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Authority *NND 959001*

By *EW NARA* Date *2/22/10*

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June 22, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY

1. Khrushchev may have lost interest in a test ban because it would no longer greatly advance the original object he had in mind - inhibiting Nth country programs; it is barely conceivable that he might be interested in more effective measures to this end. You will recall that when the President asked Khrushchev whether he would be willing to start off on the road to general disarmament with a test ban, Khrushchev replied he favored more drastic measures and mentioned several possibilities, including a cut-off of a nuclear production.

2. I wonder if it would not be useful now to go back at Khrushchev with a letter from the President, picking up this remark and suggesting a two pronged attack on the Nth country problem:

(a) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. I gather that your panel on nuclear measures concluded that inspection of such a nuclear cut-off would not pose insuperable problems.

(b) An agreement not to disseminate nuclear materials and information of other countries. This would be consistent with existing US disarmament policy, if it were linked to a cut-off, and might have some attraction for the Soviets.

3. This package would be put forward quite apart from the test ban, which we would continue to negotiate at Geneva.

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4. If this proposal led to agreement on a cut-off and no dissemination agreement, the spread of nuclear capabilities would be inhibited. If - as seems more likely - the proposal did not lead to agreement, our public posture would be improved by virtue of our having taken the initiative in putting forward a specific proposal in response to the Vienna conversation.

George C. McGhee

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