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AUGUST 1962

IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY:
A BRIEFING (U)

R. L. Blachly, L. Gouré, S. T. Hosmer, A. L. Hsieh,
B. F. Jaeger, P. F. Langer and M. G. Weiner

PREPARED FOR:

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is the text of a briefing of the RAND study, Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability, undertaken at the request of Headquarters, United States Air Force. The briefing was presented during June, 1962, to Hq USAF Directorate of Plans and the Air Force Advisory Group for The RAND Corporation by Col. R. L. Blachly, project leader, and to Hq PACAF by M. G. Weiner, project co-leader. The briefing is a condensation of material being prepared for a forthcoming RAND Memorandum that is to be the major, integrated report on the study.

Project research includes the following supporting studies on political, military, technical, and economic aspects of the development of a nuclear-armed China over the next ten years:

I. Political Studies

- A Nuclear Force, and Chinese Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy
- Japanese Reactions
- Indian Reactions
- Other Asian Nations' Reactions
- Sino-Soviet Relations
- Disarmament and Chinese Strategy

II. Military Studies

- Pacific Force Postures; 1962-1970
- Analysis of Possible Nuclear Campaigns against China

III. Technical Studies

- Analyses of Chinese Weapon Development
- Analyses of Chinese Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

IV. Economic Studies

- Chinese Industrial-technical Capabilities
- Chinese Petroleum Program
- Simplified Cost/effectiveness Comparisons of Nuclear Delivery Alternatives

Several RAND Memoranda that document the supporting research are in preparation.*

* Already published by A. L. Hsieh, Some Thoughts on Communist China's Exploitation of a Nuclear Detonation (U), The RAND Corporation, RM-3128-PR, May, 1962 (Confidential).

SUMMARY

This Memorandum reports a briefing that considers major military and political consequences and problems arising from Communist China's anticipated attainment of a modest nuclear capability.

A nuclear-armed China will pose a substantially broader spectrum of challenges to the U.S. position in Asia than she has to date. However, Chinese policy is likely to continue to be cautious and rational and to seek gains by exploiting those opportunities that represent acceptable levels of risk.

Examination of several possible nuclear and non-nuclear campaigns indicates that actions that provoke a major U.S. response represent high risks to the Chinese.

A deliberate confrontation by the Chinese of U.S. power during this period is unlikely without support from the Soviet Union. However, our analyses indicate that China cannot rely on more than ambiguous, low level support from the Soviet Union for Chinese offensive use of military power, unless U.S. retaliatory capability is clearly inadequate, the survival of the Communist regime in China is at stake, or the Soviet Union believes herself to be threatened.

China's emergence as a nuclear power will adversely affect U.S. alliances and military posture in Asia, and will generate pressures on U.S. freedom of action in the area. Peiping is most likely to exploit her opportunities through political and low level military actions.

To meet the direct challenges and to counter the wide range of repercussions in Asia, the United States must make credible this

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nation's willingness and capability to oppose effectively all Chinese aggressive action. This implies that the United States requires an improved, flexible posture strengthened by fast-reacting nuclear and non-nuclear delivery and support systems within the theater.

The study suggests that a significant contribution to U.S. strategy would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of U.S. nuclear forces explicitly targeted for China and capable of flexible and selective employment against a wide range of Chinese aggressive actions.

Such a force would present an identifiable deterrent to Chinese aggression without reducing U.S. deterrence of the Soviet Union, minimize the risk of Soviet intervention resulting from misinterpretation of U.S. intentions, and strengthen Asian confidence and will to resist.

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I. COMMUNIST CHINESE STRATEGY

Communist China represents a growing threat to the United States in the Pacific. The threat is military, political, and economic. To understand its nature we turn first to Communist Chinese objectives in the area, and to the manner in which they may try to achieve these objectives.

