

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

*Ref 18-8 US*

ACTION		
RM/R	REF	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
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NEA	CU	INR
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L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
25		

A-3082

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FOR RM USE ONLY

TO : Department of State  
INFO: Department of Defense

LEGAL ADVISER

JUN 15 1965

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_ SERIES A

DATE: June 10, 1965

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Agreed US/UK Cooperative Arrangements

REF : Deptel 6761, April 28, 1965; A-640, March 17, 1965

FOIA(b)1 AF

Attention: L/T.

The US/UK cooperative arrangements for monitoring the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty were agreed by exchange of letters of June 9, 1965 (Enclosures 1 and 2). Without reference to the foregoing exchange, the Embassy also provided the Foreign Office by note the reaffirmation desired by the British concerning consultation in the event of a suspected breach of the treaty (Enclosure 3).

Enclosures:

1. Letter of June 9, 1965, from the Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary, proposing cooperative arrangements for monitoring the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Two certified copies)
2. Letter of June 9, 1965, from the Foreign Secretary to the Ambassador, confirming agreement to the proposed cooperative arrangements. (Original)
3. Embassy note of June 9, 1965, initialed by the Ambassador, reaffirming the U.S. position on consultation in the event of a suspected breach of the Test Ban Treaty (Two certified copies)
4. Embassy letter to Foreign Office, March 24, 1965.
5. Foreign Office letter to Embassy May 20, 1965. (Original)
6. Embassy letter to Foreign Office, June 2, 1965.

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Declassified  
Authority: 34715  
By: Pam Jabrke Date: 10-12-2010

FORM DS-323

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Drafted by: PM:RVHennes/fdr: June 9, 1965

Contents and Classification Approved by: G.S. [Signature]


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PPC/HDR by: [Signature] 3/16/85  
DEF 39-24

~~SECRET~~Page 2 of Airgram  
No. A-3082LONDON

An earlier exchange of correspondence at the negotiating level served to establish an authoritative interpretation of portions of paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of the text of the cooperative arrangements (Enclosures 4, 5 and 6).

During the discussions with the Foreign Office concerning the procedural formalities of the exchange, Embassy officers were again made aware of the importance the British attached to the reaffirmation that the U.S. Government would immediately consult with Her Majesty's Government at the political level in the event of a suspected breach of the Test Ban Treaty. In this connection the Foreign Office considers the language of the reaffirmation to require immediate consultation by the U.S. Government concerning any and every suspected breach of the treaty, not merely those detected by the network of monitoring stations described in the agreed cooperative arrangements. The language is further taken to refer not only to suspected breaches by the Soviet Union, but also to suspected breaches by any party to the treaty, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

For the Ambassador:



Richard V. Hennes  
First Secretary of Embassy

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~~SECRET~~*Encl. #2*  
Foreign Office,  
S.W.1.

9 June, 1965.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of the 9th of June, 1965, confirming the understanding of the Government of the United States concerning cooperative arrangements to monitor compliance with the Treaty signed at Moscow on the 5th of August, 1963, banning certain nuclear weapon tests, and proposing that such cooperation between our two Governments should now proceed on the basis of the conditions set out

/in

His Excellency  
The Hon. David K.E. Bruce, C.B.E.,  
American Embassy,  
24/32 Grosvenor Square,  
W. 1.

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in your letter and its annexes. I confirm  
that your letter and its annexes represent also  
the understanding of Her Majesty's Government  
in this matter.

I have the honour to be,  
with the highest consideration,  
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

*Michael Stewart*

~~SECRET~~

Encl # 3

June 9, 1965

No. 76


SECRET

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning cooperative arrangements to monitor compliance with the treaty signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963 banning certain nuclear weapon tests, and to propose that such cooperation between our two Governments should now proceed on the basis of the following conditions:

1. 

FOIA(b)1 AF



2. Subject to the ability to make appropriate arrangements with other governments concerned, the Government of the U.K. will establish and operate monitoring ...

The Right Honorable  
Michael Stewart, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W. 1.

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monitoring facilities in the areas listed in Annex A of this letter.

[Redacted]

3. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Each designated operating agency will appoint a representative to the headquarters of the other who will be stationed in close proximity to such headquarters and empowered to represent his agency in technical and management matters.

4. With respect to facilities agreed upon in the areas listed in Annex A the United States Government will at its own expense:

A. [Redacted]

B. [Redacted]

FOIA(b)1 DOE

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interfere

~~SECRET~~

interfere technically with agreed monitoring techniques.

C. [redacted]

[redacted]

FOIA(b)1 AF

D. Provide promptly to the designated operating agency in the United Kingdom [redacted]

[redacted] required by the Government of the United Kingdom.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom will at its own expense:

A. [redacted]

[redacted]

B. Take all steps required to construct and operate the necessary facilities.

C. [redacted]

[redacted]

D. Operate and maintain the technical equipment [redacted]

[redacted]

E. [redacted]

[redacted]

United Kingdom to monitor compliance with the Test Ban Treaty.

6. Subject to political conditions prevailing in the areas concerned outside the U.K., the Government of the U.K. will permit access to the stations [redacted]

[redacted]

7. The U.K. will establish an operational headquarters to control field operations and to collect and analyze...

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and analyse data.

[Redacted]

8. Operation of the monitoring systems will be supported by continuing research and development programs directed towards improving the effectiveness of the monitoring systems.

FOIA(b)1 AF

[Redacted]

9.

