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E.O. 12065: RDS-2 3/5/99 (CONSTABLE, PETER D.) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, ENRG, TECH, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: HARD CHOICES

REF: A) ISLAMABAD 2650, B) ISLAMABAD 2475

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL A. DESCRIBED BACKGROUND AND PROGNOSIS FOR PAK
NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. IS IS OUR CONCLUSION THAT NO UNILATERAL OR
MULTILATERAL PRESSURE THAT USG AND ITS FRIENDS CAN MOUNT WILL PERSUADE

PAKISTAN TO FOREGO ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
CAPABILITY. SUCH EFFORTS ON OUR PART WHICH RESULT IN PUBLIC
DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN WILL HAVE SEVERE ADVERSE
EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA (REFTEL B).

3. THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBES THE MEAGRE POLICY OPTIONS TO HEAD OFF
PAKISTAN AS WE SEE THEM. ALL INVOLVE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS -- PERHAPS
INSURMOUNTABLE -- AND HARD CHOICES FOR USG. TWO ARE BASED ON THE
PREMISE THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT RPT NOT FOREGO EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ITS

NUCLEAR OPTION UNLESS IT IS SATISFIED THAT ITS SECURITY IS ASSURED
BY OTHER MEANS.

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A. RECIPROCAL INDIAN-PAKISTANI GUARANTEES:

THE GOP HAS REPEATEDLY SAID IT WOULD OPEN UP ALL FACILITIES TO INDIA OR OTHER INSPECTORS IF INDIA WOULD DO THE SAME. SIMILARLY, IT WOULD SIGN THE NPT IF INDIA WOULD DO SO. SOME FORM OF ENFORCEABLE REGIME OF INDIAN GUARANTEES THAT GOI WAS NOT UNDERTAKING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM COULD HEAD OFF PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR PARITY WITH INDIA. WASHINGTON AND NEW DELHI CAN BETTER JUDGE THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THIS. FROM ISLAMABAD IT SEEMS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE USG OR OTHERS COULD BRING ABOUT AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN THAT FORCES INDIA TO FOREGO PERMANENTLY ITS ALREADY ACHIEVED NUCLEAR OPTION, AND WHICH SEEKS TO EQUATE INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION.

B. "PINCHING OFF" THE PAK OPTION THROUGH SUPPLIERS CONTROLS, BUT WITHOUT SANCTIONS:

THIS OPTION WOULD INVOLVE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO CUT PAKISTAN OFF FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES OF MATERIAL NEEDED TO COMPLETE EITHER THE REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT FACILITIES, AND QUICKLY OBTAIN AMENDMENT OF EXISTING LEGISLATION SO THAT WE DO NOT HAVE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN. WE WOULD THUS AVOID A SHARP DETERIORATION IN U.S. - PAK RELATIONS AND THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTERESTS OUTLINED IN ISLAMABAD 2475. THIS OPTION HAS SEVERAL OBVIOUS DRAWBACKS. EVEN IF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION COULD BE OVERCOME IT IS AT BEST A TIME-BUYING DEVICE. THE GOP MAY NOW HAVE SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY, TO COMPLETE AN ENRICHMENT FACILITY, ALBEIT AT A SLOWER PACE. FURTHERMORE, THIS OPTION WOULD NOT RESPOND TO RISING REGIONAL TENSIONS GROWING OUT OF INDIAN PRESSURES AS IT PERCEIVES PAKISTAN APPROACHING A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

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C. MULTILATERAL SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PAKISTAN:
 MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES TO PAKISTAN AGAINST NUCLEAR
 ATTACKS COUPLED WITH ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ITS CONVENTIONAL
 DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES COULD BE PERSUASIVE IF THE U.S. AND
 CHINESE WERE THE PRINCIPAL GURANTORS, INCLUSION OF THE
 SOVIETS AND THE INDIANS COULD ALSO BE EXAMINED, BUT BOTH
 WOULD POSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THE DISADVANTAGES OF THIS
 APPROACH ARE READILY APPARENT: THERE WOULD BE SOME COST TO
 U.S.- INDIAN RELATIONS, ALTHOUGH THESE COULD PERHAPS BE
 OVERCOME IF THE GOI WERE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THE CONSIDERABLE
 ADVANTEGES TO IT OF A NON-NUCLEAR PAKISTAN; THE U.S. WOULD
 RISK DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN A SOUTH ASIAN KONFLICT; AND NOT
 LEAST THERE WOULD BE STRONG PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL
 OPPOSITION TO SUCH AN UNDERTAKING.

4. WE WOULD ARGUE FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT THAT THE FIRST
 OPTION IS THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW,
 SINCE THE USG WOULD INCUR NO NEW OBLIGATIONS; WE BELIEVE,
 HOWEVER, THAT IT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. OPTION TWO MERELY
 BUYS TIME, BUT IS PROBABLY UNWORKABLE FOR THE REASONS STATED.
 WHILE IT MAY SEEM NAIVE TO SUGGEST IT, WE SEE NO REAL ALTERNA-
 TIVE TO THE THIRD OPTION IF THE U.S. IS TO ACHIEVE ITS
 NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN. WE LACK THE
 LEVERAGE TO FORCE PAKISTAN OUT OF THE NUCLEAR BUSINESS.
 CONVENTIONAL CARROTS OF THE MAGNITUDE WE CAN MUSTER ARE
 INSUFFICIENT TO INDUCE PAKISTAN TO FOREGO WHAT IT SEES
 (ERRONEOUSLY IN OUR VIEW) AS ITS ONLY OPTION TO ACHIEVE SECURITY
 AGAINST AN INDIAN THREAT. IT IS ONLY BY A BOLD INITIATIVE
 OF U.S. POLICY -- WITH ITS OWN ATTENDANT RISKS -- WHICH WILL
 MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY REQUIREMENT AS PERCEIVED BY
 PAKISTAN THAT WE CAN HOPE TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERAT ON
 HERE. WE ARE FACED WITH A STARK CHOICE, BUT WE WILL BE
 DELUDING OURSELVES IF WE NOW BELIEVE THERE IS ANY EASIER
 FIX IN THIS DILEMMA. HUMMEL

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