For the past 12 years, Communist China's foreign and military policies have been directed at three major objectives--the achievement of leadership in Asia, the attainment of a great power status, and the acceleration of the Communist movement with the enhancement of China's role in that movement. The Chinese have used a range of political, psychological, economic, cultural, and military techniques in implementing these objectives. Wherever possible, they have suited the means to their long-term goals. In doing so, they have used military force or the threat of force as one technique. With the attainment of a nuclear capability, the prospect of the further use of force is increased.

How this force will be used depends on many things. Of critical importance will be Chinese estimates of U.S. power and intentions in the area. Of equal importance will be the way in which they calculate the support that they will receive from the Soviet Union. In addition Chinese actions will be influenced by the military doctrine they have developed over the years and upon the opportunities available to implement this doctrine.

One widespread image of the Chinese use of force is that they are both inexperienced and reckless and that these factors in the

nuclear age could be catastrophic. Our analysis of Chinese actions indicates that this image is not consistent with actual Chinese behavior. Their doctrine recognizes force as only one of the instruments of policy. It is not the final resort when all political means fail, but only one of the tools of the political struggle.

Despite many of their public statements, they have shown considerable understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons on their actions. They have openly discussed the implications of nuclear warfare, they have emphasized development of an air defense capability, they have acknowledged the possibility and dangers of escalation, and they have been aware of their dependence on the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

Thus, despite open deprecation of nuclear weapons, Chinese behavior and doctrine place great emphasis on a cautious and rational approach to the use of military force. The difference between Chinese pronouncements, which create the image of a reckless and irresponsible China, and Chinese practice, which is cautious and rational, appears to be motivated by the internal and international value that they derive from creating and maintaining the image.

This does not imply that the Chinese will not resort to force when the opportunity presents itself, but rather that they will use force when the opportunities represent low risk. And they will continue to exploit their military capability at the political and propaganda levels to help create such opportunities.

II. THE SOVIET ROLE

As part of the over-all study, we have attempted to assess the trends in Sino-Soviet relations and to make some estimate of the positions that the Soviets might take in regard to a Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. We appreciate the complexity of these problems and once again we will attempt only a summary of our conclusions to date.

For a long time to come we see the basic factors in Soviet policy consisting of:

- o preservation of the Soviet Union and its political system
- o strengthening of Soviet power and economic well-being
- o preservation of Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement, and
- o preservation of the unity of power of the Communist Bloc

Some of these objectives conflict with Chinese objectives. On the other hand it is apparent that both China and the Soviet Union have certain common objectives and thus considerable interest in preserving some form of unity and cooperation. Although some problems have developed and will continue to influence Sino-Soviet relations, neither power would profit from a complete break.

Sino-Soviet relations are likely to remain in a state of partial and shifting cooperation and rivalry, during which the Soviet Union will give some recognition to China's needs and interests and provide it with low risk assistance and support. The most likely forms of assistance will be political support for certain actions as well as economic and non-nuclear military assistance.

The Soviets are not inclined to welcome China's emergence as a nuclear power since this would lessen China's dependence on the Soviet

Union and would raise China's prestige in the international Communist movement. The Soviets would also be concerned about the danger of any conflict between the Chinese and the United States expanding and involving the Soviet Union, and about the increased ability of the Chinese to blackmail them by threatening to engage in dangerous actions that might lead to major conflict with the United States.

In view of these factors we believe that the Soviets will have little interest in militarily supporting any Chinese attempts to expand by force. It is unlikely that she would provide direct military support for operations against Nationalist China because of her low interest in that area. The Soviet Union is likely to oppose Chinese desires regarding Japan, Indonesia, or India because of major Soviet interest in these countries.

