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JCSM-831-62
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EO25X6 Joint Chiefs


OFF SECY OF DEFENSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continues
Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine (U)

1. As the President indicated in his speech, the quarantine of Cuba is the initial step in obtaining the withdrawal or removal of offensive missiles. He further stated that additional action would be forthcoming if the situation indicated such to be appropriate to accomplish these objectives.

2. Experience has shown that positive action pulls our Allies with us, whereas inaction results in doubt as to our resolve. Announcement of additional steps to increase the pressure is urgently required to demonstrate not only to the USSR and Cuba, but also to our Allies, that the United States is moving forward, as the President emphasized, to accomplish all the steps outlined in his message of 22 October 1962. The United States has the advantage now as the result of our forceful action, but the momentum of that advantage must be maintained by application of additional force at timely intervals.

3. A series of direct and indirect actions against Cuba in the event that the President's objectives are not achieved in a timely manner and Soviet offensive weapons are not eliminated are discussed below. Also,



4. Indirect Actions. The following actions should be considered for adoption in order to maintain the initiative and put increasing pressure on Cuba to remove voluntarily their existing offensive weapons capability:

Declassified Authority: 26942 By: Dorothy Johnson Date: 06-27-2013

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a. Intensify efforts to extend denial of landing and overflight rights to planes en route to Cuba.

Pros -

- Denies USSR air transport to Cuba
- Involves no serious risk of shooting incidents

Cons -

- Fails to force removal of offensive weapons
- Fails to remove Castro government

b. OAS continue to demand that Castro destroy or remove from the hemisphere all offensive nuclear weapon capability and submit to inspection and verification by OAS.

Pros -

- No further heightening of tensions
- Achieves US objective if accepted

Cons -


- Fails to remove Castro government and so does not eliminate possibility of reintroduction of weapons

c. OAS request United States, as an agent of the OAS, to continue surveillance of Cuba to help OAS evaluate the threat. Pilots of other members of OAS to participate as practicable and planes to be clearly marked and identified as being OAS planes.

Pros -

- Maintains essential flow of intelligence on Cuban progress at missile sites under auspices of international body
- Provides intelligence required for execution of all contingency plans
- Maintains pressure on Cuba through continuing show of force


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Cons -

- Fails to remove offensive weapons or Castro government

5. Provocative Actions



Preliminary to any air strike or invasion, certain tasks must be performed for operational reasons. These include photo missions, air reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures, among others. The very nature of these operations can make them provocative, and they serve a dual purpose. It should be noted that all of the direct or indirect actions listed in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein result in one degree of provocation or another.

Examples of provocative actions are listed below, generally in descending order of semblance of legality:

a. Constant, round-the-clock air photo missions at high, medium, and low altitude, accompanied at night with many flares.

b. Destroyer patrols constantly around the islands. Cruiser patrols directly off Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other selected



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[REDACTED]

d. Off-shore patrol ships conduct gun-firing exercises firing parallel to the shoreline. At night, conduct exercises using illuminating projectiles with illumination to be concentrated off cities and harbors.

e. If KOMAR or PT approach off-shore patrol ships day or night, take provocative action to confuse crews.

[REDACTED]

g. From time-to-time bring a major carrier task group within easy view of large coastal cities. Conduct flight operations.

h. Conduct flight operations (carrier or shore-based fighters) to confuse Cuban radar sites and create command uncertainty. Conduct mixed high-level to low-level, low-level to high-level

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[Redacted]

m. Drop "Snake" fire-fighter simulators outside military installation and cities.

n. Make intercepts on Cuban military aircraft outside Cuban territorial air space.

[Redacted]

p. Put agents ashore to start uprisings against the Castro regime.

q. Publicly announce concern over pollution of the Guantanamo water supply and send a military force into Cuban territory to check and protect the reservoir.

[Redacted]

6. Direct Actions

a. Aerial Reconnaissance over Cuba

(1) Day and night flights at irregular hours and at different altitudes.

(2) Fighter sweeps over Cuba in large numbers to show our determination and to bring home the "facts of life" to Cubans about their insecure position.

Pros -

- Will increase photo coverage necessary to intelligence community and President.
- Fighter sweeps will be a demoralizing factor to the populace.

Cons -

- Could provoke counter sweeps over US territory or sneak attack on US installations or cities. (This, however, has added provocative benefits.)

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Pros -

- Directly affects the missile that we wish to eliminate.
- Capitalizes on assets available.

Cons -

- Possible compromise of operations.

c. Add POL to the prohibited list

Pros -

- Will drastically reduce the military effort and bring the economy to a halt and create wide-spread political instability.
- Will put great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- United States would eventually be subject to criticism for humanitarian reasons.

d. If total POL blockade is not considered desirable at this time, a blockade against jet fuel could be imposed

Pros -

- Will eventually bring military effort to a halt.
- Does not expose the United States to criticism on humanitarian grounds.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be eliminated for a long time.

