This may be a sign that the Soviets expect a serious crisis in Berlin and want to put Cuba in the best possible position to resist any U.S. move which we might be tempted to make as a result of an emergency in Berlin. The Soviets may be trying to anticipate and get braced for a Berlin crisis. We should not link Soviet actions in Cuba too closely to Berlin but they may be an indicator.

The Secretary said of course the United States would not trade an easing of the Cuban situation for concessions in Berlin. He commented in passing that we do not understand the recurring waves of alerts in Cuba.

The Secretary expressed appreciation to Ambassador Alphand for information being passed to us by the French regarding Cuba.

Ambassador Alphand said the French are concerned for the entire Caribbean area, and for the effects on the rest of Latin America if the Soviets are successful in Cuba. 3

3 Ambassador Alphand also asked whether the United States was considering bringing the Berlin question before the United Nations, expressing the French view that the United Nations was not competent on the issue. Rusk replied that the United States would not take such an initiative unless there were a direct threat to the peace. (Memorandum of conversation, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–762) A memorandum of the conversation on the Common Market is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation; Lot 65 D 330.

---

114. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy


Subject

"Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict"

The attached paper on the "Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict" is submitted for your approval prior to being tabled first in the Ambassadorial Group and then in the NATO Council. 1


1 Not attached to the source text, but a copy of this 6-page paper (BQD-M-30) is in Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Fodder Blanket. On September 8 Secretaries McNamara and Rusk had sent the President a joint memorandum attaching a copy of Continued
The paper as it now stands reflects the agreed views of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also takes cognizance of many of the substantive comments and criticisms submitted earlier by General Norstad (General Norstad's message ALO 749, attached) although all of General Norstad's objections clearly have not been met.

Three basic differences remain. First, there is General Norstad's objection to the concept of the sequence paper. General Norstad questions the political and military wisdom of our spelling out in any such form our view of the possible sequence of events in Berlin. He also thinks it unrealistic to attempt to predict such a sequence. Instead, he prefers the cataloguing of possible actions to meet the Soviet challenge without putting such actions in any specific order. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand—and this is also the view of the Departments of State and Defense and the JCS—denies that the sequence paper is intended to establish a hard and fast line of development. It is a conceptual framework for planning purposes, spelling out challenges from the other side.

Second, there is the question of procedure. General Norstad argues for an oral presentation rather than the tabling of a written document. Apart from his apparent concern about possible leaks, he claims that this effort will be misunderstood and lead to unnecessary confusion and division in NATO. Paul Nitze denies this. He insists that introduced in an appropriate context, and given a proper explanation of the sequence paper's uses and limitations, a written document is a more manageable vehicle for these purposes than an oral briefing and less likely to be misinterpreted and/or misunderstood by the individual representatives in the Council.

Lastly, there is a remaining substantive difference which is somewhat camouflaged by the language of the paper. General Norstad objects strongly to the restrictions the sequence paper imposes on the use of nuclear weapons prior to Phase IV. As the responsible military com-

---

3 For text, see vol. XIV, Document 185.

---

115. Report by the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorsial Group


REVISED MILITARY SUB-GROUP PROPOSAL FOR WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP REPORT ON THE PREFERRED SEQUENCE OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN A BERLIN CONFLICT

General

1. In its instructions to NATO military authorities, CM(61)104, the Council expressed several considerations that ought to underlie Berlin planning. One dealt with the need for military and other actions to fit

---

3 Not attached to the source text, but a copy is in Department of State, G/P/M Files: Lot 59 D 258, NATO Military Plans.

5 Not found.
together in an overall strategy. The Council has previously been informed concerning the tripartite Live Oak military plans, and the Council has before it a paper on the NATO-Tripartite relationship. SACEUR's and SA CLANT's plans, along with the appraisal by the Standing Group in consultation with the Military Committee, have now come before the Council. It yet remains to be seen how these tripartite and NATO military actions might fit in relation to each other and to the various non-military activities that likewise would be part of the overall strategy seeking to preserve vital Alliance interests.

2. The Council may therefore wish to give attention to what would be my government's conception of the preferred sequence of military actions in the event military force must be used in the Berlin situation. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the account which follows will always be subject to the nature of Soviet action, and in this connection the Allies must be prepared at all times to use nuclear weapons if the nature of the Soviet response clearly requires their use in accordance with NATO guidelines on use agreed at Athens.  

3. In the account which follows, the extensive non-military actions which would be taken are broadly described merely to cross-reference their general timing relative to military actions. No attempt has been made to describe Western reaction if Soviet action should threaten NATO territory or integrity beyond the point of a Berlin blockade, since it is assumed that present NATO strategy would be applied in such event.

4. Any attempt to set out a preferred sequence of Western action has to remain rather general and cannot establish firmly separated categories and concepts for various phases. Soviet action against Western access to Berlin can be initiated in various ways whose differing natures would tend to influence Western reactions to a large degree.

