MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION
May 2, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON
FROM: JOHN MARGUM, VIC UTGOF
SUBJECT: CTB Policy Review

You are scheduled to chair an SCC Subgroup discussion of CTB issues at 10:00 a.m., tomorrow morning, in the Situation Room. Paul Warnke will attend, along with senior-level representatives from the national security agencies. Attached at Tab A is a paper prepared by the Nuclear Testing Working Group which discusses those issues requiring policy decision prior to our working group meeting with the Soviets. As background, I have also attached some relevant correspondence between Harold Agnew and Roger Batzel, the Directors of our nuclear weapons laboratories, with Congressman Kemp (Tab B).

During preparation of the Working Group paper, there was interagency consensus on a number of issues, and it would be useful for you to briefly confirm agreement on these points at your meeting:

-- Duration. The Soviets had proposed an 18-24 month bilateral halt in testing after which time the two sides would be free to resume testing unless France and the PRC had adhered to the agreement. This would place considerable pressure on France and the PRC with no real likelihood of success. There was agreement in the Working Group that a better approach would be to insist on at least a 3-4 year duration and attempt to satisfy the Soviet security concerns vis-a-vis China by providing for a review conference (rather than automatic termination) at the end of that time period.

-- Participation. There is general interagency agreement that we should bring the UK into our negotiations with the Soviets at an early point, and that, following agreement on key elements, the three countries should refer these key elements to the CCD for
negotiation of a multilateral CTB treaty. (Involvement of the CCD is not essential, but could enhance the non-proliferation impact of the treaty.)

-- PNEs. There is also agreement that we should continue to insist that PNEs be banned under the CTB agreement. During the Vance-Gromyko consultations, a Soviet military advisor (Smirnov) suggested that in monitoring PNEs, the US would be permitted extraordinary access, including unscrewing of the implanation canister so that the device itself could be examined. This sort of procedure could be of interest in reducing PNE verification uncertainties by insuring that to the degree possible, both sides share equally in any benefits. However, even if the verification uncertainties could be somewhat reduced, a PNE allowance would seriously undermine the non-proliferation benefits of a CTB, which is the main argument in favor of a treaty.

There are two contentious issues which should be resolved prior to our negotiations with the Soviets. The first is the timing of a cessation in testing. Following his review of the initial draft of the Working Group paper, Harold Brown indicated that he favored delaying a cessation for 18 months in order to accomplish most of our currently planned testing objectives.

Under a CTB, some of these modernization plans could be accomplished by using existing warheads. Others, such as an improved warhead for the M-X, might be dropped, possibly at some expense in consumption of fissile materials. A cessation would also, of course, interrupt Soviet development plans although we have little information on their specific testing objectives.

ERDA supports the Defense position in seeking a delay of cessation, while State and ACDA favor suspension of testing as soon as agreement on key elements can be reached with the Soviets. In our view, a lengthy delay would seem inconsistent with the President's stated objective of an "early and instant" halt in testing and might reduce the non-proliferation impact of a treaty by suggesting that the two Superpowers would not actually stop until all objectives were accomplished.
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