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e. Total Sea Blockade

Pros -

- Further build-up prevented.
- Will bring economy to a halt and exert great pressure on Castro to dismantle missile bases.
- Much easier to enforce than partial blockade.

Cons -

- Missiles will not be immediately eliminated.
- United States would be subject to criticism because of humanitarian aspects.

f. Air Blockade

- (1) Administrative harassment
- (2) Air defense harassment
- (3) Denial of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of US territorial waters and air space
- (4) Seizure and destruction of Bloc aircraft within 50 miles of the United States and Cuba

Pros -

- Steps up the blockade effort to maintain initiative.

Cons -

- The Berlin air corridors will be vulnerable for retaliation.

g. Offensive Strikes. Selective strike on 11 MRBM missile sites and jet fields (Reference Appendix B).

Pros -

- If completely successful, will eliminate known MRBM missile threat.

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- Could result in Cuban uprising and possible overthrow of Castro government.
- Demonstrates that the United States is withholding all out action against Cuba in favor of elimination of immediate nuclear threat only.

Cons -

- Heightens tensions and could result in escalation.
 - Subjects the United States to criticism for humanitarian reasons as well as for aggression.
 - Will not immediately solve the problem or immediately eliminate communism from Cuba.
-

h. Full Invasion

Pros -

- Definitely removes the offensive threat.
- Eliminates the Castro government.
- Removes Soviet influence in Cuba.
- Indicates to OAS and to NATO the will of the United States to protect the Free World from Communist aggression.

Cons -

- Heightens risk of general war.
- Castro may launch any offensive weapons not neutralized in initial air strikes.
- Opens the United States to charges of aggression in world opinion. However, opportunity for the United States to set up a model government and a viable economy should counter this in the long run.

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7. Although direct and indirect provocative actions are provided giving a wide range of choice, direct action to eliminate the offensive weapons threat provides the greatest promise of achieving the US objective for Cuba. Paragraph 2, Annex A of SNIE 11-18-62, dated 19 October 1962, "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," fully supports this view. It indicates that the USSR reaction would be approximately the same regardless of the scale of direct military action. All things considered, it appears at this time that the only direct action which will surely eliminate the offensive weapons threat is air attack followed by invasion and is, in the long run, the best course of action.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

APPENDIX A

EXPANDED EVALUATION OF COURSES OF ACTION PROPOSED IN THE
BASIC PAPER TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR CONSIDERATION


1. <u>Indirect Actions</u>	1
a. <u>Intensify Efforts to Extend Denial of Landing and Overflight Rights to Planes Enroute to Cuba</u>	2
<u>Advantages</u>	3
- With a minimum of effort this will deny entry of air-	4
craft into Cuba except from bases within aircraft range and	5
in countries friendly to Cuba.	6
- Avoids necessity of halting aircraft by force with the	7
attendant risks.	8
<u>Disadvantages</u>	9
- Fails to provide for removal of existing threat or	10
hostile Castro government.	11
- Dependent upon cooperation of many Allies.	12
b. <u>OAS or US Demand Castro Destroy or Remove From the</u>	13
<u>Hemisphere all Offensive Weapons and Submit to Inspection</u>	14
<u>and Verification by OAS</u>	15
<u>Advantages</u>	16
- Avoids further heightening of tensions and dangers of	17
escalation.	18
- If successful, achieves objective of obtaining removal	19
of offensive weapons.	20
<u>Disadvantages</u>	21
- Fails to remove hostile Castro government.	22
- Enforcement in sufficient degree to prevent clandestine	23
reintroduction of offensive weapons would be difficult.	24
c. <u>As a Follow-on to a Above, OAS to Request US as an</u>	25
<u>Agent of the OAS, to Continue Surveillance of Cuba to Help</u>	26
<u>OAS Evaluate the Threat</u>	27
<u>Advantages</u>	28
- Improves effectiveness of OAS inspection.	29
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- Provides a basis for expanded US intelligence on Cuba. 1
 - Continuous presence of US aircraft over Cuba would 2
- demonstrate US power and so discourage Cuban efforts at 3
- rearming. 4

Disadvantages 5

- Same as in b above. 6



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2. Direct Actions

a. INCREASE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER CUBA TO INCLUDE DAY AND NIGHT FLIGHTS AT IRREGULAR HOURS, VARYING ALTITUDES, AND FLUCTUATING NUMBERS.

Advantages:

- Provide best possible information on activities in Cuba concerning any increase or decrease in offensive weapons, as well as intelligence in general.
- Continuing flights should clearly demonstrate US capability and determination, encourage dissident reaction in Cuba and demoralize the segment of the population loyal to Castro.