5. Governmental decisions will be necessary for implementation of any of the military plans at the time. Several factors which bear decisively on such decisions will remain of uncertain nature and indeterminable relative weight. Such factors are, for example: Soviet reaction to prior military and non-military moves in a heightening crisis, the danger of stimulating uprising and revolt in East Germany or satellite areas, the state of world and home opinion, and the relative state of Western and Soviet mobilization.

6. Governments will also have to consider whether steps are necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union remains in no doubt as to the continued validity of the existing Western guarantees for West Berlin.

7. The broad, general considerations relating to progress through the several phases are:

a. There is a compelling necessity for the Allies to succeed in protecting their vital interests relating to Berlin and to ensure that this success is recognized in the Free World. They should make clear to the Soviet Union the enormous risks involved in opposing Allied communications to Berlin by force. The purpose of Allied operations, however, should not be to overpower the Soviet Union or to disintegrate the satellite area, but to make the Soviet government change their policy on Berlin. Therefore, the Allies should give the Soviet Union opportunity to draw back and even—without creating the appearance of failure on our part—help them to cover up this retreat.

b. No military operations after the initial probes would appear convincing to the Soviet Union unless preceded or accompanied by urgent Western actions to increase their military strength and readiness for war. The most effective means of inducing the Soviet Union to change their policy may be intensive mobilization measures themselves.

c. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of measures which do not initiate offensive military action before taking stronger steps. Such measures on the military side might include, for example, mobilization, built-up and deployment of forces, certain alert measures, certain maritime and air measures, and, on the non-military side, economic embargo measures and diplomatic actions.

d. The Allies should take all practicable advantage of the possibilities of non-nuclear military action before proceeding to the use of nuclear weapons. This does not necessarily mean the implementation of all available non-nuclear plans.

Phase I

8. If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air the Allies will initiate action designed to deter Soviet/GDR continued or additional interference and, failing that, to establish the fact that the Soviet Union/GDR intends to use force to interfere with Berlin access.

9. Planning for the appropriate action to meet a variety of contingencies (interference with air access to Berlin, ranging from minor administrative harassment to a determined Soviet effort to interdict all Allied transport; interference with ground access to Berlin, Allied and/ or German harassments within Berlin) is being conducted among the four governments.

10. The purpose of such planning is to agree as far as possible in advance what in each contingency would be the appropriate response and countermeasures, with final decisions, however, being reserved for governments at the time, as is normally the case in contingency planning. This planning is continuous and continuing.

11. It is hoped that a quick and determined Allied response to the initial Soviet move will deter the Soviets from continued or additional
interference. This proved to be the case in March 1962 when the Soviets initiated harassments in the air corridors.

12. If, however, this hope is falsified, and when the degree of interference reaches a point where continued access is in doubt, an Allied military probe of Soviet/GDR intentions will be launched without delay. Selected Live Oak plans, such as Jack Pine, Free Style, and Back Stroke (which is an operation identical with Free Style but conducted from the Berlin end of the autobahn) will be executed. Any unblocked mode of access would continue to be used.

13. Control of military operations will remain tripartite, but NATO military and political authorities will be kept informed and consulted if time permits, and NATO governments would be asked to undertake appropriate states of vigilance or alert (see OES TS CTS/62/1).

14. Western action would either restore access or make it clear that force is being used by the Soviet Union/GDR to deny access to Berlin.

Phase II

15. If the actions under Phase I have shown that force is being used by the Soviet Union/GDR to deny access to Berlin, the Allies will bring increasing pressure, short of offensive combat, to bear on the Soviets in an effort to induce them to desist and re-open access.

16. This phase would be characterized by intense diplomatic activity (e.g., representations in Moscow, mobilization of world opinion against the USSR, and any other action which would seem relevant [French would delete for instance, at the U.N.]), conducted against the background of mounting Western pressures. These would include a growing military build-up; naval measures (national, tripartite, and/or NATO); and economic countermeasures, including repressive measures against Bloc maritime and air traffic, of ascending intensity up to and including a full embargo, together with restrictions on the movement of Soviet Bloc nationals and officials, with the aim ultimately, in this or a later phase, of isolating the Bloc. The aim of all these measures would be to bring increasing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to restore our rights and vital interests.

17. A major element of military action will be for NATO nations to mobilize and deploy jointly additional military forces, particularly into the Central Region, at an accelerating rate, while at the same time rap-

18. Any unblocked access to Berlin should continue to be used fully. In the event of partial or intermittent blockage of air access, the three Powers would if necessary use fighter escorts in an effort to keep flights going. Should the risks and loss of aircraft be too great to warrant further flights unless air operations were deliberately extended outside the corridors (i.e., beyond Jack Pine operations), NATO would have to face, in the light of the state of the military build-up and the general situation, the necessity for taking appropriate measures concerning air access.

