SYSTEMS WERE LIKEWISE BROUGHT UNDER NEGOTIATION. HENCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN KEEPING OPTIONS OPEN.

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SYNTHESIS

I BELIEVE WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS OF EXAMING ALL THESE ISSUES. FOR OUR PART WE ARE WILLING TO LISTEN, AND TO KEEP OWN POSITION UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USNATO 10805 02 OF 06 242028Z

WE HAVE BEEN ASKED HOW WE SEE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. IN VIEW OF WHAT I HAVE SAID, I CAN ONLY REPLY THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO ANSWER. BUT HYPOTHETICALLY IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO TAKING SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE FORMS, PERHAPS AIMED AT SOME KIND OF NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON ONE OR MORE OF EACH SIDE'S SYSTEMS. NATO COUNTRIES COULD DECIDE TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY TNF MODERNIZATION; OR THEY COULD ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO MODERNIZE AND THEN NEGOTIATE; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE ONCE THEY HAD STARTED PRODUCTION; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS. THE EARLIER ANY NEGOTIATION WAS ATTEMPTED, THE WEAKER OUR HAND MIGHT BE; BUT THE LONGER WE WAITED, THE STRONGER THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE BECOME.

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY FINAL CONCLUSION. IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL IF WE SHOULD REACH FIRM VIEWS ABOUT POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS BEFORE GOVERNMENTS HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS FOR TNF MODERNIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HLG'S WORK AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OVERALL NATO STRATEGY. AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, WE ARE DEALING WITH TWO INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE SEEN AND CONSIDERED TOGETHER: I MEAN TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. END TEXT.

3. [REDACTED] READ A VERY GENERAL STATEMENT STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE TNF SYSTEMS AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SALT II ALREADY DEALT WITH

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CRUISE MISSILES, "A WESTERN SYSTEM OF IMPORTANCE FOR GAS." [REDACTED] ALSO REFERRED AGAIN TO [REDACTED] SUGGESTION AT THE NOVEMBER 7 SALT NAC CONSULTATION (USNATO 10395) THAT UPON THE CONCLUSION OF SALT A NATO CO-ORDINATED STATEMENT  
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PAGE 03 USNATO 10805 02 OF 06 242028Z

BE ISSUED IN ALLIED CAPITALS. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THIS STATEMENT INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON GAS.

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4. [REDACTED] ALSO COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE US PRESENTATION. HE , TOO, SAW DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL AS "TWO SIDES OF ONE COIN." IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT GAS PROBLEMS AWAIT THE ALLIANCE: IT IS CERTAIN THAT SOVIETS WILL INTRODUCE THIS ISSUE EARLY IN SALT III AND THUS THE [REDACTED] ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

1.4(B)

1.4(B)

5. [REDACTED] SAID THE WEST SHOULD EXAMINE HOW TO DECREASE THE DISPARITY IN MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIR-CRAFT (BACKFIRE). THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN THE BILATERAL SALT CONTEXT AND IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN OUR FLEXIBILITY TO MODERNIZE TNF. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FIRST TASK WAS TO ANALYZE THE EAST-WEST BALANCE, COMPARING ALL SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OVERALL BALANCE AND UNDERLINING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ALL THE COMPONENTS OF THIS BALANCE.

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6. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ZEINER GUNDERSEN THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

[REDACTED]

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1.4(B)

7. [REDACTED] MADE THE FOLLOWING" PRELIMINARY  
REMARKS":

1.4(B)

BEGIN TEXT: WE WARMLY WELCOME THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE  
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, WHICH ENABLES US TO HAVE THIS PRE-  
LIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A SUBJECT WHICH IS TODAY AT  
THE VERY CORE OF ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS.

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IT IS IN FACT NOT ONLY WISE BUT ESSENTIAL TO START EXAMIN-  
ING IN ONE COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXT ALL THE RELEVANT ASPECTS  
OF OUR NUCLEAR POLICY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THEIR  
POSSIBLE INTERCONNECTIONS.

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THE RECENT WIDE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS CONTROL IN MANY FIELDS  
REQUIRES ON ONE HAND THAT ARMS CONTROL BE REGARDED AS A  
FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND, ON THE OTHER  
HAND, THAT ITS OBJECTIVES BE DEFINED WITH DUE CONSIDERA-  
TION TO THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE.

IT IS THEREFORE CLEAR THAT BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATRE  
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROLS SHOULD BE STRICTLY RELATED TO THE  
FORCE MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES.

MOREOVER, ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES MUST BE CONSIDERED  
GLOBALLY AND BE CONTINUOUSLY REASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE  
EVOLUTION OF THE SINGLE ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

IN FACT, THE STRONG BUILD UP OF THE SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE  
CAPABILITIES, PARALLEL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SALT NEGOTIA-

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SECRET

PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 04 OF 06 242043Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5838  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

TIONS, HAS CALLED FOR AN INCREASED ATTENTION ON THE GREY

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AREAS PROBLEM, WHILE IT HAS ALSO CHANGED AT SOME EXTENT UNCLASSIFIED  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT TO GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO  
THE POLITICAL PRESSURE WHICH WILL BE MOST PROBABLY EXERCISED  
BY THE EAST IN ORDER TO PREVENT OUR MODERNISATION PROGRAM  
AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUPER-  
IORITY.

ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS HIGHLY DESIR-  
ABLE THAT THE ALLIES DEVELOP A COMMON COMPREHENSIVE  
APPROACH, BOTH ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED  
AND ON THE NECESSARY ADEQUATE PRESENTATION OF THEIR LINE  
OF ACTION TO PUBLIC OPINION.

AS FAR AS THE SUBSTANCE IS CONCERNED, TODAY WE CAN ONLY  
FORMULATE SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT  
THAT MANY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WILL BE CLARIFIED BY THE  
RESULTS OF THE WORKS OF THE "HIGH LEVEL GROUP".

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02            USNATO 10805 04 OF 06 242043Z

IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE THAT THEATRE NUCLEAR  
ARMS CONTROLS BE EXAMINED IN CLOSE CONNECTION WITH  
STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. OTHERWISE A DANGEROUS TENDENCY  
TOWARDS A REGIONALISATION APPROACH COULD ARISE, WHICH IS  
CONTRARY TO THE BASIC ALLIED DOCTRINE. ON THE OTHER HAND,  
WHILE IT IS UNCONCEIVABLE TO ACCEPT A CODIFICATION OF THE  
EXISTING INTERMEDIATE AND MEDIUM RANGE DISPARITY, IT  
SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE REESTABLISHMENT OF  
THE STRICT SYMETRICAL PARITY IN ALL THATRE SYSTEMS MIGHT  
ALSO IMPLY SOME RISKS OF DECOUPLING.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THESE WERE ONLY SOME INFORMAL REMARKS OF A  
VERY GENERAL NATURE. BUT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WE HAD  
TODAY AND THE VERY INTERESTING STATEMENTS MADE BY THE  
AMERICAN DELEGATION WILL HELP US TO ANALYZE FURTHER IN  
DEPTH THESE ISSUES, WHICH ARE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR  
THE ALLIANCE. WE HOPE THEREFORE TO HAVE ALSO IN THE FUTURE  
SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTATIONS.  
END TEXT.

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8.  STRESSED THAT LONG-RANGE TNF  
SYSTEMS RAISED "SENSITIVE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS" AND  
THAT ANY DECISIONS ON TNF SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER THE

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MOST CAREFUL EVALUATION OF ALL FACTORS, E.G., SECURITY, DETERRENCE AND THE OVERALL BALANCE. [ ] NOTED THAT THE US-PROPOSED STUDY OF ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES COINCIDED WITH [ ] PROPOSALS AND THAT EXAMINATION OF THESE ISSUES SHOULD PROCEED "SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH THE HLG." WHILE IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO ENTER INTO ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE WERE TO DO SO THEY SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN THE (BILATERAL) SALT FRAMEWORK.

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1.4(B)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USNATO 10805 04 OF 06 242043Z

[ ] CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE HAGUE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ER/RB WEAPON BROUGHT INTO THE ARMS-CONTROL PROCESS.

1.4(B)

9. [ ] MADE THE FOLLOWING INTERVENTION:

1.4(B)

BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTES

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL THE OPEN ENDED MEETING, 20 NOVEMBER 1978

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN PRECEEDING SPEAKERS IN THANKING AMBASSADOR BENNETT FOR HIS MOST INTERESTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF PRELIMINARY US CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY COMPLICATED SUBJECT MATTER BEFORE US.

MY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AS TWO ASPECTS OF THE SAME BASIC SECURITY PROBLEM AND OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

I KNOW THAT THE MANY THOUGHT PROVOKING QUESTIONS AND IDEAS RAISED TODAY IN AMBASSADOR BENNETT'S STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED WITH GREAT INTEREST AND ATTENTION BY MY AUTHORITIES.

I REALIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH WILL BE RATHER TIME-CONSUMING. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN ASKED TO MAKE TODAY SOME

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 05 OF 06 242050Z  
ACTION ACDA-12


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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5839  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

PRELIMINARY REMARKS WHICH WILL BE OF VERY GENERAL NATURE,  
FOCUSING ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE TNF MODERNIZATION  
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ARMS CONTROL.



1.4(B)

EUROPEAN STABILITY WOULD IN OUR VIEW NOT BE SERVED BY ANY  
CHANGE IN THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE STATUS QUO.

THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF TNF MODERNIZA-  
TION HAVE BEEN EXPLORED IN THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP. MY  
AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE OPEN AND EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS  
WITHIN THAT GROUP AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CONTINUOUS  
PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND EXAMINATION WITHIN OUR  
ALLIANCE WITH THE AIM OF UPHOLDING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT  
IN THE LIGHT OF THE TNF BUILD UP STEADILY TAKING PLACE  
ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

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THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION [REDACTED] HAS EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO VIEW THE ISSUES RELATED TO TNF MODERNIZATION IN A BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED CERTAIN KEY CRITERIA. THEY MAY BE ENCAPSULATED IN THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS:

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- A CLEAR DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.
- THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL AND NOT BE LOWERED.
- NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED FOR ENSURING POSITIVE POLITICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
- WE SHOULD STRIVE TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
- WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR USE.
- NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE SHOULD UPHOLD A MARKED DEFENSIVE ACCENT.
- MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S TNF POSTURE SHOULD NOT PROVIDE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATED ARMS CONTROL WITH THE EASTERN STATES.

IN OUR APPROACH TO MODERNIZATION WE SHOULD ADOPT AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH AVOIDING BOTH THE REALITY AND IMPRESSION OF DRAMATIC DEPARTURES. NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO ESTABLISH A SEPARATE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE AS SUCH

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SECRET

PAGE 03 USNATO 10805 05 OF 06 242050Z

AN APPROACH WOULD TEND TO WEAKEN EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND CREATE IMPRESSIONS OF DECOUPLING BETWEEN THE USA AND WESTERN EUROPE.

MY AUTHORITIES FEEL THERE IS A NEED FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION. NPG PHASE III WORK SHOULD BE COMPLETED SO AS TO PROVIDE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF CONCRETE FORCE POSTURE ISSUES. IT IS IN THEIR OPINION MUCH TOO EARLY TO POSE QUESTIONS ABOUT NUMBERS AND STRUCTURE AT THIS POINT.

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UNCLASSIFIED

MY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER IT TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING TNF INTO THE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF INCORPORATING SUCH WEAPONS INTO THE PROCESS OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE THAT ISSUES RELATING TO CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER LONG RANGE TNF STRIKE SYSTEMS BE INCLUDED IN THE SALT PROCESS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT INTRO-ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS WILL ENSURE SUFFICIENT AND PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE EUROPEAN INTERESTS BY THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS.

[ ] VIEW ON A PARTICULAR MODERNIZATION ISSUE, I.E., THE ERW IS WELL KNOWN. MY GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WEAPON. NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED IN TRYING TO BRING THE ERW EFFECTIVELY INTO AN ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT MY AUTHORITIES ARE AGAINST PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPON. WE SHOULD CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO BE FORTHCOMING. WITH RESPECT TO MODALITIES AND COUNTERPARTS WE SHOULD REMAIN FLEXIBLE.

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IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED ALSO THAT THE HISTORY OF HOW THE ERW ISSUE HAS BEEN HANDLED IN THE PAST CONSTRAIN FUTURE OPTIONS. IT CONSTITUTES AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN MANY

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 06 OF 06 242053Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
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USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 06 USNATO 10805

UNCLASSIFIED

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

COUNTRIES AND CERTAINLY IN MY COUNTRY. WE SHOULD EVALUATE VERY SERIOUSLY WHETHER THE POLITICAL COSTS INVOLVED IN A DEPLOYMENT DECISION COULD POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIED BY THE MILITARY GAINS. IT IS THE [REDACTED] VIEW THAT THE COSTS OUTWEIGH THE GAINS. END TEXT.

1.4(B)

10. [REDACTED] SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT TNF MODERNIZATION HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH NEEDED ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION. GENERALLY, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] VIEW OF THE DANGER OF ESTABLISHING A EURO-STRETEGIC BALANCE. [REDACTED] THEN REFERRED TO THE NOVEMBER 9 IHT PINCUS ARTICLE ABOUT CURRENT US CONSIDERATION OF AN MBFR SYSTEM WHICH WOULD STRIKE THE SOVIET HOMELAND. HE STRESSED THAT ANY PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF ULTIMATE TNF DECISIONS MUST BE WELL-PREPARED AND WELL-TIMED IN ORDER TO GAIN MAXIMUM PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING. WE MUST AVOID ANY CLAIM THAT WE ARE NOT MODERNIZING, BUT STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE. [REDACTED] CONCLUDED BY REMARKING THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD EXPLORE "THE NEGOTIATING VALUE" OF NEW TNF SYSTEMS

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SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USNATO 10805 06 OF 06 242053Z

AND WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

11. [REDACTED] MADE THREE POINTS:

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--WHILE TNF REPRESENTED A NECESSARY LINK TO THE CENTRAL DETERRENT, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT;

--THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND FORWARD DEFENSE PLANNING MUST BE STUDIED AND WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO INHIBIT REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION; AND

--WE MUST BE CLEAR AS TO WHAT FORUM, NPG OR THE COUNCIL, WOULD EXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND TNF MODERNIZATION.

12. AMBASSADOR BENNETT INTERVENED AT THIS POINT TO INDICATE THAT WE CONSIDERED THE COUNCIL THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

13. THE FINAL REMARKS OF THE SESSION WERE DELIVERED BY UNCLASSIFIED  
[REDACTED] WHO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS  
CONTROL AND ALLUDED ONCE AGAIN TO IT AND TNF MODERNIZATION  
AS "TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN." GLITMAN

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