Mr. Roper called to deliver the attached Aide Memoire containing UK comments on the disarmament policy alternatives presented by Mr. Farley to Lord Hood on March 26.

Mr. Roper stated that the UK reaction, particularly to the second alternative, must be seen against the background of desperate UK electric power requirements over the next twenty years, for the fulfillment of which they look principally to their nuclear program. Acceptance of even a temporary shutdown of nuclear materials facilities could spell economic ruin for the UK, and there was some surprise that this had not been realized by the State Department. This entire issue of nuclear disarmament was a delicate one for the UK Government, which had been widely attacked for three programs on which it had staked its future: (1) nuclear armaments for NATO; (2) the basic defense policy; and (3) the nuclear power program. If the Government was shown wrong in these due to some action or initiative by the United States, serious political consequences would follow. The economic consequences of shutting down Capenhurst would be enormous. The United States proposals had not been considered at the Ministerial level, but they had received the worst possible reception at the top official level in the Foreign Office. Ambassador Caccia would raise the matter with the Secretary at the earliest possible moment.

Referring to the second alternative, Mr. Farley inquired whether the UK had considered the possibility of a shut down applicable only to the United States and the USSR, with the UK exempt because of the special nature of its
program and its civil power needs. Mr. Roper, pointing out the last sentence of paragraph 7, estimated that the USSR would not agree to exempt the UK, seeing excellent opportunity to wreak havoc in the UK. Mr. Farley agreed that this suggestion was probably unrealistic.

With regard to the first alternative, Mr. Roper said that until the Atomic Energy Act was amended the UK had to be apprehensive about unilateral limits on the lengths to which the U.S. would go in cooperating with the UK. The areas of information in which the UK would be most interested, i.e. defensive weapons, were those which might be withheld in the future.

Mr. Roper asked what the status was of U.S. studies on inspection requirements for the cut-off. The UK studies, under the direction of Dr. Penny, were near completion. Although he was generally aware of their conclusion, he was not yet at liberty to discuss them. Mr. Spiers recalled that there had been some discussion of a U.S.-UK exchange of views on this issue while Mr. Stassen was in office, and that there remained a great deal to do. Mr. Farley said that no studies of the cut-off controls was presently underway but referred to the nuclear test suspension and missiles control studies on which we have concentrated our attention. Mr. Roper said that the matter of cut-off controls was an immense subject that required months of study. The Western Powers would have a large blank in their preparation for further negotiations until they could speak informally on this subject.

Mr. Roper, in conclusion, said that the UK was most grateful that the U.S. had not disclosed the policy alternatives to the French and Canadians.
AIDE MEMOIRE

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The State Department have invited the frank comments of the United Kingdom authorities upon the following two proposals with regard to the nuclear aspects of disarmament:

(a) the suspension of nuclear tests for a period of two or three years with suitable provision for inspection and with the intention that, during the suspension period, agreement should be sought upon a definitive cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

(b) the suspension, again for a period of two or three years, of production of fissile material with the proviso that reactors producing power would be allowed to continue in operation, but would be made subject to inspection to ensure that the fissile material produced was not used for military purposes (the United Kingdom authorities assume that the inspection arrangements would apply to all power reactors and not just to those in countries with an avowed military programme).

2. SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The Western position has hitherto been that the suspension of nuclear tests must be part of a disarmament agreement covering the whole Western package, including a controlled cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons. U.K. acceptance of this position was on the explicit understanding that the United States would provide the U.K. with the necessary fissile material for the British weapons programme if a cut-off came into force. The cut-off would be worked out and imposed during the two-year suspension of tests, but there would be a definite commitment to the cut-off before tests were suspended.

3. The new proposal contemplates a suspension of tests linked on the nuclear side to a commitment only to discuss the cut-off, though it is stipulated that agreement on it must be reached during the suspension period. Thus, tests could be resumed at the end of the period if the cut-off had not been agreed; but it is not clear whether they could be resumed if the cut-off had been agreed, but had not actually taken place.

4. From the United Kingdom defence point of view, the United Kingdom authorities must examine the most serious case, namely a suspension lasting
the full three years. If such a suspension started on January 1, 1959, the
United Kingdom's testing plans for this year would not be interfered with,
but it would not be possible to test the full range of weapons which Her
Majesty's Government wish to develop, although the megaton weapons would
have been taken far. The proposal would therefore be very dangerous for
the United Kingdom unless it was established that the United States
authorities would be prepared to give the United Kingdom all their information
on weapon development which the United Kingdom would otherwise derive from
their own continued testing. This by itself, however, would not really be
satisfactory because the United Kingdom would wish to assure themselves by
an occasional further test that the United States information was sufficient
and complete and that they had assimilated it properly. Such an occasional
test explosion would be contrary to the suspension itself and the United
Kingdom would therefore have to take all the United States information and
their assimilation of it on trust without experimental verification. In any
event, the United States authorities have always maintained that there was
certain information which they would not be prepared to divulge to the United
Kingdom. Unless this United States stand were changed, suspension of tests
would preclude the United Kingdom from finding it out for themselves.

5. The new proposal is therefore not in its present form acceptable
to the United Kingdom and Her Majesty's Government would not be able to
support it in a wider forum, unless at least they had been given adequate
assurances that the United Kingdom would receive all the U.S. weapons design
information necessary to its programme.

6. SUSPENSION OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

The implications of this proposal for the United Kingdom nuclear
programme are very sinister for the following reasons amongst others:

(i) to complete the minimum weapons stockpile laid down by
the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, the United Kingdom would need
to obtain supplies of fissile material which they believe
the United States is simply not in a position to supply.

(ii) the shutting down of the gaseous diffusion plant at
Capenhurst would bring work on the U.K. civil research
programme to a halt.

(iii) the shutting down of Capenhurst would have a grave effect
on the economics of power reactors in existence and under
construction in the United Kingdom and would also prevent
the United Kingdom building the more advanced types of civil
nuclear power stations of which development will start in the
near future.

(iv) while it is recognised that, if the scheme were to be put into
effect, it would mean acceptance by the Soviet Union of inspectors
on all their reactors, it seems that the United Kingdom, as the country with at present the most extensive civil nuclear power programme, would be the one which would have to accept the most detailed and numerically extensive teams of inspectors. The United Kingdom authorities have not yet had time to prepare their considered views on the implication for the U.K. nuclear programme of having a full scale inspection of reactors, but such considered views will be communicated to the State Department as soon as possible.

(v) the proposed measures would have the most damaging consequences for the nuclear power programmes of other countries, the political consequences of which would be far-reaching.

7. It seems to be intended that this temporary suspension of production of fissile material for weapons shall act as a spur to reach agreement on the cut-off as it was initially conceived. All civil programmes could, when the cut-off had been agreed, be resumed. But this would hit the United Kingdom and other countries with serious civil programmes far harder than either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. who have less need of nuclear energy for their national industrial effort. There would thus be every incentive to the Soviet Union to delay the lifting of the suspension and thereby sabotage the United Kingdom's economic effort.

8. The United Kingdom authorities for themselves see no prospect of overcoming the formidable disadvantages set out above and the proposal cannot therefore be acceptable to them.

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 3, 1958