[Redacted]

10. It is understood that the scale of the activities of each Government pursuant to these arrangements will be subject to the availability of funds.

11. Technical and administrative implementation of the terms set out herein will be worked out between the designated operating agencies of the two Governments.

12.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The policy

governing such +..



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-3-

FOIA(b)1 AF

13. Certain additional guidelines concerning security arrangements are set forth in Annex B.
14. The arrangements set forth herein will operate for a period of ten years from the date of confirmation by the Government of the United Kingdom and will continue to operate thereafter subject to termination at one year's notice in writing by either Government.

I have the honor to state that this letter and its Annexes represent the understanding of the Government of the United States as to the arrangements which are to be put in effect. I should be grateful if you would confirm that they represent also the understanding of Her Majesty's Government in this matter.

PM:RVHennes:bjr


5/7/65

(DAVID BRUCE)  
American Ambassador

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ANNEX A  
LIST OF AREAS

1. United Kingdom



FOIA (b) 1 AF

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ANNEX B  
SECURITY

1. [Redacted]

a general statement that there is collaboration in this matter between the United States and United Kingdom Governments will be UNCLASSIFIED.

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2. [Redacted]

3. [Redacted]

4. [Redacted]

5. The fact that a particular United Kingdom station is monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty may be classified or unclassified at United Kingdom discretion.

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No. 77

In response to the request of Her Majesty's Government, the Embassy reaffirms that in the event of a suspected breach of the Test Ban Treaty, the United States Government will immediately consult at the political level with Her Majesty's Government among other governments to consider what action should be taken, if any.

(DAVID BRUCE)  
American Ambassador

Foreign Office,

Whitehall,

London, S.W. 1.

RVHennes/ldr

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure No. 4 to Airgram  
No. A-308 LONDON

London, W. 1.  
March 24, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Dear Bryan:

We have now heard from our authorities in Washington concerning the changes you proposed last month in the current version of proposed cooperative arrangements for monitoring the nuclear test ban treaty. Your amendments to paragraph 1, second sentence, Annex A and Annex B were found acceptable.

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b)1 AF

[REDACTED] that the decision on this primarily technical matter will be mutually agreed by the designated operating agencies, and that the U.K. designated operating agency intends to agree to the arrangement now in effect as soon as the over-all agreement is concluded.

With regard to paragraph 12, second sentence, the following compromise wording is proposed: "The policy governing such disclosures will be mutually agreed between the designated operating agencies in advance of U.K. negotiations with the host countries concerned."

There are three points at issue in this revised wording:

1. The phrase "policy governing such disclosures" is acceptable if accompanied by your written confirmation that the agreed disclosure policy in any case should include a statement of the information which can be disclosed to various classes of persons or levels of the government concerned. Within such a policy, we would understand that disclosures to individuals would be at the discretion of the British officials conducting the negotiations.

[REDACTED]

H. B. Shepherd, Esq., T.D.  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W. 1.

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-2-

FOIA(b)1 AF

2. We continue to favor agreement on disclosure policies at the operating agency level not because the question is unimportant.

[redacted] if agreement cannot be reached by the operating agencies or if either government considers that a higher level of decision is warranted, the latter option is always available.

3. We would interpret your words "in advance of" instead of our formulation "in each case prior to," equally to permit separate consideration being given to disclosure policy for each country, since the agreed guidelines on disclosure are likely to vary somewhat in individual cases. Whether such separate consideration takes place at one or at several meetings is not material.

Should you find the foregoing acceptable, this office will be prepared to correlate texts with a view toward your presenting the agreed arrangement for Ministerial approval.

Sincerely yours,

Richard V. Hennes  
First Secretary of Embassy

~~SECRET~~Enclosure No. 5 to  
Airgram No. A-3062 LONDON

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, E.W.1.

IAN 10110

20 May, 1965.

*Dear Hennes,*

Since your letter of 24 March, we have several times discussed the proposed arrangements for monitoring the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and have agreed on the final texts of the draft letter and note from your Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary. I hope that final approval by our ministers will not be long delayed.

2. In response to the first numbered paragraph in your letter to me of 24 March, I can now confirm that it is our understanding that the agreed disclosure policy in any case should include a statement of the information which can be disclosed to those in the host country directly concerned with the negotiations for, or operation of, the monitoring system and that, within the framework of such a policy, disclosures to individuals would be at the discretion of the British officials concerned.

FOIA(b)1 AF

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I would be grateful if you could confirm this in your reply.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*H.B. Shepherd.*

(H.B. Shepherd)

Mr. R.V. Hennes,  
Embassy of the United States of America,  
LONDON, W.1.

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure No. 6 to Airgram No. A-3082  
LONDON

London, W. 1.  
June 2, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Dear Bryant:

Thank you for your letter of May 20 and for confirming in its second paragraph the understanding concerning disclosure policy in the context of paragraph 12 of the proposed cooperative arrangements for monitoring the nuclear test ban treaty.

In connection with paragraph 8 of the proposed arrangements, I have been authorized to reaffirm that the provision for full exchange of information [redacted]

[redacted] would in no way limit exchanges under other arrangements of research and development information between the A.M.R.E. and any other U.S. agency.

Sincerely yours,

FOIA(b)1 AF

Richard V. Hennes  
First Secretary of Embassy

H. E. Shepherd, Esq., T.D.,  
Assistant for Disarmament,  
Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W. 1.

PM:RVHennes:bjr

6/2/65

PM - George S. Newman

BBT:al 6761

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