MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: NIO for Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Report—Nuclear Proliferation

1. Action Requested: None; for your information and possible comments only.

2. Background: The attached report is based on discussions held during a meeting of the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation on 19 July 1979.

John Despres

Attachment a/s
India/Pakistan

1. India is likely to initiate some steps within the next few months that could reduce the lead-time between any future authorization and the actual production of nuclear weapons; India probably now requires at least two years to produce acceptable weapons. At a minimum, nuclear explosives and weapons experts will almost certainly try to ensure that India could deny Pakistan any competitive advantage from producing nuclear weapons. In this effort, specialized research and development activities are also likely to be undertaken. Conceivably, preliminary steps might also be taken to improve India's stocks of weapons-useable material.

2. Unless it needs to act boldly toward Pakistan for electoral purposes, India's political leadership will seek to defer any commitment to specific courses of action as long as it prudently can. Still, almost certainly, it will act deliberately to improve its unilateral military options and to expand its freedom of action in case diplomacy fails to arrest Pakistan's production of weapons-useable nuclear materials. To

NOTE: This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/NP. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
minimize uncertainties in their estimates of Pakistani nuclear capabilities and to hedge against the possibility of Chinese military support for Pakistan, India's leaders will also be inclined to strengthen their security ties with the USSR. However, actual military moves to prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons will probably not be planned for execution until after Indian authorities decide that, either: a) Pakistan's production of nuclear explosives is imminent, or b) Pakistan will soon achieve an invulnerable capability to stockpile weapons-usable nuclear materials. Although neither eventuality is estimated to be feasible within the next two years.

3. Pakistan's apprehensions about Indian intentions will rise as India's intensified preparations for pre-emptive air strikes or nuclear arms competition become more perceptible. Pakistan's resistance to foreign pressure on its nuclear development plans will thus tend to harden, at least initially. While Pakistan's leadership is almost certainly unwilling to transfer any nuclear explosives abroad, it could be tempted by possible offers of political and financial support from sympathizers in the Islamic world, particularly among the oil-rich Arab states. Indeed, it might already have been induced to share with unidentified foreigners some sensitive nuclear equipment and to propose terms for possible future nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Libya, or Iraq.
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