Disadvantages:

- Could provoke Cuban or USSR reaction against the aircraft, attacks on US mainland, or increased pressure elsewhere in the world.

b. Expansion of current Blockade to Include POL

Advantages:

- Could eventually be effective enough to degrade significantly the offensive military threat in Cuba.
- Would prevent the increase in POL supply stocks over that currently available.
- Would eventually bring on the economic collapse of Cuba and the attendant fall of the Castro government.
- Would generate unrest in general in Cuba through effects on economy and the people.
- Could cause Castro to consider removal of the offensive weapons.
- Demonstrates US restraint in avoiding direct attack on Cuba.

- Disadvantages 1
- Fails to remove offensive threat to US expeditiously 2
- Would produce effects sufficiently severe to encourage 3
encourage serious retaliatory measures by USSR and/or 4
Cuba. 5
- Directly affects Cuban people through impact on 6
economy, making US more vulnerable to condemnation. 7
- Fails to insure removal of the hostile communist- 8
controlled government from Cuba. 9
- Requires indefinite continuation of blockade until such 10
time as Castro regime eliminated and Soviet influence 11
removed. 12
- c. EXPANDING EXISTING BLOCKADE TO INCLUDE ONLY FUELS 13
FOR AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES. 14

- Advantages 15
- Avoids impact on Cuban economy and people and the 16
resulting criticism of US. 17
- Prevents increasing stocks of these fuels for Cuba's 18
offensive weapons. 19
- Demonstrates US restraint and effort to avoid outright 20
conflict. 21

- Disadvantages 22
- Fails to eliminate current offensive threat 23
- Does not contribute to anti-Castro efforts in Cuba 24

d. Complete Sea Blockade of all Imports 1

Advantages 2

 - Would lead to economic collapse of Cuba. 3

 - Avoids direct attack on Cuba with its attendant 4
casualties and damage. 5

 - Demonstrates US restraint and avoidance of war. 6

 - Provides environment for further negotiations for 7
removal of offensive weapons. 8

Disadvantages 9

 - Fails to eliminate existing offensive weapon threat 10
in time available. 11

 - Perpetuates tension and promotes incidents which 12
could provide the basis for expanding into war. 13

 - Complete blockage affects Cuban people directly 14
rather than being limited principally to the military, 15
making US more vulnerable to condemnation. 16

 - Even if blockade should result in successful 17
negotiations it would leave a hostile communist-controlled 18
Cuba to continue to threaten Western Hemisphere and 19
would not insure against introduction of offensive 20
weapons into Cuba. 21

 - Ties up US forces for an indefinite period. 22

e. Extending Blockade to Prevent Entry into and Departure 23
of Aircraft from Cuba 24

Advantages 25

 - Complements sea blockade by preventing introduction 26
of important cargo by air. 27

 - Eliminates communication through aerial flights be- 28
tween Cuba and the rest of the world. 29

 - Provides further harassment which might encourage 30
Castro to consider removal of offensive weapons. 31

Disadvantages

- Might provoke similar USSR reaction elsewhere, e.g., Berlin. 1
- Provides basis for incidents which might escalate to war. 2
- Not a decisive step in the elimination of the Cuban threat or the Castro government. 3
- Would be of indefinite duration. 4

F. Air Strikes Against All Offensive Weapons Systems, Missiles and Combat Aircraft, as well as Related Air Defense Systems as necessary 5

Advantages

- Eliminates immediate threat and so accomplishes stated objective. 6
- Minimizes risks of Cuban attacks on the United States or Allies since entire offensive system is destroyed. 7

Disadvantages

- Leaves Cuba in the hands of a hostile communist regime which will remain a threat to the Western Hemisphere. 8
- Requires a continuing blockade or similar surveillance system capable of preventing the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. 9
- Entails essentially the same risks of escalation as an all-out invasion with less promise of achievement of lasting results. 10

G. All-Out Invasion of Cuba

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Advantages

- Achieves US stated objective (eliminates missiles and sites, combat aircraft and the Castro regime from the Western Hemisphere).

- Confidence in US determination to take all necessary actions to remove threats to the Free World will be materially enhanced with beneficial effects on our Allies and nonaligned nations.

- The communist threat in Latin America would be considerably weakened.

- Re-establishment of Cuba as a free and independent nation with a viable economy will erase in the long run early criticism of US military actions.

Disadvantages

- Belated recourse to this course of action would reduce its effectiveness.

- The United States might be denounced as an aggressor in the United Nations.

- Soviets could cause violent reactions in Berlin against US interests throughout the world.

- Could lead to general war if the Soviets miscalculated US intentions and determinations.

- World opinion could go against the US instigated by Soviet propaganda media.