Under any circumstances the Soviets will probably seek to keep any conflict involving China localized and relatively restrained. She would probably attempt to restrain any Chinese initiation of nuclear weapons or the direct threat of initiation. In the event of an attack upon China, the responses of the Soviets would be neither automatic nor predetermined. Despite treaty obligations and public commitments to assist in the defense of China, the nature and scope of the assistance is not defined and will be based strictly on Soviet self-interest. At the same time it should be noted that the actual state of Sino-Soviet relations, while relevant, would probably not be the decisive factor in determining Soviet actions in the event of an attack on Chinese territory. The relative strength of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and the Soviet assessment of U.S. objectives in the area will be decisive factors.

We conclude that the Soviets are not apt to participate directly in low level Chinese operations where the two countries have conflicting objectives or where Soviet interests are very limited. The Soviets are not likely to participate in any high level operations with the Chinese for fear of escalation. The Soviets will attempt to restrain the Chinese from any use of nuclear weapons. And the Soviets are more likely to intervene in a nuclear conflict between the United States and China if:

- o U.S. objectives in such a conflict appear to be the overthrow of the Communist regime in China
- o the United States fails to (or cannot) distinguish between China and the Soviet Union
- o the diversion of U.S. forces to attack China weakens the U.S. deterrent posture against the Soviet Union

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III. MILITARY APPRAISALS

Independent of the degree of Soviet support, we anticipate that the Chinese can threaten the United States and our allies at a number of different levels once they possess a nuclear capability.

The levels can include:

- o Direct military threat of the use of nuclear weapons on the United States or allied countries
- o The threat of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for lower level operations
- o The use of nuclear weapons as part of political propaganda operations

Our study attempts to examine each of these levels in terms of the risk that they represent to the Chinese. Our examinations include analyses of various possible military campaigns* and various possible political exploitations of a nuclear capability.

Based upon intelligence information available to us and upon some estimates of their economic, industrial, and technical capability, we have identified certain trends in Chinese military posture that we believe are plausible and feasible within the next ten years. In brief these include strength adjustments and modernization in the army and navy. For the Chinese Air Force, the total number of aircraft will decrease, with emphasis on improved defensive weapons such as new fighters, air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles of the SA-2 type, and expansion of radar coverage. The total number of light bombers will decrease and considerable emphasis will be placed on improved offensive capabilities such as more medium jet bombers and under appropriate conditions, the development of a medium-range

*The analytic techniques included tactical exercises, two-sided war gaming, and seminar gaming.

nuclear missile capability. Accompanying these developments would be limited numbers of 20- to 200-KT nuclear weapons for bomber and missile delivery.

Using this posture, we have conducted a number of military appraisals to obtain a gross estimate of the outcome of some of the various operations the Chinese would be capable of undertaking against the United States and its allies.

For each of the military campaigns we have chosen a Chinese military capability consistent with a 1966-67 time period. Our choice of this time period and of the particular Chinese military capability should not be regarded as predictions. They were chosen primarily because they appeared to us to provide a representative threat and because information on U.S. programs for this period was available.

The initial case we examined was the capability of programmed theater forces to carry out a nuclear campaign against China following a Chinese first use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan. The objective of the campaign was to destroy the assumed offensive air and missile capability of the Chinese,* which consisted of 36 MREMs located at 12 sites, more than 100 medium jet bombers of the Badger type, and a large number of jet light bombers and jet fighters.

Our investigation indicated that the programmed theater forces would have several difficulties in eliminating the Chinese offensive

* Two major considerations in selecting this counterforce campaign were (1) its tendency to minimize Soviet intervention because the Chinese regime itself was not attacked, and (2) its reduction of Soviet capability for supplying bomber replacements because of damage to Chinese airfields.

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capability. These difficulties included lack of adequate range for deep penetrations, a limited capability to reach the assumed Chinese missile sites before launch, and considerable defense attrition if penetration were made at high altitude.

We therefore found it necessary to augment the programmed theater force with one wing of B-52 aircraft equipped with Hound Dog missiles and one Polaris submarine (SSBN) with 2500-n mi range A-3 missiles. These forces (B-52s and Polaris) are illustrative only; they represent types of weapon capabilities, not preferences for specific systems.

