

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

April 4, 1979

Time and Place: 1:45-3:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Strategic Forces Employment Policy (U)

Participants:

State

Cyrus Vance
Secretary

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

Defense

Harold Brown
Secretary

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny
Deputy Director

NSC

Victor Utgoff

JCS

General David Jones
Chairman

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Chairman opened the meeting by noting that this meeting is the first of several to discuss strategic forces employment policy and related issues. He stated that the series would probably lead to an NSC meeting in which the SCC's recommendations would be presented to the President, and ultimately to a new or updated PD on strategic forces policy. (S)

DOD gave an overview of their study of strategic forces targeting policy done in response to PD-18. The main points were:

- that while we don't know exactly what deters the Soviets, some Soviet strategists appear to believe that nuclear war is in some sense winnable;

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- that deterrence should be strengthened by improving our capability to defeat possible Soviet objectives in nuclear war; and
- that major changes in our targeting policy are not required to achieve such a strengthening. (TS)

DOD also stated that the study does not argue that nuclear war can be controlled or that the Soviets are correct in thinking nuclear war is winnable, and it does not propose that we shift from a deterrence to a warfighting posture or that we shift from targeting urban/industrial targets to targeting military forces. (TS)

State and ACDA questioned DOD's interpretation of the study -- arguing that it seems to call for a shift away from urban/industrial targets and toward placing more emphasis on targeting military forces. DOD did not agree. (TS)

DOD summarized a number of follow-on efforts it has underway. These efforts include: (1) studies on alternative criteria for targeting several general classes of targets; (2) work to improve the flexibility of the SIOP by structuring it in terms of building blocks that are finer grained than the current SIOP options; (3) construction of some SAOs for targeting conventional forces in Eastern Europe; (4) development of a launch-under-attack option; (5) development of options for damaging and disrupting Soviet forces on the Chinese border; (6) development of plans for targeting China by means of regional nuclear forces rather than SIOP forces; (7) a program to improve the crisis management process by involving senior officials in exercises that would include planning of non-SIOP nuclear options; (8) development of plans to improve our C³, and (9) efforts to improve the target data base. (TS)

The Chairman noted the large number of issues to be discussed and suggested that the discussion be framed in terms of three general questions: What are the requirements of (1) stable deterrence at all levels; (2) crisis bargaining; and (3) effective war management? (S)

After some discussion it was agreed that the following specific issues should be discussed in terms of the above framework:

- (1) removing China from the SIOP; (2) potential asymmetries in population fatalities; targeting leadership and the

control apparatus; targeting to regionalize the Soviet Union; (3) economic targeting to prolong Soviet recovery vs. targeting war supporting industry and the broad industrial base upon which Soviet post-war power might depend; (4) the requirements for time-urgent and non-time-urgent hard-target kill capability; (5) launch under attack; (6) the impact of our targeting policy upon our European Allies; (7) implications of any changes in employment policy on declaratory policy; (8) implications of employment policy changes for acquisition policy. (TS)

The Chairman noted the group's apparent agreement that increased flexibility and endurance for our strategic forces are desirable. It was also noted that the specific purposes of increased flexibility will be discussed in the next meetings. (TS)

The Chairman asked DOD to prepare issue papers on each of the above eight topics. These papers will be the basis for the next meetings and, given their sensitivity, will be handled in such a way as to insure the minimum possible distribution. (S)

Finally, DOD suggested that the group receive briefings on four topics: (1) the SIOP, (2) the RISOP, (3) C³ connectivity, and (4) the M-X. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Employment Policy
and Related Issues (U)

In Wednesday's SCC on strategic forces employment policy, we agreed that the next meetings on this general topic should be based on issue papers on the following specific topics: (1) removing China from the SIOP, (2) potential asymmetries in population fatalities; targeting leadership and the control apparatus; targeting to regionalize the Soviet Union; (3) economic targeting to prolong Soviet recovery vs. targeting war supporting industry and the broad industrial base upon which Soviet post-war power would depend; (4) the requirements for time-urgent and non-time-urgent hard-target kill capabilities; (5) launch under attack; (6) the impact of our targeting policy upon our European Allies; (7) implications of any changes in employment policy on declaratory policy; and (8) implications of employment policy changes for acquisition policy. (TS)

I suggest that we plan on discussing the first three of these topics in the next meeting and time permitting, begin discussion of the fourth. (U)

You might also begin thinking about developing two additional papers for SCC discussion -- one on targeting moving Soviet forces, and one on the requirements for a secure reserve force and its supporting C³I. (TS)

Finally, while it is clearly appropriate for DOD to draft these papers, I would like our staffs to cooperate in their preparation, particularly with respect to framing the questions that should be discussed under each of the above topics. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 5, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: VIC UTGOFF *VU*

SUBJECT: SCC on Strategic Forces Employment Policy (U)

In preparing the attached material I noted that two issues were not explicitly identified for discussion in the next SCC meetings on this general topic:

- Targeting moving general purpose Soviet forces (which is the most important flexibility issue); and
- Secure reserve force/C³I requirements (which is probably the most important endurance issue and could have some significant implications for acquisition policy). (TS)

The PD that is written at the end of this process should include guidance on both these issues. In light of this I have added a paragraph to the memo at Tab B suggesting that Harold start thinking about preparing background papers on these issues as well. At Tab C are my detailed notes on the meeting. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A. (U)

That you sign and forward the memo at Tab B. (U)

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