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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 23, 1979

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SECRET/SENSITIVEPresidential Review Committee Meeting
January 22, 1979RELEASED IN PART
B3, CIA, B1, 1.4(D)

TIME AND PLACE: 4:15-6:00 p.m.
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions:
Mini-PRC on Pakistani Nuclear Matters

PARTICIPANTS:

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
Thomas Pickering, Assistant
Secretary for Middle East
Affairs
Jane Coon, Director, Office of
Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh
Affairs

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lt. Gen. William Smith
Lt. Col. Sheldon H. Cooper

Central Intelligence AgencyDefense

Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern,
African, & South Asian Affairs
Cdr. Ronald Zwart (DOD/ISA)

White House
David Aaron

National Security Council
Thomas Thornton
Jessica Mathews

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director
Barry M. Blechman, Assistant
Director, Weapons Evaluation &
Control Bureau

Intelligence Background

It is increasingly clear that Pakistan is proceeding along a course that will enable it to achieve a nuclear explosive capability, Certain critical components in their efforts have very probably been imported since August 1977, the effective date of

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Review on January 23, 1999
Extended by David Aaron
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(b)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
DATE/CASE ID: 01 JUL 2004 199900276

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The Symington Amendment and this raises serious questions about its application. (S)

Congressional/Legal Aspects

The PRC considered the possibility of asking for changes in the Symington Amendment to bring it into line with the Glenn Amendment so that the President would have a broader waiver capability to permit continued cooperation with Pakistan while seeking to dissuade them from the nuclear option. It was decided, however, that we would, initially at least, approach key members of Congress (especially Senator Glenn and Congressman Zablocki) with a full explanation of the problem and our diplomatic strategy to cope with it. We would agree to keep them informed and to report back prior to the consideration of the foreign aid bill. In the interim we would not invoke the Symington Amendment on the grounds of our diplomatic efforts and the critical importance of Pakistan in the current circumstances of the area. (S)

State was also tasked to determine what agreements are up for signing in the next several months with Pakistan. (S)

Diplomatic Strategy

Ambassador Hummel has already been instructed to approach President Zia in general terms about the Pakistani nuclear program and to point out to him the implications for US-Pakistani relations. (The Congressional consultations will not take place until after Hummel reports on his meeting.) (S)

The PRC agreed that we should raise the issue with Deng Xiaoping. State Department will contact the Saudis and selected Europeans to enlist their support in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear course. No special approach will be made to the Soviets although we will routinely mention Pakistan to them when we discuss general proliferation concerns. We will sound out Ambassadors Goheen and Hummel on the utility of having Goheen talk privately with Indian Prime Minister Desai about the possibility of a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement not to develop or use nuclear weapons. (This, if successful, could eliminate most of the motivation for the Pakistani program.) (S)

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