After this assumed augmentation, the United States had theater based tactical fighters and Mace missiles, Seventh Fleet aircraft, B-52s, and Polaris missiles available for the counterforce campaign. Of this force, only B-52s, Polaris missiles, and a portion of the theater based tactical fighters were launched. They attacked all occupied Chinese airfields, all unoccupied airfields with hard-surface runways over 7000 ft long (potential Badger bases), and the MRBMs. Table 1 provides a brief summary of this campaign.

Table 1

CASE I, U.S. NUCLEAR STRIKE FROM UNDAMAGED POSTURE

U.S. Force	Chinese Targets	Chinese Surviving	U.S. Combat Losses
27 B-52	Airfields	Airfields	7 TAC fighters
63 TAC fighters	65 Occupied (200+ jet bombers plus fighters)	5 Occupied (16 Badgers, some fighters)	
16 Mace	21 Unoccupied (runways 7000'+)	2 Unoccupied	
12 (ready) Polaris on 1 SSBN	36 MRBMs (12 sites)		

On the basis of this hypothetical situation, under the conditions we had postulated, we drew the following conclusions:

1. Augmented theater forces have the capability to destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability
2. There are several major deficiencies in Chinese air defense, including early warning and low level coverage, and missile and aircraft defense against low level penetrations
3. U.S. losses in such a campaign would be small
4. The limited Chinese offensive capability remaining does not represent a major threat to our Pacific posture
5. U.S.-augmented theater forces have the capability for a second strike against China. If required, such a strike could be against a selected Chinese industrial-technical target complex or against political control centers

This case demonstrated that any Chinese aggressive behavior that provoked a U.S. nuclear campaign against the mainland with the augmented theater force would result in severe damage for the Chinese, with small losses for the United States. For the Chinese to risk such a response would be inviting disaster.

However, the possession of a nuclear capability provides the Chinese with the option of striking the U.S. forces in the Pacific first. Our second case study examined one possibility of this type. In this situation the same forces were assumed for the Chinese, and the United States was assumed to have augmented its theater posture with the forces previously described, i.e., one wing of B-52 aircraft and one SSBN. In addition, two carriers were added to the Seventh Fleet.

For this situation it was assumed that a high state of tension existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Chinese used this as an opportunity to strike the United States in the Pacific.

The Chinese attack was a combined aircraft and missile attack on U.S. bases in the area, on the Mace installations on Okinawa, and on the Seventh Fleet. Although there are a number of aspects of the attack that are critical to its success, including Chinese capabilities for aerial refueling, undetected penetration of radar nets, accuracy and reliability of Chinese missiles, and ability to locate the Seventh Fleet, such an attack would result in considerable destruction to our Pacific posture although Chinese losses would be high. Table 2 presents a brief summary this campaign.

Table 2
CASE II, CHINESE NUCLEAR ATTACK

Chinese Force	U.S. Targets	U.S. Surviving	Chinese Losses
27 MRBMs	Airfields	10 TAC fighters	51 bombers
68 Badgers	8 PACAF (375 TAC fighters)	8 Mace	
40 Beagles	5 Nationalist China	12 B-52s	
35 fighters	1 Guam (45 B-52s)	2 Carriers ^a (149 attack aircraft survived)	
	32 Mace		
	5 carriers (252 attack aircraft)		
	1 SSBN (not targeted)	1 SSBN (not targeted)	

^aThere was reasonable doubt about the survival of a third carrier

We then examined the ability of the United States to retaliate from this damaged posture. The same Chinese target complex, target priorities, and defense capabilities were used as in the U.S. attack from an undamaged posture. In addition, this case involved some critical assumptions about the ability to coordinate such an operation after the Chinese attack. One of these was that the naval aircraft that had been launched on warning of the Chinese attack would be authorized to proceed to target while their fuel condition permitted. Table 3 presents a summary of this campaign.