19. The length of this phase cannot be forecast since it will depend on the development of events, notably in the air corridors and in Berlin itself. If the blockage of Berlin is total, and if the pressures applied by the Allies lead to violent Soviet response, the Allies may be compelled to move on the operations envisaged for Phase III. But in the absence of such compulsion, there are advantages for the Allies in not moving too early into Phase III, because the growing military build-up will be a firm demonstration of Allied determination to assert their rights in Berlin, and this and other Phase II measures need time to have their impact on the Soviets.

Phase III

20. If, despite Allied actions in Phase II, Berlin access has not been restored, the time will have come to draw on the catalog of plans (from which appropriate action would be selected by political authorities in the light of circumstances and with the aim of applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access) (para. 6 (b) of NAC Resolution 104).

21. At the present stage of the NATO deliberations, there is no question of approving the execution of any particular plan since it is laid down in para. 8 of the NAC Resolution that "the execution of approved plans will be the subject of decisions by governments at the time." The Council may, however, wish at this stage, in the light of the Standing Group’s appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee, and in view of the fundamentally political purposes of the military operations planned, to consider the preferred sequence in which plans might be implemented.

22. If there is consensus on the general considerations set out in the introduction to this paper, it would seem to follow, in accordance with
the concept that operations should be graduated but determined, that
the initial operations to be executed by the Allies in this phase (possibly
after a further appropriate tripartite probe) should be non-nuclear and
should not be open to misinterpretation by the Russians as an attack di-
rected at the stability of the Soviet satellite empire (notably East Ger-
many) or on the Soviet nuclear strike capability. Accordingly, the choice
would seem to lie among:

a. Air operations which, though extending outside the corridors,
would be related to reopening air access.

b. Ground operations with limited objectives on one of the main
access routes, with appropriate air support.

c. Intensified maritime control or blockage measures.

d. Some combination of the above.

23. If these operations fail to make the Soviets back down, the
courses of action which might achieve NATO aims would be to increase
conventionally the scope of the action, to add another action, or to take
some form of nuclear action. Without knowledge of the actual circum-
stances that would exist in such a critical situation, it is hardly possible
to judge which of these courses would be chosen at the time. Whichever
course is adopted, general war would be imminent. If the course chosen
were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back
down and has not precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure
to be exerted will be to resort to some form of nuclear action.

Phase VI

24. Whenever nuclear action were taken, and whether it were de-
monstrative, selective, or otherwise, events would have moved into a
new phase, dominated by the nuclear equation.

116. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of
State

Berlin, September 17, 1962, 5 p.m.

412. Policy. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for
POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Sov shift Sept 4
to Sandkrug Bridge for Memorial guard transit and return to buses Sept

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–1762. Secret. Repeated to Lon-
don, Bonn, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.

14 have for time being corrected troublesome situation which contained
constant danger of incident. At same time Sov attempt to exploit use of
armor for political-psychological reasons in West Berlin has been
halted.

More important perhaps is that Allies have regulated a significant
element of Sov activity in West Berlin. On their face the actions the Sovs
have been induced to take have been minor. However, that Allies have
required Soves to change place of entry and mode of transport for War
Memorial guard is significant. It could put allies in better position to
deal with anticipated period of Sov efforts exports exploit presence in
West Berlin.

Furthermore, Allies’ moves presumably have somewhat improved
West Berlin confidence. This regard, difficult to evaluate importance of
these moves, but it is not likely that of themselves they will do more than
reduce the generally negative balance that now exists, or that their effect
will be durable in the face of any further Sov encroachments that West is
unable or unwilling to rebuff.

Return to buses by Sovs puts heavy responsibility on Allies for pre-
venting even minor attacks by West Berliners on these vehicles. British
have taken elaborate precautions on route to Memorial for initial
days, and Brandt issued good statement Sept 14 to effect West Berliners
should not make task of Allies difficult by untoward behavior in this re-
spect. Acid test efficacy of these measures will be next emotion-laden
(Fechter-type) incident.

Explanation for Sov decisions to change crossing point and return
to buses is probably simplest one, namely that issues were no: con-
sidered by Sovs as propitious, or as important enough, for making stand
which could clearly have escalated and might even have resulted in
their being denied access to West Berlin entirely. To this degree Sov ac-
quiescence evidence that they value their presence in West Berlin. In ad-
dition, by insisting that Allied messages re changes be conveyed via
CINC channel, and by emphasizing this aspect in press treatment on
crossing point shift, Sovs undoubtedly hoped drive home point that Al-
lies were forced to comply practically with recent abolition of office of
Sov Commandant in East Berlin. (That there was no East German pub-
licity about UKMLM call on HQ GSF re APC’s may be due to non-in-
volvelement East Germans and some Sov loss of face over issue.)

It must be anticipated that Sovs will exploit these events in future,
perhaps to provide justification for demands of their own re Allied ac-
cess to West Berlin. They may furthermore have plans for sector/sector
retaliatory action, such as further limitation in number of crossing
points as rumored here in last few days.

Hulick