MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

SUBJECT: Warning Report--Nuclear Proliferation (U)

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.

2. Background: The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 23 April 1980 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based in large part on the discussions that took place.

3. Warning: There are no proliferation intelligence issues that have changed markedly since the last report. Current evidence indicates that previous judgments on timing and capabilities in various countries of proliferation concern are still valid.

Attachment:
As Stated

SECRET
Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation

Pakistan. The recently reported belief within the Pakistani government that the US is reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability, and official Indian government statements in March that, inter alia, India remains committed to "peaceful nuclear experiments," could have had the effect of reinforcing Pakistani resolve to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program. Efforts to complete construction of the enrichment plant at Kahuta for production of weapons usable uranium have not slackened. Within the past four months additional security measures have been taken in the area of the plant some of which are intended to afford protection against air attack.

India. There are no indications that any preparations are under way for the resumption of nuclear explosive testing, although the government has made it clear that there has been a change in policy having the immediate effect of keeping this option open. It is unlikely that Prime Minister Ghandi has had time to focus her attention on the nuclear issue beyond the general statements she has made. A detailed study of the issue might now be underway. A likely

*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DD/NFA for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
Indian perception embodied in any such study is that Pakistan, despite its assurances, is progressing slowly but surely toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons via a dedicated, expensive, and substantial program. At a minimum, research on nuclear weapons in India is likely to resume.

Israel. There has been no discernible abatement of Israeli concern about the threat posed to Israel by the prospect of nuclear-armed hostile states in the region. Israel continues to closely monitor and evaluate nuclear developments in Iraq and Pakistan. It has shown particular anxiety about the near-term presence in Iraq of a significant quantity of weapons-useable material. It is conceivable that Israel will take steps to disrupt and delay certain parts of the Iraqi nuclear program, in particular shipments to Iraq of highly-enriched uranium and equipment or facilities that ultimately could be used to acquire plutonium.

Iraq. Current Iraqi worries about its security are comparable to those felt by the government in the mid-1970s when it is believed that the Iraqis first became interested in acquiring the capacity to build nuclear weapons. A desire to strengthen its security may have spawned a decision by the government to accelerate nuclear developments as a supplement to other political, military, and economic actions. Iraq may see possession of nuclear weapons as a necessary form of insurance for guaranteeing its sovereignty in the context of superpower maneuvers for influence in the Persian Gulf.