Table 3

CASE II, U.S. RETALIATION

U.S. Force	Chinese Targets	Chinese Surviving	U.S. Combat Losses
12 B-52s	Airfields	Airfields	30 Attack aircraft and fighters
10 TAC fighters	65 Occupied & 21 Unoccupied	9 Occupied	3 B-52s
8 Mace	(~ 150 Jet Bombers plus fighters)	6 Unoccupied	3 Mace
131 Navy Attack Aircraft	36 MREMs (12 sites)	16 Badgers	
12 (ready) Polaris	4 picket ships	Many fighters	
		1 MREM site (0-3 MREMs)	

On the basis of this case study, under our postulated conditions, we concluded that:

1. Surviving theater forces would be capable of destroying a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability
2. The surviving Chinese capability would not represent a major threat to the remaining U.S. forces and bases

- 3. U.S. losses to Chinese air defense would be higher than in the attack described earlier because of lack of coordination, and the requirement for multiple target coverage by manned aircraft
- 4. Following such an attack, the United States would not be able to carry out a major second strike with the augmented theater force because most of the missiles would have been expended and manned aircraft could not return to their bases because of range limitations or base destruction

In general, however, U.S. nuclear campaigns against China, with the forces we have assumed, whether from an undamaged or a damaged posture, would present the Chinese with heavy losses. The willingness of the Chinese to accept such losses is not in line with our view of the traditional caution with which they employ military force.

There are, of course, conditions under which such conflicts could develop, including miscalculations, or Chinese willingness to accept higher risks because of internal pressures.

The possession of a nuclear capability provides the Chinese with many other options than direct attack upon the U.S. Pacific posture. We have selected only one of these, a situation in which the Communist Chinese possess nuclear weapons and attempt to employ them as an umbrella while undertaking non-nuclear operations against the Nationalist Chinese.

We selected this situation for a number of reasons. Three of the major reasons were that Nationalist China has been an objective of Communist China for many years, that political factors play a very significant role in such a situation, and that such a situation provides a vehicle for looking at both U.S. and Communist Chinese non-nuclear capability in the period. Once again we will only summarize the results of our study.

We examined three variations of this option--Chinese assault of Big Quemoy, interdiction of Quemoy, and an assault on Taiwan. In each assault case only non-nuclear forces were used with the option of using nuclear weapons available to both sides. The total forces available to the Communist Chinese remained the same, but with greater strength in the Taiwan Strait area.

In addition, Nationalist Chinese forces were augmented by deployment of four USAF and Marine squadrons from Japan to Taiwan, repositioning of the Seventh Fleet, and CASF deployments to the area. A similar augmentation, with B-52s and a Polaris submarine, was undertaken to strengthen the nuclear deterrent.

For the assault on Big Quemoy, we estimated, based on standard Army, Navy, and Air Force planning factors, that the Communist Chinese would have to commit more than 250,000 troops and about 4000 landing craft of various types. They would have to support this force with more than 4000 air sorties against fortifications and artillery emplacements.

Our analysis indicated that an assault on Big Quemoy, even without Nationalist Chinese or U.S. air intervention, would cost the Communist Chinese more than 40,000 men and sizeable amounts of equipment. A determined defense in which the Nationalist Chinese committed their air force to prevent the assault would make the cost much higher. Commitment of U.S. non-nuclear forces would further increase the cost and leave the Communist Chinese only a marginal chance of success.

Such operations would raise a number of political problems regarding Nationalist Chinese-U.S. relations and relations with some of our other allies. There would also be some politico-military

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problems concerning U.S. force deployments in the area. There apparently would be little military benefit to a Chinese initial use of nuclear weapons because of the variety of options available to the United States to respond. It also appears that the United States would not be required to initiate the use of nuclear weapons as long as the situation remained confined to an assault on Big Quemoy; non-nuclear forces seem adequate to make the operation almost prohibitively costly to the Chinese in both men and materiel.

