SECRET/EYES ONLY November 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: LTBT Violations by Soviets

Attached (Tab A) is a memo from Fred Ikle proposing that you sign a first person protest to Dobrynin complaining of LTBT violations resulting from two recent high yield (3.8 and 2 MT) nuclear explosions.

The US has since 1963 protested 19 previous violations at the Assistant Secretary level without any noticeable impact on Soviet practices. The standard Soviet response is that they "are taking measures directed at fulfillment" of the LTBT.

A factor arguing against escalating this action to the first-person level is that over the past three years seven of the nine ventings have involved nuclear yields far above the 150 KT ceiling of the TTBT. Thus, if the PNE talks succeed and if the TTBT goes into effect next March 31, the USSR's apparent inability to adequately contain these high yield tests (or their unwillingness to go to the trouble to do so) will be of historic interest only. While there are likely to be continuing problems in relation to excavation PNEs these bear little relationship to the megaton-class weapon tests which are at issue here.

However, the latest satellite coverage indicates that the Soviets are prepared to detonate a group of four excavation explosions as part of the Kama-Pechora canal project. A co-located identical group in 1971, while of low yield, resulted in a venting which we protested. Since we are insisting in the PNE negotiations that any PNE agreement must be consistent with the LTBT, the impending canal event could undercut our position during ratification.

On the other hand, it will be difficult at this stage of the negotiations to tell the Soviets that they must forego excavation shots under the new agreement, since our position has implicitly accepted these.

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RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you authorize me to call in Dobrynin in your name while you are in China and deliver to him the first person note from you, in order that our position on the LTBTC will be clear. I would not refer to the impending excavation salvo.

John Marcum of the NSC staff concurs.

Approve _______ Disapprove [X]

[Handwritten note: Do not send it. Shy head.]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Proposed Note to Soviets Re Limited Test
Ban Treaty (LTBT) Compliance

Attached (Tab A) is the text of a proposed demarche to
the Soviet Union concerning detection by the US of radioactive
debris beyond USSR territorial borders unambiguously attri-
butable to three recent Soviet shots at Novaya Zemlya: a 2 MT
nuclear explosion on August 23, 1975; a 3.8 MT nuclear
explosion on 18 October; and a 2 MT nuclear explosion on
21 October.

These ventings are particularly serious because they not
only follow hard on a recent unsatisfactory exchange with the
Soviets over similar violations of the LTBT (reflected in
Tab A), but also appear to reflect a continuing Soviet disregard
for the LTBT at a time when the US has taken a firm position
that the PNE Treaty being negotiated to implement the TTBT
must be consistent with the LTBT.

No US nuclear explosion has produced radioactive debris
detectable beyond US borders since December, 1970. By contrast,
the Soviets have detonated 13 such explosions since then. If
the US Government now fails to express forcefully to the Soviets
its views on these latest violations, the Soviets may assume
we are revising our position on firm adherence to the LTBT,
and conclude we may be willing to acquiesce in a practice
which implies a unilateral Soviet reinterpretation of that
Treaty.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you convey our concern about these most recent
Soviet ventings to Ambassador Dobrynin, preferably by means of
a first-person note, rather than through a third-person note
as we have done in the past, in order to stress the importance
we attach to the matter; alternatively, the first-person note
could be signed by Assistant Secretary Hartman.

EUR and ERDA concur in this recommendation. PM, INR and the NSC staff would prefer you to approve a third-person note incorporating the substantive language proposed at Tab A.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt concurs in the submission of this question to you for decision.

Fred C. Ikle

Approve first-person note; your signature should be inscribed on page 2

Approve first-person note, to be signed by Mr. Hartman

Approve third-person note, to be initialled and handed over by Mr. Hartman
SECRET

Excellency:

I have the honor to remind you of the continuing importance attached by the Government of the United States to the full compliance by the Government of the Soviet Union with the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963.

In this connection I wish to call to your attention the collection by the Government of the United States outside the borders of the Soviet Union of radioactive debris directly associated with the Soviet nuclear explosions of August 23, October 18 and October 21, 1975. The Government of the United States is deeply concerned by these occurrences, which are inconsistent with the terms of the 1963 Treaty of Moscow.

The United States Government has on a number of occasions since 1963 communicated to the Government of the Soviet Union its views concerning 19 previous nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union which have similarly caused radioactive debris to be present in the atmosphere outside the territory of the Soviet Union. As recently as March 12, 1975, the Soviet Union

His Excellency

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
SECRET

orally replied to the latest United States communication on this subject, the Note Verbale of January 16, 1975, and stated, "Appropriate Soviet authorities were and are taking the measures directed at the fulfillment of the requirements of the stated Treaty." On June 6, 1975, the United States Government informed the Government of the Soviet Union that this oral Soviet response did not offer sufficient reassurance. To this, your government replied on July 7, 1975 that nothing would be added to the Soviet reply of March 12, 1975.

I wish to state the expectation of the United States Government that the Government of the Soviet Union, as an original party to the Moscow Treaty, will succeed in fulfilling these Treaty requirements. I am of the view that full compliance with the terms of the 1963 Treaty of Moscow by all parties is of vital importance, not only for preserving the integrity and effectiveness of this Treaty but also for the development between the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union of the mutual confidence necessary to ensure the success of future efforts to regulate nuclear explosions.

I assume that your Government fully shares this view.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.