- Greater likelihood of Cuban attempts to launch offensive missiles as an act of desperation. This would probably require Soviet acquiescence which is doubtful in view of the Presidential warning.

3. Additional courses of action are covered below. Any or
all of these can be taken concurrently with any action directly
concerned with Cuba. Each is designed to pose the Soviets with
a problem of how to proceed, always indicating to the Soviets
the choice of removing the offensive weapons from Cuba is the
quickest way to remove the irritation.

a. Closing US Ports and Airfields to Soviet Ships and

Aircraft:


Advantages

- Restricts Soviet freedom of movement.
- Restricts Soviet trade.
- Reduces Soviet intelligence opportunities.
- Reduces the danger of Soviet covert attack.

Disadvantages

- Reduces communications and contact between the US
and USSR.

EO25X6 Joint Chiefs - Reduces US/USSR trade and forces USSR to trade
elsewhere.



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c. Political Action. Set up Cuban government in exile -- 1
support representation in United Nations and in Organization 2
of American States. 3

Advantages 4

- A focal point for Cuban patriots. 5
- A competitive device to undermine Castro. 6
- An available organization to control Cuba in the 7
advent of invasion or revolution. 8

Disadvantages 9

- May prove to be a liability if a more favorable 10
government is formed. 11
- May prove difficult to manage, or impede some US 12
action. 13

d. Economic Action. Implement a master offensive 14
economic plan with the primary objective of sharply 15
reducing the flow of industrial, agricultural and military 16
material reaching the USSR and its satellites. Concurrently, 17
take action to reduce selected imports from the USSR. 18

Advantages 19

- May reduce the economic stability of the USSR. 20
- Could divert critical USSR resources to undesirable 21
channels. 22
- Would restrict flow of material required to sustain 23
USSR defense effort. 24

Disadvantages 25

- Adverse reaction from Allied nations. 26
- Heavier load on US resources to fill vacuum. 27
- Success depends on Allied cooperation. 28

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APPENDIX B

SCENARIO OF LIMITED ATTACK ON IREM SITES AND JET FIELDS

A. Factual Background.

The IREM sites and associated nuclear storage facilities are still under construction and do not constitute a present threat. The present offensive threat appears to be concentrated in the six MREM areas and the five jet fields available to the IL28's and MIG's

An air attack concentrated on these 11 targets, plus defense suppression including the 8 SAM sites immediately protecting these eleven targets, should therefore deal with the heart of the present offensive threat.

Because of the impossibility of assuring night time surveillance, adequate force to assure disabling of all offensive systems in the eleven target areas during the initial attack should be provided.

What is under discussion in this paper is, therefore, a one day attack on eleven target areas, accompanied by necessary defense suppression. Such an attack might involve approximately 250 sorties.

B. The Problem

To analyze the actions which should have preceded such an attack.

C. Assumptions

It is assumed that:

a. The Soviet Union has vetoed the U.S. resolution in the Security Council.

b. We have no evidence that removal or dismantling of existing offensive systems has begun.

D. Possible Courses of Action

a. To enhance public and Allied understanding and to increase political acceptability of program.

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Appendix B

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- 1. Publication of progressive series of low level photographs demonstrating continued work or, at minimum, lack of action to remove. 1-3
 - 2. High level statements reiterating President's pledge that offensive threat must be removed, emphasizing determination to see this done. 4-6
 - 3. Warnings to workers to leave areas. 7
 - 4. Intensive explanation to Allies of extent of threat to base of their security that NREM's pose, and inform them of our intended action at earliest time consistent with security. 8-11
- b. Possible incidents which could be provoked to add to justification of program. 12-13
-
- It is important to distinguish between incidents involving the Soviets directly and unambiguously and those which the Soviets might assert involved the Cubans alone. 14-16
- Search and seizure of Soviet ships at sea, or forcing a Soviet submarine to surface might create incidents of the first class. 17-19
- Those in the second class include: 20
- 1. Extension of surveillance to middle altitude as well, as high and low altitude, increased frequency. 21-22
 - 2. Provocative action by either drone or manned planes or helicopters. 23
 - 3. Provocative raid on Komar's either for close photography, examination, or disarming. 24
 - 4. Patrol from Guantanamo base to check water supply. 25
- c. Expected effectiveness. 26

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The attack would damage and destroy virtually all of those MREM's and jet aircraft located at the target areas. This will include a large proportion and maybe all of these vehicles now operational in Cuba. Some may now be concealed or may be moved and concealed between today and the time of attack.

Extensive surveillance at all altitudes would therefore seem to be indicated for three reasons:

1. It will minimize the chance of undiscovered weapons being operational.
2. It will contribute a pattern of activity that will act as a cover for the actual attack.
3. It might provoke an incident adding justification to the attack.

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Appendix B