The second possibility, a Communist Chinese attempt to interdict the supplies to Quemoy, was found to be a very unstable situation with numerous options for expanding the war open to the United States and the Nationalist Chinese and to their enemy. It appeared, however, that a determined effort to continue supplying the island could prevent the interdiction attempt from being successful at the military level. During such a period the United States could anticipate considerable pressure from some allies to avoid expanding the conflict and to seek accommodations that would reduce tensions in the area.

The final variation was a Chinese non-nuclear assault on Taiwan. Based on the estimated Chinese force required for the Quemoy operation, it appears that they would have to commit a major portion of their total military force to an assault on Taiwan. Considering the operational difficulties involved in carrying out such an assault against a determined defense, the Communist Chinese would have only a marginal chance of success. Since air operations would be critical to the outcome of the invasion, it appears that a Communist Chinese

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strike against the Nationalist Chinese air bases would be part of the operation. The air strike and invasion attempt would raise the question of U.S. nuclear intervention. Of the various options available to the United States, the use of nuclear weapons on the invasion force, assuming that U.S. timing of the strike was adequate, offered the greatest promise of eliminating the immediate threat and keeping the conflict localized.

Our study of the use of a nuclear capability as an umbrella for aggression against the Nationalist Chinese indicates that the cost of such operations to the enemy would be very high for an attempt against Quemoy or Taiwan and that the commitment of U.S. non-nuclear forces would make them even higher. In view of the military uncertainties of success and the risks involved, it does not appear that possession of a nuclear capability by the Communist Chinese represents a major contribution to military operations against Nationalist China.*

An additional group of case studies dealing with Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia is not yet complete. These cases examine Chinese commitment of ground forces with nuclear support. Up to this time, two points in the analysis are clear:

1. It is difficult to identify situations in which the Chinese could use their nuclear capability in a decisive manner, if the United States chose appropriate responses, and

*The results of our military analyses are generally consistent with earlier RAND studies updated on the basis of technological and posture changes expected for both sides by the late sixties.

2. Non-military factors would be significant in such situations

Our case studies indicate that U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear capability, with some augmentation in the Pacific, can be effective against Chinese high level non-nuclear or nuclear operations. As long as the Chinese are aware of the risks involved and maintain a policy of rational calculation of these risks, such U.S. capabilities can represent a significant deterrent to Chinese high level aggression.

However, it is to be noted that the augmented theater forces assumed in this study were marginally effective in the case of U.S. retaliation from a damaged posture. As Chinese capabilities increase, there will be a requirement for additional augmentation of nuclear delivery systems that are relatively invulnerable to both political and military action, have long range, quick response time, and high effectiveness against a variety of targets and defenses. Otherwise, the balance of power in the Pacific could shift and reduce the risks to the Chinese of overt use of force.

IV. POLITICO-MILITARY APPRAISALS

We have examined Chinese options for the use of military force at the higher levels of violence and have concluded that these are likely to involve unacceptable risks for the Communist Chinese. However, we recognize that they have other choices for exploitation of their growing power, which represent lower risks and which could create opportunities for attainment of their long-term goals. These options involve political exploitation of their nuclear capabilities as well as the use of military force at the lower levels to improve their military position relative to the United States.

We consider such actions to be the most likely course for the Chinese as long as the United States maintains an effective deterrent against high level aggression. Further, we expect the Chinese to pursue these options aggressively.

