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E.O. 12065: XDS 1 3/6/2009 (SHERMAN R) OR-P
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PEPR, PK, US

SUBJECT: (S) NUCLEAR ASPECT OF DEPSEC VISIT DISCUSSED WITH
UK AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS

REF: STATE 53819

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH REFTEL AUTHORIZATION, I CALLED ON UK AMBASSADOR
BUSHELL AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR LE GOURRIEREC MARCH 6
AND PASSED SUBSTANCE OF NUCLEAR SITUATION AS IT
DEVELOPED DURING DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER VISIT.

3. BUSHELL, HIS HEAD OF CHANCERY, ROBIN FEARN, AND
POLOFF SHERMAN WERE PRESENT IN UK MEETING. POLOFF
AND I SAW FRENCH AMBASSADOR ALONE. I MAKE FOLLOWING
POINTS TO BOTH:

-- IN ALL THREE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH GOP SUBJECT
OF PAK NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES WERE DISCUSSED.

--PAKS DID NOT DENY THAT BOTH REPROCESSING AND EN-
RICHMENT PROGRAMS ARE ABUILDING -- NOR WOULD THEY
AGREE TO DISCONTINUE THEIR MOVEMENT TOWARD WEAPONS-
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GRADE MATERIAL PRODUCTION.

-- DEPSEC POINTED OUT TO GOP IN CLEAR UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS SUBSTANCE OF US LEGISLATION ON THESE MATTERS AND STATED HIS BELIEF THAT GLENN AND/OR SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS WOULD BE TRIGGERED. CONSEQUENCES THEREOF INCLUDE AID DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE CUT-OFF, DISCONTINUANCE OF MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM (IMET), AND PROBABLE SUSPENSION OF COMMERCIAL MILITARY SALES. PL-480 WHEAT LEVELS MIGHT ALSO BE CURTAILED.

-- US ACTION WILL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND MAY WELL AFFECT RELATIONS OF OTHER (EUROPEAN) COUNTRIES' RELATIONS WITH GOP.

-- THE ENRICHMENT PROGRAM DIFFERS FROM THE FRENCH REPROCESSING CONTRACT IN THAT IT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN SUB-ROSA RATHER THAN THROUGH PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

-- I SPECULATED ON POSSIBILITY THAT US "SANCTIONS" MIGHT WELL FORCE GOP TO MOVE TO INSURE ITS ECONOMIC SECURITY THROUGH CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN ASSISTANCE FROM ISLAMIC STATES.

-- I ALSO SPECULATED EFFECT MAY BE TO ENCOURAGE SOME PAK MOVES TOWARD AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SOVIETS ON PERCEIVED SECURITY NEEDS.

-- I TOLD BOTH AMBASSADORS NEXT STEPS WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN LONDON AND PARIS.

I EMPHASIZED TO BOTH AMBASSADORS THE SENSITIVITY
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WE PLACE ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND BOTH AGREED TO HOLD DETAILS CLOSELY.

5. BUSHELL INQUIRED WHETHER WE FORESAW TRADEOFF WITH ISLAMIC NATIONS BEING THE PRODUCT OF THE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT (AS OPPOSED TO THE TECHNOLOGY) IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT. I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE ALSO ASKED IF THIS TRADE OFF RESURRECTED THE OLD BUGABOO OF A PAK-LIBYAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAM. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IT MIGHT INCLUDE LIBYA, SAUDI ARABIA AND, PERHAPS, OTHERS.

6. BUSHELL BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF DESAI LETTER TO ZIA ON PAK NUCLEAR INTENTIONS. I SAID WE HAD NOT SEEN LETTER BUT WERE AWARE THAT GOP FUREIOUS WITH DESAI'S ACTION. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT SHARE ANY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE ON THESE MATTERS WITH THE GOI DURING DEPSEC VISIT TO DELHI.

7. RE SOVIET OPTION, BUSHELL SAID THERE IS A CERTAIN "HONESTY" ABOUT THE SOVIETS IN THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. THEY WOULD BE, HE THINKS, HESITANT TO SUPPORT ACTIVELY ANY PAK WEAPONS PROGRAM. I REPLIED, THAT MAY BE SO, BUT THAT THEY COULD NOT FOREGO THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE POLITICAL GAINS.

8. BUSHELL ASKED WHAT PRECONDITIONS THE PAKS DEMAND FOR GIVING UP THEIR WEAPONS PROGRAM -- WOULD SUBSCRIPTION TO FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND NPT BY INDIA BE ENOUGH. I SUGGESTED SUCH MUTUAL (INDIAN & PAK) ACTION WOULD PROBABLY BE THE QUID FOR DISCONTINUANCE, BUT POINTED OUT THE NEAR IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUCH ACTION EVER TAKING PLACE.

9. LE GOURRIEREC REACTION MUCH LESS SUBSTANTIVE.

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HE AGREED TO PASS SUBSTANCE TO QUAI AND TO HOLD INFO
CLOSELY. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF MY SHARING WITH
HIM BUT HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO OFFER.
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