

- basis" (General Assembly resolution 1252 (XIII), Nov. 4, 1958); same membership continued by resolution 1403 (XIV), Nov. 21, 1959.
- DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE, 1954- . Established by Disarmament Commission resolution, Apr. 19, 1954. Membership: Canada, U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., and France. (Has not met since Sept. 1957.)
- GENEVA CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF POSSIBLE MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACK AND FOR THE PREPARATION OF A REPORT THEREON TO GOVERNMENTS. Began Nov. 10, 1958; recessed Dec. 18, 1958. Participants: Experts from U.S., U.K., France, Canada, Italy, U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Albania.
- GENEVA CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTING VIOLATIONS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS, July 1-Aug. 21, 1958. Participants: Experts from U.S., U.K., France, Canada, U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania.
- GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, Oct. 31, 1958- . Participants: U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.
- TEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, 1959- . Announced in Four Power communiqué, Sept. 7, 1959; endorsed by Disarmament Commission resolution, Sept. 10, 1959. Participants: U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Canada, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Rumania.
- UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, 1946-1952. Established by General Assembly resolution 1 (I), Jan. 24, 1946. Dissolved by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Membership: Same as Commission for Conventional Armaments, except that Canada was a permanent member.

1957

185. United States Memorandum Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly, January 12, 1957¹

1. The United States makes the following proposals, in broad outline. Specific details will, of course, be developed in the negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

2. *First:* The United States proposes that an agreement be reached under which at an early date under effective international inspection, all future production of fissionable materials shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. The Members of the General Assembly and scientists throughout the world know that it is impossible to account with essential certainty, or to discover through any known scientific means of inspection, all of the fissionable materials produced in the past, or all of the existing accumulation of nuclear weapons. It is not possible to turn backward the clock of nuclear discovery and development, nor to repeal the "nuclear age". One thing which can be done and which, for the sake of humanity, the United States proposes should be done, is to establish effective international control of future production of fissionable materials and to exchange firm commitments to use all future production exclusively for non-weapons purposes.

3. When such commitments are executed, it would then be possible to move reliably toward the reduction of existing stockpiles. When future production is controlled it should be easier than with information now available to establish, within a reasonable range of accuracy, the approximate amount of fissionable materials previously produced, so that equitable and proportionate transfers in successive increments could be made from past production over to the internationally supervised national or international non-weapons use of such material.

4. The Members of the Assembly will recognize that this proposal is the logical projection and follow-through of the concept emphasized by President Eisenhower in his message to this body on 8 December

¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/783, Jan. 12, 1957, in General Assembly *Official Records: Eleventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 22*, pp. 5-6. Cf. statement of Jan. 14 by Ambassador Lodge (*post*, doc. 186).

1953 when he proposed the "Atoms-for-Peace" programme.¹ It is inspired by the same motives which led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency through the co-operation of nations of the world.

5. Under this programme the United States, for its part, would make generous, progressive transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses, just as it has previously announced its intention to contribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It will continue to encourage nations to make their full contributions to the constructive uses of atomic energy.

6. Under such a programme, the whole future trend may be changed. The course of atomic development will move in a benign direction rather than toward some evil end.

7. *Second:* If such an arrangement to control the future production of fissionable material can be negotiated and put into effect it would then be possible, in a secure manner, to limit, and ultimately to eliminate, all nuclear test explosions. The United States proposes that this be done. Pending the negotiation of such an agreement, the United States is also willing to work out promptly methods for advance notice and registration of all nuclear tests and to provide for limited international observation of such tests. This could be an effective forerunner of far-reaching agreement affecting both the nuclear threat itself and testing, in particular.

8. *Third:* The United States proposes that States move ahead toward the realization of a first stage reduction, under adequate inspection, of conventional armaments and armed forces, using as a basis of measurement the figures 2.5 million for the USSR and the United States, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom, upon which the countries represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission seem to agree. The United States proposes this forward step would be achieved through the progressive establishment of an effective inspection system concurrent with such reductions. An effective inspection system would require an appropriate aerial inspection component, as well as ground units. The United States accepts the principle of establishing observers at key ground locations, as generally proposed by Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union,² in addition to air inspection. The proposed first stage of reductions can be fulfilled provided there is good faith on all sides in establishing a system of inspection that can in fact verify the commitments.

9. It would seem appropriate, also, for other nations to begin to consider the relation between their own armed forces and the projected first-stage force levels, in the event the fulfilment of such first-stage

reductions can be assured in the coming negotiations of the Sub-Committee.

10. The United States does not believe that deeper reductions than those agreed for the first stage can be made unless some progress is made in settlement of the major political issues now dividing the world. But the fulfilment of a first-stage reduction would certainly improve the climate for the negotiation of such political settlements.