The Chinese will attempt to disrupt the U.S. alliances, inhibit local self-defense efforts, and force Asian nations to impose restrictions on U.S. access and military policies in the area. The Chinese will be likely to carry out this campaign by a variety of techniques:

- o deprecating the U.S. military position to reduce allied confidence in the United States
- o stressing the dangers of nuclear war
- o using nuclear threats and blackmail, emphasizing the vulnerability of U.S. bases and allied countries to attack
- o fostering various ambiguous arms control and disarmament proposals, and
- o prompting and supporting local Communist and insurgent movements

If successful, such a Chinese campaign will confront the United States with the following problems in Asia:

1. A greater tendency for Asian nations to seek compromises that avoid testing Chinese intentions and capabilities
2. Increased internal instability and insurrection in certain Asian countries
3. Low level military probes against U.S. allies to test U.S. will and capability to respond
4. Restriction or denial of U.S. bases on allied territory, and
5. Political pressure on the United States to control or to limit its military responses in the area

Chinese claims and threats are most likely to be backed up by a major effort aimed at conveying an impression of great military strength. This could include displays and demonstrations of military equipment, maneuvers, air shows, missile and nuclear tests, and major reorganizations of the armed forces, such as creation of a special rocket command. Their indications of great power will make difficult an adequate estimate of their true capabilities. The propaganda and publicity may be in even greater volume than was characteristic of the Soviets during a comparable period, and could lead to a biased estimate of Chinese capabilities.

The allied countries of the area will be confronted with two major questions:

1. Will the U.S. alliance continue to be capable of providing protection against Chinese pressure?
2. Will this protection entail unbearable risks for the country and heighten the danger of conflict with China?

Doubts about the answers to these questions will increase pressure on the United States to avoid antagonizing China, to seek an accommodation over critical problems, to avoid provocative actions, to consider options such as arms control or disarmament, and to avoid any situation that increases the risk of conflict.

The U.S. response to these problems will involve convincing the allies that the balance of power in the Pacific has not changed as a result of a Chinese nuclear capability, that there is validity in maintaining military alliances with the United States, that the individual countries are part of the common defense against Chinese ambitions, and that the United States and her allies can maintain an effective posture for dealing with a nuclear-armed China at low risk to the individual countries.

To make these positions credible, the United States will be required to demonstrate a willingness and a recognizable capability to deter or to retaliate against Chinese high level aggression. In addition, the United States will be required to maintain appropriate capabilities for dealing with low level actions so as to strengthen the will and the participation of U.S. allies in common defense efforts. The combination of these capabilities, covering a spectrum of Chinese politico-military options, can serve to minimize the impact of a Chinese nuclear capability.

V. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist Chinese have consistently pursued their long-term objectives in the Pacific despite an inferior military position. A nuclear-armed China will pose an even broader spectrum of political and military problems for the United States and Asia.

2. A nuclear-armed China can expect only ambiguous or low level Soviet support for any offensive use of its military power except where U.S. capabilities are clearly inadequate, the Soviet Union is implicitly threatened, or the survival of the Communist regime in China is at stake.

3. Popular impressions to the contrary, China's use of military force, even when in possession of a nuclear capability, will continue to be based on opportunities that represent acceptable risks.

4. The United States theater force, with augmentation as the threat increases, can pose high risks to unilateral Chinese high level nuclear and non-nuclear aggression.

5. Exploitation of the Chinese nuclear capability through political means and in low level military operations will be the most likely course of action either by itself or as an accompaniment to higher level military operations.

6. The actions of a nuclear-armed China will result in pressures on the United States to demonstrate its willingness and capability to oppose these actions at any level.

7. One military implication of this situation is the requirement for continued improvement of non-nuclear delivery and support systems to permit political and military flexibility in U.S. actions.

8. A major contribution to U.S. strategy would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of U.S. nuclear forces explicitly targeted for China.

The principal characteristics of these forces would be:

- o a relative invulnerability to political and military threats
- o a capability for deployment and for launching without weakening or otherwise being confused with forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union
- o a capability for flexible employment under a wide range of conditions, and
- o an expandability as Chinese capabilities increase

This force would:

1. present an identifiable and credible deterrent to Chinese aggression,
2. minimize the risk of Soviet involvement by demonstrating a capability for selective use against China, and
3. strengthen allied confidence and will to resist.