

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

March 9, 1960



Noted by Mr. Gray

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Nuclear Elements of the United States Disarmament Policy

The National Security Council, at a Special Meeting held on Thursday, February 18, 1960, attended by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the U. S. Representative to the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference:

1. Discussed Paragraph A(1) of the attached draft proposal on the subject (Annex A) presented by the Secretary of State; in the light of comments thereon by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of State prepare a revised draft of Paragraph A(1) of Annex A in the light of the discussion at this meeting, which would:
 - a. Make very clear that the installation and effective operation of an agreed inspection and control system would have to be a prerequisite to cessation by the United States of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.
 - b. Ensure that the meaning of the term "fissionable materials" excludes tritium and other fusionable materials.
 - c. Make clear that the term "weapons" as used in this proposal excludes nuclear power reactors and propulsion.

The President emphasized the importance of a thorough and effective inspection and control system. The President further directed that the Secretary of State coordinate this revised draft proposal with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, prior to making this proposal in current negotiations with Western disarmament representatives.

The following redraft of Paragraph A(1) was prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to 2 above:

SECRET

Approved: 62-6941

- 1 -


~~SECRET~~

By: 9/7/64

"Agreement on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use after the cut-off date of fissionable materials produced prior to and on hand at that date (a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture and (b) to fabricate and maintain weapons on hand or completed under (a). 'Fissionable materials for use in weapons'* is defined as not including materials for nuclear power or propulsion.)

"*Fissionable materials for use in weapons' does not include tritium or other fusionable materials (Nofofn)."

The President has this date approved the above redraft of Paragraph A(1) and has referred it to the Secretary of State for guidance in the current disarmament negotiations.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary



- cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- The Chairman and other Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The U. S. Representative to the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference

DRAFT

ANNEX A

February 17, 1960

NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY



A. The United States would be prepared to reach agreement on the following measures subject only to negotiation of appropriate inspection and control and not dependent on specific political settlements or other disarmament measures:

(1) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date -- (a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (b) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (a).)

(2) Conditional on (1), agreement to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of other nations except in defense against armed attack.

(3) Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production would be transferred in successive increments under international supervision to non-weapon uses including stockpiling. (Amounts transferred under this provision after institution of the cut-off and separately from significant progress in other disarmament areas would not be so great as drastically to reduce U. S. nuclear weapons capability.)

(4) Agreement to place non-military atomic energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

B. Without commitments as to a subsequent course of action the United States would agree to:

(1) A technical conference on the possibility of accounting for past production of nuclear weapons.

(2) A joint study to design an inspection system to police a cut-off of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes.