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67 D 248, *Atomic Energy Commission*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF

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May 9, 1960
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TO : The Secretary ✓
THROUGH: S/AE & Mr. Farley
S/S
FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith
SUBJECT: Unresolved Arms Control Issue

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(Tab A) One unresolved issue in the disarmament position paper (SMP D-1/19) seems to be particularly important: whether the President should be prepared to indicate, if his private discussions with Khrushchev take a turn that makes this appropriate, our willingness to consider some agreed restrictions on transfer of nuclear weapons to other nations, if the USSR would agree to a production cut-off.

The Soviets are unlikely to take any interest in a production cut-off, in the absence of some restriction on transfers. The State Department's disarmament proposals provide for such a restriction, in the event of cut-off, but this has not been agreed by Defense. Pre-Summit discussion of disarmament with the President may offer a good opportunity to resolve this issue.

Its resolution now would be timely: Current Western proposals to the Ten Nation Committee do not - unlike our August 1957 proposals - include any restriction on transfer. The Soviets have probably noticed this omission. Khrushchev may suggest to the President that Nth country capabilities are more likely to be created, in the next few years, by transfers than by new production programs. If the President could respond by indicating our willingness to consider these problems in conjunction with each other, the chances of interesting Khrushchev in a production cut-off might be somewhat increased.

cc: U - The Under Secretary
M - Mr. Merchant
C - Mr. Achilles
EUR - Mr. Kohler
S/AE - Mr. Farley

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SMP D-1/1a

May 11, 1960

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Paris, May, 1960

Disarmament

(Position Paper)

(The President might wish to raise)

Recommended U. S. Position

The U. S. should continue to pursue at the Summit the approach we have taken in the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference and should reaffirm Allied disarmament proposals. The U. S. should:

- 1) attempt to convince the Soviet Union that the way to make progress in disarmament is to isolate and agree on feasible specific measures which are in the interest of both countries:
- 2) explain how the specific measures we propose are responsive to the needs of the present situation; and
- 3) suggest that the Four Powers identify at the Summit certain specific proposals of considerable importance in creating a stable military environment, which could then be worked out in more detail by the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee.

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DISCUSSION

1. The first objective of the U. S. at Summit discussions of disarmament should be to explain our fundamental approach to disarmament. The U. S. should make clear that the specific measures we proposed for negotiations were not advanced in hopes of giving the U. S. a one-sided military advantage or with the thought that these proposals would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The U. S. should emphasize that progress in disarmament will also require progress toward open societies. The U. S. does not seek unilateral advantages from greater openness; all we seek is that agreements be verifiable. The specific measures we have proposed are responsive to the perils which exist for all countries in (a) the instability which would be caused by the spread of the possession of nuclear weapons to other nations, and (b) the hazard of war by accident or miscalculation; e.g., as a result of reciprocal moves toward heightened readiness being misinterpreted in some future crisis.

2. The U. S. should identify the purpose of disarmament negotiations as that of isolating, exploring and agreeing on measures which serve the common interests of the participating states. The U. S. is convinced that this is the way to make progress in disarmament. Agreement on presently feasible concrete measures is the approach the U. S. has urged in the Ten Nation Committee; it is the approach the U.S. will continue to follow both at the Summit and in the resumed discussions of the Committee. Discussions of general principles are only of secondary importance.

3. Agreement on measures contained in the first two stages of the Allied plan would go far towards removing the most immediate dangers. Such agreement would make it easier to move toward general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The U. S. seriously desires to move as rapidly as possible towards this goal. Aside from our most basic concern for survival of civilization, as we know it, the U. S. is intensely aware of (a) the drain on human and economic resources in maintaining modern military establishments; and (b) the difficulty of settling outstanding political differences between East and West while tensions are high and the arms race is uncontrolled. In the absence of safeguarded disarmament, however, the U.S. has no

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alternative but to maintain a strong up-to-date defense establishment despite its cost.

4. The U.S. should reaffirm the specific measures set forth in the Five Power paper of March 16. We should set forth the rationale behind each of these proposals, stressing that our effort is to avoid complicated "package" approaches through the presentation of a series of measures which can be agreed on their merits. We are willing to study any proposal the Soviets make for such specific measures, provided only they are controllable and do not have the result of conferring on one side a security advantage over the other. We would lay stress on three specific measures from the Allied Five Power paper, reinforcing them by new concrete details where possible, for maximum public impact and pressure on the Soviets:

A. First we should state the importance we attach, under an agreed and adequate system of safeguards, which we attach to the cut-off in production of fissionable material for weapons purposes as a method which could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other nations and of stopping the build-up of stockpiles of fissionable material for weapons in those nations now possessing this capability. We should suggest that our experts begin immediately to consider jointly the inspection system that would be required to verify the cut-off. We should indicate we would be prepared, concomitantly with the cut-off, to join the USSR in transferring specific and massive quantities of fissionable material from past production to internationally supervised stockpiles to be drawn upon for peaceful purposes only. We should specify, in terms of explosive yield, the amounts of material we are ready to remove from our weapons stockpiles simultaneously with entry into force of the cut-off. The amount we would propose for this initial transfer out of our weapons materials stocks (U.S. Eyes Only - 5,000 kg. of U-235 would, in thermo-nuclear weapons, produce a total yield equal to about 2000 megatons. [Other suggestions on nuclear matters for further consideration are attached.]

B. Secondly, we should repeat our interest in safeguards against surprise attack which would reduce the possibility

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possibility of war by miscalculation. In this context, we should propose exchange of observers between military installations in the U.S. and the USSR and their Allies. In particular, observers might be stationed at missile launching sites and airbases. These observations might be useful, in some future crisis, in giving each side greater assurance that the other side was not preparing imminently to launch a first strike. This proposal might be related to the 1955 Bulganin ground control post scheme and the August 1957 Western proposal. Exchanges might be on as wide or as narrow a basis as the Soviets desire, provided only they were reciprocal in application.

C. Third, the U.S. should put renewed stress at the Summit on our proposals for prior notification of satellite and missile launchings and for prohibition against vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction being placed into orbit or stationed in outer space. This proposal should be justified as one whose acceptance might reduce risk of war by miscalculation and which would not upset present military balances, inspection requirements for which are relatively moderate, and which should be an important confidence-building measure.

5. In the course of discussions on disarmament, the U.S. should try to set the record straight publicly on two matters which are of public concern. First, the U.S. is striving for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. If the USSR is genuinely interested in the same objective, then there is no disagreement between our nations in this respect; it will not be constructive to debate this matter further. (There is a difference on how peace would be maintained in a disarmed world -- we think there must be a build-up in international capabilities based on a strengthened UN and including an international force; the Soviets do not.) Second, secrecy, which is characteristic of the Soviet Union, may presently be a strategic advantage for the USSR, but is an impediment to disarmament. Progress toward disarmament will not be possible if the USSR looks on legitimate inspection requirements as attempts at espionage or subversion.

6. The communique will depend on developments in Summit discussions. The most probable assumption is that no specific

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arms control agreements will be reached; on that basis, the U.S. might propose the following communique, designed to emphasize the importance of taking first steps in disarmament: "The four heads of government urge the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva to achieve through balanced, phased, and safeguarded disarmament agreements the goal of general and complete disarmament of national military establishments under effective control. They have agreed that this is the goal towards which their representatives in the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee will direct their efforts. Motivated by the desire that the maximum feasible disarmament be achieved as soon as practicable, they have agreed that their representatives in the committee will explore controlled measures of disarmament which are feasible of accomplishment as first steps in each principal area of disarmament. They express the hope that the committee will continue its work until satisfactory disarmament agreements have been reached."

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