11. *Fourth:* Scientists in many nations are now proceeding with efforts to propel objects through outer space and to travel in the distant areas beyond the earth's atmospheric envelope. The scope of these programmes is variously indicated in the terms "earth satellites", "inter-continental missiles", "long-range unmanned weapons" and "space platforms". No one can now predict with certainty what will develop from man's excursion into this new field. But it is clear that if this advance into the unknown is to be a blessing rather than a curse the efforts of all nations in this field need to be brought within the purview of a reliable armaments control system. The United States proposes that the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes would be to bring the testing of such objects under international inspection and participation. In this matter, as in other matters, the United States are ready to participate in fair, balanced, reliable systems of control.

12. *Fifth:* The United States continues to emphasize the importance of providing against the possibility of great surprise attack. This is not a minor or peripheral proposal. The nature of modern weapons is such that if all nations are safeguarded against great surprise attack there is much less likelihood that a calculated major war would be initiated in the nuclear age. Likewise, such mutual assurances against great surprise attack would do much to prevent miscalculation by any nation regarding the intention of another. The greater the speed of potential attack and the more devastating the blows that could be struck, the greater is the danger that anxious apprehension, feeding on ignorance of the dispositions and intentions of others, would adversely and dangerously affect the decisions of nations.

13. It is in the interest of each nation not only that it have sure knowledge that other nations are not preparing a great surprise attack upon it, but also that these other nations should have sure knowledge that it is not planning a great surprise attack upon them. Today many nations have knowledge of the location of key centres, of the areas of strategic importance, and of the concentration of the military power of other nations. This information would be adequate for the waging of a devastating war. But unless a reliable inspection system is established with open skies, open ports, open centres,

¹ *Ante*, doc. 92.

² *Ante*, doc. 112.

each nation will possess something less than the regular, dependable information necessary to form a stable basis for a durable peace. The United States proposes, therefore, the progressive installation of inspection systems which will provide against the possibility of great surprise attack. The United States is willing to execute, either as an opening step or a later step, the complete proposal made by President Eisenhower at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, held at Geneva in 1955.¹

14. It is clear that whatever the first steps may be, a method of control, an organization of supervision, and a mechanism for regulation will be needed. The United States proposes that such an international agency for the regulation of armaments should be installed concurrently with the beginning of the programme. It can constitute a nucleus of hope at the centre of the grim implications which radiate from the destructive power of modern armament.

15. In making these new proposals the United States continues to stand back of the proposals and suggestions made by it at the Conference of the Heads of Government and in the meetings of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission since that time.

186. Statement by the United States Representative (Lodge) to the First Committee of the General Assembly [Extracts], January 14, 1957²

The report of the Disarmament Commission,³ including the proceedings of its Subcommittee,⁴ is before us. Now is the time to review that work.

My statement today, however, will look more to the future than to the past. It deals with the steps and means by which a sound and safeguarded agreement might be reached in the new year just beginning.

The President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, will soon begin a new administration in the Government of our country. He has been elected for a second term by the people and will be inaugurated for that 4-year period. The members of the United Nations may be confident of his continued devotion to the quest for

¹ *Ante*, doc. 120.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 11, 1957, pp. 225-228. Statement made at the 821st meeting.

³ *Ante*, doc. 174.

⁴ *Disarmament Commission Official Records: Supplement for January to December 1956*.

a just and durable peace. He continues to lead our Nation in a renewed effort to find the way to devote more of the resources of mankind to abundant peace and less to armaments and armed forces; to reduce tensions and increase confidence among nations by establishing a reliably inspected and lower level of armaments; and to lessen the perils of the outbreak of war by easing the dangers of great surprise attack.

Only recently, in his letter to Marshal Bulganin of December 31, 1956,¹ President Eisenhower reaffirmed his belief that "deliberations within the framework of the United Nations seem most likely to produce a step forward in the highly complicated matter of disarmament."

President Eisenhower also declared the intention of the United States to submit new proposals in the United Nations.

These new proposals will center upon five principal points. Before outlining these points, I wish to emphasize that the United States is ready and willing to take sound steps toward arms reductions, whether they are very small or whether they are large and extensive, provided, however, that any such step must be subject to effective inspection. This insistence on adequate inspection is not a whim. It arises from the deep conviction after a thorough study that only an inspected agreement would serve the objective of a reliable peace.

An agreement without effective inspection would immediately become the source of doubts and suspicions, of distrust and invective, and of charges and countercharges. Such an unsound agreement would add to tensions and increase the danger of war.

Deeply as we are convinced of the desirability of a reliable agreement and of the dangers in the absence of agreement, we have nonetheless concluded that a bad agreement is worse for the cause of peace than no agreement. An uninspected agreement, or an inadequately controlled agreement, or a one-sided agreement would be a bad agreement. It would not serve the objective of peace.

We believe that renewed negotiations should strive toward these objectives:

1. To reverse the trend toward larger stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to reduce the future nuclear threat.
2. To provide against great surprise attack and thus reduce the danger of major war.
3. To lessen the burden of armaments and to make possible improved standards of living.
4. To insure that research and development activities concerning the propulsion of objects through outer space be devoted exclusively to scientific and peaceful purposes.

¹ *Ante*, doc. 184.