

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

ACTION

March 26, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM *WEO*
JASPER WELCH
SUBJECT: Targeting Policy

Attached is the revised memorandum to Harold Brown, list of questions, and the draft PD. *(e)*

We worked long on David's request for a low-population-high-military sentence in the "priorities" section. Logically it does not fit there. SIOP sub-options, of course, already lead in that direction. Thus, we wonder if we might appeal this point and leave it out. If "flexibility" is obtained, then the option David wants is implicit, both for pre-planned and hasty options. *(S)*

RECOMMENDATION

Sign the memorandum at Tab I. (U)

*dispatched 3-27-80
copy given to Odom
& Welch
green sheets
done*

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TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~
Review on March 26, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

DECLASSIFIED
per 6/15/09 NSC 1tr.
NLJC-08-041
BY BAE NARA, DATE 8/21/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Targeting Policy (C)

The time has come to sum up and formalize the work that has been done in the PD-18 follow-on studies on nuclear forces employment policy. I know you have made a number of changes, and I have also taken careful note of your articulation of a "countervailing strategy" in your Defense posture statement and in the Defense Consolidated Guidance. A number of questions were left after the SCC on targeting in April 1979, but interaction between our staffs seems to have answered them satisfactorily. I would like your assurance on that. (TS/S) *nc*

I am also attaching a draft Presidential Directive (Tab A) on nuclear forces employment policy for your comments. I do not propose to review it in the SCC because it is so centrally related to military contingency planning, an activity that justly remains a close-hold prerogative and responsibility of the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff. It purposely eschews great detail. It also leaves you considerable leeway on the schedule of implementation. It is written to codify most of what you have already done and the doctrinal trend you have been developing in your posture statements. It provides for modification each year as we acquire experience from exercises and program developments. Finally, it takes account of the changing realities of Soviet strategic capabilities and what they mean for our own maintenance of deterrence in the decade ahead. (TS/S)

I welcome your reaction and solicit your support in taking the matter to the President. I would like your response by April 4. (U)

This PD could represent a major step forward in our collective efforts to solve the problems of the 80s.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Review on March 24, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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per 2/16/11 NSC e-mail
NSC-08-091
BY *[Signature]* NARA, DATE 2/17/11